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Broyles v. McNeal
(2026)
Case details
Full caption
BROYLES v. MCNEAL. A26A0384 May 8
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Georgia (GA)
Court
Georgia Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Broyles
v.
McNeal,
---
S.E.2d
----
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
1
2026
WL
1263356
Only
the
Westlaw
citation
is
currently
available.
Court
of
Appeals
of
Georgia.
BROYLES
v.
MCNEAL.
A26A0384
|
May
8,
2026
Attorneys
and
Law
Firms
Joshua
Broyles,
for
Appellant.
Suzanne
Temple
Prescott
,
Damon
Sharad
Bivek
,
Marietta,
for
Appellee.
DOYLE
,
P.
J.,
DAVIS
,
J.,
and
SENIOR
JUDGE
FULLER
Opinion
Doyle
,
Presiding
Judge.
*1
Joshua
Broyles,
appearing
pro
se,
appeals
from
the
trial
court's
order
addressing
his
petition
of
legitimation
as
to
his
paternity
of
G.
N.
B.
(“the
child”)
and
granting
sole
physical
and
legal
custody
to
the
mother,
Fayth
McNeal;
granting
Broyles
limited
daytime-hour
visitation;
and
ordering
Broyles
to
direct
the
Social
Security
Administration
(“SSA”)
to
transfer
payment
of
the
child's
Social
Security
Disability
Insurance
(“SSDI”)
dependent
benefit
to
McNeal
rather
than
to
him.
Broyles
argues
that
the
trial
court
erred
by
limiting
his
visitation
with
the
child
and
challenges
the
order
of
support
and
the
child's
SSDI
dependent
benefit.
1
For
the
reasons
that
follow,
we
vacate
the
order
and
remand
for
further
proceedings
consistent
with
this
opinion.
When
reviewing
an
order
in
a
child
custody
case,
we
view
the
evidence
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
trial
court's
decision.
We
will
not
set
aside
the
trial
court's
factual
findings
if
there
is
any
evidence
to
support
them,
and
we
defer
to
the
trial
court's
credibility
determinations.
We
review
de
novo,
however,
the
legal
conclusions
the
trial
court
draws
from
the
facts.
Mashburn
v.
Mashburn
,
353
Ga.
App.
31,
32,
836
S.E.2d
131
(2019)
(citations
omitted).
So
viewed,
the
record
shows
that
Broyles
filed
a
petition
for
legitimation
in
July
2024,
requesting
that
the
court
legitimate
him
as
the
biological
father
of
the
child,
who
was
about
14
months
old
at
the
time.
Broyles
also
requested
that
he
be
granted
liberal
visitation
or
primary
physical
custody
and
shared
legal
custody,
and
he
indicated
that
no
child
support
order
was
in
place
at
the
time.
In
a
counseled
response,
McNeal
admitted
that
Broyles
was
the
father,
but
requested
sole
legal
and
physical
custody.
The
appellate
record
contains
pictures
of
Broyles
and
the
child
during
the
various
times
he
had
cared
for
her;
letters
from
his
treating
physician
and
therapist,
which
stated
that
although
he
was
diagnosed
with
schizophrenia
,
Broyles
was
financially
responsible
and
not
a
danger
to
himself
or
others;
and
copies
of
text
messages
between
the
parties
related
to
Broyles's
visitation
with
the
child,
which
visitation
the
parties
had
been
facilitating
themselves.
Some
of
the
messages
indicated
that
Broyles
was
providing
in-kind
support,
including
baby
food,
diapers,
and
other
supplies,
which
he
gave
to
McNeal.
Additionally,
there
are
copies
of
a
letter
showing
that
Broyles's
delivery-driver
account
had
been
cancelled
as
well
as
evidence
of
the
amounts
of
his
car
insurance
and
rent.
*2
McNeal
provided
a
domestic
relations
financial
affidavit,
the
first
page
of
a
letter
from
the
SSA
verifying
that
the
child
received
a
monthly
social
security
dependent
benefit
of
$957
per
month,
a
child
support
worksheet
which
imputed
income
to
Broyles
in
addition
to
his
own
SSDI
benefit,
and
McNeal's
attorney's
invoice
totalling
$3,267.35.
After
a
hearing
which
was
not
transcribed,
the
court
issued
a
final
order
in
which
it
found
that
the
parties
had
agreed
that
Broyles
was
the
biological
father,
so
it
granted
his
request
for
legitimation.
The
court
declined
to
grant
Broyles's
request
for
shared
custody,
instead
granting
sole
legal
and
physical
custody
to
McNeal,
and
ordered
visitation
with
Broyles
for
eight
hours
every
Saturday
or
four
hours
each
on
Saturdays
and
Sundays.
The
child
support
worksheet
entered
by
the
court
did
not
impute
income
to
Broyles,
instead
showing
that
Broyles
had
SSDI
income
of
$1,915
while
McNeal
Broyles
v.
McNeal,
---
S.E.2d
----
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
2
had
income
of
$3,833.33,
which
resulted
in
a
presumptive
amount
of
child
support
for
Broyles
of
$365.16
per
month.
The
worksheet
stated
that
deviations
from
the
presumptive
amount
of
support
were
not
applicable.
The
worksheet
also
noted
that
the
child
received
an
SSDI
dependent
benefit
based
on
Broyles's
disability
of
$957
per
month.
Based
on
this
worksheet,
the
court
ordered
Broyles
to
“direct”
the
SSA
to
transfer
payment
of
the
total
dependent
benefit
to
McNeal
because
she
was
the
custodial
parent
of
the
child
and
found
that
such
transfer
of
the
benefit
would
fully
satisfy
his
child
support
obligation.
The
court
also
ordered
Broyles
to
pay
$1,000
in
attorney
fees
to
McNeal.
This
appeal
followed.
1.
As
an
initial
matter,
Broyles
has
failed
to
provide
a
transcript
of
the
hearing.
If
an
appeal
is
taken
which
draws
in
question
the
transcript
of
the
evidence
and
proceedings,
it
shall
be
the
duty
of
the
appellant
to
have
the
transcript
prepared
at
the
appellant's
expense.
...
[Boyles],
as
the
appellant
here,
bears
the
burden
of
showing
error
below.
In
accordance
with
the
presumption
of
the
regularity
of
court
proceedings,
[this
Court]
must
assume
in
the
absence
of
a
transcript
that
there
was
sufficient
competent
evidence
to
support
the
trial
court's
findings.
Reed
v.
Reed
,
295
Ga.
574,
577–78(2),
761
S.E.2d
326
(2014)
(citation
modified).
Moreover,
although
Broyles
is
pro
se,
it
is
still
incumbent
on
him
to
provide
citations
to
the
record
and
to
applicable
case
law
to
support
his
appellate
arguments.
Lewis
v.
State
,
330
Ga.
App.
650,
652,
768
S.E.2d
821
(2015)
(“A
party
is
not
held
to
a
different
or
more
lenient
standard
merely
because
he
elected
to
proceed
pro
se.
One
who
knowingly
elects
to
represent
himself
assumes
full
responsibility
for
complying
with
the
substantive
and
procedural
requirements
of
the
law.”)
(citations
and
punctuation
omitted).
McNeal's
brief
argues
that
Broyles
used
a
chatbot
to
prepare
his
brief.
While
there
are
incorrect
citations
in
the
brief,
at
least
one
is
a
correct
citation.
We
caution
parties
that
the
products
marketed
to
them
as
“artificial
intelligence,”
like
calculators,
can
be
useful
tools,
but
any
language-like
strings
of
words
or
citation-like
strings
of
numbers
and
letters
provided
therefrom
must
be
verified
against
actual
authority
and
should
not
be
assumed
to
exist
or
be
correct
propositions
of
law
or
fact.
That
said,
McNeal's
response
brief,
which
was
drafted
by
a
licensed
attorney,
contains
no
supporting
citation
to
case
law,
not
even
to
the
standard
of
review,
and
contains
only
statutory
authority
in
response
to
the
issues
raised
by
Broyles.
The
only
case
law
that
McNeal
references
are
those
cited
in
Broyles's
brief.
The
lack
of
a
transcript
only
creates
a
presumption
of
regularity,
not
a
requirement
that
we
affirm
if
the
legal
basis
is
questionable.
The
prudent
attorney
will
provide
supporting
authority
for
one's
position
in
a
response
brief.
*3
2.
Broyles
argues
that
the
trial
court
erred
by
granting
McNeal
custody
and
restricting
his
visitation
to
a
limited
number
of
hours
on
weekends
because
the
restriction
is
not
in
the
child's
best
interests
and
does
not
support
the
existing
relationship
between
him
and
the
child,
for
whom
he
was
an
active
involved
parent.
Broyles
also
maintains
that
the
trial
court
erred
by
failing
to
consider
McNeal's
poor
judgment,
unsafe
childcare
decisions,
and
prior
misconduct
when
it
determined
custody.
Normally,
the
lack
of
a
transcript
of
the
hearing
would
result
in
the
presumption
that
the
trial
court's
decision
is
supported
by
the
evidence
presented
during
the
hearing.
See
Reed
,
295
Ga.
at
577–78(2),
761
S.E.2d
326
.
Moreover,
we
recognize
matters
of
custody
and
visitation
are
left
to
the
sound
discretion
of
the
trial
court.
See
Mashburn
,
353
Ga.
App.
at
32,
836
S.E.2d
131
.
Nevertheless,
the
deficient
nature
of
the
order
requires
us
to
vacate
and
remand
for
further
proceedings.
See
Pryce
v.
Pryce
,
359
Ga.
App.
590,
591–
93(1),
859
S.E.2d
554
(2021)
(vacating
order
and
remanding
for
further
proceedings
because
trial
court
failed
to
include
certain
required
findings
in
parenting
plan).
Cf.
Selvage
v.
Franklin
,
350
Ga.
App.
353,
355(1),
829
S.E.2d
402
(2019)
(vacating
order
and
remanding
for
recitation
of
factual
findings
because
trial
court
granted
parent
no
visitation).
First,
the
order
lacks
inclusion
of
any
required
elements
under
OCGA
§
19-9-1(b)(1)
,
including:
(A)
A
recognition
that
a
close
and
continuing
parent-child
relationship
and
continuity
in
the
child's
life
will
be
in
the
child's
best
interest;
(B)
A
recognition
that
the
child's
needs
will
Broyles
v.
McNeal,
---
S.E.2d
----
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
3
change
and
grow
as
the
child
matures
and
demonstrate
that
the
parents
will
make
an
effort
to
parent
that
takes
this
issue
into
account
so
that
future
modifications
to
the
parenting
plan
are
minimized;
(C)
A
recognition
that
a
parent
with
physical
custody
will
make
day-to-day
decisions
and
emergency
decisions
while
the
child
is
residing
with
such
parent;
and
(D)
That
both
parents
will
have
access
to
all
of
the
child's
records
and
information,
including,
but
not
limited
to,
education,
health,
health
insurance,
extracurricular
activities,
and
religious
communications.
Second,
although
the
order
states
the
normal
custody
and
visitation
for
the
parents
throughout
the
year,
it
includes
no
provision
as
to
“[h]ow
holidays,
birthdays,
vacations,
school
breaks,
and
other
special
occasions
will
be
spent
with
each
parent
including
the
time
of
day
that
each
event
will
begin
and
end,”
or
“[w]hat,
if
any,
limitations
will
exist
while
one
parent
has
physical
custody
of
the
child
in
terms
of
the
other
parent
contacting
the
child
and
the
other
parent's
right
to
access
education,
health,
extracurricular
activity,
and
religious
information
regarding
the
child.”
OCGA
§
19-9-1(b)
(2)(B)
,
(b)(2)(F)
.
The
order
also
fails
to
include
the
appropriate
findings
under
OCGA
§
19-9-3
,
and
it
lacks
any
statutory
basis
for
the
limitations
on
Broyles's
visitation
or
why
McNeal
received
sole
physical
and
legal
custody
despite
the
fact
that
Broyles
had
been
co-parenting
the
child
with
McNeal.
Compare
Selvage
,
350
Ga.
App.
at
355–56(1),
829
S.E.2d
402
(citing
OCGA
§
19-9-3
and
explaining
that
if
requested
“
‘the
permanent
court
order
awarding
child
custody
shall
set
forth
specific
findings
of
fact
as
to
the
basis
for
the
judge's
decision
in
making
an
award
of
custody’
”).
We
recognize
that
as
a
pro
se
party,
Broyles
may
not
have
explicitly
requested
such
findings,
but
it
is
clear
that
he
attempted
to
present
evidence
in
support
of
his
custody
claim.
Thus,
in
light
of
the
obvious
legal
deficiencies
of
the
order
and
Broyles's
pro
se
status,
we
vacate
the
custody
and
visitation
portion
of
the
order
for
reconsideration
and
inclusion
of
any
and
all
findings
applicable
to
the
issues
noted
as
well
as
any
other
requirements
from
OCGA
§
19-9-1
et
seq.
that
this
Court
may
have
inadvertently
omitted
above.
*4
3.
In
several
enumerations,
Broyles
challenges
the
trial
court's
child
support
award
and
the
portion
of
the
order
directing
him
to
“direct”
the
SSA
to
transfer
payment
of
the
child's
SSDI
dependent
benefit
to
McNeal.
For
the
following
reasons
we
vacate
this
portion
of
the
order
and
remand
for
further
proceedings.
“The
Social
Security
Act
provides
that
a
dependent
child
of
a
person
who
is
entitled
to
Social
Security
benefits
is
also
entitled
to
a
monthly
insurance
benefit.”
Scarborough
v.
Scarborough
,
282
Ga.
427,
428
n.1,
651
S.E.2d
42
(2007)
.
See
20
CFR
§
404.350(a)(1)
(“You
are
entitled
to
child's
benefits
on
the
earnings
record
of
an
insured
person
who
is
entitled
to
...
disability
benefits
...
if
...
[y]ou
are
the
insured
person's
child[.]”),
§
404.355
(defining
“natural
child”
for
purposes
of
a
dependent
benefit).
The
SSDI
dependent
benefit
is
a
benefit
for
the
child,
and
it
does
not
belong
to
the
parent
receiving
SSDI
or
to
the
child's
custodial
parent
or
guardian,
assuming
those
individuals
are
not
one
and
the
same.
Generally,
the
SSA
will
make
payments
to
a
representative
payee
if
a
beneficiary
is
under
the
age
of
18.
See
20
CFR
§
404.2010(b)
.
Federal
regulations
require
that
a
representative
payee
of
dependent
benefits
use
the
benefit
payments
only
for
the
benefit
of
a
child
and
consistent
with
the
child's
best
interests
or
hold
the
benefit
payments
in
an
account
for
the
child's
future
use.
See
20
CFR
§
404.2035(a)
.
Payments
are
used
for
the
benefit
of
the
child
if
they
are
used
for
the
child's
current
maintenance.
See
20
CFR
§
404.2040(a)
.
Current
maintenance
includes
“the
cost
of
food,
shelter,
clothing,
medical
care,
and
personal
comfort
items.”
Id.
Any
amount
remaining
after
proper
expenditures
must
be
conserved
or
invested
on
behalf
of
the
child.
See
20
CFR
§
404.2045(a)
.
If
a
representative
payee
does
not
comply
with
these
regulations,
the
SSA
will
attempt
to
replace
the
payee.
See
20
CFR
§
404.2050(a)
.
Additionally,
a
representative
payee
may
also
be
subject
to
criminal
liability
for
conversion.
See
42
USC
§
408(a)(5)
.
In
many
cases
involving
dependent
benefits,
the
custodial
parent
is
the
representative
payee
for
the
child's
benefit,
and
state
law
regarding
child
support
has
been
tailored
for
those
instances,
giving
credit
toward
child
support
to
the
non-
custodial
parent
in
the
amount
of
the
benefit
paid
directly
to
the
custodial
parent
and
allowing
the
custodial
parent
to
maintain
control
over
any
amount
of
the
benefit
beyond
the
state
award
of
support.
See
OCGA
§
19-6-15(f)(3)(B)
,
(f)
Broyles
v.
McNeal,
---
S.E.2d
----
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
4
(3)(C)
,
(f)(3)(D)
.
With
this
background
in
mind,
we
turn
to
Broyles's
arguments.
(a)
Broyles
argues
that
the
court
erred
by
failing
to
apply
the
child's
benefit
to
his
presumptive
amount
of
child
support.
Pursuant
to
OCGA
§
19-6-15(b)(10)
“[a]ny
benefits
which
the
child
receives
[from
the
noncustodial
parent's
SSDI]
shall
be
applied
against
the
noncustodial
parent's
final
child
support
amount.
The
final
child
support
amount
for
each
parent
shall
be
entered
on
the
child
support
worksheet,
together
with
the
information
from
each
of
the
utilized
schedules[.]”
See
also
OCGA
§
19-6-15(f)(1)(A)(xiii)
,
(f)(3)(A)
.
In
this
case,
the
written
portion
of
the
order
does
state
that
Broyles
was
not
required
to
pay
more
child
support
than
the
amount
of
the
child
benefit.
In
the
attached
child
support
worksheet,
however,
the
court
failed
to
include
an
amount
of
“final
child
support”in
Line
14
for
Broyles.
Instead,
in
Line
11
Broyles's
presumptive
amount
of
support
is
$365,
and
then
in
Line
12
the
child
benefit
is
$957.
The
failure
to
include
a
final
amount
in
Line
14
could
lead
to
confusion
as
to
whether
Broyles
was
liable
for
an
additional
$365
above
the
child
benefit
of
$957.
This
issue
should
be
clarified
upon
remand
by
including
a
final
child
support
amount
in
Line
14.
See
OCGA
§
19-6-15(b)(10)
(“The
final
child
support
amount
for
each
parent
shall
be
entered
on
the
child
support
worksheet[.]”).
*5
(b)
Broyles
also
argues
that
the
court
erred
by
ordering
him
to
direct
the
SSA
to
have
the
child
benefit
transferred
to
McNeal.
2
We
take
this
to
mean
that
McNeal
should
be
made
the
representative
payee.
McNeal
provides
no
citation
to
authority
to
support
the
court's
order,
and
we
have
not
discovered
any
Georgia
authority
to
support
this.
On
the
other
hand,
we
have
discovered
a
similar
case
involving
payment
of
a
child's
social
security
old-age
benefit
to
a
noncustodial
father
rather
than
to
a
custodial
mother.
In
Banakar
v.
Krause
,
674
S.W.3d
564
(2023)
,
a
Texas
court
explained
in
response
to
the
mother's
request
to
be
made
the
representative
payee
that
[t]he
authority
to
appoint
an
individual
to
serve
as
a
social
security
beneficiary's
representative
payee
belongs
solely
to
the
SSA
Commissioner.
[The
mother]
does
not
identify
any
Texas
law
that
would
give
similar
authority
to
the
trial
court
and,
if
there
were
such
a
statute,
it
would
violate
the
Supremacy
Clause
of
the
United
States
Constitution,
which
declares
that
federal
law
is
the
“supreme
Law
of
the
Land.”
Because
the
trial
court
lacked
the
authority
to
change
the
representative
payee
for
the
children's
social
security
benefits,
we
hold
that
it
did
not
err
in
denying
[the
mother’]s
request
for
appointment.
Id.
at
579
(citations
omitted).
See
also
US
Const.
Art.
VI,
cl.
2
;
42
USC
§
405(j)(1)(A)
.
Compare
generally
Rose
v.
Rose
,
481
U.S.
619,
636,
107
S.Ct.
2029,
95
L.Ed.2d
599
(1987)
(explaining
that
a
state
court
may
order
payment
of
child
support
from
veteran's
benefits
without
violating
the
Supremacy
Clause);
Brevard
v.
Brevard
,
74
N.C.
App.
484,
487–89,
328
S.E.2d
789
(1985)
(discussing
the
difference
between
the
child
benefit
and
a
worker's
benefit
for
purposes
of
child
support
and
holding
that
the
superior
court
of
that
state
lacked
authority
to
order
the
SSA
or
the
representative
payee
to
transfer
that
status
to
another
parent).
We
note
that
whether
Broyles
or
McNeal
is
the
representative
payee
for
the
child's
benefit,
the
representative
payee
is
required
to
follow
federal
law
regarding
the
benefit.
See,
e.g.,
20
CFR
§
404.2035
.
Moreover,
federal
law
provides
avenues
for
challenging
a
representative
payee's
status
or
use
of
benefit
money.
See
42
USC
§
1383(a)(2)(B)(xi)
.
In
any
event,
without
citation
to
legal
support
for
this
portion
of
the
order
in
the
order
itself
or
McNeal's
brief,
we
are
left
to
vacate
the
order
as
to
this
issue
and
remand
for
further
proceedings.
(c)
Based
on
the
foregoing,
we
need
not
address
the
remainder
of
Broyles's
arguments.
4.
Broyles
has
also
filed
a
motion
for
sanctions
against
opposing
counsel.
We
agree
that
counsel's
commentary
in
its
response
brief
would
have
been
better
presented
citing
case
law
supporting
their
client's
interests.
That
said,
this
motion
is
hereby
DENIED.
Judgment
vacated
and
case
remanded
with
direction.
Davis
,
J.,
and
Senior
Judge
C.
Andrew
Fuller
concur.
All
Citations
---
S.E.2d
----,
2026
WL
1263356
Broyles
v.
McNeal,
---
S.E.2d
----
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
5
Footnotes
1
McNeal
argues
that
this
appeal
should
be
dismissed
because
Broyles
failed
to
file
a
discretionary
application.
We
decline
to
do
so
because
this
order
is
directly
appealable
based
on
Broyles's
challenge
of
the
court's
award
of
full
legal
and
physical
custody
to
McNeal
and
of
the
limited
visitation
granted
to
him.
See
Voyles
v.
Voyles
,
301
Ga.
44,
47,
799
S.E.2d
160
(2017)
(“[T]he
‘issue-raised-on-appeal’
rule
applies
to
appeals
from
orders
or
judgments
in
child
custody
cases.
This
means
that
the
proper
appellate
procedure
to
employ
depends
upon
the
issue
involved
in
the
appeal,
even
if
the
order
or
judgment
being
challenged
on
appeal
was
of
the
type
listed
in
OCGA
§
5-6-34(a)(11)
and
was
entered
in
a
child
custody
case.”).
2
We
are
aware
that
if
McNeal
had
requested
to
be
named
representative
payee
prior
to
the
appointment
of
Broyles,
then
she
could
have
retained
control
over
the
dependent
benefit
beyond
Broyles's
presumptive
amount
of
child
support.
See
OCGA
§
19-6-15(f)(3)(B)
,
(f)(3)(C)
,
(f)(3)(D)
.
But
this
Georgia
statute
does
not
answer
the
question
raised
by
Broyles,
which
is
whether
the
trial
court
can
order
him
to
direct
the
SSA
to
take
any
specific
action
in
this
instance.
End
of
Document
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
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