quest, to the flashlight inspection of the truck on the highway and at the station since he willingly opened the truck and there was no refusal or resistance to this limited search. See Eden v. State, 370 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Sharpe v. State, 366 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Bagocus v. State, 359 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State v. Drake, 343 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). When appellant asked the foregoing question, however, he indicated lack of consent to any further search in that he questioned the officer’s authority to search further without a warrant. The officer’s response was evasive. He sought to interpret “personal belongings” to mean only the suitcases thereby indicating that he needed no warrant to search the balance of the cargo. Villari’s statement of “Un-huh” or “Okay” was- merely acquiescence or resignation to Pease’s statement. This does not meet the state’s burden to produce clear and convincing evidence showing voluntary consent by Villari. See Powell, supra, and Rose v. State, 369 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). To accept the state’s version would require that we interpret appellant’s remarks to mean that he did not consent to the search of his suitcases, which in no way incriminated him, but voluntarily consented to the search of the cargo consisting of the marijuana which did incriminate him. We find this reasoning untenable and consider the following statement from Talavera v. State, 186 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), to be appropriate here:
“We feel in consideration of the record in the case sub judice, to hold that a consent to search was freely and voluntarily given would not be ‘in accord with human experience.’ ”
In Rose, supra, this Court said:
“While it is true that appellant was cooperative in opening the camper top to his truck, it is equally true that he had indicated his lack of consent to a further search of the closed boxes.”
We have the same situation here. By his question, Villari indicated that he did not voluntarily consent to the search of his truck beyond the flashlight search which had already been made. At this point, in the absence of consent, further search necessitated the issuance of a search warrant pursuant to § 570.15(l)(b), Fla.Stat.(1977).
REVERSED.
LARRY G. SMITH, J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., dissents.