Slay v. Ross (2026)

Case details
Full caption
SLAY v. ROSS. A25A2100 March 9
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Georgia (GA)
Court
Georgia Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Doyle (P.J.); Padgett (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
SLAY v. ROSS., --- S.E.2d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 656355Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.Court of Appeals of Georgia.SLAYv.ROSS.A25A2100|March 9, 2026DOYLE, P. J., MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.OpinionMarkle, Judge.*1 In this modification of custody and contempt case,Everett B. Slay appeals from several orders of the trial court.1On appeal, Slay contends that the trial court erred by grantingStacie Ross's motion to modify visitation without a showingof any material change in circumstances, denying his motionto hold Ross in contempt, awarding attorney fees to Ross inviolation of OCGA § 19-6-2, and denying Slay's motions torecuse. Finding no error, we affirm.Before addressing the merits of the case, we are troubled bycertain irregularities in the brief filed on Slay's behalf by hisattorney, Loletha Hale. We note that several of the cases citedtherein appear to be fictitious.2 Such “hallucinated” cases aretypically a hallmark of the irresponsible use of regenerativeartificial intelligence (A.I.) in legal drafting. See Shahid v.Esaam, 376 Ga. App. 145, 146(1) (918 SE2d 198) (2025).Although we can only surmise that the brief was drafted withthe use of unchecked generative A.I., we are aware that Halehas submitted a brief with seemingly similar defects in federaldistrict court. See Boston v. Williams, No. 1:23-CV-00752-WMR (ND Ga. Dec. 5, 2025) (2025 WL 3895555). However,Ross has not complained, nor does it appear that the fictitiouscases impeded her ability to respond to Slay's arguments.Compare Shahid, 376 Ga. App. at 147(1) (finding the useof bogus cases and citations in appellate brief “deprived theopposing party of the opportunity to appropriately respond”).And, we are unaware of the imposition of any sanctionsagainst Hale for similar conduct in this Court. We thus cautionHale that any future filings in this Court containing fictitiouscases and citations may result in the imposition of sanctionsagainst her. See Shahid, 376 Ga. App. at 149(1); Court ofAppeals Rule 7(e)(2) (“The panel of the Court ruling ona case, with or without motion, may by majority vote toimpose a penalty not to exceed $10,000 against any partyand/or a party's counsel in any civil case in which there is adirect appeal, application for discretionary appeal, applicationfor interlocutory appeal, or motion that is determined to befrivolous.”).Turning now to the merits of the case, “we view the evidencein the light most favorable to upholding the trial court'sorder.”Granados v. Newsome, 373 Ga. App. 859 (910 SE2d341) (2024).So viewed, the record shows that Slay and Ross were divorcedin 2013 and are the parents of a minor child. Ross wasgranted primary physical custody of the child, and the partiesshared joint legal custody. The record reflects a contentiousand litigious history between the parties. In 2015, the trialcourt ordered Ross to reimburse Slay for his child supportpayments for the months of June and July, as Slay was entitledto summer visitation during those months under the custodyschedule. In 2016, the trial court held Ross in wilful contemptfor, among other things, refusing to allow Slay to exercisecertain of his visitation rights under the divorce decree. In2018, the trial court ordered certain modifications to thevisitation schedule.*2 Pertaining to the case at hand, in 2022, Slay moved for adownward modification of his child support payments. Slaythen amended his petition, seeking to increase the amount ofhis visitation time during spring break and certain holidays.In response, Ross requested a reduction in Slay's visitationtime. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Slay's petitionfor modification of his child support payments and visitationtime, while granting Ross's request to reduce Slay's summervisitation time. The trial court awarded Ross attorney feesunder OCGA §§ 19-6-15(k)(5) and 19-9-3(g) as to theseclaims.Contemporaneous with his petition to modify child supportand visitation, Slay filed a petition for contempt, allegingRoss had failed to reimburse him for his summer childsupport payments, as previously ordered. This petition wasconsolidated and addressed at the same hearing as thepreceding petition. The trial court denied Slay's petition forcontempt. Ross moved for attorney fees under OCGA §9-15-14(b), which the trial court granted, concluding that the
SLAY v. ROSS., --- S.E.2d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2petition lacked substantial justification because Slay had notpaid child support for the summer months.Additionally, the trial court granted Ross's motion to hold Slayin wilful contempt for his failure to comply with an earlierorder of the court compelling him to respond to discoveryrequests. On this basis, the trial court awarded Ross attorneyfees under OCGA § 9-11-37(b)(2).Finally, Slay filed three motions to recuse the trial judge, allof which were denied. This appeal followed.1. Slay first contends that the trial court erred in modifyinghis visitation rights where there was no showing of a materialchange in circumstances. We disagree.Slay cites to OCGA § 19-9-3(b), but that statute places nosuch restriction on the trial court under the circumstances ofthis case.3 Rather, that statute provides:In any case in which a judgment awarding the custody of achild has been entered, on the motion of any party or on themotion of the judge, that portion of the judgment effectingvisitation rights between the parties and their child orparenting time may be subject to review and modificationor alteration without the necessity of any showing of achange in any material conditions and circumstances ofeither party or the child, provided that the review andmodification or alteration shall not be had more often thanonce in each two-year period following the date of entry ofthe judgment.OCGA § 19-9-3(b) (emphasis added).The record reflects that the last order of the court affectingvisitation rights issued in 2018, more than two years priorto the judgment at issue here. Accordingly, the trial courtwas not required to determine there was a material changein circumstances prior to modifying visitation, and Slay'sargument fails. See Spirnak v. Meadows, 355 Ga. App. 857,861(1) (844 SE2d 482) (2020); OCGA § 19-9-3(b).2. Slay next argues that the trial court erred by denying hismotion to hold Ross in contempt for failing to comply with thecourt's previous order to reimburse his child support paymentswhen he exercised his visitation rights during the summermonths. Again, we disagree.As we have explained, “[t]he essence of civil contemptis willful disobedience of a prior court order.” Saravia v.Mendoza, 303 Ga. App. 758, 763(2) (695 SE2d 47) (2010)(citation modified). “Trial courts have broad discretion inruling on a motion for contempt, and the trial court's rulingwill be affirmed on appeal if there is any evidence in therecord to support it.”Brown v. Brown, 300 Ga. 559, 560 (796SE2d 269) (2017) (citation modified); Pate v. Pate, 280 Ga.796, 798(3) (631 SE2d 103) (2006).*3 Here, the underlying order directed Ross to reimburseSlay the amount of his child support payments she receivedfrom him for the months of June and July. However, at thehearing, she testified that she never received child supportfrom Slay in those months. And, Slay confirmed that hehad not paid child support for those months. Thus, therewas record evidence supporting the trial court's denial ofSlay's contempt motion. See Brown, 300 Ga. at 560; Wrightv. Wright, 367 Ga. App. 15, 22(1) (884 SE2d 610) (2023)(reversing contempt judgment where there was no evidencefather wilfully disobeyed child support order). To the extentthere was any conflicting evidence, it was for the trial court toresolve, and we will not interfere with its ruling. Pate, 280 Ga.at 798(4) (“A trial court in a contempt action acts as the trierof fact, and is vested with broad discretionary power when theevidence is conflicting.”).3. Slay next contends the trial court erred in awardingattorney fees against him under OCGA § 19-6-2 because itfailed to consider the parties’ financial circumstances, andunder OCGA § 9-15-4(b) because there was no evidence offrivolous conduct on his part. This enumeration of error isunavailing.(a) The trial court awarded attorney fees to Ross pursuantto OCGA §§ 19-6-15, 19-9-3, 9-11-37, and 9-15-14(b).Nevertheless, Slay contends the trial court was required toconsider the parties’ financial circumstances as if it awardedattorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-2.419-6-2(a)(1) authorizes an award of attorney fees for actions“for alimony, divorce and alimony, or contempt of courtarising out of either an alimony case or a divorce and alimonycase.”Because this action is not for alimony, divorce, or contemptfor noncompliance with the original divorce decree,5 OCGA§ 19-6-2 does not apply, and the trial court was not requiredto consider the relative financial circumstances of the parties.See Spirnak, 355 Ga. App. at 871(7)(a) (statute does notapply to petition for modification of custody); Claybrooks v.
SLAY v. ROSS., --- S.E.2d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Claybrooks, 364 Ga. App. 157, 160(2)(b) (874 SE2d 190)(2022) (statute does not apply to contempt action involving aconsent order modifying custody, visitation, and child supportrights); Cothran v. Mehosky, 286 Ga. App. 640, 641 (649SE2d 838) (2007). Slay's argument to this effect is thusmisguided.6(b) Slay argues that the record does not support the trial court'saward of fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b). This argument isbaseless.Under OCGA § 9–15–14(b), a court may assess reasonableand necessary attorney fees and expenses of litigation ifit finds that an attorney or party brought or defendedan action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantialjustification, i.e., was substantially frivolous, groundless,or vexatious. A decision under OCGA § 9–15–14(b) mustbe sustained unless the trial court abused its discretionGlaza v. Morgan, 248 Ga. App. 623, 624 (548 SE2d 389)(2001) (quotation marks omitted).Here, the trial court concluded that Slay's contempt actionfor reimbursement of child support payments for the summermonths lacked substantial justification pursuant to OCGA§ 9-15-14(b) because the overwhelming evidence showedthat he did not pay child support for the months he soughtreimbursement. The trial court found that Slay's claim foradditional parenting time also merited an award of attorneyfees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b) because the evidence showedthat Slay had voluntarily forfeited a considerable amount ofparenting time in the past years.7 Notably, Slay points tono evidence of record to challenge either of the trial court'sfindings. Having reviewed the record, we cannot say the trialcourt abused its discretion in sanctioning Slay under OCGA§ 9-15-14(b). See generally Carson v. Carson, 277 Ga. 335,336(2) (588 SE2d 735) (2003) (record supported trial court'saward of fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b)).*4 4. Finally, Slay argues the trial court erred by refusing torecuse from the case. We discern no error.In pertinent part, Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 25.3provides:When a judge is presented with a motion to recuse, ordisqualify, accompanied by an affidavit, the judge shalltemporarily cease to act upon the merits of the matter andshall immediately determine the timeliness of the motionand the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, and make adetermination, assuming any of the facts alleged in theaffidavit to be true, whether recusal would be warranted.To be timely, the recusal motion must be filed “not laterthan five (5) days after the affiant first learned of the allegedgrounds for disqualification, and not later than ten (10) daysprior to the hearing or trial which is the subject of recusalor disqualification.” USCR 25.1. With regard to the affidavitrequirements, USCR 25.2 provides:The affidavit shall clearly state the facts and reasons forthe belief that bias or prejudice exists, being definite andspecific as to time, place, persons and circumstances ofextra-judicial conduct or statements, which demonstrateeither bias in favor of any adverse party, or prejudicetoward the moving party in particular, or a systematicpattern of prejudicial conduct toward persons similarlysituated to the moving party, which would influence thejudge and impede or prevent impartiality in that action.Allegations consisting of bare conclusions and opinionsshall not be legally sufficient to support the motion orwarrant further proceedings.We review de novo a trial court's denial of a motion to recusefor failure to meet the USCR 25.3 requirements. Mayor &Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga.114, 119(1) (728 SE2d 189) (2012).Here, Slay filed an emergency motion to recuse the seniorjudge presiding over this matter in August 2023, on the firstday of hearings. He attached an unsworn “declaration” ofhis counsel, alleging, inter alia, the judge was biased againsther and her clients based on prior adverse rulings and racialprejudice, and due to a grievance she filed against the judgewith the Judicial Qualifications Committee (JQC).8 The trialcourt deemed this motion timely because Slay could not haveknown prior to that date of the senior judge assignment. SeeUSCR 25.1 (trial court may extend time limit for filing motionupon showing of good cause for the delay). Nevertheless, thetrial court correctly denied the motion because Slay failed toattach a sworn affidavit. See Post v. State, 298 Ga. 241, 247(2)(b) (779 SE2d 624) (2015) (“The Uniform Superior CourtRules could not be clearer in their requirement that the motionbe accompanied by an affidavit.”) (quotation marks omitted);Oduok v. Fulton Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 340 Ga. App. 205,212-213(3) (797 SE2d 133) (2017) (unsworn “declarationwas legally insufficient to satisfy Rule 25”); USCR 25.1, 25.2.
SLAY v. ROSS., --- S.E.2d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Slay then filed substantially the same motion to recuse thesenior judge in June 2024, again alleging that the judge's prioradverse rulings in cases involving his counsel, as well as theJQC grievance filed by his counsel, were evidence of thejudge's bias against him. Additionally, his counsel opined thatthe judge suffered from dementia.9 The trial court correctlydenied this motion because Slay again violated the proceduralrequirements of Rule 25 by failing to attach a sworn affidavitto the motion. Oduok, 340 Ga. App. at 212-13(3); USCR 25.1,25.2.*5 Later that same month, Slay filed a third motion,now seeking the permanent recusal of the judge based onsubstantially the same reasons as the prior two motions. Slayattached a sworn affidavit to this motion, in compliance withUSCR 25.1 and 25.2. However, the trial court deemed themotion untimely because it had not been filed within fivedays “after [the affiant] first learned of the alleged groundsfor disqualification.” Indeed, all of the grounds alleged in themotion and affidavit to show bias occurred well beyond thefive-day limitation period.10 And counsel's affidavit makesno showing to establish good cause for the late filing. SeeUSCR 25.1. Accordingly, the trial court committed no error indenying this motion as untimely. See Battlefield Invs. v. Cityof Lafayette, 326 Ga. App. 405, 408(2) (756 SE2d 639) (2014)(trial court properly denied motion to recuse as untimelywhere it was not filed within five days of knowledge ofalleged bias and without good cause for delay); Long v. State,324 Ga. App. 882, 895(5) (752 SE2d 54) (2013); USCR 25.1.Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Padgett, J., concur.All Citations--- S.E.2d ----, 2026 WL 656355Footnotes1Because this appeal involves a modification of child custody, we have jurisdiction over this direct appeal. See Voyles v.Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 45 (799 SE2d 160) (2017); OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11), (d).2Slay's brief purports to cite to these following cases: Waller v. Waller, 288 Ga. 164, 164-165 (2010); Johnson v. Johnson,286 Ga. 720, 721 (2010); Durden v. Barron, 287 Ga. 858 (2010); and In re Waitz, 255 Ga. 474 (1986), none of whichactually exist.3Slay misstates the holding of Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445 (588 SE2d 728) (2003). That opinion has no bearing on thecase at hand as it specifically dealt with “what weight should be given a custodial parent's move to another state in anaction seeking a change in primary physical custody.” Id. at 446.4The trial court's order briefly mentions OCGA § 19-6-2, but when the order is viewed in its entirety, it is clear the trialcourt mistakenly named this statute in place of OCGA § 19-6-15(k)(5). Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60(g), the trial courtmay correct this error upon the return of the remittitur.5The order addresses the parties’ contempt motions for violations of an order compelling discovery and for violations oforders entered in 2015 and 2018 — not the original divorce decree.6To the extent Slay contends that the trial court improperly based its fee award on a petition he had previously withdrawn,he fails to point to any such withdrawal in the record. Our review of the hearing transcripts contradicts this claim.7The trial court also found an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(a) was warranted on this ground, but,ultimately, did not award fees pursuant to this provision.8The judge stated on the record that he was not aware of the JQC grievance.9Counsel states that this diagnosis is based solely on her “personal and professional” opinion, and is thus unfounded.10In her affidavit, Slay's counsel surmises that the trial court and opposing counsel engaged in improper ex partecommunications because the trial court used opposing counsel's proposed order in denying the second motion to recuse— entered just days before the third motion was filed. But, “[a]llegations consisting of bare conclusions and opinionsthat the assigned judge is biased or prejudiced for or against a party, USCR 25.2, are not legally sufficient to support a
SLAY v. ROSS., --- S.E.2d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5recusal motion or to justify forwarding the motion for decision by another judge.”Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials,303 Ga. 764, 767(2) (815 SE2d 70) (2018). Moreover, the motion to recuse must be based on extra-judicial acts, andtherefore cannot be based on the issuance of an order. Echols v. Echols, 281 Ga. 546, 548(1)(a) (640 SE2d 257) (2007);USCR 25.2.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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