jury returned a verdict, finding petitioner guilty of both counts as charged, and subsequently, petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on the first count, and five years imprisonment on the second count, the sentences to run concurrently.
In its opinion, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held as follows:
“Appellant contends, inter alia, that the court erred in imposing concurrent sentences for the two offenses since each count involved but a facet or phase of the same transaction. In support of his contention, appellant cites Yost v. State, 243 So.2d 469 (Fla.App.1971), in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced on two separate counts of possession and sale of marijuana. The court in Yost held that where an information contains more than one count but each is a facet of the same transaction, only one sentence may be imposed. The principle enunciated in Yost was adopted by this court in Walker v. State, 261 So.2d 514 (Fla.App.1972). Subsequent to Yost and Walker, the Supreme Court recently decided Cone and Sanders v. State, 285 So.2d 12 (Opinion filed March 7, 1973). In Cone and Sanders, the court held that armed robbery and displaying or using a firearm during the commission of a felony were a facet of the same transaction and, therefore, sentence could only be imposed on the higher offense. Cone and Sanders and Yost are distinguishable from the case at bar.”3
The First District then proceeded to “distinguish” these two prior cases from the instant case. It would appear, however, that distinctions made by the court are highly questionable, at best. The First District noted:
“As to Yost, it is a logical consequence of being guilty of sale to be also guilty of possession, for one cannot sell something without first possessing it. They are facets of the same transaction. Likewise in Cone and Sanders, one cannot be found guilty ,of using a firearm during the commission of a felony unless one is in fact committing a felony. The two crimes are an indivisible transaction punishable under two statutes. However, in the case at bar, possession of burglary tools and breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, although related crimes, are not facets of the same transaction. One may be guilty of possessing burglary tools and not be guilty of breaking and entering.”4
What the court has done in this case, however, is to look at the Yost case and the Cone and Sanders case in one perspective, and to look at the instant case in an entirely different perspective.
Reversing the perspective of the three cases, and looking first at Yost, it certainly can be said that one can be convicted of possession of marijuana without being convicted of the sale of marijuana. Applying the same reverse perspective to Cone and Sanders, it certainly can be said that one can be convicted of displaying or using a firearm during the commission of a felony without being convicted of armed robbery. Finally, reversing our perspective, and looking at the instant case [and noting the facts of the instant case, i. e., that the "burglary tool" which petitioner was convicted of possessing was, in fact, a simple screwdriver], it can hardly be said that the petitioner could have been convicted of possession of burglary tools, in this case only a screwdriver, had he not been participating in a breaking and entering. Dissenting Judge Johnson in the instant case made just such an observation:
“In this case, in moments after the appellant, defendant below, was seen entering or allegedly entering the rooms, and while waiting for the police to arrive, the screw