Kim v. Wexel (2026)

Case details
Full caption
KIM v. WEXEL. A26A1514 June 24
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Georgia (GA)
Court
Georgia Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Vacated and Remanded
Panel
Barnes (P.J.); Markle (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
KIM v. WEXEL., --- S.E.2d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1825447Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.Court of Appeals of Georgia.KIMv.WEXEL.A26A1514|June 24, 2026BARNES, P. J., MARKLE and HODGES, JJ.OpinionHodges, Judge.*1 Michelle Kim, acting pro se, appeals a trial courtorder that entered a final decree of divorce, found her incontempt, and awarded attorney fees to Andrew Wexel, herex-husband, in this domestic relations action. She assertsvarious enumerations of error related to the court's order.For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court's awardof attorney fees to Wexel and remand the case for thecourt to enter a new order that remedies the deficiencies inits fee award, but we decline to address Kim's remainingenumerations of error.1. We note at the outset that Kim's pro se appellate brief listsfour enumerations of error.1 Kim, however, only raised oneargument in her application for discretionary appeal:Applicant seeks discretionary review of the Final Judgmentand Decree of Divorce entered by the Superior Courtof DeKalb County solely as it relates to the award andamount of attorney's fees ordered to be paid by Applicantto Respondent. No other portion of the divorce decree ischallenged.Kim v. Wexel, Case No. A26D0292 (granted Jan. 27, 2026).As a result, Kim's enumeration of error regarding theattorney fees awarded by the trial court in its order isproperly before this Court, but the remaining issues raisedin Kim's appellate brief are not properly before us forreview. See Zekser v. Zekser, 293 Ga. 366, 369(2) (744 SE2d698) (2013) (“An application for discretionary review mustenumerate the errors to be urged on appeal, and so, whenwe grant discretionary review, it necessarily is limited tothe errors actually enumerated in the application.”) (citation,punctuation, and footnote omitted). See also Lutz v. Lutz,302 Ga. 500, 502(1) (807 SE2d 336) (2017) (holding thatwhen a party did not raise an issue in his application fordiscretionary review, the issue was not properly before theappellate court for review); Bernard v. Bernard, 347 Ga. App.429, 431(1) (819 SE2d 688) (2018) (holding that when a partydid not raise a claim of error in his application, this Courtcould not consider it). Accordingly, we will not consider onappeal the arguments not raised by Kim in her application fordiscretionary appeal.2. Turning to Kim's argument regarding the attorney feeaward ordered by the trial court, we note that Kim's pro seappellate brief is woefully inadequate. First, her brief does notcontain a single citation to the record in violation of Courtof Appeals Rules 25(a)(5) (“At a minimum, the appellant'sbrief must include ... [a] statement of the case that sets outthe material facts relevant to the appeal, describes the relevantproceedings below, and identifies how each enumerated errorwas preserved for review, with appropriate citations to therecord.”) or 25(d)(1)(i) (“Each enumerated error shall besupported in the brief by specific reference to the record ortranscript. In the absence of a specific reference, the Court willnot search for and may not consider that enumeration.”). Suchcitations are “essential to consideration of the enumeratederrors[,]” Tucker v. Crystal Clear Luxury Pools, 361 Ga.App. 369 (864 SE2d 462) (2021), and we may deem anenumeration of error abandoned based on such failure to citethe record, Yang v. Washington, 256 Ga. App. 239(1) (568SE2d 140) (2002).*2 In addition, Kim's two-sentence conclusory argumentmerely provides one case citation, to a non-existent case,2 anddoes not provide any meaningful legal authority or argumentrelated to the specific facts of the case. In such cases, we havedeemed arguments abandoned. See In the Interest of K. R.,367 Ga. App. 668, 677(2)(b) (888 SE2d 204) (2023). AccordGresham v. Harris, 349 Ga. App. 134, 138(1) n. 9 (825 SE2d516) (2019) (holding that legal analysis “is, at a minimum, adiscussion of the appropriate law as applied to the relevantfacts”) (citation and punctuation omitted); PraultShell, Inc.v. River City Bank, 366 Ga. App. 70, 80(2) (880 SE2d 616)(2022) (“[M]ere conclusory statements are not the type ofmeaningful argument contemplated by our rules.”) (citationand punctuation omitted).Despite the issues with Kim's appellate brief, however, thetrial court's award of attorney fees in this case, on its face, is
KIM v. WEXEL., --- S.E.2d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2deficient. The trial court's order states as follows with respectto attorney fees:[Wexel's] request for attorney's fees is granted pursuant toOCGA § 9-15-14 and § 19-6-2. The Court hereby orders[Kim] to deliver to [Wexel] the amount of twenty thousandseventy-five and fifty cents ($20,075.50) within thirty (30)days of the date of this Order. The Court finds these feesto be reasonable, customary and necessary in the litigationof this case.“Generally, an award of attorney fees is not available inGeorgia unless authorized by statute or contract.” O'Keefe v.O'Keefe, 285 Ga. 805, 805-06 (684 SE2d 266) (2009) (citationand punctuation omitted).OCGA § 19-6-2 authorizes a court, within its discretion, toaward attorney fees in a contempt of court action arisingout of a divorce case; however, the court is to considerthe financial circumstances of both parties in assessingsuch an award. An award under OCGA § 19-6-2 dependson the financial circumstances of the parties, not theirwrongdoing; it is to be made with the purpose of ensuringeffective representation of both spouses in an action arisingout of a divorce.Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 299-300(3) (637 SE2d 716)(2006) (citations and punctuation omitted). An award underthis statute requires the trial court to issue “findings of factregarding the relative financial circumstances of each party,or otherwise cause the record to show that such had beenproperly considered.” Amoakuh v. Issaka, 299 Ga. 132, 134(3)(786 SE2d 678) (2016).In addition, OCGA § 9-15-14(a) mandates that the trialcourt must award attorney fees when a party asserts a claim,defense, or other position with “such a complete absence ofany justiciable issue of law or fact” that the party could notreasonably believe that the court would accept it. And OCGA§ 9-15-14(b) permits a trial court to award attorney fees if aparty brings an action that “lacked substantial justification[,]”“was interposed for delay or harassment,” or “unnecessarilyexpanded the proceeding by other improper conduct[.]” “[A]norder awarding attorney fees pursuant to [OCGA § 9-15-14]must specifically state whether the award is made underOCGA § 9-15-14(a) or (b),” Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App.93, 97(2) (726 SE2d 596) (2012) (citation and punctuationomitted), and it must include “findings of fact that specify theconduct upon which the award is made[,]” Hicks v. Gabor,354 Ga. App. 714, 726(2)(b) (841 SE2d 42) (2020) (citationand punctuation omitted). See Cohen v. Rogers, 341 Ga.App. 146, 152(2)(b) (798 SE2d 701) (2017) (“To permitmeaningful appellate review of an award of fees and expenses[under OCGA § 9-15-14], the trial court's order cannot betoo vague and conclusory, such as where it fails to citeexamples of conduct that authorize the award.”) (citation andpunctuation omitted).*3 Here, the trial court's order “fails to set forth the requiredfacts to support an imposition of attorney fees under eitherOCGA § 19-6-2 or OCGA § 9-15-14.” O'Keefe, 285 Ga. at806. In addition, we cannot tell from the order under whichsubsection of OCGA § 9-15-14 the trial court may haveawarded the fees. “If the award of attorney fees to [Wexel]was predicated on OCGA § 9-15-14, it must be vacatedbecause the findings necessary to support such an award werenot made.” Moon v. Moon, 277 Ga. 375, 379(6) (589 SE2d76) (2003). “If the award was predicated on OCGA § 19-6-2,it must be vacated” because the trial court's order does notinclude any evidence of the parties’ financial circumstancesto “support the conclusion that the award of attorney feeswas to ensure that the recipient spouse could afford effectiverepresentation.” Id. As a result, the trial court's award ofattorney fees in this case must be vacated, and the case must beremanded for the trial court to explain the particular statutorybasis for the award and include any findings necessary tosupport it. O'Keefe, 285 Ga. at 806.Judgment vacated in part and remanded with direction.Barnes, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.All Citations--- S.E.2d ----, 2026 WL 1825447Footnotes1Kim's enumerations of error include the following: (1) the trial court committed reversible error by awarding attorney feeswithout competent evidentiary support; (2) the trial court erred in finding contempt absent clear and convincing evidenceof willful noncompliance; (3) the trial court violated her due process rights by failing to consider her filings; and (4) thetrial court abused its discretion in issuing its order, resulting in manifest injustice.
KIM v. WEXEL., --- S.E.2d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.32Kim cites to Johnson v. Ware, 258 Ga. 439 (1988), a fictitious case. Although Kim is pro se, she nonetheless is requiredto follow the rules of this Court and cite to appropriate authority. See Modi v. India-Am. Cultural Ass'n, 367 Ga. App.572, 574(2) (886 SE2d 378) (2023) (“Although [Appellant] is proceeding pro se, [she] is not relieved of [her] obligationto conform to this Court's rules.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). We caution Kim that any future filings in thisCourt containing fictitious cases may result in the imposition of sanctions against her. See Washington v. Washington,A26A0506; slip op. at 1 n. 1 (Ga. App. June 4, 2026) (2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 272); see also Court of Appeals Rule 7(e)(2) (“The panel of the Court ruling on a case, with or without motion, may by majority vote to impose a penalty not toexceed $10,000 against any party and/or a party's counsel in any civil case in which there is a direct appeal, applicationfor discretionary appeal, application for interlocutory appeal, or motion that is determined to be frivolous.”).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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