Washington v. Washington (2026)

Case details
Full caption
A26A0506. WASHINGTON v. WASHINGTON. MERCIER
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Georgia (GA)
Court
Georgia Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Mercier (J.), joined by Brown (C.J.), Rickman (P.J.)
FIFTH DIVISIONBROWN, C. J.,RICKMAN, P. J., and MERCIER, J.NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must bephysically received in our clerk’s office within tendays of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.https://www.gaappeals.gov/rulesJune 4, 2026In the Court of Appeals of GeorgiaA26A0506. WASHINGTON v. WASHINGTON.MERCIER, Judge.Shani Washington (“Mother”) and Jermel Washington (“Father”), who shareone minor child, N. W., were divorced in 2016, and Father was given primary physicalcustody of N. W. Mother later filed a motion to modify custody, which the trial courtdenied in a February 2024 order, but it modified the parenting plan. In August 2024, Father filed a motion for contempt asserting, inter alia, thatMother had failed to follow the February 2024 order regarding exchange locations fornon-school days. The trial court found Mother in civil contempt of the February 2024order and awarded Father attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-2. Mother filed this prose appeal of the trial court’s order, arguing that it erred by finding her in contempt,
that her due process rights were violated, that the trial court erred by excludingevidence, that the award of attorney fees was improper, that the order was improperand that cumulative error required reversal.1 As Mother has failed to show error, weaffirm the trial court’s order.2Although the parties shared joint legal custody of N. W., the trial court awardedprimary physical custody to Father and visitation to Mother. The parenting planprovided that non-school day exchanges of custody would occur at the ViningsVintage Clubhouse or Mother’s house. 1 As an initial matter, we are troubled by Mother’s citation to fictitious casesand fictitious quotations throughout her appellate brief. “Such ‘hallucinated’ casesare typically a hallmark of the irresponsible use of regenerative artificial intelligence(A.I.) in legal drafting.” Slay v. Ross, 379 Ga. App. 1, 1 (927 SE2d 569) (2026). WhileMother is pro se, she is nonetheless required to follow the rules of this Court, and wecaution her that any future filings in this Court containing fictitious cases and/orfictitious quotations may result in the imposition of sanctions against her. See Courtof Appeals Rule 7(e)(2) (“The panel of the Court ruling on a case, with or withoutmotion, may by majority vote to impose a penalty not to exceed $10,000 against anyparty and/or a party’s counsel in any civil case in which there is a direct appeal,application for discretionary appeal, application for interlocutory appeal, or motionthat is determined to be frivolous.”); Modi v. India-Am. Cultural Ass’n, 367 Ga. App.572, 574(2) (886 SE2d 378) (2023) (“Although [Appellant] is proceeding pro se, [she]is not relieved of [her] obligation to conform to this Court’s rules.”) (quotation marksomitted). 2 As we have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a)(11), wehereby deny the Father’s motion to dismiss.2
Mother filed a motion to modify custody, and the trial order entered an orderon February 13, 2024, which denied her motion to modify custody but modified theparenting plan, which included changing the exchange location for non-school daysto both parents’ houses. On August 19, 2024, Father filed a motion for both civil and criminal contemptalleging, inter alia, that Mother violated the February 2024 order by moving the non-school day exchange location, and he requested attorney fees.3 The trial court held a hearing on June 4, 2025, regarding the Father’s motionfor contempt, and both parents testified. Father testified that Mother failed to followthe custody exchange procedures in the February 2024 order. Instead, Mother tookN. W. to other locations for the exchange. Mother conceded that she refused toconduct the exchange at her house. However, she claimed that she did not act in“willful disobedience” of the February 2024 order, but, instead, she moved theexchange to public locations due to her “very tumultuous relationship” with Father. 3 On May 9, 2025, Mother filed a pro se motion to modify the custody exchangelocations, which remains pending. 3
The trial court found Mother “in willful [civil] contempt for failing to bring theminor child to the proper exchange location as outlined in the parties’ temporaryorder” and awarded Father attorney fees in the amount of $11,378.02.4 1. Mother argues that the trial court erred by finding her in civil contempt of theFebruary 2024 order. “The essence of civil contempt ... is willful disobedience of aprior court order. If there is any evidence in the record to support the trial judge’sdetermination that a party has willfully disobeyed a trial court’s order, the decision ofthe trial court will be affirmed on appeal.” Pate v. Pate, 280 Ga. 796, 798(3) (631 SE2d103) (2006) (citation omitted).Mother argues that her violations of the February 2024 order were “motivatedby anxiety and panic attacks arising from the prospect of conducting exchanges atprivate residences, given the parties’ history of domestic tension and firearmpossession [and] [t]hese safety considerations do not amount to willful defiance[.]”(emphasis omitted). The February 2024 order provided that:[t]he pick-up and drop location if school is not in session or during thesummer shall change to [the] following: the parent whose parenting timeis beginning shall pick up the minor child at the other parent’s residence.4 The trial court denied Father’s motion for criminal contempt. 4
The parties shall be courteous and remain in their vehicles to allow theminor child to come out to the parent’s car. Upon arrival, the partiesshall text the other parent they have arrived and are outside waiting. Evidence was given at the hearing that, after the February 2024 order, Mother wouldnot allow Father to pick up N. W. from her residence. Instead, Mother would driveto another location, and then tell Father to pick up N. W. from there. In one instance,Father arrived to Mother’s house to pick up N. W. and sent Mother a text messageinforming her that he had arrived. However, Mother drove out of her garage with N.W., proceeded to the library, and instructed Father to pick N. W. up there. While Mother may disagree with the February 2024 order, there was ampleevidence to support the trial court’s ruling that Mother acted in wilful disobedienceof the order by refusing to allow Father to pick up N. W. from her residence. As such,we affirm the trial court’s finding of contempt. See Pate, 280 Ga. at 798(3) (affirmedtrial court’s contempt order when there was evidence that husband understated hisgross income); Sullivan v. Harper, 352 Ga. App. 427, 435(2)(b) (834 SE2d 921) (2019)(evidence supported finding of contempt after mother requested to receiveconsultation from the child’s doctor prior to the release of information to the fatherbecause the divorce decree stated that neither parent would interfere with the other5
parent’s right to receive medical information – even though father received therecords the following day). 2. Mother agues that the trial court violated her due process rights by denyingher motion for continuance and proceeding with the contempt hearing over herobjection. Specifically, Mother contends that “[t]he denial of a continuance ...deprived [her] of her right to a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present herdefense, a procedural right guaranteed by both state and federal law.” (emphasisomitted). The respondent to a contempt proceeding must have “notice of the chargesand the opportunity for a hearing at a specific time and place.” Brown v. King, 266 Ga.890, 891(1) (472 SE2d 65) (1996). “To comport with due process, the notice of thehearing must be reasonable.” Id.It appears that an error occurred and electronic notice of the hearing, which wasissued in March 2025, was not sent to the parties. However, the trial court found that“the March 25th, 2025 Scheduling Order shows that notice was sent to the motherat her physical address listed on file as of the date of the Order.” Mother does notdispute that she received notice of the hearing at her physical address. Moreover, sheadmits that she knew of the June 4, 2025 hearing by at least May 19, 2025.6
Accordingly, Mother had notice at least 16 days prior to the contempt hearing. Suchnotice was sufficient to satisfy due process concerns. See Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga.107, 109(2) (549 SE2d 384) (2001) (“Notice of the hearing shall be served not laterthan five days before the time specified for the hearing.”) (quoting OCGA § 9-11-6(d)(punctuation omitted)); See also Hedquist v. Hedquist, 275 Ga. 188, 189 (563 SE2d854) (2002) (“personally serving a party with a motion for contempt and a rule nisi17 days before the show cause hearing complies with the notice requirements of dueprocess”). Mother’s due process rights were not violated, and the trial court did notabuse its discretion by denying her motion for continuance. See Pointer v. Roberts, 288Ga. 150, 152 (702 SE2d 130) (2010) (“The trial court’s discretion in granting orrefusing a continuance will not be interfered with by the appellate courts unless itclearly appears that the judge abused his [or her] discretion.”) (quotation marksomitted). 3. Mother contends that the trial court “committed reversible error byexcluding the affidavit of [her] treating therapist[,]” and refusing her proffer. “A trialcourt retains broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence,and an appellate court generally will not interfere with that discretion absent abuse.”7
Landry v. Walsh, 342 Ga. App. 283, 284(1) (801 SE2d 553) (2017) (quotation marksomitted). Initially, Mother argues that the trial court “refused to allow [her] to make aproper proffer of [the affidavit’s] substance for the appellate record.” However, afterthe Mother introduced the exhibit at the hearing, and opposing counsel objected, thetrial court questioned if the affidavit had been previously filed. The Mother concededthat the affidavit had already been filed. Therefore, Mother’s argument that the trialcourt refused her proffer fails.Further, setting aside whether the trial court erred when it excluded theaffidavit, any such error was harmless and presents no grounds for reversal. See Cookv. State, 312 Ga. 299, 302(2) (862 SE2d 510) (2021); See OCGA § 24-1-103(a)(2).Mother testified that she suffers from anxiety and post traumatic stress disorder, andthat her therapist informed her that the “exchanges heighten [her] anxiety and [her]PTSD.”5 In light of Mother’s testimony, it is highly unlikely that her therapist’saffidavit would have had any effect on the trial court’s finding of contempt. See id.(evidence was cumulative and highly unlikely to have had any effect on the verdict so5 Her therapist averred that “the current custodial exchange setting exacerbates[Mother’s] symptoms and poses an ongoing risk to her emotional well-being.” 8
any possible error in exclusion was harmless); Chatham v. Gardner Excavating, 353 Ga.App. 806, 808-09(1) (840 SE2d 46) (2020) (exclusion of evidence at contempthearing was, at most, harmless error when it was cumulative of other evidenceproperly before the court). 4. Mother argues that the trial court erred by awarding Father attorney feespursuant to OCGA § 19-6-2. However, in support of this argument, Mother cites fivefictitious cases and two real cases which provide no support for her enumerated error,Johnson v. Johnson, 260 Ga. 443 (396 SE2d 234) (1990) and Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga.296 (637 SE2d 716) (2006). Accordingly, she has abandoned this argument. See Porterv. State, 364 Ga. App. 465, 467(1) (875 SE2d 486) (2022) (appellant abandonedenumerated error by failing to provide legal citations in support, save one inappositecase); Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 110(2) (796 SE2d 489) (2017) (appellantabandoned enumerated error by failing to provide citation to legal authority insupport). 5. Mother argues that the trial court erred by using the following language in itscontempt order: “Pursuant to Franklin [v. Franklin, 294 Ga. 204 (751 SE2d 411)(2013)] and other applicable Georgia law, in the event of an appeal of this final order9
on contempt, the provisions of this order shall constitute a new temporary order(suspending all prior temporary or final relief to the contrary) during the pendency ofsuch appeal and the parties shall be bound by the terms even while an appeal ispending.” Mother argues that the trial court’s use of the above language “exceededits jurisdiction and improperly encroached upon the appellate process.” However,again, in support of this argument, Mother cites fictitious cases. Specifically, Mothercites three fictitious cases, and one inapposite case, Hawkins v. State, 130 Ga. App.426 (203 SE2d 622) (1973). Accordingly, she has abandoned this argument.6 SeePorter, 364 Ga. App. at 467(1); Nixon, 340 Ga. App. at 110(2). 6. Finally, Mother argues that the “cumulative procedural and evidentiaryerrors deprived [her] of a fundamentally fair hearing[.]” (emphasis omitted).However, “pretermitting whether cumulative error applies in civil cases, it appliesonly to errors in the evidentiary context[.]” Steusloff v. Finelli, 377 Ga. App. 154, 6 Of note, the Supreme Court in Franklin stated that a temporary order maybind “the parties pending decision and appeal of the final judgment and is enforceablethrough contempt proceedings pending review of the divorce judgment[.]” Id. at208(3) (quotation marks omitted).10
170(5) n.13 (921 SE2d 760) (2025). As Mother asserted only one evidentiary error,which failed, this claim also fails. Id. Judgment affirmed. Brown, C. J., and Rickman, P. J., concur.11
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access