Zhdanovich-Doty v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. 4:24-cv-04829-YGR (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Maria ZHDANOVICH-DOTY v. PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Zhdanovich-Doty v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1784554Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. California.Maria ZHDANOVICH-DOTY, Plaintiff,v.PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENTINSURANCE COMPANY., Defendant.Case No. 4:24-cv-04829-YGR|Signed 06/22/2026Editor's Note: This document contains discussion ofunverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by aparty or counsel. These citations are not attributable to theCourt. The unverified citations have been preserved as part ofthe official record, but links are unavailable.Attorneys and Law FirmsMatthew Cogan Buxbaum Bourhis, Ritsa Gountoumas,Bourhis Law Group, PC, Los Angeles, CA, Alexander TivaTaubes, Pro Hac Vice, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.Theona Zhordania, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & HamptonLLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Second AmendedComplaintRe: Dkt. No. 121Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers United States District Court Judge*1 Plaintiff Maria Zhdanovich-Doty, on behalf of her latehusband James Doty, brings this action against Provident Lifeand Accident Insurance Company (“Provident”) for breachof contract and insurance bad faith. This action challengesProvident's decision denying Doty residual disability benefitsfor the period of August 12, 2014 to December 1, 2019.This is the second time that the Court has considered plaintiff'ssignificant delay in bringing suit. The Court previouslygranted Provident's motion for judgment on the pleadingswith leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 118, “Prior JOP Order”.)Here, the Court considers Provident's motion to dismissthe second amended complaint (“SAC”). (Dkt. No. 121.)Having carefully considered the pleadings and the paperssubmitted, the Court Grants Provident's motion to dismisswith prejudice.1I. BACKGROUNDA. Factual BackgroundThe facts are well known to the parties and were set forthin the Court's prior Order granting Provident's motion forjudgment on the pleadings. The Court incorporates thatbackground here and includes only those facts that arerelevant to this motion. The SAC alleges as follows:1. Claim SubmissionOn November 3, 2020, now-decedent James Doty retainedcounsel to assist with submitting a disability insurance claim.(SAC 40.) Prior to retaining counsel, Doty worked as aneurosurgeon “in a diminished capacity” given his “residualdisability.” (Id.)On February 1, 2021, Doty submitted notice of an individualdisability claim with Provident. (Id. 10.) Despite notice,Provident did not send Doty a claim form for filing his proofof loss. (Id. 11.) Doty submitted a claim to Provident onSeptember 22, 2021, and again via fax on October 22, 2021.(Id. 12.) On December 20, 2022, Provident approved Doty'sdisability claim from December 1, 2019 to August 31, 2022but denied his claim from January 1, 2008 to December 1,2019. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 51.)Doty appealed that decision and requested that Providentreevaluate his disability claim “for the period of August 12,2014 to December 1, 2019 under the more lenient test forResidual Disability benefits.” (Id. 14.) Provident deniedDoty's appeal on February 20, 2024 (id. 16) and Doty filedthis action on August 7, 2024.2. Contractual RequirementsProvident's policy with Doty set forth a specific procedure tosubmit a disability claim. Doty was required to submit writtennotice “within 20 days after a covered loss starts or as soon
Zhdanovich-Doty v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2as reasonably possible.” (Id., Ex. 1 at 18.) Once the insurednotified Provident, the policy details:Claim Forms. When we receive your notice of claim, wewill send you claim forms for filing proof of loss. If theseforms are not given to you within 15 days, you will meet theproof of loss requirements by giving us a written statementof the nature and extent of your loss. You will give us thisproof within the time set forth in the Proof of Loss section.*2 (Id.) Consistent with California Insurance Code §10350.7, the policy set specific time-limits to file proof ofloss. The policy states:Proof of Loss. If the policy provides for periodic paymentfor a continuing loss, you must give us written proof of losswithin 90 days after the end of each period for which weare liable. For any other loss, written proof must be givenwithin 90 days after such loss.If it was not reasonably possible for you to give writtenproof in the time required, we will not reduce or denythe claim for this reason if the proof is filed as soon asreasonably possible. In any event, the proof required mustbe furnished no later than one year after the 90 days unlessyou are legally unable to do so.(Id.) Disability benefits were to be paid monthly. (Id. at 19.)The policy also includes the following contractual limitationsprovision, per California Insurance Code § 10350.11:Legal Actions. You may not start a legal action to recoveron this policy within 60 days after you give us requiredproof of loss. You may not start such action after three yearsfrom the time the proof of loss is required.(Id.)B. Procedural BackgroundProvident initially moved for judgment on the pleadings onthe basis that the policy's contractual limitations provisionbarred Doty's claim. Although the Court granted Provident'smotion, it permitted Doty leave to amend given a potential“very narrow path forward.” (Prior JOP Order.) The Courtruled that Doty's claim, as pled, was untimely and that plaintiffhad not alleged sufficient facts to establish equitable tollingor estoppel. It also cautioned plaintiff's counsel of their Rule11 obligation to not advance false allegations. Plaintiff hadalleged that Doty submitted proof of loss by November 3,2020 when other evidence in the record suggested that he didnot submit proof of loss until October 22, 2021. (Id.)Plaintiff elected to amend her complaint for a second time,which Provident now moves to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 121.)II. LEGAL STANDARDA motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legalsufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v.Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003). Thestandard is well known and not in dispute.III. DISCUSSIONBy way of overview, Provident moves to dismiss plaintiff'sclaims as untimely under the policy's contractual limitationsprovision. Provident raises many of the same argumentsthat persuaded the Court in ruling on Provident's motionfor judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff responds with twoarguments based on her revised allegations. Plaintiff arguesfirst that the policy's contractual limitations period does notapply, and second, even if the provision did apply, Doty timelysubmitted proof of loss. The Court addresses each.2A. Application of the Contractual Limitations Provision*3 A claim may be untimely because of the claim'sapplicable statute of limitations or because of a contractualprovision in the policy that limits when a legal claim maybe filed. Withrow v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shield, Inc., 655F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Wetzel v. Lou EhlersCadillac Grp. Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d643, 648 (9th Cir. 2000) (“California courts have treatedpolicy provisions that arise out of the application of Section10350.11 as contractual limitations periods which operatedistinct and apart from the statutory limitations period set bythe state legislature.”) This motion concerns the latter.Under the contractual limitations provision in the parties'policy, Doty was prevented from taking legal action againstProvident if Doty initiated that action more than three yearsafter the date on which he was required to submit proof ofloss. Plaintiff argues that the contractual limitations periodshould not apply for five reasons: (1) California InsuranceCode § 10350 does not apply to Doty's policy because it is nota “selected group disability insurance” policy and thereforethe contractual limitations provision should not have beenincluded in the policy; (2) the notice-prejudice rule preventsits enforcement absent a showing of actual prejudice; (3)Provident is equitably estopped from asserting the contractuallimitations period; (4) the policy's grace period excuses any
Zhdanovich-Doty v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3delay; and (5) the policy's language is ambiguous and raisesfactual issues. The Court analyzes each in turn.1.Section 10350.1 through 10350.12: Group v. IndividualPlaintiff first argues that Sections 10350.1 through 10350.12of the California Insurance Code do not apply to individualdisability policies, so any provision similar to those sectionsin Doty's policy was therefore incorrectly included in thepolicy. In particular, plaintiff maintains that those sectionsdo not govern Doty's individual disability policy because“Chapter Four” (entitled Standard Provisions in DisabilityPolicies § 10270 to § 10402) applies only to “selectedgroup disability insurance.” To support her argument, plaintiffpoints to Section 10270(b) of Insurance Code, which statesthat “[t]his chapter shall apply to selected group disabilityinsurance as defined in Section 10270.97, except insofar as itis exempted from Section 10401.”The Court disagrees because the plain language of the statuteproves otherwise. Although Section 10270(b) explains thatchapter four of the insurance code applies to “selected groupdisability insurance,” it does not state that the chapter appliesonly to group disability insurance. On the contrary, Section10270(a) lists the types of insurance policies that are excludedunder the chapter, and crucially, individual disability policiesare not among that list.3 Smith v. Stonebridge Life Ins.Co., 582 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Notably,‘individual disability insurance’ is not included as type ofinsurance excluded from coverage by the chapter. § 10270(a).Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio uniusest exclusio alterius, where exemptions are specified in astatute the court may not imply additional exemptions unlessthere is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.”) (cleanedup). Moreover, the relevant section's text defining compulsorystandard provisions explicitly states that “each disabilitypolicy delivered or issued for delivery to any person inthis State shall contain the provisions specified in Sections10350.1 to 10350.12.” Cal. Ins. Code § 10350. That languagecovers this individual disability policy.*4 Plaintiff challenges here whether a provision followingSection 10350.11 should have been included in the policy.Section 10350.11 states:A disability policy shall contain a provision which shall bein the form set forth herein.Legal Actions: No action at law or in equity shall bebrought to recover on this policy prior to the expirationof 60 days after written proof of loss has been furnishedin accordance with the requirements of this policy. Nosuch action shall be brought after the expiration of threeyears after the time written proof of loss is required to befurnished.As noted above, the Court finds that the statute appliesto all disability policies, not merely group policies asplaintiff argues. See also Smith, 582 F.Supp.2d at 1218.Unsurprisingly, plaintiff fails to cite a single case to supporther argument. Plaintiff's argument fails.2. Notice-Prejudice RulePlaintiff next claims that the notice-prejudice rule supplantsthe policy's express contractual limitations provision.Under California law, the notice-prejudice rule provides aninsured a defense where the insured has failed “to givetimely notice [by] requir[ing] the insurer to prove that itsuffered substantial prejudice.” Shell Oil Co. v. WinterthurSwiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal.App.4th 715, 760, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 815(1993) (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff boldly—and incorrectly—asserts that no court has ever addressed this issue. Not so.Plaintiff's position “conflates the Proof of Loss provisionswith the Legal Action provisions of the policies,” as Providentunderscores in its reply. See Bonin v. Provident Life &Accident Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1967260, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May1, 2015).“[W]hile the contractual limitations period begins to accrueon the date that proof of loss is required, it makes nodifference—for purposes of the limitations period accrualdate—whether or when proof of loss was actually given.” Id.Unlike with a notice provision, “[California] courts requireno showing of prejudice to enforce a statute of limitations,in insurance cases or otherwise.” Id. (quoting State FarmFire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal.App.3d 604, 612,258 Cal.Rptr. 413, (1989)); see also Niagara Bottling, LLCv. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2019 WL 6729756, at *4 (C.D. Cal.Oct. 5, 2019) (“California's courts, including the CaliforniaSupreme Court, have never extended the notice-prejudicerule to the contractual suit limitation provisions found ininsurance policies.”); Keller v. Fed. Ins. Co., 765 F.App'x 271,273 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he notification and suit-limitationprovisions are ‘separate and distinct policy condition[s],’ so
Zhdanovich-Doty v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4the notification provision is ‘irrelevant to the question ofwhether the limitation period had run.”)Plaintiff misses that distinction. Each of plaintiff's cited casesapply the notice-prejudice rule to whether a plaintiff timelyprovided proof of loss under the notice provision, not asto the legal action (or contractual limitations) provision.As many other courts have held, a plaintiff cannot use thenotice-prejudice rule to circumvent the effect of a contractuallimitations period. Bonin, 2015 WL 1967260, at *5; StateFarm Fire & Cas. Co., 210 Cal.App.3d at 612, 258 Cal.Rptr.413; Enger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 10829363, at *5(N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016). This argument also fails.3. Equitable Estoppel*5 Plaintiff argues that Provident should be equitablyestopped from asserting the contractual limitations periodbecause Provident (i) caused plaintiff's delay through its ownconduct and (ii) failed to notify Doty of the contractuallimitations period. Neither argument persuades.First, Provident's conduct is not relevant to this analysis. AsUpadhyay instructs, and plaintiff ignores, “the only reasonwhy the contractual limitations period ran prior to [Doty]filing [his] claim for benefits is that [Doty] did not file [his]claim for benefits until ... years after the deadline passed.”Upadhyay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2014 WL 186709 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 16, 2014), aff'd, 645 F.App'x 569 (9th Cir. 2016). HadDoty not waited nearly twenty years to submit proof of loss,plaintiff would not be confronted with this issue. Plaintiffcannot avoid that conclusion by pointing to Provident'salleged conduct in reviewing Doty's claim.4 She also cannotargue that Provident erred in not providing a claims formto Doty within 15 days because the policy required Doty tononetheless “meet the proof of loss requirements by giving[Provident] a written statement of the nature and extent of[Doty's] loss.” (SAC, Ex. 1 at 18.)Moreover, equitable estoppel cannot revive a stale claim.Bonin v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2015 WL1967260, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2015). Under theUpadhyay framework, which this Court discussed in itsprior Order and further explains below, Doty was requiredto file suit no later than November 10, 2018. (Prior JOPOrder at 5–6.) By the time Doty submitted proof of loss inSeptember or October 2021, the contractual limitations periodhad long since run. Notably, Doty was represented by counselthroughout the claims process,5 and “[i]n general, the lawparticularly disfavors estoppe[l] where the party attemptingto raise the estoppel is represented by an attorney at law.”Steinhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1316, 104Cal.Rptr.3d 195, 223 P.3d 57 (2010).Second, Provident was not required to notify Doty of thecontractual limitations period prior to Doty submitting noticeof his claim. Arguing otherwise is illogical as it unreasonablyplaces a burden on insurers to warn about limitations periodsfor unidentified claims. Doty, on the other hand, executed thepolicy and was on notice of the terms included in the policy.*6 Plaintiff relies on two Department of Insuranceregulations (10 CCR § 2695.4(a) and 10 CCR § 2695.7(f)) tosupport her argument. Neither applies because the regulationsaddresses scenarios where a claim has already been presentedto an insurer (§ 2695.4(a)) or where the insured is notrepresented by counsel (§ 2695.7(f)). See Superior Dispatch,Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of New York, 181 Cal.App.4th 175, 188–90,104 Cal.Rptr.3d 508 (2010). Moreover, once Doty notifiedProvident of his claim, Provident cautioned Doty in writtendenial communications that “[t]he policy under which you areinsured has a provision which states, in part, that no lawsuitor legal action shall be brought to recover on the policy after 3years from the date proof of loss is required.” (Dkt. No. 51-1.)Finally, plaintiff fails to allege facts that meet the elementsof equitable estoppel. A plaintiff must allege “(a) arepresentation or concealment of material facts; (b) madewith knowledge, actual or virtual, of the facts; (c) to a partyignorant, actually and permissibly, of the truth; (d) with theintention, actual or virtual, that the ignorant party act on it;and (e) that party was induced to act on it.” Simmons v.Ghaderi, 44 Cal.4th 570, 584, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 83, 187 P.3d934 (2008). Plaintiff does not allege facts that suggest thatProvident was aware of Doty's claim prior to notice. Equitableestoppel cannot save plaintiff's claims.4. Grace PeriodPlaintiff next argues that under Doty's policy any delay insubmitting proof of loss should be excused because “it wasnot reasonably possible for [Doty] to give written proof inthe time required.” (SAC 44.) Plaintiff alleges that Doty'scondition “substantially impaired his ability to attend toadministrative matters unrelated to his immediate medical
Zhdanovich-Doty v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5care and his extremely demanding professional duties.” (Id. 97.)Again, that argument fails. The Court is not required to makeunreasonable, and implausible, inferences. None of plaintiff'sallegations suggest that it was not reasonably possible forDoty to submit proof of loss, particularly where plaintiffsimultaneously alleges that Doty continued working as aneurosurgeon. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 37, 94.) That Doty may have beentoo busy is not a legal defense. As a neurosurgeon, heunquestionably had the capacity to submit proof of loss.Whether the grace period applies, however, is beside thepoint. It nonetheless requires that Doty furnish proof “nolater than one year after the 90 day [period].” As the Courtpreviously ruled, the period cannot save Doty's delayed claim(Prior JOP Order at 6–7) and cannot overcome the separatecontractual limitations period that required Doty to file anylegal action within “three years from the time proof of loss isrequired.” (SAC, Ex. 1 at 18.)5. Vague and Ambiguous ProvisionsFinally, plaintiff argues that the contractual limitationsprovision is vague and ambiguous and should be construedagainst Provident. That argument is baseless. Both provisionsare mandated by the California Insurance Code. See Cal. Ins.Code §§ 10350.7, 10350.11. Where a “clause in an insurancepolicy is authorized by statute, it is deemed consistent withpublic policy as established by the Legislature. In addition,the statute must be construed to implement the intent of theLegislature and should not be construed strictly against theinsurer.” Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. 3d674, 684, 274 Cal.Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230 (1990); see alsoNN Invs. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 208 Cal.App.3d 1070,1073–74, 256 Cal.Rptr. 598 (1989).In sum, the Court finds that the contractual limitations periodapplies.B. TimelinessBecause the Court finds that the contractual limitations periodapplies, it must next determine whether Doty's claim wastimely.*7 In its prior Order, the Court ruled that Doty's claims,as pled, were untimely under both plaintiff and Provident'sproposed frameworks. (Prior JOP Order at 5–7.) UnderProvident's proposed Upadhyay framework—which centersthe timeliness inquiry on the onset date of the insured'sdisability—plaintiff's claim was untimely because Doty failedto take legal action prior to November 10, 2018. (Id. at 5–6.) By contrast, under plaintiff's proposed Gray framework—which centers the timeliness inquiry on the last date of theinsured's disability—plaintiff's claim was untimely becauseDoty failed to take legal action prior to February 28, 2024.(Id.)6 The Court did not select between the approachesbecause neither could salvage Doty's claim.Plaintiff's amended complaint does not cure the defect. Itprimarily does three things: it (1) attempts to allege equitableestoppel (SAC ¶¶ 87–93); (2) confirms that Doty submittedproof of loss in September or October 2021, not November2020 (id. ¶¶ 11, 12); and (3) clarifies that Doty submitted oneclaim for disability benefits that did not distinguish betweenresidual and total disability (id. 86). None save plaintiff'sclaim for residual disability benefits from August 12, 2014through December 1, 2019.As to the first, plaintiff has not established grounds forequitable estoppel. (See supra § III.A.3.) As to the second,plaintiff confirms that Doty did not timely submit proof ofloss. As to the third, it is a distinction without a difference.Plaintiff nonetheless seeks to recover benefits for Doty'sresidual disability from the August 12, 2014 to December1, 2019 time period. Although plaintiff now argues thatProvident, not Doty, split Doty's claim into total and residualdisability claims, plaintiff nonetheless seeks to recoup fundsfor that period.Inasmuch as plaintiff argues that the Court must applythe Gray framework and consider the “entire continuousperiod of disability” in examining the period for whichProvident is liable, the Court now squarely rejects thatargument. As the Court indicated in its prior Order, it is“persuaded by the framework affirmed in Upadhyay” whichanalyzes the disability period from the onset date—not thelast date of disability. (Prior JOP Order at 5–8.) It cautionedplaintiff that “the Gray framework would effectively renderthe contractual limitations provisions mandated by Section10350.11 meaningless in cases of continual disability.” (Id. at7.)The Court remains persuaded by Upadhyay. That approachwas affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, albeit in a nonprecedentialopinion. Upadhyay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 645 F.App'x569 (9th Cir. 2016). It is also consistent with the text of
Zhdanovich-Doty v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6the policy's proof of loss provision, which follows Section10350.7 of the California Insurance Code. The provisiondistinguishes between two types of loss: “periodic paymentsfor a continuing loss” and “any other loss.” (SAC, Ex. 1 at18.) The Gray approach would erase that distinction. Instead,a plaintiff could elect how to categorize their disability—even if the disability, like here, continued for decades whilemedical records grew stale. Because the deadline to file legalaction hinges on the date that proof of loss is required,defendants would be exposed to perpetual liability forcontinuing disabilities and to difficulties collecting evidenceand fairly adjudicating claims.The Gray court disregarded those concerns, explaining that“there appear to be few, if any, cases in which a claimant hasdelayed so long in filing an administrative claim as to makethe limitations period absurd.” Gray v. United of Omaha LifeIns. Co., 251 F.Supp.3d 1317, 1327 (C.D. Cal. 2017). Thiscase, however, is one.*8 The policy's contractual limitations provision barsplaintiff's claims.IV. CONCLUSIONThe Court Grants Provident's motion to dismiss. Given theCourt's prior analysis, the prior leave to amend, and theinability to change the key facts, the Court denies leave toamend as futile.The parties shall meet and confer regarding next steps in thislitigation—including as to Provident's pending counterclaimsagainst plaintiff—and submit a case management statementwithin ten (10) days of this Order.This terminates Dkt. No. 121.It Is So Ordered.All Citations--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2026 WL 1784554Footnotes1The Court finds the motion appropriate for resolution without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. Fed.R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L. R. 7-1(b).2Plaintiff argues that Provident overwhelmingly cites cases which analyze ERISA, not breach of contract and insurancebad faith, claims. Although some cases involve ERISA, others involve breach of contract and insurance bad faith. Plaintiffherself cites to cases in the ERISA-context to support her timeliness argument. (Dkt. No. 123 at 10–11.) Moreover,plaintiff's argument confuses the accrual of a cause of action (like ERISA or breach of contract) with the contractuallimitations period. Both apply.3Cal. Ins. Code § 10270(a) provides: “This chapter shall not apply to workers' compensation insurance, any policy ofliability insurance with or without supplementary coverage, or any policy or contract of reinsurance.”4Plaintiff cites the case Moss v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, 2009 WL 4043065 (S.D. Cal. 2009),which does not exist. The Court believes that plaintiff intended to cite Moss v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2009WL 10671659 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009). That case does not stand for the proposition for which plaintiff cites it, nor doesit include the quoted language. Rather, the case holds the opposite—that a plaintiff could not assert equitable estoppelto defeat a contractual limitations argument.The Court is concerned that plaintiff's counsel relied on an artificial intelligence tool that generated a nonexistent casecitation. Counsel is on notice that any future submission of nonexistent authority may result in appropriate sanctions.5Although plaintiff argues that Doty was not represented prior to November 2020, counsel must still appropriately litigateDoty's claim such that it comports with the policy's requirements. Holding otherwise would nullify the contractual limitationsperiod where an insured is not represented. Counsel may not use Doty's ignorance of a prior potential claim for residualbenefits to expand the period for which plaintiff may recover.
Zhdanovich-Doty v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.76Each date provided Doty a one-year grace period despite that Doty failed to plead that he could not reasonably submitproof of loss within the time set forth in the policy (within 90 days after the period for which Provident is liable).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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