In re W.G., No. 25-1916 (Apr. 1, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
In the Interest of W.G., Minor Child
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Iowa (IA)
Court
Iowa Supreme Court
Decided
Apr. 1, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Buller (J.) (unanimous Court)
Interest of W.G., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 892837Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTICE: FINAL PUBLICATION DECISION PENDINGCourt of Appeals of Iowa.In the INTEREST OF W.G., Minor Child,K.M., Potential-Intervenor-Appellant.No. 25-1916|Filed April 1, 2026Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, TheHonorable Angeline Johnston, Judge.AFFIRMEDAttorneys and Law FirmsK.M., Cedar Falls, self-represented potential-intervenor-appellant.Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, AssistantAttorney General, attorneys for appellee State.Robin L. Himes of Linn County Advocate, Cedar Rapids,attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Bullerand Sandy, JJ.OpinionBULLER, Judge.*1 In this case, we are asked: Can a biological parent whoserights to a child were terminated later intervene in the courtswhen that child is back in the juvenile-court system as a childin need of assistance (CINA)? We answer no, at least onthe facts present here—where the biological mother has norecent relationship with the child. And we address an issuewith artificial intelligence hallucinating case citations beforeassuming without deciding we can reach the merits.BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGSIn 2020, we affirmed on appeal the termination of K.M.’sparental rights to two children, including the child now knownas W.G. In re A.M., No. 20-0116, 2020 WL 1881109, at*1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020). Following termination ofK.M.’s rights, W.G. was adopted. Then, during a 2025 CINAcase relating to that placement, W.G. was removed from histhen-legal parents and they consented to termination of theirrights.At some point during this latest CINA case, the IowaDepartment of Health and Human Services (HHS) sent noticeof case developments to K.M. HHS now says that noticewas sent in error. Regardless, K.M. subsequently movedto intervene, claiming she should be considered a relativeof W.G. despite termination of her parental rights. Thecounty attorney and W.G.’s guardian ad litem both resisted.Following multiple hearings, due in part to recusal of the firstjuvenile judge at K.M.’s request, the juvenile court denied hermotion to intervene under the relevant statutory provisionsand rules of civil procedure.As to the statutory bases, the juvenile court recognized partiesgenerally may intervene in juvenile cases if they have astatutory right to be considered for custody. See In re B.B.M.,514 N.W.2d 425, 427–28 (Iowa 1994). As relevant here,the court considered whether K.M. was an “adult relative”under Iowa Code section 232.117(3)(b) (2025) or “fictivekin” under 232.117(3)(c). By definition, a “relative” does notinclude a parent (of the child or a sibling) whose parentalrights to the child at issue were previously terminated. IowaCode § 232.2(60). So the court ruled out the first provision.As for the second, “ ‘fictive kin’ means an adult personwho is not a relative of a child but who has an emotionallypositive significant relationship with the child or the child'sfamily.” Id. § 232.2(24); cf. In re L.P., ––– N.W.3d ––––,––––, 2026 WL 705431, at *10–12 (Iowa 2026) (discussing“fictive kin”). K.M. has no meaningful relationship with W.G.and hasn't since termination. So the juvenile court ruled outthis provision too.As for the rules of civil procedure, the juvenile court notedit had some discretion to permit K.M. to intervene even ifshe did not meet the statutory definitions. See Iowa R. Civ.P. 1.407(1). The court considered K.M.’s potential interest,including what if any of her legal rights the proceedingsmight affect. See In re A.G., 558 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa1997); B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d at 427–30. And the courtconcluded that K.M. lacked any definite interest that wouldsupport intervention because her parental rights to W.G. wereterminated.*2 K.M. appeals pro se.1
Interest of W.G., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ANDHALLUCINATED CASE CITATIONSAfter this case was transferred to our court, we discoveredthat K.M.’s petition on appeal appeared to have been draftedby or with the assistance of generative artificial intelligence(AI). It included at least one citation to a nonexistent Iowaappellate decision and asserted multiple propositions of lawthat were nowhere to be found in the cited authorities. Werecently addressed this issue in another case. See In re R.A,No. 24-1629, 2025 WL 2793560, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct.1, 2025). Most pertinent here, we note that using AI in legalmatters carries the risk of AI “hallucinating” or fabricatinglegal authorities that do not actually exist. See Thomas A.Mayes Artificial Intelligence, Special Education, and theLaw: Risks, Rewards, and Opportunities for Leadership, 20 J.Bus. & Tech. L. 115, 121–22 (2025) (“[AI] may ‘sometimeseven make up facts.’ This includes fabricating case citations,even if the proposition it is citing the case for is corrector misstating the holding of a case that exists.” (footnotesomitted)).Like in R.A., we entered an order here directing K.M. to filecopies of the problematic cases and providing that, if she wasunable to do so, she was required to disclose whether sheused AI to draft her petition on appeal. In her response to thecourt's order, K.M. admitted that the case we believed to behallucinated was in fact “non-existent” and her citation “d[id]not correspond to any Iowa appellate decision.” She alsoadmitted that AI led her to “attribut[e] specific propositions”of law to a case in which those propositions “do not appear.”And she disclosed that she prepared the petition using thepaid version of the AI tool Perplexity. See generally What IsPerplexity Pro?, Perplexity: Perplexity Help Center (Mar. 12,2026), https://perma.cc/5DAL-2LXN.K.M. went on to apologize to the court and opposing party,and she said that she believed she had verified the AI's legalcitations but now understood she “made mistakes.” She wrotethat she “accept[ed] full responsibility for these errors.” Andthat she “underst[ood] that it is [her] duty—even as a prose litigant—to independently verify that all case citations arereal, correctly cited, and accurately described before filingthem with the Court.”On her duty, K.M. is correct as a matter of law: evenself-represented litigants must “independently verify theauthenticity and veracity of all sources and assertions” in theircourt filings. See Luke v. Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs., 29N.W.3d 635, 636 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). This is because “Iowalaw dictates that [a pro se] brief is judged by the same standardas a brief filed by an Iowa lawyer. The law does not judge bytwo standards, one of lawyers and another for non-lawyers.”In re Est. of DeTar, 572 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa Ct. App.1997) (internal citation omitted). While we appreciate thatK.M. has expressly vowed, going forward, to independentlycheck and verify all citations in her filings, that is the bareminimum we expect from litigants.*3 In her response, K.M. recognized that filing pleadingswith fabricated citations is a serious matter and underminesthe “integrity of the judicial process.” We agree. K.M.’sfabricated citation has caused substantial expenditure ofjudicial resources and delayed resolution of this appeal.Last, K.M. asks that we allow her to “withdraw” herfabricated citation and decide this appeal on the merits. Wethink we would be justified in striking the entirety of herpetition on appeal and dismissing the appeal or summarilyaffirming the ruling below on that basis. Cf. id. at 181 (“Weare not bound to consider a party's position when the brief failsto comply with the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure.”).And in R.A., the sanction we imposed included striking theentirety of the problematic brief. 2025 WL 2793560, at *2–4. However, as a matter of grace and in an exercise ofour discretion, we elect a lesser sanction here. We strikethe problematic portions of K.M.’s petition on appeal andconsider only the arguments we can discern without the taintof the fabricated and false citations. We thus assume withoutdeciding we can reach the merits, in part to provide finalityon this issue to the child affected by this juvenile proceeding.MERITSHaving finished our detour to address the briefingmisconduct, we review the juvenile court's ruling for“correction of errors at law, giving some deference to thedistrict court's discretion.” A.G., 558 N.W.2d at 403. After anindependent review of the record, we agree with the juvenilecourt's statutory and rules-based analysis and discern no abuseof discretion.A biological parent who has no legal or recent relationshipwith a child does not qualify as either an “adult relative” or“fictive kin” as those terms are used in chapter 232. Nor does
Interest of W.G., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3such a biological parent have a sufficient legal interest in theproceedings to warrant intervention under the rules of civilprocedure. As a result, we affirm denial of K.M.’s motion tointervene under these circumstances.In addition to the statutory and rules-based arguments, we alsoexplicitly reject K.M.’s challenge concerning conduct of thefirst (recused) juvenile judge. K.M. made no objection belowto the second judge conducting a hearing, judicially noticingthe prior filings, and ruling on the merits of her motion.Therefore any allegation that the second judge's ruling wassomehow tainted by the alleged problems with the first judgeis unpreserved and cannot be considered by us on appeal.Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).Last, we observe that many of K.M.’s scattershot complaintsare unpreserved or not properly brought in this appeal fromdenial of her motion to intervene. For example, the legalpreference for placing siblings together is irrelevant to thatorder, as W.G.’s placement is not before this court. Andbecause she has no parental rights to W.G., HHS had noduty to make reasonable efforts toward reunifying K.M. withW.G., and we have nothing on that issue to review. Similarly,whether HHS correctly or incorrectly gave K.M. notice ofthe CINA case has nothing to do with the legal question ofwhether she may be a statutory or rules-based intervenor.To the extent K.M. makes any other challenges we do notexpressly reject in this opinion, we deny them as meritless,unpreserved, waived, or some combination of those.DISPOSITION*4 Based on K.M.’s court-ordered response addressingfabricated and inaccurate case citations generated by AI, westrike the portions of her petition on appeal containing theproblematic citations. Assuming without deciding we canreach the merits of her argument, we affirm the juvenilecourt's denial of K.M.’s motion to intervene.AFFIRMED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 892837 (Table)Footnotes1We assume without deciding that K.M.’s appeal of the motion-to-intervene ruling may proceed as a matter of right or bydiscretionary review. We have some concern about the potential consequences of recognizing appeal as a matter of rightin these circumstances, as we do not believe the General Assembly contemplated a parent whose rights were terminatedcould file endless motions to intervene or as-of-right appeal the same. Since neither party contests appellate jurisdiction,we leave this question for another day, and we grant extraordinary review to the extent necessary.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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