Schools v. Grant. A26A0699. Henry County Schools v. Douglas. A26A0700. Henry County Schools v. Forbes. Markle (2026)

Case details
Full caption
A26A0698. HENRY COUNTY SCHOOLS v. GRANT. A26A0699. HENRY COUNTY SCHOOLS v. DOUGLAS. A26A0700. HENRY COUNTY SCHOOLS v. FORBES. MARKLE
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Georgia (GA)
Court
Georgia Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Vacated and Remanded
Majority
Markle (J.), joined by Barnes (P.J.), Hodges (J.)
FIRST DIVISIONBARNES, P. J.,MARKLE and HODGES, JJ.NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must bephysically received in our clerk’s office within tendays of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.https://www.gaappeals.gov/rulesJune 10, 2026In the Court of Appeals of GeorgiaA26A0698. HENRY COUNTY SCHOOLS et al. v. GRANT.A26A0699. HENRY COUNTY SCHOOLS et al. v. DOUGLAS.A26A0700. HENRY COUNTY SCHOOLS et al v. FORBES.MARKLE, Judge.In these related interlocutory appeals, Henry County Schools and several of itsemployees appeal from the denial of their motions to dismiss the state law tort andcontract claims, and the employment discrimination suits brought under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 USCA § 2000e-2 et seq., by threeformer employees on the grounds that (1) the suits were barred by sovereign andofficial immunity, and (2) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the denial of the motions with regardto the state law claims asserted against all defendants as either barred by immunity or
for failure to state a claim, we vacate the order as to the Title VII claims against theschool district, and we remand the cases with direction.“We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based onsovereign immunity grounds, which is a matter of law. However, factual findings bythe trial court in support of its legal decision are sustained if there is evidenceauthorizing them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver ofimmunity.” Loehle v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 334 Ga. App. 836, 836–37 (780 SE2d469) (2015) (quotation marks omitted). See also Ga. Dep’t of Labor v. RTT Assocs., 299Ga. 78, 81(1) (786 SE2d 840) (2016). We also review the trial court’s order on amotion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo, taking the allegations in thecomplaint as true and resolving any doubts in the plaintiffs’ favor. Williams v. DeKalbCounty, 308 Ga. 265, 270(2) (840 SE2d 423) (2020).Based on the allegations in the complaints, the records shows that TyromeGrant, Sr., a Black male, is the former principal of Oakland Elementary School, whichhas a predominantly Black student body, in Henry County. Beginning in 2019, hevoiced concerns regarding staffing shortages and transportation issues at his schoolthat he believed did not exist at predominantly white schools. Thereafter, the assistant2
superintendent allegedly responded by assigning a mentor to him, began visiting theschool at inappropriate times, and took control over certain transportation duties. Asa result, in 2023, Grant resigned his position. Plaintiff Malik Douglas, a Black male army reservist, was the principal of EaglesLanding Middle School, a predominantly Black school, in 2019. Douglas alsocomplained to district staff about transportation issues for his students. Additionally,during his tenure, the assistant superintendent “recruited administrators toundermine [his] authority,” resulting in false complaints being filed against him withthe school district. After he discussed his concerns with district staff, his contract forrenewal was delayed. He was also told that his style was too militant, which heperceived as discrimination due to his military service. Ultimately, he was put on leaveand denied promotions or other positions. Kathleen Forbes, a Black/Panamanian woman, was the principal at StockbridgeMiddle School until 2021, when her contract was not renewed. During her tenure, shewas subject to harassment; district employees demeaned her professional skills; andshe was demoted to a position as assistant principal at McDonough High School.When she complained that she had been threatened with termination, she was placed3
in a “Professional Development Plan.” She later applied for the principal position andwas denied an interview. She ultimately resigned her position. All three then filed separate suits, alleging breach of contract, and racediscrimination, harassment, and retaliation under Title VII against the school district;and intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of fiduciary duty against theschool district and its employees in their individual and official capacities. Douglasalso alleged that he was discriminated against because of his military status. Theyrequested compensatory and punitive damages. The school district moved to dismiss all three complaints as barred by sovereignand official immunity, as well as for failure to state a claim. Following a hearing, thetrial court denied the motions. It then certified its orders for immediate review, andwe granted the interlocutory applications. These appeals followed. 1. We begin with the threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction, that is,whether the claims against the school district and the employees in their officialcapacities are barred by sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is immunity from suit, involving actions orclaims against the state and its departments, agencies, officers, andemployees. The Georgia Constitution provides that the General4
Assembly may waive the immunity of counties, municipalities, andschool districts by statute. ... [T]he applicability of sovereign immunityto claims brought against the State is a jurisdictional issue and therefore,the applicability of sovereign immunity is a threshold determination, and,if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and,concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that isbarred.Ga. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Downs, 370 Ga. App. 669, 675(2) (898 SE2d850) (2024) (citation modified). Constitutional sovereign immunity extends tocounties and school districts. McBrayer v. Scarbrough, 317 Ga. 387, 391-92(2)(a) (893SE2d 660) (2023). And, where the State or school district enjoys immunity, publicemployees who are sued in their official capacities are also entitled to sovereignimmunity. Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 126(3) (549 SE2d 341) (2001). See also Ga.Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. IX; OCGA § 36-33-1.In addition to state constitutional immunity, the Eleventh Amendment providesimmunity from suit against federal claims in state court. U. S. Const. Amend. XI. Butthat immunity does not extend to “lesser entities” unless they are “an arm of the[S]tate.” Ga. Ports Auth. v. Lawyer, 304 Ga. 667, 668(1) (821 SE2d 22) (2018). Theburden is on the plaintiffs to show sovereign immunity has been waived. Alred v. Ga.5
Pub. Def. Council, 362 Ga. App. 465, 466 (869 SE2d 99) (2022). See also Dep’t of Pub.Safety v. Justice, 320 Ga. 149, 153(2) (907 SE2d 817) (2024). With this framework in mind, we consider whether the plaintiffs met theirburden to show a waiver of sovereign immunity for their various federal and state lawclaims.(a) Is there a waiver of immunity for Title VII claims in state court?1The school district argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdictionover the discrimination claims because there is no waiver of immunity in state courtfor Title VII claims. The plaintiffs contend that the school district is not an arm of theState and thus was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.2 1 The trial court considered Douglas’s claim for military discrimination underthe Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994(“USERRA”), 38 USC § 4311, et seq. We have held that there is no waiver ofimmunity for USERRA claims in state court. Anstadt v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys.of Ga., 303 Ga. App. 483, 486-87(1) (693 SE2d 868) (2010).2 The State is immune from federal claims brought in state court under theEleventh Amendment if the state would be immune from suit on those claims infederal court. See Augusta Jud. Circuit Off. of Pub. Def. v. Hodge-Peets, 370 Ga. App.819, 822(2) (899 SE2d 363) (2024). Title VII claims contain a waiver of immunity infederal court. See 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(3); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (96SCt 2666, 49 LE2d 614) (1976); Collier v. Clayton County Comm. Serv. Bd., 236 FSupp2d 1345, 1370(III)(A)(2) (N. D. Ga. 2002). Although the plaintiffs failed toidentify this waiver of immunity afforded Title VII claims as a basis to waive immunity6
The Eleventh Amendment, which protects states from suit in federal court, alsoprovides immunity against suits brought against a state in state courts. Alden v. Maine,527 US 706, 741-754(II)(B)(1) to (4) (119 SCt 2240, 144 LE2d 636) (1999). Thatimmunity extends to departments and agencies of the State, but not to other Stateentities unless they are “an arm of the State.” Id. at 756(III); Ga. Ports Auth., 304 Ga.at 674(3). Thus, a county school district is only immune from federal claims if itconstitutes an arm of the State. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,429 US 274, 280 (III) (97 SCt 568, 50 LE2d 471) (1977). See also Lightfoot v. HenryCounty Sch. Dist., 771 F3d 764, 768-69(III)(A) (11th Cir. 2014) (setting out the factorsrelevant to determining whether the school board was an arm of the State).Here, in addressing whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applied to theTitle VII claims, the plaintiffs failed to plead any basis for a waiver of immunity intheir complaints and did not raise the issue until their responses to the motions todismiss. And, in those responses, they cited law applicable to official immunity,conflating the legal framework for claims alleging constitutional violations by stateactors under 42 USC § 1983 with liability under Title VII. It was not untilin state court, Eleventh Amendment immunity only applies if the school district is anarm of the State. Ga. Ports Auth., 304 Ga. at 668(1). 7
supplemental briefing that the plaintiffs even mentioned that Eleventh Amendmentimmunity would not protect the school district because it was not an arm of the State. Critically, the trial court’s order, which was drafted by the plaintiffs’ attorney,contains several mistakes. In addition to citing federal law applicable to motions todismiss and confusing constitutional claims with employment discrimination, it alsoignores binding Georgia precedent, mis-quotes cases cited, and relies on at least onehallucinated case. We find it troubling that counsel submitted such an order to the trialcourt, and regrettable that the trial court failed to identify any of these errors. SeePayne v. State, Case No. S26A0459, slip op. at 1-5(1)-(4), 2026 WL 1215905 (Ga. May5, 2026) (sanctioning counsel who prepared order citing hallucinated cases,remanding to the trial court to issue a new order omitting such citations, andencouraging trial courts to engage in a careful review of materials submitted to it); Slayv. Ross, __ Ga. App. __ (927 SE2d 569, 571) (2026) (“[h]allucinated cases aretypically a hallmark of the irresponsible use of regenerative artificial intelligence (A.I.)in legal drafting.” (punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, we must, yet again, remindcounsel, and lower courts, of their professional responsibilities and obligations in theuse of artificial intelligence.8
Moreover, the trial court’s order contains no analysis of the EleventhAmendment immunity issue nor factual findings as to any of the factors applicable tothe question of whether the school district was an “arm of the State.” The trialcourt’s summary conclusion, coupled with the errors identified above, hampers ourability to reach the merits of the Eleventh Amendment arguments. As a result, we findit necessary to vacate the order denying the motion to dismiss the Title VII claims, andwe remand the case for reconsideration under the proper standards and bona fide caselaw. See Payne, Case No. S26A0459, slip op. at 1-5(1)-(4) (remanding case forreconsideration without hallucinated cases).(b) Is there a waiver of the district’s sovereign immunity for state law claims broughtin state court?We next consider whether the plaintiffs established a waiver of sovereignimmunity for the state law tort and breach of contract claims, concluding that they didnot.The Henry County School District is a political subdivision of the State and isentitled to sovereign immunity unless it has been waived. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX,9
Sec. II, Par. IX (“The General Assembly may waive the immunity of counties,municipalities, and school districts by law.”). See also Worth County School Dist. v.Tibbets, 319 Ga. 103, 107(2) (902 SE2d 558) (2024); Parr v. Cook County School Dist.,359 Ga. App. 823, 824(1) (860 SE2d 114) (2021); Wellborn v. DeKalb County SchoolDist., 227 Ga. App. 377, 379-80(4) (489 SE2d 345) (1997); Crisp County School Systemv. Brown, 226 Ga. App. 800(1) (487 SE2d 512) (1997). Such immunity “can be waivedonly by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereignimmunity is thereby waived and the extent of the waiver.” Wellborn, 227 Ga. App. at379(4) (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e)). “[I]mplied waivers arenot favored.” Augusta Jud. Circuit Off. of Pub. Def. v. Hodge-Peets, 370 Ga. App. 819,824(3) (899 SE2d 363) (2024). The plaintiffs bear the burden of showing a waiver ofimmunity. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 320 Ga. at 153(2); Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466. Here, the plaintiffs alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress andbreach of fiduciary duty against the district and its employees in their officialcapacities. But they failed to plead any basis for a waiver of immunity in theircomplaints, or the extent of such waiver. See Ramos v. Owens, 366 Ga. App. 216, 21810
(881 SE2d 464) (2022). And, although Douglas amended his complaint after theschool district filed its motion to dismiss, he did not remedy this omission. In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs asserted that immunity waswaived due to the alleged malice of the school district and its various employees, andthat the school district was not an arm of the State. But, neither argument establishesa waiver of the district’s sovereign immunity from the state law claims. First, maliceis a waiver to official — not sovereign — immunity. See Atlanta Pub. Schools v. M. M.,__ Ga. App. __ (1) (926 SE2d 859, 862-63(1) (2026) (“[S]overeign immunity andofficial immunity are not synonymous, but are separate, related doctrines.” (quotationmarks omitted)).Thus, malice would waive immunity only as to those claims againstthe employees in their individual capacities. Id. Second, school districts’ sovereignimmunity under the Georgia Constitution does not depend on whether they are “anarm of the State.” See Worth County School Dist., 319 Ga. at 107(2); Parr, 359 Ga.App. at 824(1); Wellborn, 227 Ga. App. at 379-80(4); Crisp County School System, 226Ga. App. at 802(2).33 To the extent that they now claim the Georgia Tort Claims Act provides awaiver of immunity, the Act expressly states that it does not apply to school districts.OCGA § 50–21–22(5); Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 295 (454SE2d 149) (1995). See also McConnell v. Dep’t of Labor, 345 Ga. App. 669, 675(1)(b)11
Because the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing the waiver ofsovereign immunity, the tort claims against the school district and the employees intheir official capacities must be dismissed. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 320 Ga. at 153(2);Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466. As to the breach of contract claims against the district, one of the exceptions to the defense of sovereign immunity is for “anyaction ex contractu for the breach of any written contract ... entered intoby the state or its departments and agencies.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.I, Sec. II, Par. IX (c). To meet [the] burden of proving a waiver ofsovereign immunity, [the plaintiffs were] required to show that thecontract sought to be enforced is in writing and contains all of the termsnecessary to constitute a valid contract. And general provisions ofcontract law cannot be applied by the courts to create a waiver ofsovereign immunity by means other than by written contract.Justice, 320 Ga. at 153-54(2). See also OCGA § 50-21-1(a). Here, none of the plaintiffs attached a copy of the contract to their complaintor established the existence of a valid contract and its terms within the framework of(814 SE2d 790) (2018) (noting that breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim). And, anyargument that the school district waived immunity through the purchase of liabilityinsurance is foreclosed by our decision in Crisp County School System, 226 Ga. App.at 801(1).12
the complaint, nor did they amend the complaint to include it after the school districtfiled its motion to dismiss. Boyd v. Neal, 350 Ga. App. 274, 275-79(1) (828 SE2d 650)(2019) (no waiver of immunity where plaintiff did not establish existence of a contractin the original complaint or the amended complaint). Accord Young v. Johnson, 359Ga. App. 769, 771 (860 SE2d 82) (2021) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff failed toexplicitly plead a waiver of sovereign immunity in her complaint, did not amend thecomplaint to correct the omission, and she failed to raise the waiver issue in any of herfilings in the trial court below or respond to the motion to dismiss). Compare Justice,320 Ga. at 150(1) (complaint alleged there was a written contract that included all ofthe elements of a contract and the terms that allegedly were breached). See alsoOCGA § 20-2-211(a) (providing for written contracts for teachers). As a result, theplaintiffs failed to establish a waiver for their contract claims against the schooldistrict. The trial court therefore erred by denying the motions to dismiss the contractclaims.2. We now turn to whether the claims against the employees in their individualcapacities would be barred by official immunity or, alternatively, whether theallegations failed to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”).13
(a) Official immunityThe only claims at issue with regard to official immunity are the state law claimsfor intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of fiduciary duty. “We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based onofficial immunity grounds, which is a matter of law. However, factual findings by thetrial court in support of its legal decision are sustained if there is any evidenceauthorizing them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver ofimmunity.”4 Garren v. Bryant, 377 Ga. App. 699, 699 (922 SE2d 902) (2025).“The doctrine of official immunity offers public officers and employees limitedprotection from suit in their personal capacities.” Schultz v. Lowe, 364 Ga. App. 345,348(2) (874 SE2d 842) (2022) (quotation marks omitted). See also Ga. Const. of 1983,Art. I, § II, Par. IX. Such immunity protects public employees from suit for“discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and donewithout wilfulness, malice or corruption.” Hall v. Acker, 367 Ga. App. 411, 414(1) (8854 Where a defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds of official immunity, “atrial court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint but is authorized to hearthe matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, or to direct that the matterbe heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.” State of Ga. v. FederalDef. Program, 315 Ga. 319, 327(3) (882 SE2d 257) (2022) (citation modified). Here,the plaintiffs proffered no evidence apart from the allegations in the complaints.14
SE2d 266) (2023) (quotation marks omitted). The acts complained of here arediscretionary acts, which “call[s] for the exercise of personal deliberation andjudgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions,and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.” Roper v. Greenway, 294 Ga. 112,115–16 (751 SE2d 351) (2013) (citation modified).Here, in response to the motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs alleged that theemployees acted with malice. Although the trial court applied the standard of reviewapplicable in federal court instead of Georgia law, we need not remand on this basisbecause the federal standard applicable to a motion to dismiss is more stringent thanthe state standard. Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 679(IV)(A) (129 SCt 1937,173 LE2d 868) (2009) (to survive a motion to dismiss under federal law, legalconclusions made in the complaint “must be supported by factual allegations” that“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”), with Dillingham v. Doctors Clinic,P.A., 236 Ga. 302, 303 (223 SE2d 625) (1976) (under Georgia law, complaint needonly “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and a general indication of thetype of litigation involved; the discovery process bears the burden of filling indetails.”). Thus, the allegation that the defendants acted with malice is sufficient to15
overcome official immunity at this stage of the litigation under Georgia law. Eversonv. DeKalb County School Dist., 344 Ga. App. 665, 669(2) (811 SE2d 9) (2018).(b) Rule 12(b)(6)Having concluded that official immunity would not bar the plaintiffs’ claims atthis stage of the litigation, we next consider whether any of the plaintiffs’ allegationsare sufficient to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). We conclude that they are not.We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s grant of a motionto dismiss. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not besustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose withcertainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any stateof provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movantestablishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidencewithin the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of therelief sought. Stewart v. Johnson, 358 Ga. App. 813, 818(4) (856 SE2d 401) (2021) (citationsomitted). (i) Plaintiff Grant 16
In his complaint, Grant alleged that he suffered intentional infliction ofemotional distress (“IIED”) and breach of fiduciary duty. We conclude that theclaims must be dismissed. Georgia has long recognized a cause of action for intentionalinfliction of emotional distress. However, the burden which the plaintiffmust meet in order to prevail in this cause of action is a stringent one. Toprevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the conduct giving rise tothe claim was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme andoutrageous; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) theemotional distress was severe. The defendant’s conduct must be soextreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, andto be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilizedcommunity. Whether a claim rises to the requisite level ofoutrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentionalinfliction of emotional distress is a question of law.Mayorga v. Benton, 364 Ga. App. 665, 670(1) (875 SE2d 908) (2022). As we haveexplained, “conduct which occurs in the context of the victim’s employment mayproduce a character of outrageousness that might otherwise not exist ... [because] theworkplace presents a hierarchy of structured relationships which cannot easily beavoided and thereby provides a captive victim[.]” Howerton v. Harbin Clinic, 333 Ga.App. 191, 206(2)(a) (776 SE2d 288) (2015) (citation modified). And when we consider17
whether conduct meets the standard for IIED, we consider the alleged actionscollectively. Id. Nevertheless, “[a]ctionable conduct does not include insults, threats,indignities, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other vicissitudes of daily living butmust go beyond all reasonable bounds of decency.” Ashman v. Marshall’s of MA, 244Ga. App. 228, 229(1) (535 SE2d 265) (2000). Thus, we have imposed liability “onlywhere the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as... to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”Ghodrati v. Stearnes, 314 Ga. App. 321, 323–24 (723 SE2d 721) (2012) (quotationmarks omitted).Here, even assuming the allegations in Grant’s complaint are true, and viewingthe alleged actions cumulatively, they do not rise to the requisite level of extreme oroutrageous conduct to state a claim for IIED as a matter of law. Mayorga, 364 Ga. App.at 670(1). Grant complained that he was assigned a “coach” or mentor to shadowhim, but white principals were not; other employees warned him that districtemployees were “trying to build a case against” him; he was “forced to relinquishcommand and control of the school” to district employees; and he was “placed onleave due to the stressors incurred at the hands of” district employees before he18
ultimately resigned. But we have generally required more than a mere adverseemployment decision to establish that the conduct was sufficiently extreme andoutrageous to state a claim for IIED. Bowers v. Estep, 204 Ga. App. 615, 618(2) (420SE2d 336) (1992) (plaintiff failed to establish IIED where plaintiff alleged that he was“maliciously” transferred to another position, and his supervisors threatened,humiliated, and intimidated him while asking about his emotional condition).5Compare Howerton, 333 Ga. App. at 206-07(2)(a) (plaintiff stated a claim for IIEDwhere she alleged physician in the clinic where she worked made comments about hergenitalia to other employees while she was being treated by them). The conduct Grant alleges, although unpleasant and demeaning, is insufficientto survive a motion to dismiss because it is not “so outrageous in character, and soextreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Ghodrati, 314 Ga.5 We have repeatedly found similar conduct insufficient to avoid summaryjudgment. Southland Propane v. McWhorter, 312 Ga. App. 812, 819(3) (720 SE2d 270)(2011) (accusations of forgery, followed by termination and removal from premiseswas insufficient to constitute IIED); Abdul-Malik v. AirTran Airways, 297 Ga. App.852, 857(1) (678 SE2d 555) (2009) (comments in meeting calling plaintiff a terroristand a liar were insufficient to establish IIED); Kramer v. Kroger Co., 243 Ga. App. 883,888(3)(c) (534 SE2d 446) (2000) (“defamatory or derogatory remarks regarding one’semployment generally do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.”(citation modified)); 19
App. at 323–24. At most, this conduct constitutes the type of annoyances andindignities that can occur in the workplace. Ashman, 244 Ga. App. at 229(1). As to the breach of fiduciary duty, Grant contends that there is a fiduciaryrelationship between himself, the defendant employees, and the Human Resourcesofficers based on the contract for employment. We disagree.To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, Grant must show “(1) the existence ofa fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by thebreach.” Ansley Marine Const., Inc. v. Swanberg, 290 Ga. App. 388, 391(1) (660 SE2d6) (2008) (citation modified). The employee-employer relationship is not one from which thelaw will necessarily imply fiduciary obligations; however, the facts of aparticular case may establish the existence of a confidential relationshipbetween an employer and an employee concerning a particulartransaction, thereby placing upon the parties the fiduciary obligationsassociated with a principal-agent relationship.Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 607(1)(b) (503 SE2d 278)(1998). A fiduciary relationship stems from a confidential relationship between theparties. McConnell, 345 Ga. App. at 680(3). See also Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., 269 Ga.at 606(1). And, under OCGA § 23-2-58, 20
[a]ny relationship shall be deemed confidential, whether arising fromnature, created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is sosituated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, andinterest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutualconfidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as therelationship between partners, principal and agent.See also McConnell, 345 Ga. App. at 680(3). And, to constitute a fiduciary relationshipin an employer-employee context, the employee must be “vested with authority, realor ostensible, to create obligations on behalf of the employer.” Atlanta Mkt. Ctr.Mgmt., 269 Ga. at 606(1)(a).Here, Grant has not alleged any particular facts, outside the contract foremployment, that would create a confidential relationship and a fiduciary duty. SeeAtlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., 269 Ga. at 607(1)(b). See also Haley v. Children’s Healthcareof Atlanta, No. 1:25-cv-3855-ELR-LRS, slip op. at *6(D), 2026 WL 790900, at *6(D)(N. D. Ga. 2026) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty claim where plaintiff failed toallege how the parties’ relationship established a fiduciary duty).Given the allegations in the complaint, Grant has failed to state a claim for IIEDor a breach of fiduciary duty. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying the motion21
to dismiss Grant’s complaint with regard to the allegations against the employees intheir individual capacities.b. Plaintiff Douglas Douglas alleged that district employees questioned his decisions in front ofother staff; ignored reports that he had been threatened by the spouse of a schoolemployee; held his contract for a period of time before renewing it; demeaned hisleadership; recruited staff to undermine his authority and harass him; and placed himon administrative leave without cause. Douglas does not allege in his complaint that the employees’ actions wereoutrageous and extreme. Scouten v. Amerisave Mortg. Corp., 284 Ga. App. 242, 244(3)(643 SE2d 759) (2007), vacated in part on other grounds in 291 Ga. App. 493 (662SE2d 741) (2008) (where plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege or show that employer’sactions were “extreme” or “outrageous,” it was “defective as a matter of law” andproperly dismissed) (quotation marks omitted).Nor has Douglas sufficiently stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. SeeAtlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., 269 Ga. at 606(1)(b); Haley, No. 1:25-cv-3855-ELR-LRS, slip22
op. at *6(D), 2026WL790900, at *6(D). Accordingly, the trial court erred by denyingthe motion to dismiss these claims against the employees in their individual capacities.c. Plaintiff Forbes Forbes alleged that district employees demeaned her communication andleadership skills; harassed her; warned her that she would be removed after her thirdyear; made negative comments about her in front of other staff; and demoted her. As detailed above, these allegations fail to state a claim for either IIED, Bower,204 Ga. App. at 618(2), or breach of fiduciary duty, Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., 269 Ga.at 607(1)(b); Haley, No. 1:25-cv-3855-ELR-LRS, slip op. at *6(D), 2026 WL 790900,at *6(D). Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss Forbes’sclaims against the employees in their individual capacities.For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order denying the motions to dismissis reversed in part as to the state law claims raised against all defendants. Those claimsare either barred by sovereign immunity or failed to state a claim. As to the Title VIIclaims against the school district, we vacate the trial court’s order, and remand the 23
case for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.Judgments reversed in part; vacated in part; and cases remanded with direction.Barnes, P. J., and Hodges, J., concur.24
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