Hulvat v. Gumina (Apr. 9, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Robert S. Hulvat v. Juli Gumina, STG Divorce Law, and Jennifer B. Hulvat
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Illinois (IL)
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Decided
Apr. 9, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Bertani (Justice), joined by Holdridge (Justice), Anderson (Justice)
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 IL App (3d) 240628-UUNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULESBEFORE CITING.NOTICE: This order was filed under SupremeCourt Rule 23 and is not precedent except in thelimited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.JULI GUMINA, STG DIVORCE LAW f/k/aSULLIVAN, TAYLOR, GUMINA & PALMER, P.C.,and JENNIFER B. HULVAT, Defendants-Appellees.Appeal No. 3-24-0628|Order filed April 9, 2026Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 18th Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Illinois, Circuit Nos. 23-LA-858, 04-D-2177Honorable Jennifer L. Barron, Judge, Presiding.Justices Holdridge and Anderson concurred in the judgment.ORDERJUSTICE BERTANI delivered the judgment of the court.*1 1 Held: Plaintiff's misuse of artificial intelligence inhis appellate brief violates Illinois Supreme Court policyand rules, and defendants’ motion for sanctions is granted.Absolute litigation privilege barred complaint alleging civilconspiracy and unauthorized filing based on the alterationof an agreed order before its entry in post-dissolutionproceedings. 2 This case involves a stand-alone lawsuit that allegesa former wife and her attorney surreptitiously substitutedlanguage in an order that differed from the languageher former husband agreed to before its submission tothe court in post-dissolution proceedings. Plaintiff, RobertS. Hulvat, proceeding self-represented, appeals the circuitcourt's dismissal of his complaint which named his formerspouse, Jennifer B. Hulvat; Juli Gumina, Jennifer's attorneyin the post-dissolution proceedings; and Gumina's law firm,STG Divorce Law (STG) in two joint counts of civilconspiracy and unauthorized filing and a separate countof forgery against Gumina alone based on the allegedmisconduct. On appeal, Robert argues the court erred indismissing his civil conspiracy and unauthorized filing countswith prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm thejudgment of the circuit court. 3 Separate from the merits of his appeal, this court issueda rule to show cause against Robert as to why he shouldnot be sanctioned for filing a brief produced using artificialintelligence (AI) that contained citations to nonexistentauthorities and fictitious holdings. Defendants’ request tostrike his brief and dismiss his appeal as well as the issueof an award of attorney fees incurred from defending againstRobert's improper use of AI were taken with the appeal. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 On October 19, 2004, the circuit court of Du PageCounty entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage (caseNo. 04-D-2177) dissolving Robert and Jennifer's seven-year marriage. Two children were born to the marriage.The dissolution judgment incorporated a joint parentingagreement and marital settlement agreement, the latterestablishing Robert's monthly child support obligation. Thejoint parenting agreement directed Jennifer to assume controlover the children's college savings plans that had beencreated pursuant to section 529 of the Internal RevenueCode (26 U.S.C. § 529 (West 2004)) (529 account) duringthe marriage. Neither agreement addressed contribution forhigher education expenses. 6 A. Petition for Contribution 7 In 2017, their eldest child enrolled in an out-of-state university and Jennifer, then self-represented, filed apetition for Robert to contribute to anticipated expenses. 750ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2018). Thereafter, Gumina entered anappearance on Jennifer's behalf, and Robert filed a petition toterminate his child support obligation. 8 The following facts concerning the negotiations ofJennifer's and Robert's petitions are based on the record,the e-mail communications, and exhibits attached to Robert'scomplaint, and the defendants’ combined motions to dismiss.Although Robert and Jennifer obtained legal representation,they negotiated privately to resolve their petitions. After back-and-forth negotiations, they reached an agreement which
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2modified Robert's child support obligation and he agreedto withdraw his petition in return. It further apportionedcontributions of each parent to their eldest child's collegeexpenses. Jennifer retained custody of the 529 account, buthalf of its balance was allocated to Robert to use in furtheranceof his contribution. Relevant to this appeal, it directed Robertto create and fund a separate dedicated savings account forthe benefit of his eldest child to fulfill the remainder of hiscontribution.*2 9 Two days before a scheduled status hearing,Jennifer e-mailed Robert a proposed order containing theiragreement and a separate signature page with her signature.She requested that he sign and return the signature page.Robert complied and attached the executed signature page toan e-mail indicating he was instructing his attorney not toattend the hearing. The following day, Jennifer erroneouslysent a prior version of the agreement and the executedsignature page to Gumina. On September 6, 2017, Guminaalone appeared and presented the errant version of the agreedorder with the attached executed signature page to the court,which entered the order. 10 Two days later, Jennifer e-mailed Robert to confirmthat the order was entered without incident. Robert respondedthat the order entered was different from the one he hadagreed to. Jennifer was contrite in her responding e-mail,accepted responsibility, and apologized for her mistake. Shenoted, however, that the only difference between the orderagreed upon and the one entered was language in the eighthparagraph that addressed the particulars of the dedicatedsavings account. In short, the errant order included twoprovisions that were not agreed upon which established (1)their eldest child as sole beneficiary of the dedicated savingsaccount and (2) deadlines for disclosing financial statementsto one another related to the 529 account and the dedicatedsavings account. She proposed the following courses of actionto correct her error: “[w]e can either go back into courtwith the fixed #8 and have the judge sign an entirely newamended total order, OR you can send (or I can send) an emailindicating [w]hat number 8 should be.” 11 Robert agreed to the second course of action. He sentJennifer an e-mail correcting paragraph eight by removinglanguage that their eldest child was the sole beneficiary ofthe saving's account and establishing a quarterly deadlinefor the exchange of financial documents related to the529 and dedicated savings accounts. Jennifer agreed withthis correction. Neither Robert nor Jennifer formalized thecorrection by presenting it to the court. 12 B. Petitions Related to the Agreed Order 13 Approximately a year later, on November 21, 2018,Jennifer filed a petition for rule to show cause concerningRobert's alleged failure to comply with the agreed order.The petition averred that Robert did not contribute to thecollege expenses and had not provided credible evidence thathe created the dedicated savings account the agreed orderrequired. It requested that a rule issue requiring Robert toshow cause why he should not be held in indirect civilcontempt. Robert's response asserted in part that the subjectagreed order was not the one that he had signed. The courtissued a rule against him on January 8, 2019. 14 On January 24, 2019, Jennifer filed a petition to correctparagraph eight of the agreed order and modify collegecontribution. The petition explained that two days after theorder had been entered “the parties agreed in writing to correctterms of the Agreed Order to be followed by both parties,”an allegation that Robert later admitted in his response. Onthe same day, Robert filed a petition for sanctions pursuant toIllinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), assertingthat, despite knowledge of its defect, neither Jennifer norher attorneys sought to correct the error in the September 6,2017, order before filing her petition for rule to show cause.Jennifer's answer to Robert's petition asserted her attorneyswere unaware of the agreed order's error until Robert filed hisanswer to her petition, and that the uncorrected error did notrelate to Robert's violations as alleged in her petition for ruleto show cause.*3 15 In April 2023, the court vacated the erroneousorder and the rule issued against Robert and entered anorder which accurately reflected their agreement retroactiveto September 6, 2017. Robert subsequently withdrew hispetition for sanctions against Gumina and STG. 16 C. Civil Lawsuit 17 Robert filed a complaint in Cook County (case No. 22-L-11157) on December 16, 2022, against Jennifer, Gumina,and STG arising out of purported misconduct related to filingthe September 6, 2017, agreed order. He alleged Guminasubmitted a version of the order that was more favorable
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3to her client, a version not agreed upon. The complaintfurther alleged that despite Robert bringing up the error toJennifer “almost immediately” after the order was entered,the defendants did nothing to amend the order and insteadfiled a rule to show cause that he expended “large sums” todefend against. Robert sought relief through three separatecauses of action. Count I alleged civil conspiracy againstall defendants, asserting they acted in concert to enter thesupposed agreed order for Jennifer's benefit and to Robert'sdetriment. Count II alleged unauthorized filing against alldefendants in that submitting the order was “an actionablewrong” in violation of rules 3.3 and 3.4 of the Illinois Rulesof Professional Conduct. Ill. R. Prof'l Conduct (2010) Rs.3.3, 3.4 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010). Count III alleged forgery againstGumina based on the improper, unauthorized copying ofRobert's signature with the intent of defrauding him when shesubmitted the agreed order. 720 ILCS 5/17-3 (West 2022).While Robert attached a number of emails as an exhibit to hiscomplaint relating to his and Jennifer's negotiations regardingthe agreed order, he neglected to include those in whichJennifer admitted her error and which acknowledged theiractual agreement. Robert's civil action was transferred to DuPage County in case No. 23-LA-858 and consolidated withthe post-dissolution matters. 18 Defendants moved to dismiss Robert's complaint inrespective combined motions brought under section 2-619.1of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code). 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1(West 2024). Both motions argued Robert's lawsuit wasbarred by the absolute litigation privilege. Id. § 2-619(a)(9). Gumina and STG's motion also argued inter alia thatthere is no private right of action for forgery and that thethree causes of action were insufficiently pled. Id. § 2-615.Jennifer's motion supplementally argued Robert's action wasuntimely based on the statute of limitations, that a principaland agent cannot conspire, and the two counts directed againsther were insufficiently pled. Id. §§ 2-615, 2-619(a)(5), (9). 19 The court heard and granted defendants’ motions anddismissed Robert's complaint with prejudice. Its October 1,2024, written ruling held that the complaint failed to allegefacts sufficient to state a claim for each cause of action undersection 2-615. It dismissed the unauthorized filing count(count II) and forgery count (count III) with prejudice onthese grounds. It noted that the facts alleged failed to supportthe tort of unauthorized filing, which concerns institutinga lawsuit without permission from a putative plaintiff. SeeSafeway Insurance Co. v. Spinak, 267 Ill. App. 3d 513, 516(1994). Further, it explained there is no private right of actionfor forgery, and that Robert conceded the issue by failing toaddress it in his response to defendants’ motions.*4 20 Regarding the civil conspiracy count (count I), thecourt found that the complaint failed to allege the requisiteelements of an unlawful act or a cognizable injury necessaryto support a claim. It stated “[w]hile it is difficult to imaginehow this count could ever be re-pled to sufficiently allegecivil conspiracy, it is conceivably possible” and dismissedthe count without prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 beforeaddressing the affirmative matters under section 2-619. It thenheld that the affirmative matters raised by defendants pursuantto section 2-619 were dispositive to defeat that claim. First,it held that the absolute litigation privilege applied findingthat the submission of the erroneous agreed order was anaction governed by the privilege and was correctly invokedby all defendants. It found that the unrebutted evidence fromdefendants’ motions demonstrated that the inclusion of thedraft wording into the agreed order was accidental and nounlawful act was committed. Given the agreement to correctthe error “almost immediately” upon its discovery, the courtheld there could be no injury as a matter of law and anyexpenses incurred “relative to this mistake were unnecessaryand entirely self-inflicted.” Second, it concluded that Robert'sDecember 16, 2022, complaint was barred by the five-year statute of limitations given his “almost immediate[ ]”discovery of the error in September 2017. 735 ILCS 5/13-205(West 2024). 21 Robert timely appealed. 22 D. Appellate Brief Violation 23 Robert filed his initial appellate brief on March 4, 2025.In their response, defendants Gumina and STG includeda motion for sanctions against Robert on account of hisbrief violating the Illinois Supreme Court Policy on AI andcertain Illinois Supreme Court rules by citing nonexistentauthority and fictitious holdings. They requested we strikeRobert's appellate brief and dismiss the appeal on this basis.Thereafter, Robert conceded to this wrongdoing and movedfor leave to file an amended appellate brief. Defendantsopposed Robert's motion on the basis of time and expensesincurred. 24 On June 3, 2025, this court entered contemporaneousorders related to Robert's motion for leave and defendants’motion for sanctions. We allowed Robert's motion for leave to
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4file an amended brief, withdrew his original brief, and deniedhis request to strike defendants’ pending motion to strike.Separately, on this court's own motion, we ordered Robert toshow cause why he should not be sanctioned for his improperfiling. We also directed defendants to file affidavits averringto the expenses incurred in responding to Robert's appellatebrief, later clarifying that these expenses should includeefforts expended in responding to both Robert's original andamended briefs. We address defendants’ motion for sanctionsand their fee petition below. 25 II. ANALYSIS 26 On appeal, Robert challenges the circuit court's dismissalof his complaint and argues it abused its discretion by grantingdismissal with prejudice. His amended brief is disorganizedand contains wide-ranging appellate argument. He argues thathe properly pled the civil conspiracy count and that the circuitcourt misapplied the affirmative defenses it found barred thiscause of action. He also argues the unauthorized filing count issupported by evidence and should withstand dismissal. Akinto his response to the defendants’ motions in the trial court,he forgoes any discussion of the dismissal of the forgerycount and it is therefore waived. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited.”). He alsoraises newfound due process and ethical concerns beyondthe dismissal of his complaint. Those issues are waived.Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996)(“It is well settled that issues not raised in the trial court aredeemed waived and may not be raised for the first time onappeal.”). 27 A. Sanctions 28 We consider the request for sanctions in light of thiscourt's order directing Robert to show cause as to why heshould not be sanctioned based on his violations of IllinoisSupreme Court rules and AI policy by citing nonexistentauthorities and fictitious holdings in his appellate brief.Before us are defendants Gumina and STG's request to strikeRobert's brief and their petition for attorney fees. 29 Robert's initial brief included citations to ninenonexistent cases (Bjorlin v. Aluminum Co. of America, 261Ill. App. 3d 552 (1994); In re Estate of Drawve, 119 Ill. App.2d 487 (1970); In re Marriage of Lewis, 213 Ill. App. 3d1042 (1991); In re Marriage of Royster, 278 Ill. App. 3d1076 (1996); In re Williams, 2012 IL 113475; Krumwiedev. Tremco, Inc., 2014 IL App (4th) 130733; Ontario SewingMachine Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 258 Ill. App. 3d 972(1994); Salgado v. Marquez, 2012 IL App (1st) 111890;Suttonhouse v. Rockford Savings & Loan Ass'n, 94 Ill. App.3d 125 (1981)). Robert employed these nonexistent cases tofurther his argument, and in one instance, quoted languagefrom Krumwiede v. Tremco, Inc., 2014 IL App (4th) 130733, 41, to support the proposition that dismissal with prejudiceis “a drastic sanction to be employed only as a last resort.”In fact, Krumwiede, a real case, involved the appeal of awrongful death products liability action, has nothing to dowith dismissal of a complaint, contains no such quotation inthe disposition, and is correctly cited as Krumwiede v. Tremco,Inc., 2020 IL App (4th) 180434. Equally troublesome arecitations to existing cases with misrepresented holdings, suchas the incorrect assertion that In re Marriage of Lehr, 317Ill. App. 3d 853, 858 (2000), a spousal maintenance appeal,involved a holding concerning “fraud upon the court.”*5 30 Robert acknowledged these improper citations werethe result of using generative AI in drafting his brief. Ina written response to the rule to show cause, he argueshis status as a self-represented litigant, his reliance upon awell-known generative legal research tool which he assertswas done in good faith, and his efforts to promptly correcthis error by filing an amended brief should weigh againstsanctioning his conduct. Counsel for defendants Guminaand STG claim $8,960 in expenses and fees incurred fromdefending against Robert's original and amended brief. Robertobjects to defendants’ fee request stating, in part, that the feesare unreasonable and excessive. 31 Robert's reliance on fictitious authority is a pervasive,nascent, and “very serious issue” afflicting courts asthe use and reliance on generative AI in preparinglegal filings becomes more commonplace. In re BabyBoy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, 57. Our supremecourt's policy authorizes the use of AI when compliantwith legal and ethical standards. Ill. Sup. Ct., IllinoisSupreme Court Policy on Artificial Intelligence (Jan. 1,2025), https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/e43964ab-8874-4b7abe4e-63af019cb6f7/Illinois%20Supreme%20Court%20AI%20Policy.pdf (AI Policy).To adhere to these standards, the policy forewarns that “[a]llusers must thoroughly review AI-generated content beforesubmitting it in any court proceeding,” that “[u]nsubstantiated*** AI-generated content that *** obscures truth-finding
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5and decision-making will not be tolerated,” and identifiesself-represented litigants as “accountable for their final workproduct.” Id. 32 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), givesdiscretion to a reviewing court, on its own initiative, to imposean appropriate sanction upon a party if it determines thatthe party willfully failed to comply with the rules governingappeal or filed a frivolous appeal. Rule 375(a) provides thatappropriate sanctions for violating appeal rules“may include an order that a party be barred frompresenting a claim or defense relating to any issue to whichrefusal or failure to comply with the rules relates, or thatjudgment be entered on that issue as to the other party,or that a dismissal of a party's appeal as to that issue beentered, or that any portion of a party's brief relating tothat issue be stricken. Additionally, sanctions involving anorder to pay a fine, where appropriate, may also be orderedagainst any party or attorney for a party or parties.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 375(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).At least one court has concluded that the “intentional” useof AI and the “intentional” failure to review the resultingcitations for accuracy satisfies the willful requirement of afailure to comply with rules governing appeals under Rule375(a). Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, 115. Citationto nonexistent cases for principles of law that do not existalso constitutes a violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule347(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), that requires an appellant'sbrief “contain the contentions *** and reasons therefor, withcitation of the authorities *** relied on.” Id. 110. 33 Rule 375(b) allows for the imposition of an appropriatesanction upon a party, “after consideration of an appeal ***it is determined that the appeal *** itself is frivolous.” Ill.S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Rule 375(b) sanctionsare punitive; the rule's purpose is to condemn and punish alitigant's abusive conduct. Chernyakova v. Puppala, 2019 ILApp (1st) 173066, 40. The act of citing fictitious cases in anappellate brief is deemed violative of Rule 375(b) and aspectsof an appeal have been found frivolous by reason of fictitiouscitations. Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶¶ 119, 127.Frivolity is determined under an objective standard, and anappeal is deemed frivolous if it would not have been broughtby “ ‘a reasonable, prudent attorney’ ” in good faith. Id. 117(quoting In re Marriage of Lindell, 2023 IL App (2d) 220055, 25). “ ‘A fake opinion is not “existing law” and citationto a fake opinion does not provide a non-frivolous groundfor extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or forestablishing new law.’ ” Id. 118 (quoting Mata v. Avianca,Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)). Appropriatesanctions for a Rule 375(b) violation may include reasonableattorney fees. Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).*6 34 Robert's self-represented status does not excusehis misuse of AI. Our supreme court clearly extends itsAI Policy to self-represented litigants. AI Policy, supra.Ensuring the accuracy of AI-generated content before courtsubmission is an obligation shared by “[a]ll users.” Id. InIllinois, self-represented litigants must comply with rules ofprocedure as if he or she were an attorney and more lenienttreatment is not afforded based on self-represented status.See Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, 78. As for sanctioning a self-represented litigant's deficientbrief for rule noncompliance, reviewing courts have affordedsome latitude where the issues presented on appeal are clear.Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st)130380, 85. Nevertheless, “when the line is crossed” underthese circumstances, Rule 375 sanction rules are enforced. Id.“The imposition of Rule 375 sanctions is left entirely to thediscretion of the reviewing court.” Id. 87. 35 To date, the other districts that have addressed thisissue have done so by fashioning suitably strict sanctions inefforts to curb this violation. The Fourth District in In reBaby Boy, imposed a fee sanction under Rule 375(a) and (b)against the appellant's attorney related to his representationin a termination of parental rights appeal. 2025 IL App(4th) 241427, ¶¶ 7, 134. Following a rule to show causeconcerning numerous citations to nonexistent authorities inthe appellant brief and the appellant attorney's confessionto AI violations, he was ordered to disgorge the paymentreceived from working on the appeal, pay an additional$1,000 fine, and a copy of the opinion was sent to the AttorneyRegistration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). Id. ¶¶94-105, 129-30, 132. In a nonprecedential order, the FourthDistrict issued a similar sanction—a $1,000 monetary fineupon counsel and a copy of the decision sent to the ARDC—when that attorney made the same violations in a separateappeal. In re A.S., 2025 IL App (4th) 250298-U, ¶¶ 19-20, 22. 36 The Second District has addressed the issue infour nonprecedential orders, two of which involved self-represented litigants’ misuse of AI that resulted in grantingmotions to strike the offending briefs. Pletcher v. Village ofLibertyville Police Pension Board, 2025 IL App (2d) 240416-U, 29; BKA Holdings, LLC v. Sam, 2025 IL App (2d)250160-U, 23; In re S.A., 2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U, 87;
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6In re A.R. & N.R., 2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U, 50. As the AIviolations were committed in the self-represented appellant'sbrief, the Pletcher court granted appellee's motion to strikethe brief and thus dismissed the appeal. Pletcher, 2025 ILApp (2d) 240416-U, ¶¶ 11, 29. In BKA Holdings, LLC, thecourt struck the self-represented litigant's reply brief basedon AI violations and granted appellee's motion for attorneyfees and costs in relation to filing the motion for sanctionsand researching the hallucinated authorities. BKA Holdings,LLC, 2025 IL App (2d) 250160-U, 23. In In re S.A., theSecond District noted fictitious quotations and holdings fromexisting cases in an appellant's brief were “likely hallucinatedby artificial intelligence” but reached the merits of the caseinvolving the termination of parental rights as it implicated“a fundamental liberty interest.” 2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U, ¶¶ 80, 85, 87; A.R. & N.R., 2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U, 50 (same). 37 Robert's response to the rule to show cause herein runsafoul of the case law indicating self-represented litigants aregoverned by the same standards of licensed counsel. Wedecline however to strike his brief and dismiss his appeal.We conclude that Robert violated both Rule 375(a) and(b), that the violation of Rule 375(a) was willful, and thatsanctions are appropriate. Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th)241427, 114. We further conclude that imposing an awardof fees based on Robert's AI violation is the appropriatesanction in this matter for the same reason the court imposedattorney fees in BKA Holdings, LLC, which also involveda self-represented litigant—to make the aggrieved partywhole. 2025 IL App (2d) 250160-U, 23. When fashioningan appropriate sanction, reviewing courts should considerwhether the offending party has acted in bad faith, whethersanctions would serve as a deterrent from similar conduct,and the merits of the parties’ positions. Mote v. Estate ofMcManus, 2025 IL App (4th) 241307, 84. In contrast tothe cases referenced above, a review of the record reveals noindication that Robert has made similar AI violations in thecircuit court. See Pletcher, 2025 IL App (2d) 240416-U, 28;see also BKA Holdings, LLC, 2025 IL App (2d) 250160-U, 23. Nonetheless, we grant defendants’ motion for sanctionspursuant to Rule 375(b).*7 38 In his objection to defendants’ fee request,Robert argues the requested $8,960 attorney fees and costsis excessive and unreasonable, and such a sizable request“epitomizes why pro se litigants fear the legal system.” Amonetary penalty in this context should impress upon alllitigants the caution one must undertake when utilizing AI inbrief preparation and the solemnity of filing documents beforethe court. Robert's objection does not include a statement thathe cannot afford the attorney fees or that the fee would causehim substantial financial harm. See Chernyakova, 2019 ILApp (1st) 173066, 42. 39 An attorney presenting a fee petition has the burden ofestablishing the reasonable value of his services. In re Estateof Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (1991). Only those fees whichare reasonable will be allowed. Kaiser v. MEPC AmericanProperties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 983 (1987). The partyseeking fees carries the burden of establishing that the feessought are reasonable. Id. A proper fee consists of reasonablecharges for reasonable services; however, to justify a feeaward, the movant cannot simply submit a mere compilationof hours multiplied by a fixed hourly rate or bills issuedto the client, since this type of information, without more,fails to provide the court with sufficient information as totheir reasonableness—a matter which cannot be determinedon the basis of conjecture or on the opinion or conclusionsof the attorney seeking the fees. Id. at 983-84. Rather, anyfee petition must identify the services performed, by whomthey were performed, the time expended thereon and thehourly rate charged for said services. Id. at 984. Because thesefactors are critical, the movant must present “detailed recordsmaintained during the course of the litigation containing factsand computations upon which the charges are predicated.” Id.Once presented with this information, the court should thenreview other relevant considerations“such as the skill and standing of the attorneys, the natureof the case, the novelty and/or difficulty of the issues andwork involved, the importance of the matter, the degree ofresponsibility required, the usual and customary chargesfor comparable services, the benefit to the client [citation],and whether there is a reasonable connection between thefees and the amount involved in the litigation [citation].”Id.; Callahan, 144 Ill.2d at 44.The court may also use its own knowledge and experiencein determining whether a fee is reasonable. Kieken v. City ofJoliet, 2023 IL App (3d) 220392, 34. 40 The fee affidavit provided by Gumina and STG's counselseeks an award of $8,960 for fees and costs associated withaddressing the AI violations, while the supporting billingrecord indicates a total of $8,914 in fees and costs. In the firstinstance, we conclude that the billing statements contain therequisite detailed information on the services performed andthe time expended thereon such that the claim can be properly
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7evaluated. While the discovery of errant or nonexistentcitations is not novel or difficult, we conclude that the hourlyrate of $230 is considerably below the reasonable, usual, andcustomary rates for both trial and appellate services. The cruxof the issue in this case is whether the amount claimed wasreasonably necessary to address the use of errant AI citations. 41 Gumina and STG chose to file a complete response briefwhich included a motion to strike Robert's brief and dismissthe appeal as a sanction for the errant citations. This couldhave readily been accomplished by the filing of a dispositivemotion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 361(a) and(h). Ill. S. Ct. R. 361(a), (h) (eff. April 15, 2024). As such,we conclude that the appropriate sanction should be thosefees reasonably incurred in discovering the violations andpresenting a motion to this court to address them.*8 42 Turning to the billing record which itemizes feesincurred between February and July 2025, the February 28sum of $138 and the May 1 sum of $1,058 (the first indicationof discovery of the errant citations) are reasonably relatedto the appropriate sanction noted above. The interveningcharges for reviewing the record on appeal and undertakingthe drafting of a statement of facts and starting the brief itselfare actions that would have been undertaken in the absenceof the errant citations and are thus disallowed. We find the3.9 hours billed for reviewing Robert's six-page motion to filean amended brief and the drafting of a five-page objectionthereto is not reasonable and award $345 for those services.The 4.1 hours billed on June 3 for $943 to review versionsof Robert's briefs and the review and drafting of the motionto clarify this court's orders are entirely related to Robert'serrors, as are a June 4 bill of $138 for revising their motion,a June 10 charge of $161 for the review of the rule issuedby this court, and a July 14 bill of $368 for communicationswith Robert regarding his objection to their motion for leaveto file an amended response brief. This court awards fees inthe sum of $3,151 in favor of Gumina and STG and againstRobert, plus costs of $27 for a total of $3,178. With regardto each approved fee above, we conclude that the time spentand fees were reasonable and necessarily incurred to addressthe task visited upon Gumina and STG's counsel stemmingfrom Robert's violations. While a July 11 bill includes thetask of drafting the motion to file the amended response,we cannot readily separate that rather menial task from themore substantive work listed in that entry. Lastly, we deemcertain fees listed after June 10 were not incurred as a resultof Robert's violations and counsel's actions would have beennecessary had Robert's initial brief been compliant with therules governing appeals. 43 While additional sanctions in terms of fines payable tothis court could be appropriate under the circumstances, wedecline to do so in that the award of fees is sufficient to deterothers from engaging in similar conduct. Judgment enters infavor of Gumina and STG and against Robert S. Hulvat in thesum of $3,178 for fees and costs pursuant to Illinois SupremeCourt Rule 366. Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(a)(5), (c) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). 44 B. Underlying Action 45 Turning to the merits, the circuit court granteddefendants’ motions to dismiss Robert's complaint undersections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-615,2-619 (West 2024). Defendants’ combined motions werebrought pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code, whichpermits a party to move for dismissal under sections 2-615and 2-619 in a single motion. Id. § 2-619.1. A section2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of acomplaint. Reynolds v. Jimmy John's Enterprises, LLC, 2013IL App (4th) 120139, 25. In ruling on a section 2-615 motionto dismiss, only the facts on the face of the pleadings, matterssubject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the recordmay be considered. Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County ofCook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 473 (2009). 46 A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legalsufficiency of a complaint but asserts the action is barredbased on an affirmative matter outside of the complaint.Reynolds, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, 31; DeLunav. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). Here, the court heldthat Robert's allegation of civil conspiracy was barred bythe statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West2024)) and the absolute litigation privilege (id. § 2-619(a)(9)). Under subsection 2-619(a)(9), the affirmative mattermust be apparent on the face of the complaint; “ ‘otherwise,the motion must be supported by affidavits or certain otherevidentiary materials.’ ” Reynolds, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th)120139, 37 (quoting Van Meter v. Darien Park District,207 Ill. 2d 359, 377 (2003)). All pleadings and supportingdocuments are interpreted in the light most favorable tothe nonmoving party. Coley v. Bradshaw & Range FuneralHome, P.C., 2020 IL App (2d) 190627, 16. Under bothdismissal sections, a court accepts all well-pleaded facts andreasonable inferences drawn from those facts as true. Id.;Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d at 473. Conversely,
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8mere conclusions unsupported by specific facts are notaccepted as true. In re Estate of Powell, 2014 IL 115997, 12. 47 The standard of review applied to a judgment on acombined motion to dismiss is de novo. In re Estate of Khan,2021 IL App (1st) 200278, 20. We likewise employ de novoreview to the question of law regarding the applicability ofthe absolute litigation privilege. Scarpelli v. McDermott Will& Emery LLP, 2018 IL App (1st) 170874, 14. Under thisstandard, our review is “unconstrained by the reasoning ofthe trial court.” Zameer v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st)120198, 12. We may affirm the court's judgment on anygrounds supported by the record. DiCosola v. Ryan, 2015 ILApp (1st) 150007, 8.*9 48 We hold that the absolute litigation privilege appliesto the conduct alleged in Robert's complaint. The issueof absolute litigation privilege is treated as an affirmativedefense and appropriately raised in a section 2-619 motionto dismiss. Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 2014 IL App(1st) 122677, 15. The privilege immunizes from civil action“certain statements and conduct by attorneys in the course oflitigation.” Doe v. Williams McCarthy, LLP, 2017 IL App (2d)160860, 19. The privilege is based on section 586 of theRestatement (Second) of Torts, which states:“An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publishdefamatory matter concerning another in communicationspreliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in theinstitution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicialproceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it hassome relation to the proceeding.” Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 586 (1977).Section 587 includes comparable language that extends theprivilege to private litigants whom “enjoy[ ] the sameprivilege concerning a proceeding to which he is a party.”Johnson, 2014 IL App (1st) 122677, 15 (citing Restatement(Second) of Torts § 587 (1977)); Thompson v. Frank, 313Ill. App. 3d 661, 664 (2000). Motives are irrelevant in theapplication of the privilege. See O'Callaghan v. Satherlie,2015 IL App (1st) 142152, 25. Rather, communications orconduct must satisfy a “pertinency requirement” in order tofall within the privilege's ambit. Scarpelli, 2018 IL App (1st)170874, 19. That is, the scrutinized statement or action mustbe related to the pending litigation and be in furtherance ofrepresentation. O'Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, 25. The pertinency requirement is not strictly applied, andall doubts are resolved in favor of pertinency. Id. However,the pertinency requirement prevents an attorney or party fromshielding unrelated misconduct or communications fromliability. See id. 27; see also Thompson, 313 Ill. App. 3dat 664 (declining to extend absolute litigation privilege to alibel action concerning a defamatory letter sent by one party'sattorney to the spouse of the opposing party). 49 While the privilege historically applied to defamationactions, it has expanded to bar other causes of action under therationale that the “privilege would be meaningless if a partycould merely recast its cause of action to avoid the privilege'seffect.” O'Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, 26. Similarconduct alleged in Robert's lawsuit has been recognizedas conduct subject to the absolute litigation privilege. InO'Callaghan, plaintiffs sued an attorney and her firm thatrepresented plaintiff's adversaries in an underlying toxic blackmold litigation, alleging that the attorney and her firm causedintentional infliction of severe emotional distress and werestrictly liable for ultrahazardous activity related to the mold.Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 8-9. In addition to a slew of purported discoverymisconduct, the attorney and her firm allegedly “obtained acourt order against the” plaintiffs. Id. 29. These actions,however, were pertinent to the underlying action and donein furtherance of representation. Id. Therefore, the causewas barred by the privilege, and the complaint was properlydismissed. Id. 33. 50 Here, the claims of civil conspiracy and unauthorizedfiling in counts I and II of Robert's complaint rest on identicalallegations of misconduct. Robert alleges that Gumina tookthe errant copy of the order that Jennifer had provided toher and caused it to be entered. The transfer, submission,and entry of the agreed order, however, pertained to post-dissolution proceedings. By securing the order's entry onbehalf of and at the direction of her client, Gumina actedin furtherance of her representation and brought resolutionto Jennifer and Robert's outstanding petitions. Thus, theabsolute litigation privilege applies to the alleged conduct anddismissal of Robert's complaint is warranted.*10 51 We briefly note that the record reflects Robert haswithdrawn his motion for sanctions related to the misconductconcerning the entry of the agreed order. As many plaintiffshave attempted in similar actions, Robert filed a motion forsanctions against defendants in tandem with the filing of hissuit at bar. Therefore, while the preferred “ ‘redress’ ” foralleged misconduct from judicial proceedings in the samelitigation is not to pursue litigation against a new party, but toutilize “traditional motion practice and sanctions procedures,”Robert has elected to forgo this remedy. Kim v. State Farm
ROBERT S. HULVAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULI GUMINA,..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2021 IL App (1st) 200135, 38 (quoting Johnson, 2014 IL App (1st) 122677, 19). 52 Robert also argues the court erred in dismissinghis complaint with prejudice, thereby depriving him ofan opportunity to replead. Under sections 2-615 or 2-619,dismissal with prejudice should be granted “only where it isclear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that wouldentitle it to relief.” Lake Point Tower Condominium Ass'n v.Waller, 2017 IL App (1st) 162072, 21. A court's decision todismiss a complaint with prejudice is reviewed for an abuse ofdiscretion. Id. Given our determination that Robert's lawsuitis barred by the absolute litigation privilege, the court did notabuse its discretion in granting dismissal with prejudice. 53 In addition to challenging the court's final judgment,Robert argues the court erred in its factual findings supportingdismissal. Namely, Robert asserts the court's finding thatthe submission of draft language in the agreed order wasaccidental is a mischaracterization when the documentaryevidence reveals the alteration was deliberate fraud. Wedisagree. We determine whether a circuit court's factualfindings from a hearing on a 2-619 motion to dismiss areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. See Kirbyv. Jarrett, 190 Ill. App. 3d 8, 13 (1989). Findings areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence only where theopposite conclusion is clearly evident or its determinationis unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidencepresented. In re K.E.-K., 2018 IL App (3d) 180026, 13. Asthe court explained in its written order, its factual findingswere based on the unrebutted evidence from defendants’motions. In addition to the email correspondences attachedto the complaint and motions to dismiss, Jennifer attachedan affidavit to her motion averring that she “emailed what[she] then believed was a final version of the agreed order”to Gumina on September 5, 2017, and at the time itwas entered, she did not know the agreed order was theincorrect version. Moreover, the e-mail chain attached toeach of the defendants’ motions to dismiss included theportions in which Jennifer took responsibility for the errorand the parties agreed to memorialize the correct languagefor paragraph eight. In fact, it was Robert who sent thecorrected language, which was agreed to by Jennifer onthat date. Again, it is noteworthy that Robert's complaintattached only a portion of the email chain and omitted thesesalient subsequent correspondences. Robert's response failedto challenge Jennifer's affidavit, provide a counter affidavit,or refute this evidentiary fact whatsoever. Piser v. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co., 405 Ill. App. 3d 341, 353(2010). Therefore, the fact that Jennifer accidentally includedthe draft language into the copy of the order that she sent to herattorney, which was later entered by the court, was deemedadmitted. Id. 54 III. CONCLUSION 55 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page Countyis affirmed. We order plaintiff, Robert S. Hulvat, to paydefendants Juli Gumina and STG Divorce Law's appellateattorney fees necessary to address the AI violations presentedin his appellate brief as a sanction pursuant to IllinoisSupreme Court Rule 375(b). Judgment for fees and costs isentered in favor of defendants for $3,178.*11 56 Affirmed.All CitationsNot Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2026 IL App (3d) 240628-U, 2026WL 963201End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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