perceived why proof of identity should differ in that respect from proof of venue.
Under the whole evidence in this' case the identity of the appellant was sufficiently established, if it was not sufficiently established with respect to some •counts by the state’s case alone. Conse■quently, if any error was committed in ■denying the appellant’s “shotgun” motion for directed verdict at the close of the .state’s case, with respect to some counts, it was “harmless error that did not injuriously affect the substantial rights of the appellant.”
The appellant also complains that he was found guilty under separate counts of the indictment that charged him with engaging in the same conspiracy. Counts II and III of the indictment charged the appellant with engaging in essentially the same conspiracy; counts V and VI charged him with engaging in another conspiracy, that was essentially the same conspiracy in each of those two counts; and counts VIII and IX charged him with engaging in still another conspiracy, that was essentially the same conspiracy in each of those two counts.
The jury found the appellant guilty upon every count of the indictment, “thereby determining that defendant committed the offense in every manner charged,” and the court did not err in entering judgment of guilt accordingly.3
Because no appeal was taken from the sentence, it is perhaps not necessary to mention the point, but in the interest of preserving intact an important principle we note that the trial court sentenced the appellant to “a term of three (3) years on Count No. 1, three (3) years on Counts 4 and 7 to run concurrently with Count No. 1. One (1) year on Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 to run concurrently with Counts 1, 4, and 7.”
That sentence was erroneous, insofar as punishment was imposed with respect to each count of the three sets of paired counts referred to, for in the three pairs of counts each pair charged “different aspects of the same criminal transaction”, “variations of only one offense”, “two facets of one transaction”, so that sentence should have been imposed with respect to only one count of each pair.4
If an appeal had been taken from the sentence as well as the judgment, the practical effect of vacating the sentence imposed with respect to one count of each pair would be nil, for it would result only in imposing a one-year sentence on three counts instead of six counts, to irun concurrently with other and longer sentences. The appellant would still be sentenced to serve a maximum of three years. Undoubtedly, that practical consideration motivated the appellant not to appeal from the sentence as such.
Even though this court is not called upon to reverse and remand the case for the vacation of the sentence with respect to count II or III, count V or VI, and count VIII or IX, the principle involved is deemed important enough to be preserved by this mention, for without continued recognition of this proposition, in a similar case a court might impose a sentence on each count and direct the sentences to be served consecutively rather than concurrently, thus inflicting greater punishment than is authorized by the statutes involved.
The many other points raised by the appellant, relating mainly to the refusal of the trial court to allow certain proffered testimony into evidence, are found to be without merit. Particularly without merit is the appellant’s contention that he did not
3
Bueno v. State, 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862, 864 (S.C.Fla., 1898).
4
Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436, 439 (S.C.Fla., 1942); Williams v. State, 69 So.2d 766, 767 (S.C.Fla., 1953); Norwood v. State, 86 So.2d 427 (S.C.Fla., 1956);
State v. Schaag, 115 So.2d 783, 786 (D.C.A.1, Fla., 1959).