nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Hofco, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 482 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1992). The resisting party should be afforded every legitimate inference that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence. Id. A fact question is generated if reasonable minds could differ on how the issue should be resolved. Hoefer v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass’n Trust, 470 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa 1991).
II. Kubik argues section 668.11 should not apply in this case. He states he relied on Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 136(b), which does not set any specific time limits for designating experts. He states that because he was a pro se litigant and untrained in the law, the fact he relied on rule 136(b) should constitute good cause for his failure to comply with section 668.11.
The district court has broad discretion in ruling on the issue of whether good cause has been shown.1 Hantsbarger v. Coffin, 501 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Iowa 1993). The exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be disturbed unless it was exercised on clearly untenable grounds or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id.
Our supreme court in Hantsbarger stated:
We next look to the objectives of section 668.11. We have previously stated that the legislative intent for establishing deadlines in professional liability actions was to provide certainty about the identity of experts and prevent last minute dismissals when an expert cannot be found. Cox v. Jones, 470 N.W.2d 23, 25-26 (Iowa 1991). We have also stated:
Early disposition of potential nuisances eases, and those which must ultimately be dismissed for lack of expert testimony, would presumably have a positive impact on the cost and availability of medical services.
Thomas v. Fellows, 456 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 1990). Section 668.11 is designed to require a plaintiff to have his or her proof prepared at an early stage in the litigation in order that the professional does not have to spend time, effort and expense in defending a frivolous action.
Hantsbarger, 501 N.W.2d at 504.
We do not utilize a deferential standard when persons choose to represent themselves. Metropolitan Jacobson Development Venture v. Board of Review, 476 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa App.1991). The law does not judge by two standards, one for lawyers and another for lay persons. Id. Rather, all are expected to act with equal competence. Id. If lay persons choose to proceed pro se, they do so at their own risk. Id.
In Thomas v. Fellows, 456 N.W.2d 170, 171-172 (Iowa 1990), plaintiffs sought to show good cause for failing to comply with section 668.11 by arguing that their attorney was unaware of the designation requirements of section 668.11 because it is not in the rules of civil procedure governing discovery. The supreme court found plaintiffs had failed to show good cause. Id. at 172. Good cause under section 668.11 must be more than an excuse, a plea, apology, extenuation, or some justification for the resulting effect. Id.
We conclude the district court acted well within its discretion in finding Kubik had failed to show good cause for failing to comply with section 668.11. A claim that an attorney was unaware of section 668.11 has not been accepted as a sufficient good cause for fading to comply with that section. Id. We cannot treat Kubik, as a pro se litigant, any differently.
III. Kubik contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Burk. He states he should have been permitted to proceed with his case without an expert. Kubik believes Burk’s negligence was so obvious and outrageous a layperson could understand it without the assistance of an expert.
We agree with Mr. Kubik that a lawyer has a duty to his client to exercise ordinary care in handling the client’s work. Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa
1
See Thomas v. Fellows, 456 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1990), where our supreme court stated, "The plaintiff’s failure to raise the issue of abuse of discretion in his appeal brief could be deemed to waive the issue. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3).” Like in Thomas, we will address the issue.