tioner all denied any criminal arrangement between the agency and the petitioner.
In the McGough opinion, supra, at 149 the District Court stated:
“The defendant insists, however, that although this evidence may have established that Timmons and McGough were involved in a kind of payola, it did not, as circumstantial evidence such as this must, exclude a reasonable hypothesis that he was not guilty of larceny from the Co-op, the crime with which he was charged; that is, that he did not know that it was the Co-op’s money which was being used to supply him with inordinately inexpensive, or free, personal vehicles. If this were all the evidence, despite its overwhelming suspiciousness, McGough might he right.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)
The State, however, relies on the testimony of the former owner (1959-1966) to predicate and preserve the finding of guilt.
Naturally, we must now first direct our attention to the case as a whole.
The transcript of testimony, however, unravels the backlash created in this case. Mr. Pershing, the bookkeeper for the agency from January, 1967 to February 1, 1971, (called as the State’s witness), in accordance with standard practices of Ford Motor Company, set up a reserve or general account, primarily designed for “fleet” accounts, i. e., big customers, which included company executives.
Into this master reserve account various sums were credited. These were assigned from the “agency’s profit from sales”, if any. In the automobile retail sales business this was considered to be a reduction of profit to the agency.
Subsidiary accounts from the master reserve were then established which contained numerous names, including among others those of the petitioner as well as the Co-op. Sums allocated to the master reserve were in turn then allocated to the various subsidiaries.
Mr. Pershing did not receive instructions to establish this procedure, but, due to his many years of bookkeeping in automobile retail sales, proceeded in customary manner and practice to so arrange it. In this type of business, this method was employed for the convenience of good customers and came from the profits of the agency, with each allocation being determined by Mr. Pershing. It also had the effect of simplifying records and assisted in the preparation of the agency’s profit and/or loss statements since ultimately the reserve fund would be credited as a discount on any future purchase by the designee.
Mr. Pershing never discussed this procedure with the petitioner because it was not an unusual practice. In fact, considerable bargaining accompanied the purchase price of new cars when consideration was given to the listed sales price and trade-in value of older cars. A new car was always sold less than its listed retail price.
The accounts in question clearly revealed the discounts allocated to petitioner to be deductions from “profits” of the agency and not coming from any overcharge to the Co-op. In fact, the agency’s “average” profit, per unit sale, ranged from approximately $800 to $274.
Petitioner, as vice-president and general manager of the Co-op over numerous years, had absolute authority to purchase vehicles from whomsoever he desired. He performed his duties well and advised the Co-op’s board of all matters. Apparently, no problems occurred until 1971.
Of the seven larceny counts surrounding petitioner’s allocated discounts during 1970-1971, these totalled approximately $3,378.35 and were credited as discounts, less trade-in allowances, on the purchase price of two automobiles, leaving a balance of approximately $1,200.00. This sum was still owed by petitioner at time of trial.