Chenco v. Do-Fluoride, No. 2:24-cv-00632-AKB (Aug. 22, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
D. Idaho. CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH v. DO-FLUORIDE NEW MATERIALS CO. LTD
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Idaho (ID)
Court
Idaho Supreme Court
Decided
Aug. 22, 2025
Disposition
Remanded
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2430556Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Idaho.CHENCO ENGINEERING &CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff,v.DO-FLUORIDE NEW MATERIALS CO.LTD.; DO-FLUORIDE NEWENERGYTECHNOLOGY CO. LTD.; LILINGYUN (A/K/A MICHELLE LI); and LI YUNFENG, Defendants.Case No. 2:24-cv-00632-AKB|Filed 08/22/2025MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDERAmanda K. Brailsford U.S. District Court Judge*1 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Chenco Engineering& Consulting GmbH's Motion to Remand (Dkt. 24) andDefendant Do-Fluoride New Materials Co. LTD.’s Motion forLeave of Court to File Sur-Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff'sMotion to Remand (Dkt. 34). Having reviewed the recordand the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that the factsand legal argument are adequately presented, and that oralargument would not significantly aid its decision-makingprocess, and it decides the motions on the record. Dist. IdahoLoc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b)(“By rule or order, the court may provide for submittingand determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”).For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants PlaintiffChenco's motion to remand and denies Defendant Do-Fluoride New Materials’ motion for leave to file a surreply.I. BACKGROUNDA. Factual BackgroundThis case arises out of an action in state court. PlaintiffChenco Engineering & Consulting GmbH (“Chenco”) isa German chemical engineering company, organized underthe laws of Germany, and with a registered office inRegensburg, Germany (Dkt. 11-14 at 1). Chenco specializesin “developing and licensing technology for fluorine-basedchemical production facilities” (id. at 9). Defendant Do-Fluoride New Materials Co., Ltd. (“New Materials”) is aChinese corporation, organized under the laws of China, withits principal place of business in Jiaozuo, Henan Province,China (id. at 2).1 Defendant Do-Fluoride New Energy(“New Energy”) is also a Chinese corporation, organizedunder the laws of China, with its principal place of businessin Jiaozuo, Henan Province, China (id. at 3). DefendantsLi Yunfeng and his sister, Li Lingyun (a/k/a Michelle Li)(hereinafter, the “Li Siblings”), are both Chinese nationals(id. ¶¶ 4, 5). Chenco alleges that Li Yunfeng is the legalrepresentative of New Materials, that both Li Siblings haveties to New Materials and/or New Energy, and both LiSiblings exercise some level of control over New Materialsand/or New Energy's assets (id. at 5; Dkt. 24-1 at 5).Chenco's state complaint alleges the following: On December11, 2005, Chenco and New Materials entered a contractto set up an aluminum fluoride production plant usingChenco's proprietary technology (Dkt. 11-14 at 12). Afterestablishing the factory, New Materials misappropriatedChenco's proprietary technology and built four additionalplants without compensating Chenco, in violation of theparties’ contract (id. at 13). The parties engaged inarbitration before the International Chamber of Commercearbitral tribunal (“ICC Panel”) in Zurich, Switzerland (id.at ¶¶ 14-17). On May 15, 2013, the ICC Panel issued itsFinal Award (“Arbitration Award”), which awarded damagesto Chenco for New Materials’ unauthorized use of Chenco'stechnology, among other penalties, fees, and costs (id. at 20).*2 New Energy and New Materials attest that on May 26,2015, Chenco applied for recognition and enforcement ofthe Arbitration Award in the Xinxiang Intermediate People'sCourt of Henan Province (the “Xinxiang Judgment”), butChenco received an unfavorable decision (Dkt. 30 at 3; Dkt.32 at 3). Chenco submits that in 2018, it applied to recognizethe Arbitration Award in the United Kingdom (Dkt. 11-14at 22). On June 22, 2020, the U.K. High Court entered anorder in Chenco's favor and ordered additional payments forChenco (the “U.K. Judgments”) (id. at ¶¶ 21-25). Chencoalleges that New Materials appeared in the proceedings, didnot request to set aside the U.K. Judgments, and did not appealthe U.K. Judgments (id. at ¶¶ 22, 28).Since obtaining the U.K. Judgments, Chenco alleges thatNew Materials has evaded payment and continues to accrueadditional costs, which as of October 16, 2023, total$11,249,540.20 (id. at 32; Dkt. 24-1 at 4). Chenco filed itsfirst complaint in state district court on September 18, 2023
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2(Dkt. 2-2) (citing case number CV28-23-5986). Chenco'sstate action sought to enforce and collect on the U.K.Judgments under Idaho's Uniform Foreign Country MoneyJudgments Recognition Act (Dkt. 11-14 at ¶¶ 59-66) (citingIdaho Code §§ 10-1401, et seq.). Chenco alleges NewMaterials and New Energy have assets in Idaho, includingliquid funds currently held by Idaho-based Kore Power, Inc.,which is controlled by Li Lingyun and is 14 percent owned byNew Materials (Dkt. 11-14 at ¶¶ 4 (“Defendant Li Lingyun ...[is] a director of Idaho-based Kore Power, Inc.”), 40, 71).Chenco asserts that Kore Power has raised at least $75 millionfrom investors and received a conditional loan commitmentfrom the U.S. Department of Energy for $850 million; NewMaterials and/or New Energy had received $45 million fromKore Power in the first half of 2023; and when Chencosought to enforce the U.K. Judgments in Idaho, Kore Power'spayments to New Materials and/or New Energy ceased (id. at¶¶ 41, 71).Chenco also moved for injunctive relief in state court toprevent New Materials and New Energy from removing,authorizing, or directing the transfer of assets out ofIdaho (id. at ¶¶ 67-72). Chenco attests that as litigationcontinued, it became aware of the “intertwined finances”between New Materials and New Energy (Dkt. 24-1 at 5).Chenco eventually filed an amended complaint that sought adeclaratory judgment under Idaho Code § 10-1201 that NewMaterials and New Energy are alter egos and that the debtsof New Materials may be collected from New Energy (Dkt.11-14 at ¶¶ 73-76). Chenco also added claims for tortiousinterference and civil conspiracy against the Li Siblings, who(according to Chenco) moved assets amongst New Materials,New Energy, and Kore Power after Chenco filed the instantcase (Dkt. 11-14 at ¶¶ 77-84; Dkt. 24-1 at 5).This case had been pending for about fifteen months in statecourt before New Materials and New Energy sought removal.Chenco filed its initial complaint on September 18, 2023 (Dkt.6-2). New Energy responded by filing a motion to dismissChenco's state complaint (Dkt. 7-6) and then filed an amendedmotion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment (Dkt.9-12). The state district court denied New Energy's motionsto dismiss and deferred ruling on its motion for summaryjudgment (Dkt. 11-13). New Energy applied for permissionto seek an interlocutory appeal from the state district court'sdenial of its motions to dismiss (Dkt. 11-18), and the statedistrict court denied permission (Dkt. 12-2). New Energy thenapplied to appeal directly to the Idaho Supreme Court (Dkt.12-4; Dkt. 12-5), and the Court denied that request (Dkt.13-1).*3 On July 24, 2024, New Energy filed a second motionfor summary judgment (Dkt. 14-7; Dkt. 14-8). It argued,among other issues, that the U.K. Judgments conflict with theXinxiang Judgment and cannot be recognized under state law;Chenco did not file its claims within the applicable statute oflimitations; Chenco's alter-ego claim is “derivative”; the U.K.Judgments should not be recognized because New Energywas not afforded due process; and adequate alternative forumsexists (including China, the U.K., and Switzerland) (Dkt.14-7).The state district court denied New Energy's summaryjudgment motion in its entirety (Dkt. 15-23). New Energyagain applied for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal tothe Idaho Supreme Court (Dkt. 15-25), which the state districtcourt again denied (Dkt. 15-40 at 9-12) (“New Energy'sargument that it is not the party resisting the recognition of theU.K. Judgment is without merit .... This Court does not findthat an appeal, which would delay the already beleaguereddiscovery process in this matter, materially advance[s] theorderly resolution of the litigation. Lastly, the Court findsNew Energy's argument that this permissive appeal will notcause delay in this litigation to be unpersuasive and basedupon incorrect factual representations.”). Again, New Energysought to appeal directly to the Idaho Supreme Court (Dkt.15-42), which the Supreme Court denied (Dkt. 15-51).In November 2024, the state district court granted Chenco'smotion for alternative service on the Li Siblings, who hadyet to appear in the case (Dkt. 15-48). Specifically, thestate district court authorized Chenco to complete serviceby publication (id.). Up until December 2024, Chenco andNew Materials engaged in a series of contentious discoverydisputes (see, e.g., Dkt. 15-45 at 5) (summarizing Chenco'sdescription of New Energy's counsel's remarks to opposingcounsel, including “tough shit” and “way to go hot shot,”before abruptly ending a discovery call). Following the mostrecent motions practice on discovery, the state district courtordered the parties to meet and confer before Chenco soughtits fourth motion to compel, though the court acknowledgedNew Energy's apparent lack of good faith in cooperating withdiscovery (id. at 10) (“[T]he court finds that New Energy'sprevious history of delaying responses to discovery, coupledwith New Energy's insistence of a detailed letter identifyingthe specific disputed discovery after the meet and confer, isalso not indicative of good faith.”). Chenco represents that it
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3continued to attempt to meet and confer with New Energy'scounsel, though New Energy's counsel said he would not beavailable in December (Dkt. 24-1 at 7).B. Procedural BackgroundOn December 30, 2024, New Energy filed its first notice ofremoval to this Court (Dkt. 1). New Energy's notice reliedupon diversity jurisdiction as its basis for removal (id. at 5). Chenco's counsel represents that it communicated to NewEnergy that this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction becauseall parties are foreign entities or individuals (Dkt. 24-1 at2). Given the issues with establishing diversity jurisdiction,Chenco requested the parties stipulate to a remand backto the state district court (id.). New Energy's counsel (alsoappearing on behalf of the Li Siblings) filed a motion todismiss the Li Siblings for lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkt.17). Shortly after, New Energy filed an amended notice ofremoval (Dkt. 18). New Energy's amended notice allegesthe action is removable under 9 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 205because the action “relates to an arbitration agreement oraward falling under the [New York] Convention” and that itis removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1603 because New Energy“is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign government withimmunity” (Dkt. 18 at 3). Thereafter, New Materials filed itsown notice of removal based on §§ 203 and 205 (Dkt. 20).*4 Chenco filed a motion requesting that the Court staythe briefing deadlines for the Li Siblings’ motion to dismissbecause the Court should first address whether it has subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear this case (Dkt. 22 at 3). Chencorepresented that it would timely file a motion to remand basedon lack of subject matter jurisdiction (id.). The Court grantedChenco's motion to stay the deadlines pending the Court'sdecision on Chenco's forthcoming motion to remand (Dkt.23). Shortly after, Chenco filed its motion to remand (Dkt.24). New Energy and New Materials responded with separatebriefs in opposition to Chenco's motion to remand (Dkt. 30;Dkt. 32). Roughly a month after Chenco submitted its replyin support of its motion to remand (Dkt. 31), New Materialsfiled a motion for leave to file a surreply so it could address“legal misstatements and omissions” in Chenco's reply (Dkt.34 at 1).II. LEGAL STANDARDFederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, havingsubject matter jurisdiction only over matters the Constitutionand Congress have authorized. Kokkonen v. Guardian LifeIns. Co. v. Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “[A]ny civil actionbrought in a State court of which the district courts of theUnited States have original jurisdiction, may be removed bythe defendant or the defendants, to the district court of theUnited States for the district and division embracing the placewhere such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). If at anytime before final judgment it appears that the district courtlacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Given the “strong presumption” againstremoval jurisdiction, a defendant “always has the burden ofestablishing that removal is proper.” Mullis v. J.P. MorganChase & Co., No. 3:24-CV-01334-JES-MSB, 2024 WL5004528, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2024) (quoting Gaus v.Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), codified under title9 of the U.S. Code, governs arbitration-related litigation infederal court. Padilla Ayala v. Teledyne Def. Elecs., 533 F.Supp. 3d 920, 923 (C.D. Cal. 2021). Following the UnitedStates’ accession to the Convention on the Recognitionand Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “NewYork Convention” or “Convention”), Congress adopted whatis now Chapter 2 under title 9. See 9 U.S.C. § 201, etseq.; id. (internal citations omitted). Section 205 providesfederal courts with removal jurisdiction “[w]here the subjectmatter of an action or proceeding pending in a State courtrelates to an arbitration agreement or award falling underthe Convention ....” 9 U.S.C. § 205 (emphasis added).Federal courts interpreting the phrase “relates to” haveassigned it a “plainly broad” meaning. Infuturia Glob. Ltd. v.Sequus Pharms., Inc., 631 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011).Specifically, an action “relates to” an arbitral agreement oraward under the Convention when the agreement or award“could conceivably affect the outcome of the plaintiff's case.”Id. (quoting Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir.2002)).The removing party “bear[s] the burden of establishingfederal jurisdiction” under § 205. Mullis, 2024 WL 5004528,at *2 (quoting Freaner v. Valle, No. 11CV1819, 2011 WL5596919, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2011)). A districtcourt may exercise its discretion in considering whether theremoving party has met this burden or if it lacks jurisdictionto hear the case. See Totalenergies Renewables USA, LLC v.Trina Solar (U.S.), Inc., No. 22-16763, 2023 WL 8821328,at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2023) (“Because its analysis hingedon whether an arbitration agreement related to the dispute forthe purpose of 9 U.S.C. § 205, the district court's order can be
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4colorably characterized as a remand for lack of subject matterjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) .... Section 1447(d)precludes our review.... The FAA alone does not providesufficient grounds here for appellate jurisdiction since ‘[t]heprocedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by lawshall apply’ [under § 205].”).III. ANALYSISC. Defendant Do-Flouride New Materials’ Motion forLeave to File Surreply*5 As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses NewMaterials’ motion for leave to file a surreply in oppositionto Chenco's remand motion. New Materials asks the courtfor permission to file a surreply to “address new legalmisstatements and omissions” in Chenco's briefing on thepending motion for remand (Dkt. 34 at 1). While the Court didnot discover any misstatements from Chenco's counsel, theCourt has found New Materials’ motion contains at least fivecase quotations that do not exist. Specifically, New Materialsprovides purported direct quotes from the following cases:(1) Quoting Jones Day v. Orrick, Herrington & SutcliffeLLP, 42 F.4th 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2022), as stating “acase need only relate to an arbitration agreement in thebroadest sense” to be removable under § 205 (Dkt. 34at 7). This quoted phrase appears nowhere in the case.(2) Quoting Jones Day, 42 F.4th at 1138 as stating ifa Convention award “does not appear on the face ofthe complaint,” the presence of a “colorable defenserelating to the award” is enough to keep it in federalcourt (Dkt. 34 at 11). These quoted phrases appearnowhere in the case.(3) Quoting C.B.F. Industria de Gusa S/A v. AMCIHoldings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 2017) asstating “recognition of a foreign arbitral award andrecognition of a foreign judgment enforcing thataward are not mutually exclusive categories.” (Dkt. 34at 8). This quoted phrase appears nowhere in the case.(4) Quoting National Aluminum Co., Ltd. v. PeakChemical Corporation, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 990,997 (N.D. Ill. 2015) as stating state law judgmentrecognition statutes “do not override the provisionsof the New York Convention or the FAA when thosefederal laws govern the underlying dispute.” (Dkt. 34at 8). This quoted phrase appears nowhere in the case.(5) Quoting Infuturia Glob. Ltd. v. Sequus Pharms., Inc.,631 F.3d 1133, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 2011) as stating“[r]emoval is proper even if the arbitration clauseor award is raised in the defense, rather than thecomplaint” (Dkt. 34 at 9). This quoted phrase appearsnowhere in the case.New Materials’ brief also contains several other citationerrors (see, e.g., Dkt. 34 at 10) (citing Int'l Trading & Indus.Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aerospace Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d 12,19-20 (D.D.C. 2011), for the proposition that courts recognizethe importance of the three-year statute of limitations periodunder 9 U.S.C. § 207, despite that the case does not addressthe statute of limitations).Counsel should take seriously its obligation to providethe Court with an accurate description of the law. See,e.g., United States v. Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (E.D.Cal. 2025) (levying $1,500 in monetary sanctions againstcounsel personally for fictitious cases and quotations that thecourt suspected were produced using artificial intelligence),reconsideration denied, No. 2:24-CR-0280-DJC, 2025 WL1067323 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2025); Grant v. City of LongBeach, 96 F.4th 1255 (9th Cir. 2024) (striking an appellant'sbrief and dismissing an appeal for materially misrepresentingor fabricating case citations). After New Materials freelyaccused opposing counsel of misstating the law, NewMaterials’ submission of non-existent quotes is troubling(Dkt. 30 at 5 (“Chenco's argument for remand collapsesunder the weight of its own misreading of the law”); id.at 7 (“Chenco fundamentally misrepresents the applicableremoval standard”); Dkt. 34 at 1 (“The proposed sur-reply ...is necessary to address new legal misstatements ....”); id. at2-3 (“Chenco's failure to address this standard ... misstatescontrolling law and warrants correction.”)). Accordingly, theCourt reminds counsel of their duties to act according to theIdaho Rules of Professional Conduct.2*6 Turning to the merits, the Court finds New Materials’surreply arguments are unpersuasive. Surreplies are “highlydisfavored, as they usually are a strategic effort by thenonmoving party to have the last word on a matter.” Simsv. Paramount Gold & Silver Corp., No. CV 10-356-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 5364783, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2010)(quoting In re Enron Corp. Sec., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 n.4(S.D. Tex. 2006)). The moving party should identify in hismotion the new arguments he alleges the opposing party raisesand why the arguments justify granting leave to file a surreply.Edwards v. Mondora, 700 F. App'x 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2017).
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Here, New Materials neither identifies the ‘new arguments’from Chenco that warrant a surreply nor identifies a genuinemisstatement by Chenco (Dkt. 34). Rather, New Materialssummarizes its understanding of the § 205 removal standard,how New Materials’ defenses justify removal, and attemptsto “clarify the federal nature of Chenco's claim” (id. at 3).Even if the Court were to grant leave to file a surreply, thesearguments are either summaries or variations of argumentsraised in New Materials’ principal response brief, whichthe Court has already considered. As the Court explainsbelow, those arguments do not justify removal. Accordingly,the Court denies New Materials’ motion for leave to file asurreply.D. Chenco's Motion to Remand1. Removal Jurisdiction Under § 205Chenco moves to remand this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1447because the Court lacks removal jurisdiction over this case(Dkt. 24). In responding to Chenco's motion, New Energyhas withdrawn its earlier argument that it may removeunder 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 and 1603 because New Energy isan “instrumentality of a foreign state” (Dkt. 32 at 14-15)(“New Energy is not arguing removal based on 28 U.S.C.§§ 1330 and 1603 in response to the motion to remand”).As a result, the parties’ outstanding disagreement concernsremoval under 9 U.S.C. § 205. Section 205 provides that adefendant may remove an action previously filed in state courtif “the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in aState court relates to an arbitration agreement or award fallingunder the Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 205; see Cerner MiddleE. Ltd. v. Balbadi Enters. LLC, 939 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir.2019).New Materials and New Energy submit parallel briefingopposing Chenco's motion to remand (Dkt. 30; Dkt. 32).Given the complexity of this case and the parties’ overlappingarguments, the Court organizes these arguments into fivecategories: (1) whether the case “relates to” an arbitrationagreement or award under the Convention; (2) distinctionsbetween arbitral awards and foreign judgments for purposesof removal under § 205; (3) a defendant's ability to removeunder § 205 based on a defense; (4) the degree to which acourt must “strictly” or “broadly” construe the § 205 removalstatute; (5) federalism concerns; and (6) waiver of removalunder § 205. The Court addresses these issues below andconcludes that remand is proper because the Defendants havenot met their burden of showing the Court has removaljurisdiction under § 205.a. Whether the State District Court Action “Relatesto an Arbitration Agreement or Award” falling Underthe New York ConventionSection 205, Title 9 of the U.S. Code provides federal courtswith removal jurisdiction “[w]here the subject matter ofan action or proceeding pending in a State court relatesto an arbitration agreement or award falling under theConvention ....” (emphasis added). The statute's key phrase is“relates to,” which courts have found to be “plainly broad.”Infuturia, 631 F.3d at 1137 (explaining the “critical phrase”in the statute is “relates to”). An action “relates to” anarbitration agreement or award if it “could conceivably affectthe outcome of the plaintiff's case.” Id. at 1138 (citing Beiser,284 F.3d at 669). “The ‘relates to’ and ‘conceivably affect’standard may be broad, but it is not limitless.” Cerner, 939F.3d at 1016. Where “no close reading of the arbitrationagreement or award is required,” removal under § 205 isimproper. Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank of China, 740 F.Supp. 2d 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The incantation of theword ‘arbitration’ somewhere in the record of a case doesnot convey federal jurisdiction.”). “The possibility that somediscussion in the Award might conceivably be perceived aspersuasive—just as a law review article might be persuasive—cannot be enough by itself.” Cerner, 939 F.3d at 1016.*7 New Energy argues that this action “relates to” anarbitration agreement or award and that “Chenco intentionallydoes not apprise the Court of other proceedings and facts”that support this point (Dkt. 32 at 6). New Energy explainsthat in 2017, the Xinxiang Intermediate People's Courtof Henan Province issued the Xinxiang Judgment (id.).According to New Energy, Chenco was unhappy with theresult, began “forum shopping,” and obtained the U.K.Judgments (id.). New Energy questions the validity of theU.K. Judgments, calling them a “Secondary Judgment,” andsubmits it “require[s] litigation that relates to the underlyingArbitration Agreement and Award” (id. at 7-8). New Energydoes not elaborate on how this “Secondary Judgment”argument invokes the underlying Arbitration Agreement andAward, or how it “relates to” an arbitral award under theConvention.Similarly, New Materials argues the U.K. Judgments“implicate[ ] the Agreement/Award and require[ ]judicial interpretation of the Convention's enforcementprovisions” (Dkt. 30 at 9). New Materials asserts that Chencoviolated the Convention by seeking the U.K. Judgments,which are from a “secondary jurisdiction” (id. at 2).
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Like New Materials, New Energy broadly references the“secondary jurisdiction” of the U.K. Judgments withoutidentifying the specific conflict with the Convention'senforcement provisions or submitting any authority thatsuggests a conflict exists (see, e.g., id.) (describing secondaryjurisdiction judgments as “uniquely localized” and unable tobe enforced globally without invoking any specific term ofthe Convention, the arbitration award or agreement, or otherstate or federal authority).Under the “relates to” text in § 205, the dispositive inquiryis whether the Arbitration Agreement or Award couldconceivably affect the outcome of the case (Dkt. 33 at 2).Here, Chenco is seeking to enforce the U.K. Judgmentsunder Idaho law, not under the Convention or the terms ofthe Arbitration Award. Neither Defendant explains how analleged conflict between the Xinxiang Judgment and the U.K.Judgments invokes a specific term of the Convention, or howthe Arbitration Award or Agreement bears on any conflictwith the U.K. Judgments. Likewise, neither Defendantcites authority explaining how questions of “secondary”jurisdiction bear on the Court's removal authority under §205. Additionally, to the degree either Defendant suggeststhe U.K. Judgments are questionable, Chenco responds “DFDaffirmatively consented to the jurisdiction of the U.K. Courtto render the [U.K. Judgments]” (id. at 3). At the core of thisaction, the parties disagree over the U.K. Judgments, whichChenco seeks to enforce under Idaho law. Accordingly, theCourt does not find Defendant's arguments met their burdenof showing the instant case relates to an arbitral award oragreement under the Convention.b. “Foreign Judgments” Versus “Arbitral Awards”Generally, the recognition of foreign judgments is an issue ofstate law. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Lawof the United States § 481 cmt. a. (1987) (“[R]ecognition andenforcement of foreign country judgments is a matter of Statelaw, and an action to enforce a foreign country judgment is notan action arising under the laws of the United States. Thus,State courts, and federal courts applying State law, recognizeand enforce foreign country judgments without reference tofederal rules.”); see also Midbrook Flowerbulbs Holland B.V.v. Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 615 n.12 (9thCir. 2017) (explaining state law controls the recognition offoreign judgments in federal diversity cases).Federal courts have recognized the “conceptual difference”between foreign court judgments and arbitral awards.Commissions Import Export S.A. v. Republic of the Congo,757 F.3d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“State courts have longrecognized the conceptual difference between arbitral awardsand foreign court judgments on arbitral awards ... and treatedforeign court judgments on awards as enforceable understate law.”) (internal citations omitted); see also AmaplatMauritius, Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Dev. Corp., 663 F. Supp.3d 11, 32 (D.D.C. 2023) (“Plaintiffs have brought an actionunder the D.C. Judgments Recognition Act to recognize andenforce the Zambian judgment, which itself confirms theunderlying arbitral award.”).*8 Courts have further distinguished foreign courtjudgments from arbitral awards in the context of the FAAand the Convention. For example, the Court of Appealsfor the D.C. Circuit recognized that foreign judgments arenot subject to the limitations of the Convention, such asthe Convention's three-year limitations period. CommissionsImport Export, 757 F.3d at 328. The Second Circuit alsodistinguished between arbitral awards and foreign judgmentswhen it concluded the FAA did not preempt state laws onrecognizing foreign judgments. Island Territory of Curacaov. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1973)(“It is not insignificant that the Federal Arbitration Act itselfmakes a very clear distinction between action on an awardand action on a judgment enforcing the award .... We hold,then, that ... New York state law is not preempted to the extentthat it permits, regulates and establishes a procedure for theenforcement of the foreign money judgment.”).Chenco relies on Seetransport Wiking TraderSchiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaftv. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 582 (2d Cir.1993), to argue that there is a distinction between foreignjudgments based on arbitral awards and the independentrecognition of arbitral awards (Dkt. 33 at 5) (citingSeetransport). The Second Circuit in Seetransport provided“unlike the recognition of arbitral awards, which is governedby federal law, the recognition of foreign judgments isgoverned by state law.” 989 F.2d at 582. Chenco explainsthat under Idaho law, once a foreign judgment is recognized,“it is enforceable in the forum state in accordance with theprocedures for enforcement in the forum state and to thesame extent that a judgment of the forum state would beenforceable.” (Dkt. 33 at 5) (citing I.C. § 10-1407, cmt. 3). Chenco emphasizes that its Second Amended Complaintis based solely on Idaho state law (id.). To the extent eitherparty suggests Chenco was obligated to seek confirmationof the U.K. Judgments in Switzerland, Chenco asserts thisis contrary to established law (Dkt. 33 at 5) (citing C.B.F.
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7Industria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58,79 (2d Cir. 2017)) (“For the foregoing reasons, we hold thatthe district court erred in dismissing appellants’ EnforcementAction because: (1) appellants are not required to bring anaction to confirm their foreign arbitral award before they canseek to enforce it ....”).New Energy does not address Chenco's distinction betweenforeign judgments and arbitral awards. Separately, NewMaterials claims Chenco's distinction between “judgment”and “arbitration award[s]” is “an appeal to semantics” (Dkt.30 at 12). Throughout its briefing, New Materials arguesthe U.K. Judgments are “intertwined with the arbitrationagreement, arbitral award, and the treaty framework” (see,e.g., id.). As support, New Materials cites AMCI Holdings,Inc., 850 F.3d at 71, to argue “recognition of a foreignjudgment confirming an arbitration award remains subject tothe FAA and the New York Convention” (Dkt. 30 at 12).3No party here is seeking confirmation of the ArbitrationAward in Idaho state district court; Chenco is only seekingrecognition and enforcement of the U.K. Judgments. To theextent New Energy represents the state action implicatesan arbitral award and not a foreign judgment, this conflictswith New Energy's own representations in state court (see,e.g., Dkt. 14-7 at 2 (New Energy argues “Chenco's claimsagainst New Energy all arise from its request to have theCourt recognize a Foreign Country Money Judgment it claimsto have.”); Dkt. 15-43 at 3 (New Energy describing themain legal issue as “whether a foreign judgment should berecognized under I.C. § 10-1404 where there is undisputedevidence showing conflicting judgment amounts issued bymultiple foreign courts.”)).*9 Relatedly, New Materials suggests Chenco's “foreignjudgement” characterization is only an attempt to avoid thethree-year statute of limitations for arbitral actions underthe FAA (Dkt. 30 at 4) (“By structuring its claim as anenforcement action for a foreign judgment rather than anarbitral award, Chenco avoided directly addressing the FAA'sthree-year statute of limitations.”). New Materials providesno authority suggesting that Chenco's action is not actuallya foreign judgment action; the FAA's three-year statute oflimitations should apply to a foreign judgment; or the FAApreempts Idaho state law regarding foreign judgments. TheCourt is unaware of any instance where a federal court hasfound the FAA preempts state law on enforcing foreignjudgments, including the imposition of the FAA's three-yearstatute of limitations. See Island Territory of Curacao, 489F.2d at 1319 (explaining “the Convention on Recognitionitself and its enforcing legislation go only to the enforcementof a foreign arbitral award and not to the enforcement offoreign judgments confirming foreign arbitral awards,” so theFAA did not preempt state law). Accordingly, the Court findsthe instant action concerns a foreign judgment, not an arbitralaward under the Convention.c. Defenses as a Basis for Removal Under § 205Unlike the general removal statute, a colorable affirmativedefense that could be “conceivably affect[ed]” by the arbitralaward or agreement may justify removal under § 205.Infuturia, 631 F.3d at 1138-39 (“[W]here the defendant relieson the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel regardingissues already resolved against the plaintiff in arbitration, thearbitral award ‘could conceivably affect the outcome’ of thecase.”) (internal citations omitted).New Energy provides three main defenses that it believesimplicate the Convention: (1) Chenco's alter-ego claim is a“derivative claim”; (2) as a result of the “derivative” alter-egoclaim, New Energy is “entitled to raise statute of limitationdefenses and laches” related to the Arbitration Agreementand Award; and (3) Chenco is “attempt[ing] to expand the[arbitral] award to add a debtor,” which deprives New Energyof “due process and its rights under the Convention” (Dkt. 32at 9-10). Chenco rebuts New Energy's arguments by assertingNew Energy has already raised these arguments in state court,which the state district court and/or the Idaho Supreme Courtrejected (Dkt. 33 at 8).Having reviewed the state court record, the Courtacknowledges that New Energy previously raised identicaldefenses to those it reasserts before this Court. The statedistrict court rejected New Energy's argument that an alter-ego claim may be brought as an independent claim and not asa derivative claim attached to another claim (Dkt. 12-2 at 7)(“New Energy's argument that there is no authority under I.C.§ 10-1406 for Chenco to assert alter-ego as an independentclaim following entry of its foreign money judgment isunpersuasive.”). The state district court also declined NewEnergy's statute of limitations argument and explained thatthe applicable statute of limitations is six years (Dkt. 15-23at 5 n.1, 17). Finally, the state district court rejected NewEnergy's due process argument (id. at 18) (finding “no meritin New Energy's argument that it was not afforded due processbecause it received no notice of the Swiss Arbitration or thefollowing enforcement actions on the judgments stemmingfrom the arbitration award,” and that “New Energy, as it has
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8asserted throughout this litigation, was not a party to thecontract between New Materials and Chenco, nor a party tothe resulting arbitration. Unless New Energy now concedesthat it has a unity of interest with New Materials, New Energywas not entitled to due process protections in the underlyingarbitration proceedings.”). Notwithstanding the state districtcourt's rulings, New Energy cites no authority as to howthe “derivative” nature of Chenco's alter-ego claim bearson Chenco's motion to remand, or why a shorter statute oflimitations applies to Chenco's alter-ego claims.New Materials argues that it has asserted federal defensesunder the FAA and the Convention that “directly relate tothe arbitration agreement and the award,” and that thesedefenses “go to the heart of the arbitration Agreement andAward, raise significant federal questions under the UnitedStates Treaty, and place this case squarely within the FAA'sjurisdictional framework” (Dkt. 30 at 9). Specifically, NewMaterials argues that (1) Chenco seeks to enforce a secondaryjurisdiction recognition judgment as if it were a globallyenforceable primary confirmation judgment; (2) Chencoattempts to impose an alter-ego liability on a non-signatoryto the arbitration agreement; and (3) Chenco's action violatesthe three-year statute of limitations on arbitral awards (id. at9, 12).*10 While the Court need not adjudicate the parties’defenses to determine whether removal under § 205 isproper, the Defendants must still submit a defense that“could conceivably affect the outcome of the plaintiff'scase.” Infuturia, 631 F.3d at 1139. Here, Chenco is askingan Idaho state district court to recognize and enforce aforeign judgment that recognizes an arbitral award. It isunclear how New Materials’ arguments regarding primaryand secondary jurisdictions could affect the outcome of thiscase; the U.K. Judgments recognizing the Arbitration Awardare enforceable in Idaho under Idaho state law, whether ornot the U.K. is a secondary jurisdiction under the arbitralagreement. Under Idaho law, once a foreign judgment isrecognized, it is enforceable to the same extent as an Idahojudgment, including against a judgment debtor's alter ego. SeeI.C. § 10-1407. While New Materials repeatedly describesChenco's action as an attempt to skirt the three-year statuteof limitations under the FAA, it cites no authority to suggesta three-year limit applies to Chenco's action to enforce theU.K. Judgments. It also submits no authority that the FAAor Convention preempts Idaho law regarding recognitionof foreign judgments. Accordingly, the Court finds theDefendants’ asserted defenses are insufficient grounds toremove under § 205.d. ‘Strict’ Versus ‘Broad’ Construction of § 205Removal StatuteGenerally, removal is “strictly construed against removaljurisdiction.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389,1393 (9th Cir. 1988). “Where doubt regarding the right toremoval exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089,1090 (9th Cir. 2003). In the context of removal under § 205,however, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the plainlanguage of § 205 “provides federal courts with remarkablybroad removal authority.” Infuturia, 631 F.3d 1133, 1138 n.5(9th Cir. 2011).The parties highlight the tension between case law regardingstrict views of general removal statutes and the uniquelybroad view of removal under § 205. Notably, New Materialsconcludes that under § 205, removal is “presumed” (Dkt. 30at 12) (arguing that “under controlling precedent, removalis not only proper—but presumed”). While New Materialsdoes not cite any authority for this proposition, New Materialscites Infuturia and Jones Day throughout its briefing toargue that the “relates to” phrase in § 205 should be readas an expansive basis for removal, including any case that“could conceivably affect” the arbitration's outcome (Dkt.30 at 7-9, 11). The Ninth Circuit in Infuturia recognizedthe general practice of construing removal statutes strictlywhile recognizing that removal authority under § 205 isbroad. Infuturia, 631 F.3d at 1138 n.5. Notwithstanding thebreadth of § 205 removal, district courts citing Infuturiahave continued to place the burden on the removing partyto establish federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mullis, 2024 WL5004528, at *2 (“Despite the broad removal authority underSection 205, the removing party continues to bear the burdenof establishing federal jurisdiction.”) (cleaned up); Freaner,2011 WL 5596919, at *2 (“ ‘[T]he plain language of §205 provides federal courts with remarkably broad removalauthority’ .... Nevertheless, the removing party continues tobear the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.”) (citingInfuturia, 631 F.3d at 1138 n.5). Accordingly, the Courtrecognizes that § 205’s basis for removal is “broad” butdeclines to find federal jurisdiction here is presumed.e. Federalism ConcernsThough not a dispositive issue, federalism concerns“animate” how courts construe federal removal statutes.
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9See Beiser, 284 F.3d at 674 (“Federalism concerns animatethe rule requiring strict construction of removal statutes.”).Unique considerations apply to removal under § 205 becauseCongress conferred broad removal jurisdiction. Id. In Beiser,the Fifth Circuit summarized federalism concerns in thecontext of § 205 removal—[Section] 205 will rarely permanentlydeprive a state court of the power todecide claims properly brought beforeit. The district court will ordinarilyremand those cases that turn out notto be subject to arbitration, such thatthe state court will be able to resolvethe merits of the dispute. Section205 therefore raises fewer federalismproblems than the general removalstatute, § 1441, except in arbitrablecases, it will ordinarily permit statecourts to resolve the ultimate issues ina case.*11 Id. at 675. The Court therefore considers whether theDefendants’ removal under § 205 “wrongly deprives” thestate court of its power to decide Chenco's case, which maycontravene broader federalism principles. Id.Raising its own federalism concerns, New Energy arguesthat remanding this case would “result in inconsistent rulingsbetween the State Court and the Federal Court” (Dkt. 32at 9). New Energy cites the possibility that New Materialscould file a new action in federal court and seek to havethe Chinese secondary judgment recognized in federal courtwhile Chenco's state action continued (id.). As a preliminaryissue, the Court takes issue with New Energy's presumptionthat New Materials would file an action in federal court, aswell as its implied presumption that New Materials couldestablish jurisdiction in federal court despite all parties beingforeign and no apparent federal claim. Further, the Court notesthat New Energy's main arguments for removal invoke issuesthat the state courts already addressed (see, e.g., Dkt. 12-2at 7 (declining New Energy's alter ego and derivative claimarguments); Dkt. 15-23 at 5, 17 (declining addressing theapplicable statute of limitations); Dkt. 15-23 at 18 (decliningNew Energy's due process arguments)).New Materials does not specifically address issues offederalism, though its arguments raise broader concerns. NewMaterials challenges the unfavorable rulings of the statedistrict court, suggesting this was a factor in its decision toremove (Dkt. 30 at 4) (questioning the Idaho state court'sdenial of its motion to dismiss, “fail[ure] to meaningfullyaddress Chenco's alter ego theory,” and “allow[ing] the case tomove forward based solely on Chenco's assertions”). Chencoargues these criticisms show “it is clear [New Materials]intends to ask this Court to reach a different conclusion basedon the same arguments already rightly rejected by the statecourt” (Dkt. 31 at 3 n.2). Chenco argues that should this Courtentertain those requests, it would run afoul of federalismprinciples, violate the law of the case doctrine, and underminejudicial economy (id.).Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lackjurisdiction over a case if the exercise of jurisdiction wouldresult in the reversal or modification of a state court decision.Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citingRooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), andDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460U.S. 462 (1983)). In other words, the doctrine bars suits“brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries causedby state-court judgments rendered before the district courtproceedings commenced and inviting district court reviewand rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 1050 (quoting ExxonMobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284(2005)).Defendants’ arguments do little to assuage concerns regardingrelitigating arguments that the state courts have alreadyrejected. As the Court addressed in the context of NewEnergy's defenses, it would be improper for this Courtto allow New Energy to relitigate past defenses thatwere unsuccessful at the state district court or IdahoSupreme Court. Doing so risks turning this Court into astate court appellate mechanism, which is contrary to theRooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court will not forecast whatarguments Defendants may raise in this Court, though itacknowledges the Defendants have already used this forumto reassert the same questions they previously raised instate court regarding alter ego, “derivative” claims, statuteof limitations, and due process. While federalism concernsare not a dispositive issue under § 205, the Defendants’arguments—particularly their challenges to the state courts’rulings—weigh against removal here.f. Waiver Under § 205
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10*12 In its motion for remand, Chenco argues New Energywaived its right to remove by engaging in “extensive litigationconduct” before seeking removal under § 205 (Dkt. 24-1 at13). Chenco explains that because New Energy filed twomotions to dismiss and two motions for summary judgmentin state district court before filing its first notice of removal,it waived any right to remove (id. at 14). Chenco contendsthat by waiving its removal, New Energy's waiver defeatsthe general rule requiring all removing parties to consent toremoval (id. at 13) (citing Petry v. Versabar, Inc., 744 F.Supp. 3d 742, 747 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2024)). New Energyresponds that “the plain language of § 205” dispenses withany possibility of waiver because the statute provides forremoval “at any time before trial” (Dkt. 32 at 14) (citing ChinaN. Indus. Tianjin Corp. v. Grand Field Co. Inc., 197 F. App'x543, 544 (9th Cir. 2006)) (“There is no question that GrandField had the right to remove this action at any time beforetrial under the New York Convention.”).Chenco does not address this issue in its reply brief. TheCourt need not resolve whether New Energy waived anyright to remove under § 205, however, because all the above-mentioned factors indicate remand is proper. Accordingly, theCourt declines to rule on whether waiver is an independentbasis for remanding this case.2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under § 203“It is well-settled that removal jurisdiction is distinct fromsubject matter jurisdiction.” Bearden v. PNS Stores, Inc., 894F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (D. Nev. 1995). The FAA distinguishesbetween subject matter jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction.Compare 9 U.S.C. § 203 (addressing “original jurisdiction”)with 9 U.S.C. § 205 (addressing “removal of cases fromState courts”). Section 203 provides “An action or proceedingfalling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise underthe laws and treaties of the United States. The district courtsof the United States (including the courts enumerated insection 460 of title 28) shall have original jurisdiction oversuch an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount incontroversy.” In contrast to § 205’s “relates to” languageregarding removal, § 203 requires an action to “fall[ ] under”the Convention to establish subject matter jurisdiction.The Ninth Circuit has not specifically addressed whetherSection 205 alone confers subject matter jurisdiction. See,e.g., Infuturia, 631 F.3d at 1136-37 (“Because we concludethe district court had diversity jurisdiction, we do not reachthe other contended bases for subject matter jurisdiction under§§ 203 and 205.”). Other circuit and district courts haveconcluded § 205 does not independently confer subject matterjurisdiction. See Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. SaintPaul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2012)(holding that “the FAA does not independently confer subjectmatter jurisdiction,” but instead “provides federal jurisdictionover actions to confirm or vacate an arbitral award that isgoverned by the Convention.”); Miller v. Oscar Gruss &Son, Inc., No. 24-CV-00239 (MMG), 2025 WL 1733258, at*4 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2025) (explaining removal statutes,including § 205, are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction)(citing Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Unocal Corp., 584 F.3d43, 49 (2d Cir. 2009)) (explaining “the removal statute isnot the source of subject matter jurisdiction”); LandbridgePort Servs. (Hong Kong) Ltd v. Notarc Port Inv. LLC, No.CV 24-254-GBW, 2024 WL 1299685, at *3 (D. Del. Mar.27, 2024) (“This Court finds the Second Circuit's positionthat § 205 does not independently confer jurisdiction morepersuasive.”). Conversely, the Fifth Circuit has concluded §205 does confer subject matter jurisdiction. See Beiser, 284F. 3d at 670 (“Section 205 confers a form of federal questionjurisdiction.”).*13 Here, New Materials’ notice of removal cites to §203 to explain the matter “arises under the laws of theUnited States” (Dkt. 20 at 4). New Energy likewise cites §203 and states, “[t]his notice is based on federal questionsincluding relevant treaties” (Dkt. 18 at 2-3).4 Outside ofpassing references to § 203, neither New Materials nor NewEnergy discusses how they have subject matter jurisdictionunder § 203, or whether they believe § 205 independentlyconfers subject matter jurisdiction.As outlined above in the context of removal jurisdiction, theCourt has already concluded that Chenco's action to enforcethe U.K. Judgments does not “relate to” the Convention.See 9 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205. Thus, even if the Court wereto liberally construe § 203’s “arise under” to be as broadas § 205’s “relates to” phrase or were to adopt the FifthCircuit's understanding that § 205 is a form of federal questionjurisdiction, the Defendants have not established that thisCourt has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case.Accordingly, the Court remands this case for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.E. Li Siblings’ Pending Motion to DismissA district court may exercise its discretion in delegatingpending questions of personal jurisdiction to the statecourt following remand. Cerner, 939 F.3d at 1014 (“We
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11do not reach the issue of personal jurisdiction and leavethat issue for the state court following remand.”) (internalcitations omitted); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526U.S. 574, 586 (1999) (explaining a district court willconclude that “federalism concerns tip the scales in favorof initially ruling on the motion to remand” when facedwith complex challenges to personal jurisdiction) (internalcitations omitted).Here, counsel for the Li Siblings filed a motion to dismissfor lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkt. 17-1 at 4-5). Theyargue Chenco “seems to be relying on [the Li Siblings’]titles in the companies despite failing to present an alter-egotheory of veil-piercing claim” (id. at 6). They further invokedue process arguments regarding their burden of “travel andaccommodation, translation service, and loss of earnings fromabsence of work” (id. at 7). These arguments invoke complexissues of state law, which the parties have yet to fully briefbecause of the Court's stay of the parties’ deadlines (Dkt. 23).Accordingly, the Court will not reach the issue of personaljurisdiction and will leave that issue for the state district courtfollowing remand. See Cerner, 939 F.3d at 1014.IV. ORDERIT IS ORDERED that:1. Defendant Do-Flouride New Materials Co., Ltd.’s Motionfor Leave of Court to File Sur-reply in Opposition toPlaintiff's Motion to Remand (Dkt. 34) is DENIED.2. Chenco Engineering & Consulting GMBH's Motion toRemand (Dkt. 24) is GRANTED. This case is REMANDEDback to the District Court of the First Judicial District of theState of Idaho, in Kootenai County.3. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a certified copy of thisorder to the clerk for the District Court of the First JudicialDistrict of the State of Idaho, in Kootenai County. See 28U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A certified copy of the order of remandshall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. TheState court may thereupon proceed with such case.”).All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2430556Footnotes1Chenco alleges that in 2021, New Materials’ name was changed from Do-Fluoride Chemicals Co., Ltd. to Do-Fluoride New Materials Co., Ltd. (Dkt. 11-14 at 2). In the interest of consistency and avoiding confusion,the Court will refer to both Do-Fluoride Chemicals Co., Ltd. (which Chenco alleges is the entity's pre-2021name) and Do-Fluoride New Materials Co., Ltd. (which Chenco alleges is the entity's post-2021 name) as“New Materials.” The Court's use of this naming convention does not constitute an adjudication on any alter-ego claim.2Under Rule 3.3 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney shall not knowingly “make a falsestatement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously madeto the tribunal by the lawyer.” The rules do not require an “impartial exposition” of the law, and the judiciaryexpects attorneys to advocate zealously on behalf of their clients, even if that entails interpreting the lawin novel ways. Idaho R. of Prof'l Conduct 3.3 cmt. 2; Idaho L. R. Civ. 83.8 (“lawyers have an obligation torepresent clients zealously”). Still, an attorney has a responsibility to engage in a manner that does not bringtheir profession into disrepute, such as misstating the law.3The Second Circuit in AMCI Holdings, Inc., addressed whether under the Convention “appellants wererequired to confirm their foreign arbitral award before they would be allowed to enforce it.” 850 F.3d at 74. TheSecond Circuit found that appellants were not required to first confirm their arbitral award before enforcing it.
CHENCO ENGINEERING & CONSULTING GMBH, Plaintiff, v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12Id. The court did not address the issue of foreign judgments or suggest that the FAA or Convention preemptsstate law regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments.4New Energy initially cited diversity jurisdiction as a basis for removal before filing an amended notice ofremoval (Dkt. 1 at 2). This case involves foreign entities or persons on both sides of the suit, which destroysdiversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S. Code § 1332; Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. 303 (1809); Mossman v.Higginson, 4 U.S. 12 (1800). Accordingly, diversity jurisdiction would not provide an independent basis forsubject matter jurisdiction in this case.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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