to any interest the State might have in facilitating the reporting or tracing of irregularities is apparent from the fact that a sale which occurs on a Saturday or a Friday evening must go unreported twice as long as one which occurs on a Sunday.
Finally, I am concerned with the legitimacy of what the Secretary of State appears to admit is the real reason for the Sunday closing law in this case, to increase the profitability of the automobile sales business by decreasing competition and reducing the availability of its product. As I have, indicated, I view the law as having the effect of reducing purchasers’ options, denying them the opportunity to buy cars on the day consumers are most free to shop around with their families, thereby forcing them to postpone their purchases or channeling their demand to other days of the week and to those dealers which are most readily accessible to the family on a workday.
In whatever terms the law is viewed, the law’s effect and intent are in conflict with the “legislative judgment in favor of competition” which is expressed by the Congress in the national antitrust laws (Givens, Antitrust: An Economic Approach sec. 2.01, at 2 — 6 (1983); see National Society v. United States (1978), 435 U.S. 679, 695, 55 L. Ed. 2d 637, 652, 98 S. Ct. 1355, 1367; Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Com. (1951), 340 U.S. 231, 248-49, 95 L. Ed. 239, 250-51, 71 S. Ct. 240, 249; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. (1927), 273 U.S. 392, 397, 71 L. Ed. 700, 705, 47 S. Ct. 377, 379). The unconcealed restraint the statute places on purchasers as well as on those dealers who wish to remain open on Sundays strikes at the heart of Congress’ “assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market [which] recognizes that all elements of a bargain — quality, service, safety, and durability— and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers” (National Society v. United States (1978), 435 U.S. 679, 695, 55