In re A.R. (Mar. 10, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Illinois (IL)
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Decided
Mar. 10, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Schostok (Justice), joined by McLaren (Justice), Hutchinson (Justice)
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 IL App (2d) 250299-UUNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULESBEFORE CITING.NOTICE: This order was filed under SupremeCourt Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in thelimited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.In re A.R. and N.R., Minors(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,v.Sarah B., Respondent-Appellant.)Nos. 2-25-0299, 2-25-0300 cons.|Order filed March 10, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. HonorableKathryn D. Karayannis, Judge, Presiding. Nos. 22-JA-64, 22-JA-65Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment.ORDERJUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court.*1 1 Held: The trial court did not err in terminatingrespondent's parental rights where the evidence supportsits finding that respondent was an unfit parent and thattermination of her rights was in the children's best interests. 2 Respondent, Sarah B., appeals, pro se, from orders of thecircuit court of Kane County terminating her parental rights toher children, A.R and N.R. (the minors).1 She raises variousarguments challenging both the trial court's finding that shewas an unfit parent and its finding that termination of herparental rights was in the children's best interests. We affirm. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 On May 16, 2022, the State filed amended petitionsfor adjudication of wardship regarding the minors, twinsgirls born in June 2016, who had been taken into protectivecustody by the Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS) on May 5, 2022. The petitions alleged that theminors were neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(d) of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(d)(West 2020)) in that they were left without supervision for anunreasonable period of time without regard for their mental orphysical health, safety, or welfare, when respondent left themunsupervised and they went onto the roof of a two-story home. 5 The original petitions for adjudication of wardship werefiled on May 9, 2022. At a hearing that same day, JessicaGarcia, a DCFS investigator, testified that the minors weretaken into protective custody after they had climbed out ofan attic window and were found on the roof of the two-story home where they lived with respondent and their oldersister. The minors had thrown their pet bunny from theroof. Respondent was at home at the time of the incident.Garcia further testified that this was respondent's fifth DCFSinvestigation since 2018, three of which were indicated.Specifically, respondent was indicated: (1) in May 2018 forleaving the minors unsupervised in a running vehicle; (2)on May 10, 2020, after the minors were found alone inthe street at about 10 p.m. and were nearly struck by avehicle; and (3) during Memorial Day weekend 2020, whenrespondent left the minors home alone with their nine-year-old older sister, L.B., for about two hours. For the latterincident, respondent pleaded guilty to child endangerment.An intact family case was opened in 2020 and successfullycompleted in 2021. Respondent testified that, with respect tothe present incident, she had been on the phone with her priestfor approximately 90 minutes when the minors went onto theroof. Following the hearing, the trial court entered a writtenorder granting temporary custody of the minors to DCFS,noting that respondent appeared with counsel and submittedto the court's jurisdiction. The trial court also entered an orderappointing a court-appointed special advocate (CASA) for theminors.*2 6 The record reflects that DCFS worked with outsideagencies, initially One Hope United and later Guardian AngelCommunity Services, and their caseworkers to coordinateservices in this matter. A July 5, 2022, service plan requiredrespondent to complete a parenting class; submit to random
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2drug screens and maintain sobriety; obtain a mental healthassessment; participate in individual therapy and parentcoaching; and demonstrate an ability to meet her own needswhile also meeting the minors’ physical, emotional, andmedical needs. The caseworker indicated that referrals wouldbe made for these services. The record further reflects that thereferrals were not made until October 2022. 7 The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on August 3,2022. Respondent stipulated, and the trial court found that theminors were abused and neglected in that they were under 14years old and left unsupervised for an unreasonable period oftime (id.). At a dispositional hearing on September 14, 2022,respondent stipulated that she was unfit and unable to care forthe minors and that it was in their best interests to be madewards of the court. The court thereafter adjudicated the minorswards of the court and awarded custody and guardianship toDCFS. Respondent was ordered to engage in recommendedservices, visit consistently, and maintain stable income andhousing. The permanency goal was set at return the minorshome in 12 months. 8 A January 6, 2023, status order noted that respondent wasparticipating in individual therapy. She had been dischargedfrom parenting classes due to nonattendance and requiredre-referral. Respondent submitted to two drug drops, one ofwhich was positive and one negative, and failed to appearfor two additional drug drops. The trial court admonishedrespondent that she was required to attend all drug drops andthat missed drops would be considered positive. 9 An April 27, 2023, permanency order maintained thegoal of return home in 12 months. The order indicatedthat respondent had completed parenting classes and asubstance abuse assessment, which resulted in no treatmentrecommendations. However, respondent continued to testpositive for THC. She was unsuccessfully discharged fromindividual therapy due to missed sessions and was re-referred.She had been visiting consistently and the visits were goingwell. 10 A CASA report dated September 12, 2023, indicatedthat respondent worked at a nightclub, a hookah lounge, and aburger restaurant. After being unsuccessfully discharged fromtherapy in April, she resumed individual therapy in Augustand was scheduled to begin parent coaching. Respondent hadnot been submitting to drug drops. She had weekly visitationwith the minors on Saturdays from 12 to 3 p.m., supervised bythe foster mother. The foster mother reported that respondentgenerally attended visits but did not always adhere to thescheduled times. CASA observed a visit on July 22, 2023.When respondent arrived, the minors greeted her. Respondentthen sat on the couch between the minors while they watchedtelevision, and she used her phone. When asked whether shehad brought any books or activities, respondent indicated thatshe had not. She then directed the minors to retrieve a craftbox she had brought during a previous visit. 11 An October 5, 2023, agency report indicated thatrespondent successfully completed individual therapy onSeptember 11, 2023. Thereafter, virtual parent coachingbegan because the agency was unable to find an in-personprovider. At the time of the report, respondent had beenscheduled for 10 drug drops; three were positive for THC, twowere negative, and she failed to appear for five. Respondentreported that she was 34 weeks pregnant. She worked for acompany that provided vintage items for weddings and alsoworked as a massage therapist. She was paid in cash for both.Respondent was living in Chicago with a friend and attendedweekly supervised visits at foster mother's home.*3 12 Following an October 24, 2023, permanency reviewhearing, the trial court maintained the goal of return homein 12 months. The court found that although respondent hadmade efforts, she had not made reasonable and substantialprogress. The court noted concerns regarding housing andemployment and respondent's failure to appear for drugdrops. The court further recommended that the agency re-refer respondent for individual therapy due to inconsistenciesbetween respondent's actions and what the therapist wasreporting. 13 A November 14, 2023, service plan indicated thatrespondent made unsatisfactory progress toward maintaininga substance-free lifestyle, as she continued to miss drug dropsand test positive for THC when she did submit to testing.Respondent gave birth to a child on October 28, 2023. 14 Agency and CASA reports filed in January andFebruary 2024 indicated that respondent was residing in amaternity shelter and was unemployed. Respondent beganin-person parent coaching in November 2023. She waspermitted visitation, supervised by the agency, on Tuesdaysand Thursdays for two hours. Respondent completed fouror five in-person parent coaching sessions. However, basedon observations by the parent coach and the foster motherduring a parent-coaching session on Saturday, January 6,2024, respondent was directed to submit to a drug drop on
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3January 9, 2024. Respondent failed to appear but submittedto a drug drop the following day that was positive for THC.She was unsuccessfully discharged from in-person parentcoaching and placed on a waitlist with a different provider.Respondent's therapist reported that she had not received areferral to resume individual therapy as previously orderedby the trial court. Respondent made unsatisfactory progresswith respect to substance abuse: of 14 drug screens scheduledbetween October 2022 and January 2024, she failed to appearfor seven, tested positive on four, and tested negative for three. 15 At a March 8, 2024, permanency review hearing,the agency reported that respondent consistently attendedTuesday visits but failed to confirm Thursday visits inadvance and therefore had only one Thursday visit. Theagency made a referral for respondent to resume individualtherapy and explained that the delay resulted from awaitingresponses from providers regarding availability. Althoughrespondent had been attending parent coaching on Saturdaysat foster mother's home, an incident occurred and the fostermom was no longer willing to host those sessions in her home.The agency was attempting to arrange parent coaching withanother provider. The agency did not schedule any drug dropsfor respondent in February. Respondent failed to appear for adrug drop in early March. 16 Respondent stated that her therapist was ready to resumeindividual therapy but that they were awaiting a referral,which had not yet been received. She was told she wason a waitlist for parent coaching. Respondent further statedthat she was unaware she was required to confirm visits inadvance or that visits were scheduled for both Tuesdays andThursdays, as she believed she was permitted visitation onlyonce per week. 17 Following argument, the trial court noted respondent'sunsuccessful discharge from individual therapy and virtualparent coaching, her positive tests for THC, and her failureto appear for scheduled drug drops. The court furtherobserved that respondent had not maintained stable housingor employment for at least one year. Nearly two yearsinto the case, respondent remained at supervised visitationand had been missing Thursday visits. The court alsoexpressed concern that the agency had not fulfilled itsobligations, noting that respondent had not been referredfor all required drug drops and that discussions regardingresuming individual therapy had been ongoing since Octoberwithout implementation. The court observed that the minorswere thriving in the foster home. Although the court indicatedthat it wished to change the permanency goal to terminationof parental rights, it concluded that it could not do so becausethe agency had failed to do its job. The court set the matterfor another permanency review in three to four months. Itadmonished respondent to attend all visits and drug drops anddirected the agency to ensure respondent was tested weekly.The court further emphasized that respondent needed to makeprogress toward obtaining suitable housing and employment.The court found that respondent had made only minimalefforts and had not been visiting consistently. It also foundthat the agency had not made reasonable efforts and that thisdeficiency was the sole reason respondent was being affordedadditional time. The permanency goal remained return homewithin 12 months.*4 18 May and June 2024 service plans and CASAreports indicated that respondent continued to test positivefor THC. Respondent was participating in individual therapyand making satisfactory progress. In March 2024, the agencybegan supervising visits at a public library. During thosevisits, respondent resisted assisting the minors with theirhomework. After the caseworker resigned, the foster mothersupervised the visits at the library. On May 4, 2024,respondent arrived two hours late for a scheduled visit.After supervising four visits, the foster mother reported thatrespondent failed to bring activities for the minors and refusedto help them with homework on multiple occasions. Whilea service plan indicated respondent was employed througha temporary agency and had stable housing, CASA reportedthat respondent rented a room from a friend in Chicago andthat her employment status was unclear. 19 Following a June 13, 2024, permanency review hearing,the trial court changed the permanency goal to privateguardianship, finding that return home was inappropriatebecause respondent continued to test positive for THC. Thecourt stated that respondent could not attribute her continuedmarijuana use to any deficiencies by the agency. Althoughthe most recent reports indicated that certain services initiatedweeks earlier had not yet begun, the court concluded that theagency was not responsible for delays caused by respondent'sprior unsuccessful discharges and need for re-referrals. Thecourt further noted that respondent had not found stablehousing, there were conflicting reports regarding where shewas employed, and she had not provided verification ofincome. The court also observed that respondent arrived lateto visitation, did not request additional visitation, and failedto assist the minors with homework during visits. The courtconcluded that although respondent had made some efforts,
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4those efforts were not reasonable and did not constituteprogress. The court also found that, based on the most recentreport, the agency had made reasonable efforts. 20 Agency and CASA reports filed in September 2024,indicated that respondent's last scheduled visit with theminors occurred on May 23, 2024, supervised by thefoster mother at her home. The foster mother reportedthat respondent had been in Elgin twice without requestingvisitation and had not attended the minors’ birthday party.The reports also indicated that respondent was renting aroom from a friend in Chicago. On October 11, 2024, anew caseworker, Eva Coe of Guardian Angel CommunityServices, was assigned to respondent's case. An October 23,2024, CASA report indicated that the foster mother continuedto experience problems with respondent arriving on time forvisitation. On one occasion, the foster mother agreed to bringthe minors to a tea party in Chicago at respondent's request,but respondent did not arrive until the event had concluded. 21 On December 30, 2024, following a hearing, the trialcourt set the permanency goal at substitute care pendingdetermination of a petition to terminate parental rights. Thecourt noted that the minors had been in the foster mother's carefor two years and that respondent had not made reasonableprogress in completing her services. The court ordered thatthe minors remain in the custody and guardianship of DCFSand found that the agency had made reasonable efforts andthat the services were appropriate. 22 On February 13, 2025, the State filed a petition fortermination of parental rights as to each minor. The petitionsalleged that respondent was unfit because she: (1) failedto maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern orresponsibility as the minors’ welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)(West 2024)); (2) failed to protect the minors from conditionswithin their environment injurious to their welfare (id. §1(D)(g)); (3) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that were the basis for the minors’ removal or tomake reasonable progress toward their return during the nine-month period being August 4, 2022, to May 4, 2023 (id. §§1(D)(m)(i), 1(D)(m)(ii)); (4) failed to make reasonable effortsor reasonable progress during the nine-month period fromMay 5, 2023, through February 4, 2024 (id.); and (5) failed tomake reasonable efforts or reasonable progress during nine-month period from February 6, 2024, through November 6,2024 (id.). The State asserted that termination of respondent'sparental rights would be in the minors’ best interests.*5 23 On April 9, 2025, the trial court commencedhearing on the State's petition, which continued on twoadditional days. Devin Gazelle testified that she wasemployed by One Hope United and had been involved withthe minors’ case from its opening in June 2022 until ittransferred to another agency in October 2024. Respondentwas recommended for individual therapy, parenting classes, asubstance abuse evaluation, random drug screens, and parentcoaching. Respondent successfully completed her parentingclass and began individual therapy in October 2022, butwas discharged unsatisfactorily in April 2023 due to lackof attendance. She subsequently resumed individual therapyand was successfully discharged in September 2023. Hertherapy addressed historical trauma, healthy relationships,grief and loss, and decision-making skills. However, concernsarose about five months later due to respondent's limitedengagement with the minors, instability, and lack of makingherself available to the agency. 24 A substance abuse evaluation was added to respondent'sservices after some of her drug screens came back positivefor THC, and she never provided a medical marijuana card.Respondent was referred for 29 drug screens, of which shefailed to appear for 14, 11 tested positive for THC, and 4 werenegative. She completed a substance abuse assessment, butno treatment was recommended. 25 Gazelle testified that respondent began virtual parentcoaching in September 2023, following completion of herindividual therapy. She did not successfully complete parentcoaching due to scheduling conflicts. Respondent's visitationwas initially supervised by the foster mother at the fostermother's home. Respondent was consistent with visits untilthe birth of her child in October 2023. In early 2024, thefoster mother declined to continue supervising visitationbecause respondent would show up and prioritize personaltasks, such as doing laundry, rather than engaging with theminors. Respondent was frequently late, missed visits, orarrived at unscheduled times. As a result, the agency assumedsupervision of visits. Respondent was required to confirmvisits in advance, which she failed to do, leading to additionalmissed visits. During agency-supervised visits, respondentwas largely passive and did not actively participate with theminors. Based on her service participation and progress, theagency never recommended unsupervised or overnight visits.Respondent did not have stable housing until May 2024 andnever maintained consistent employment or provided proofof income.
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5 26 On cross-examination, Gazelle acknowledged thefrequent changes in respondent's caseworker but testified thatshe had consistently served in a supervisory role overlookingrespondent's case and filled in for any caseworker gaps.After respondent was discharged from individual therapy inApril 2023 due to sporadic attendance, Gazelle re-referredrespondent for individual therapy that same month. Shetestified that respondent had the following caseworkers:Jimmiria Porter from May to October 2022; Kimdra Harrisfrom October 2022 to October 2023; Andrea Salas for abouta month; Porter from January 2024 to May 2024; and ElisaRansome from May 2024 until October 2024. 27 Kenyatta Williams testified that she was a parent coach.Respondent was referred for in-person parent coaching inOctober 2023 to help her reconnect and bond with the minors,understand their needs, and address the issues that led to theirremoval. Despite attempts to schedule something sooner, thefirst session occurred in November 2023 at the foster homewith respondent, her newborn, and the minors. During thatsession, respondent interacted with the minors by teachingthem how to feed the baby with a bottle. However, shedid not actively participate in activities with the minors andprimarily attended to her newborn. The sessions generallylasted one to two hours. Respondent completed five sessionsover a three-month period. At the final session, on January6, 2024, respondent appeared withdrawn and explained thatshe had taken Benadryl. The foster mother informed Williamsof respondent's history of marijuana use and stated that shewould no longer host the parent coaching sessions in herhome. Williams unsuccessfully discharged respondent due toalleged marijuana use and the inability to secure an alternativetime and location for the sessions. Williams encouragedrespondent to submit to a drug drop to prove she was not underthe influence at the final session, but respondent refused.*6 28 On cross-examination, Williams acknowledged thatrespondent had been participating well and making progressprior to the unsuccessful discharge. She explained that parentcoaching did not resume because, without the foster parenthosting the sessions on weekends, the sessions had to occurduring the week. Williams, respondent, and the agency wereunable to find a mutually available time for the sessions thatworked for the minors as well. 29 Shantina Griffin testified that she was a therapist.Respondent was referred to Griffin for individual therapyin October 2022 and for parent coaching in June 2023.Respondent began missing sessions in December 2022 andwas discharged unsuccessfully in April 2023 due to lack ofattendance. She was subsequently re-referred, and counselingresumed. The sessions addressed past trauma involvingrespondent's own mother, grief associated with losing custodyof her children, and decision-making skills. Respondentsuccessfully completed individual therapy in September2023. At the request of the trial court, she was again referredfor individual therapy near the end of 2023. Griffin alsoconducted virtual parent coaching with respondent beginningin June 2023, which lasted approximately six months. Whenin-person sessions became necessary, respondent was nolonger within Griffin's service area, and the agency indicatedit would assign a different provider to continue parentcoaching. 30 On cross-examination, Griffin testified that respondentexpressed frustration during their sessions, complaining aboutcaseworker changes and difficulty contacting her caseworker.After being discharged in April 2023 due to sporadicattendance, respondent resumed therapy in June or July2023. Griffin noted that the delay in resuming therapy waslonger than necessary because the agency did not respondpromptly to her calls and emails requesting a new referral.During virtual parent coaching, which did not include theminors, they discussed appropriate disciplinary techniques,decision-making, and budgeting and finances. Respondentsuccessfully completed virtual parent coaching. 31 Respondent testified on her own behalf that the minorswere removed from her care in May 2022. She was not offeredany services until Harris was assigned to her case in October2022. She initially stopped attending individual therapybecause the sessions began addressing past trauma with herown mother, which she found emotionally difficult. Aftermissing three sessions, she was discharged unsuccessfully inApril 2023. She did not resume therapy until June 2023, dueto difficulty obtaining a re-referral from Harris. 32 Respondent further testified that, during a substanceabuse assessment in February 2023, she stated that sheneeded therapy to address her marijuana use, but the providerconcluded that no services were necessary. She explained thatshe used marijuana as a coping mechanism and informedPorter and Ransome that she wanted to participate in aprogram to help her stop. Respondent stated that she missedsome drug drops due to lack of money for transportation, earlyclosure of testing sites, or insufficient advance notice.
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6 33 Respondent testified that she was frustrated because shedid not begin services until October 2022 and felt that shestarted off behind and was treated unfairly by the agency.She explained that visitation was sometimes supervised by theagency, but at other times she was only able to visit the minorsbecause the foster mother arranged and supervised the visits.Respondent stated that she requested additional visitation, butit was never arranged.*7 34 On cross-examination by the State, respondentacknowledged that the trial court had ordered her not to usemarijuana while engaged in services. She admitted that shesmoked marijuana two to three times per week at times,never obtained a medical marijuana card, and understood thatmissed drug drops would be considered positive but missedthem due to poor planning. She also admitted using marijuanaduring her most recent pregnancy and continuing to use itsporadically. 35 Respondent acknowledged that she received referralsfor individual therapy three times, a parenting class, parentcoaching twice, a substance abuse assessment, and visitation.She admitted that she was under the influence at her last parentcoaching session with Williams but testified that this was notthe only reason the sessions ended. She asserted that CASAdiscontinued the sessions because Williams was bringing herown children to the sessions and CASA thought that thiswas unprofessional. Respondent stated that she submittedto a drug drop a day or two after the last session and itwas positive for THC. She never advanced to unsupervisedvisitation because she did not complete parent coaching.Respondent acknowledged that her visitation with the minorswas inconsistent. She testified that, since May 2024, shehad lived in a two-bedroom apartment with her youngestchild. She worked two part-time jobs paid in cash, earningbetween $400 and $1,100 per week, but never provided proofof income. 36 Following argument, the trial court found that the Statehad proved all alleged grounds of unfitness. The court notedprior involvement between respondent and DCFS. In 2018,respondent left her children unattended in a car. In 2020, therewere two incidents: one in which the minors were found inthe street at night after respondent fell asleep and were nearlyhit by a car, and, three weeks later, an incident in whichrespondent left the minors and their older sister home alonefor approximately two hours; the children were outside andwere picked up by police. 37 The trial court noted that in this case, on May 4, 2022,the minors accessed the roof of the two-story home and threwtheir pet rabbit off it while respondent was on the phonefor two hours. Investigation reports indicated that the oldersibling, L.B., stated that she assumed parental responsibilities,frequently cooking for the minors and taking them to school.There were also indications that the minors were largely non-verbal, not bathed, not completing homework, and did nothave a normal sleep schedule. The court acknowledged thatthese reports were hearsay but considered them relevant onlyto highlight the need for respondent to make progress inservices. 38 The trial court found that, while respondent participatedin services, her efforts were never reasonable, and she madeno substantial progress. The court was particularly concernedwith respondent's continued marijuana use. Respondentmissed numerous drug drops despite knowing that absenceswould be treated as positive tests, and the court foundher explanations for missing drops not credible. The courtconcluded that respondent used marijuana as a copingmechanism and did nothing on her own initiative to stop. 39 The trial court further found that, although respondentattended individual therapy and received some parentcoaching, she did not make reasonable progress. Even aftersuccessfully completing individual therapy in September2023, concerns remained about her ability to maintain healthyrelationships and make good decisions. The court noted thatrespondent completed virtual parent coaching with Griffin,but found it insufficient because it did not involve the minors.In-person parent coaching with Williams was delayed fora month due to respondent's recent childbirth. At the firstsession, respondent primarily attended to the newborn whilethe minors engaged in activities on their own. Respondent wasunsuccessfully discharged from in-person parent coaching inJanuary 2024 after the foster mother declined to host sessionsdue to respondent's substance use. Parent coaching neverresumed because the parties could not coordinate a mutuallyavailable time.*8 40 The trial court also found that visitation, which wasinitially consistent, began to decline after November 2023. Inearly 2024, the agency assumed supervision of visits becauserespondent frequently failed to follow rules at the fostermother's home—arriving late, missing visits, or attendingbut prioritizing personal tasks such as doing laundry. Therewas a two-month period with no visits. The court concludedthat this demonstrated a lack of reasonable interest, concern,
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7or responsibility for the minors. Visitation never progressedto unsupervised because respondent had not demonstratedan active ability to parent. Further, respondent lacked stablehousing for most of the case, only obtaining it in May 2024.She claimed to work two jobs but never provided proofof income. The court found her testimony not credible andconcluded that, despite many opportunities to make progress,respondent failed to do so and was unfit to parent the minors. 41 A best-interests hearing commenced the same day. Thetrial court took judicial notice of the exhibits and testimonyfrom the unfitness hearing and admitted People's Exhibit15, CASA's best-interests report. The report indicated thatthe minors had lived with the foster parents for almostthree years. The foster parents had been family friends ofrespondent and involved in the minors’ lives since theirbirth. The minors referred to the foster parents as “grandma”and “grandpa” and stated that they felt safe with them. Thefoster parents provided appropriate clothing, books, toys,and met all the minors’ needs. The minors enjoyed cookingwith the foster mother, and the home was well-maintained,clean, and comfortable. The foster parents were willing toallow contact with respondent as long as it was safe andappropriate. The minors attended church with the fosterparents and participated in church events. Because the fosterparents shared the same race as the minors, the childrenwere able to learn about their culture. The minors wereinvolved with the foster parents’ extended family and werescheduled to serve as flower girls at an upcoming wedding.The minors had a strong attachment to the foster parentsand their extended family and stated that they wanted tocontinue living in the foster home, which was the only homethey remembered. They attended school and participated inextracurricular activities. CASA concluded that it was inthe minors’ best interests to terminate respondent's parentalrights. 42 Coe testified that she had been employed by GuardianAngel Community Services as a foster care case managersince July 2023 and became the minors’ caseworkerin October 2024. Within two weeks of her assignment,she visited the minors at the foster mother's home andsubsequently observed them approximately once a month.Coe testified that the home was safe and appropriate, and all ofthe minors’ needs were met. Their relationship with the fostermother was loving and nurturing, and they referred to her as“Granny.” The minors adored their foster father. The childrenparticipated in basketball, summer camp, and other activitiesand field trips. They were involved with the foster mother'sextended family and had recently served as flower girls atthe wedding of the foster mother's sister. Although enteringthird grade, the minors were behind academically and hadIEPs requiring extra tutoring. The foster mother activelyassisted with reading and writing. Additionally, as a result offoster mother's intervention, the minors were diagnosed withattention deficit disorder and the foster mother ensured theytook their daily medication. The foster parents were willingto provide permanency, and the minors expressed a desire toremain in the foster home. The foster parents would allowfuture contact with respondent if it was safe and appropriate. 43 Respondent testified that she was still living in the sameapartment in Chicago with her infant daughter. She stated thatif the minors returned home, they would have their own room.Respondent acknowledged that she had failed her childrenbut maintained that her home with the minors was alwaysfull of love. She expressed gratitude for everything the fostermother had provided. Respondent believed it was still in theminors’ best interests to have her as their mother, even ifthey remained in the foster mother's care. She argued thatmotherhood was a journey and that she should be allowed tocontinue that journey.*9 44 Following argument, the trial court rendered itsruling. The court found that it was in the minors’ bestinterests to terminate respondent's parental rights. Whileacknowledging that respondent loved her children, the courtemphasized that the minors had been in the foster parents’care for three years and that the foster mother, a familyfriend, had been involved in the minors’ lives since their birth.The court concluded that, to maintain stability, the minorsneeded to be available for adoption. The minors attendedchurch with the foster family and shared the same race,allowing them to experience similar cultural opportunities.They were involved in the foster parents’ extended family,attending gatherings, holidays, and other celebrations. CASAreported that the minors were eager to remain in the fosterhome, which they stated was the only home they remembered.In the foster home, the minors were making academic andbehavioral progress, with the foster parents providing tutoringand additional schoolwork support. The court found that,although respondent loved the minors, she did not have astrong bond with them. The trial court concluded that, bya preponderance of the evidence, it was in the minors’ bestinterests to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondentthen filed a timely notice of appeal.
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8 45 II. ANALYSIS 46 Respondent filed her notice of appeal on July 16, 2025.Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5), our dispositionis to be filed within 150 days of that date, or by December15, 2025, unless good cause is shown why that date shouldbe extended. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. Apr. 3, 2018). Here,respondent filed a motion for extension of time and twolater motions for leave to file her opening brief instanter. Inlight of respondent's pro se status, this court granted thosemotions. As a result of these extensions and the attendantdelay, full briefing was not completed until December 15,2025. Accordingly, we find good cause to issue our decisionafter the 150-day deadline. 47 On appeal, respondent, proceeding pro se, argues that:(1) the trial court's fitness finding was against the manifestweight of the evidence because the State relied on insufficient,contradictory, and unreliable testimony; (2) the court erredin relying on subjective assertions by CASA and the fosterparents that were not based on firsthand knowledge orobservations; (3) the court failed to consider agency-causeddelays and deficiencies in services; (4) she was denied dueprocess; and (5) the trial court's best interests determinationwas against the manifest weight of the evidence. 48 We first address the State's argument that respondent'sstatement of facts should be stricken and her argumentsdeemed forfeited for failure to comply with Illinois SupremeCourt Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h) governsthe contents and requirements of an appellant's brief. Rule341(h)(6) provides that the statement of facts “shall containthe facts necessary to an understanding of the case, statedaccurately and fairly without argument or comment, and withappropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.”Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h)(7)further provides that the argument section “shall contain thecontentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, withcitation of the authorities and the pages of the record reliedon.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h) isnot a mere suggestion, and this court has discretion to strikea noncompliant brief and dismiss the appeal. Niewold v. Fry,306 Ill. App. 3d 735, 737 (1999). 49 Upon review of respondent's brief, we concludethat her statement of facts is deficient, contains argumentand commentary, and includes few citations to the record.The argument section likewise largely fails to includecitations to the record. In addition, several authorities citedby respondent do not support the propositions for whichthey are offered. For example, respondent relies on In reA.P., 2012 IL 113875, for the propositions that “when therecord affirmatively demonstrates progress, compliance, andagency-created barriers rather than parental unwillingness,the manifest weight standard requires reversal” and that an“unfitness finding cannot be grounded in conjecture, hearsay,or subjective impressions.” However, A.P. reversed a findingof neglect where a child was injured while in the care of athird party and there was no evidence that the parents knewor should have known that the third party was not suitable toprovide a safe and nurturing shelter for the child. Id. 26.The case did not address parental progress or compliance withservice plans and did not involve a finding of unfitness.*10 50 Further, respondent cites a case, In re K.B., 2019IL App (3d) 180086, which does not exist. The citation istherefore erroneous, which could be due to a transcriptionerror (see, e.g., In re K.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190496)or reliance on an artificial intelligence (AI) research tool.Although the use of AI is not prohibited, litigants remainresponsible for ensuring the accuracy of their filings. In reBaby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, 131. Citation toa nonexistent authority is grounds for striking a brief anddismissing an appeal. Pletcher v. Village of Libertyville PolicePension Board, 2025 IL App (2d) 240416-U, 29. Despiterespondent's failure to comply with Rule 341(h) and hererroneous citations, we will address her arguments on themerits because a biological parent's right to raise his or herchild is a fundamental liberty interest, and the involuntarytermination of parental rights is a drastic measure (In reGwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 353 (2005)). In re C.R., 2024IL App (4th) 231441-U, 20 (addressing termination on themerits despite briefing failures). 51 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) sets forth atwo-stage process for the involuntary termination of parentalrights. 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2024)). Initially, theState must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, thatthe parent is unfit under any single ground set forth in section1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)).See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2024); In re J.L., 236 Ill.2d 329, 337 (2010). If the trial court finds the parent unfit, theState must then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest.See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d347, 367 (2004). We will not disturb a trial court's finding as tofitness or best interests unless it is against the manifest weight
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9of the evidence. In re N.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 180797, ¶¶ 30,43. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidenceonly where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or thedetermination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on theevidence. In re Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, 16. 52 Respondent's first contention is that the trial court'sfitness finding was against the manifest weight of theevidence. Rather than addressing each specific ground,respondent argues generally that the court erred becauseshe completed multiple services, including a parenting class,individual therapy, and visitation-related requirements. Here,the trial court found respondent unfit on five differentgrounds. A finding of unfitness may be affirmed on any singleground, and we need not consider the remaining grounds ifone is supported by the record. In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill.App. 3d 883, 891 (2004). We affirm the trial court's fitnessdetermination on the basis that respondent failed to maintaina reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility forthe minors. 53 In addressing a finding of unfitness based on a failureto maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern orresponsibility for the minor (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West2024)), the court must examine the parent's conduct “in thecontext of the circumstances in which that conduct occurred.”In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 278 (1990). The focusunder this ground is on the reasonableness of the parent'sefforts, not their ultimate success. In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App. 3d 239, 259 (2004). The court must also consider anycircumstances that made it difficult for the parent to visit,communicate with, or otherwise demonstrate interest in thechild. Id. Noncompliance with a service plan is relevant to thisinquiry. Id. “[A] parent need not be at fault to be unfit, and sheis not fit merely because she had demonstrated some interestin or affection for her child.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App.3d 1052, 1064 (2006). Because the trial court is in the bestposition to observe the demeanor and conduct of the partiesand witnesses, it is best situated to assess credibility andweigh the witnesses’ testimony. In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d661, 667 (2001). Accordingly, the trial court is afforded broaddiscretion and great deference in matters involving minors. Id.*11 54 Although respondent completed certain services,including a parenting class, individual therapy, and virtualparent coaching, the trial court's finding of unfitness wasnot against the manifest weight of the evidence. The courtcorrectly noted heightened concern in this case due torespondent's prior history with DCFS. The record shows thatrespondent had three prior indicated findings with DCFSregarding failure to properly supervise the minors. She hadbeen offered intact family services and pled guilty to childendangerment. Nonetheless, in the incident giving rise to thepresent case, the minors were found on the roof of the homeand had thrown their pet rabbit from it while respondent wason the telephone. 55 The trial court also correctly found that respondent failedto make reasonable progress in her recommended services.Respondent was unsuccessfully discharged from individualtherapy for nonattendance and required re-referral. Althoughshe later successfully completed an initial round of individualtherapy, the court ordered her to resume therapy becauseconcerns remained regarding her lack of participation withthe minors, instability, and failure to make herself available tothe agency. Respondent was also unsuccessfully dischargedfrom in-person parent coaching after appearing withdrawn atthe final session and raising concerns about substance use.She stated that she had taken Benadryl but failed to completea requested drug drop until several days later, and thereforecould not prove that she was not under the influence of THCor another substance. 56 Respondent's services required her to refrain frommarijuana use, but she continued to use it. Of 29 scheduleddrug screens, she missed 14 and tested positive 11 times. Sheadmitted smoking marijuana two to three times per week. Hercontinued use ultimately impacted her services, as the fostermother discontinued hosting in-home parent coaching afterrespondent appeared under the influence at the final session.Although respondent attributed the failure to resume parentcoaching to her caseworker and Williams, it was her ownconduct that necessitated relocating the service and limitingit to weekdays, which created the scheduling difficulties. 57 Respondent also failed to make reasonable progresswith visitation. Her visitation decreased after the birth ofher baby in October 2023. The foster mother reported thatrespondent was inconsistent, often arriving late or missingvisits entirely. When the agency took over supervision,respondent attended only about half the scheduled visits.Both the foster mother and the agency reported that, duringvisits, respondent frequently refused to help the minors withhomework or provide activities. There was also a two-monthperiod during which no visitation occurred. Respondent didnot attend the minors’ birthday party in June 2024 and arrivedat a tea party scheduled with the minors after it had concluded.
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10Because respondent did not complete parent coaching, visitsnever progressed to unsupervised or overnight visits. 58 Additionally, respondent failed to demonstrate an abilityto maintain stable housing or employment. Although theminors had been in foster care since May 2022, respondentdid not obtain her own apartment until approximately twoyears later. Prior to that, she resided with various individualsor in a maternity shelter. While she claimed to work two jobsand receive cash payment, she provided no proof of incomeand did not regularly contribute financial support toward theminors’ care during the nearly three years they resided withthe foster parents. Based on the foregoing, we cannot saythe trial court's finding that respondent failed to maintain areasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility forthe minors was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on theevidence, or that the opposite conclusion was clearly evident.*12 59 Respondent raises several arguments challengingthe reliability and credibility of the evidence. For example,she contends that CASA's testimony was “confused,speculative, and not based on firsthand observations,” andthat the foster parent's assertions were “subjective, unverified,and contradicted by DCFS investigators.” However, it is wellsettled that “[w]here the evidence is in conflict, we deferto the trial court's disposition regarding factual findings andcredibility assessments, because the trial court is in the bestposition to make these determinations.” In re S.T., 2021 ILApp (5th) 210077, 68; In re Natalia O., 2019 IL App(2d) 181014, 56 (conflicts in the evidence are for the trialcourt to resolve). Moreover, neither CASA nor the fosterparent testified at the fitness hearing; any references to theirstatements were contained in exhibits that were admittedwithout objection. 60 Respondent further argues that the trial court improperlyrelied on hearsay statements attributed to the minors’ oldersister, L.B., suggesting she acted in a mother's role forthe minors. The record, however, reflects that the trialcourt expressly stated that it was not considering thosestatements for the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, thecourt referenced them in the context of emphasizing the needfor respondent to demonstrate progress in services and herability to care for the minors—an obligation that existedindependent of any statements by L.B. Although respondentcharacterizes those statements as a “central pillar” of thecourt's reasoning, the record does not support that assertion. 61 Respondent next argues that the trial court failed toconsider agency-caused delays and service deficiencies. Therecord, however, reflects that the trial court was well awareof the agency delays and service failures, which is why itdeclined on two occasions to change the permanency goal tosubstitute care. In March 2024, the court stated that it wantedto change the goal but maintained it at return home becausethe agency had not made reasonable efforts. In June 2024, thecourt changed the goal to guardianship, allowing respondentadditional time to make progress with her service plans. Itwas not until December 2024 that the trial court found theagency had made reasonable efforts and changed the goalto substitute care pending a determination on termination ofparental rights. 62 Moreover, apart from the minors being taken into care inMay 2022 and the initial services not beginning until October2022, the remaining delays were at least partially attributableto respondent. She missed appointments, which led to herdischarge from individual therapy and required a new referral.The foster mother discontinued hosting in-home parentcoaching after respondent appeared under the influence at thefinal session. This necessitated a new referral and relocationof the service from weekend sessions at the foster hometo weekday sessions elsewhere, which created schedulingconflicts. Further, at the unfitness hearing, respondentacknowledged receiving multiple referrals, including threefor individual counseling, two for parenting coaching, aparenting class, a substance abuse assessment, and visitation.Accordingly, respondent's claim that her service failures weresolely attributable to DCFS, and therefore insufficient tosupport a finding of unfitness, is not supported by the record. 63 Respondent next contends that she was denied dueprocess because critical hearings were held and orders enteredwithout proof of notice or service upon her. She notes, forexample, that the record contains no affidavit of service,certified mailing, or sheriff's return related to the June 2022removal hearing or the September 2023 permanency reviewhearing. She also raises arguments on behalf of the putativefather, Darryl R., alleging that he was also denied due process.*13 64 Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in thecare, custody, and control of their children. In re M.H., 196Ill. 2d 356, 362-63 (2001). Accordingly, due process requiresthat a parent have adequate notice in juvenile proceedings. Inre A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d 720, 724 (2010). The Juvenile CourtAct further sets forth a respondent's right to be present at
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11proceedings. 705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West 2024). Further, section2-15(7) of the Act provides:“The appearance of the minor's legal guardian or custodian,or a person named as a respondent in a petition, in anyproceeding under this Act shall constitute a waiver ofservice of summons and submission to the jurisdiction ofthe court, ***.” Id. § 2-15(7). 65 In the present case, respondent appeared not only atthe June 2022 removal hearing and the September 2023permanency hearing, but also at every other hearing in thiscase. Her presence not only satisfied her due process rightto be present at the proceedings, but also waived any noticerequirements. In re A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d at 724. Further,respondent lacks standing to assert alleged due processviolations on behalf of the putative father. “For a party tohave standing, the party must suffer some injury in fact to alegally cognizable interest and must have sustained, or be inimmediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result ofthe complained-of conduct.” Department of Transportation v.Anderson, 384 Ill. App. 3d 309, 313-14 (2008). We thereforereject her due process arguments. 66 Finally, respondent challenges the trial court's findingthat termination of her parental rights was in the minors’best interests. As noted, once a parent is found unfit, thecourt must determine whether termination serves the child'sbest interests. In re B'yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, 41. The best interests of the child are paramount and takeprecedence over all other considerations. In re I.H., 238 Ill. 2d430, 445 (2010). A child's best interests are not to be balancedagainst any other interest; they must remain inviolate. In reAustin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 49 (2005). Even the superior rightsof a natural parent must yield if consistent with the child'sbest interests. Id. at 50. Accordingly, at the best interestsphase, “the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-childrelationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, lovinghome life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. The State bears theburden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence thattermination is in the child's best interests. Id. at 366. 67 The Juvenile Court Act enumerates factors for assessinga child's best interests, which must be considered in thecontext of the child's age and developmental needs. Thesefactors include: (1) the minor's physical safety and welfare;(2) the development of the minor's identity; (3) familial,cultural, and religious background; (4) sense of attachment,including love, security, familiarity, and continuity ofrelationships with parental figures; (5) the minor's wishesand goals; (6) community ties; (7) the minor's need forpermanence; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9)the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferencesof the person available to care for the child. 705 ILCS405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024). The trial court need not explicitlyreference every factor in rendering its decision. Jaron Z., 348Ill. App. 3d at 262-63. We review the trial court's best interestsfinding under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.B'yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, 41.*14 68 Here, the record supports the trial court's bestinterests finding. At the time of termination, the minors werenine years old, had lived with the foster parents for over threeyears, and needed permanence. The minors expressed a desireto remain with the foster parents, reported feeling safe there,and identified it as the only home they truly remembered.Evidence showed that the minors were well cared for, with alltheir needs met. They were the same race as the foster parents,had become part of the foster family and extended family, andattended church with them. Academically, the minors madeprogress, attended school regularly, received help from thefoster parents with schoolwork, participated in extracurricularactivities, and received professional tutoring. The fostermother advocated for attention deficit diagnoses and ensuredthe minors took their medication. While respondent clearlyloves the minors, the evidence demonstrated that she neverproved an ability to care for them independently. She neveradvanced to unsupervised visitation and did not maintainstable housing until one month before the termination hearing.Given the record and the deference afforded to the trial court,we cannot say its finding that termination was in the minors’best interests was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 69 III. CONCLUSION 70 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of thecircuit court of Kane County. 71 Affirmed.All CitationsNot Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U, 2026WL 684158
In re A.R. and N.R., Minors (The People of the State of..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (2d) 250299-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12Footnotes1The parental rights of Darryl R., the minors’ putative father, and of John Doe and any unknown fathers wereterminated in the same proceedings but are not at issue in this appeal. The minors also have an older half-sister, L.B., who was placed with her natural father and whose status is likewise not at issue in this appeal.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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