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In re Boy
(2025)
Case details
Full caption
July v. Lerin H
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Illinois (IL)
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Zenoff (Justice), joined by Lannerd (Justice), Knecht (Justice)
In
re
Boy
Appellate
Court
of
Illinois,
Fourth
District
July
21,
2025,
Filed
NOS.
4-24-1427,
4-24-1430
cons.
Reporter
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427
*;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008
**;
2025
LX
284835
In
re
BABY
BOY
and
A.H.,
Minors
(The
People
of
the
State
of
Illinois,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Lerin
H.,
Respondent-
Appellant).
Prior
History:
[**1]
Appeal
from
the
Circuit
Court
of
Sangamon
County.
Nos.
22JA121,
23JA122.
Honorable
Karen
S.
Tharp,
Judge
Presiding.
Disposition:
Affirmed.
Counsel:
William
T.
Panichi,
of
Springfield,
for
appellant.
John
C.
Milhiser,
State's
Attorney,
of
Springfield
(Patrick
Delfino,
Thomas
D.
Arado,
and
Laura
Bialon,
of
State's
Attorneys
Appellate
Prosecutor's
Office,
of
counsel),
for
the
People.
Judges:
JUSTICE
ZENOFF
delivered
the
judgment
of
the
court,
with
opinion.
Justices
Lannerd
and
Knecht
concurred
in
the
judgment
and
opinion.
Opinion
by:
ZENOFF
Opinion
JUSTICE
ZENOFF
delivered
the
judgment
of
the
court,
with
opinion.
Justices
Lannerd
and
Knecht
concurred
in
the
judgment
and
opinion.
[*P1]
Respondent,
Lerin
H.,
appeals
from
the
trial
court's
order
terminating
her
parental
rights
as
to
her
minor
children,
Baby
Boy,
also
known
as
E.H.
(born
in
2023),
and
A.H.
(born
in
2022).
On
appeal,
respondent
contends
(1)
the
court's
unfitness
finding
was
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence,
(2)
the
court's
best-interest
finding
was
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence,
(3)
her
due
process
rights
were
violated
when
the
court
denied
her
motion
to
represent
herself,
(4)
the
State
failed
to
provide
reasonable
accommodations
for
respondent
to
complete
required
[**2]
services
during
her
incarceration,
and
(5)
respondent
was
provided
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel.
For
the
reasons
articulated
below,
we
affirm.
[*P2]
Additionally,
unrelated
to
the
merits
of
the
termination
of
respondent's
parental
rights,
this
court
issued
a
rule
to
show
cause
against
respondent's
attorney,
William
T.
Panichi,
as
to
why
he
should
not
be
sanctioned
for
citing
eight
nonexistent
cases
in
the
briefs
he
filed
on
behalf
of
respondent.
For
the
reasons
articulated
below,
we
find
that
Mr.
Panichi
violated
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
375
(eff.
Feb.
1,
1994)
and
order
that
(1)
Mr.
Panichi
disgorge
the
payment
of
$6,925.62
he
received
for
his
work
on
this
appeal;
(2)
Mr.
Panichi
pay
$1,000
as
monetary
sanctions
to
the
clerk
of
the
Fourth
District
Appellate
Court;
and
(3)
the
clerk
of
the
Fourth
District
Appellate
Court
send
a
copy
of
this
opinion
to
the
Illinois
Attorney
Registration
and
Disciplinary
Commission.
[*P3]
I.
BACKGROUND
Page
2
of
21
[*P4]
A.
Underlying
Action
[*P5]
Respondent
gave
birth
to
A.H.
in
March
2022.
On
May
23,
2022,
the
State
filed
a
petition
alleging
that
A.H.
was
a
neglected
minor
because
(1)
he
was
"not
receiving
the
proper
care
and
supervision
necessary
for
his
wellbeing
in
that
mother
failed
to
make
a
proper
care
[**3]
plan
for
the
minor's
supervision"
(see
705
ILCS
405/2-
3(1)(a)
(West
2022))
and
(2)
his
environment
was
injurious
to
his
welfare,
"as
evidenced
by
mother's
mental
instability"
(see
705
ILCS
405/2-3(1)(b)
(West
2022)).
[*P6]
The
trial
court
held
an
adjudicatory
hearing
on
October
20
and
November
17,
2022.
The
court
then
held
a
dispositional
hearing
in
December
2022.
On
January
25,
2023,
the
court
found
that
it
was
in
A.H.'s
best
interest
to
be
placed
in
the
custody
and
guardianship
of
the
Illinois
Department
of
Children
and
Family
Services
(DCFS)
and
made
A.H.
a
ward
of
the
court.
Respondent
appealed
to
this
court,
arguing
that
the
court's
neglect
finding
was
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence.
This
court
affirmed.
In
re
A.H.,
2023
IL
App
(4th)
230131-U,
¶
33
.
[*P7]
We
reiterate
the
salient
facts
here
as
relevant
to
this
termination
of
parental
rights
appeal.
In
October
2022,
respondent
was
arrested
on
federal
charges
of
cyberstalking
her
previous
caseworker.
She
was
incarcerated
at
the
time
of
the
adjudicatory
and
dispositional
hearings
in
connection
with
A.H.'s
case.
At
the
adjudicatory
hearing
on
November
17,
2022,
respondent
requested
to
proceed
pro
se
.
Respondent
began
interrupting
the
trial
court
and
her
attorney,
Selena
Young,
attempting
to
state
that
she
was
not
a
[**4]
threat
to
herself
or
anyone
else.
The
court
tried
to
explain
to
respondent
that
she
was
not
testifying
at
that
time
and
that
there
was
a
process
that
the
proceedings
must
follow.
As
respondent
continued
to
interrupt,
the
court
stated,
"Based
upon
the
communications
I've
just
had
with
the
respondent
mother
here
in
court,
it
seems
to
me
that
she
is
not
comprehending
what
is
going
on
in
court
nor
the
direction
and
structure
of
court
adequately
to
represent
her[self]."
Thereafter,
respondent
continually
interrupted
the
court
and
her
own
attorney
until
the
court
directed
jail
personnel
to
return
respondent
to
the
holding
cell
so
the
hearing
could
proceed.
[*P8]
In
May
2023,
while
respondent's
first
appeal
was
pending
and
she
was
incarcerated,
she
gave
birth
to
E.H.
On
June
1,
2023,
the
State
filed
a
petition
alleging
that
E.H.
was
a
neglected
minor
in
that
(1)
E.H.
"is
not
receiving
the
proper
care
and
supervision
necessary
for
his
well-being
in
that
Mother
failed
to
make
a
proper
care
plan
for
the
minor's
supervision"
(see
705
ILCS
405/2-3(1)(a)
(West
2022)),
(2)
E.H.'s
"environment
is
injurious
to
his
welfare
as
evidenced
by
Mother's
mental
instability"
(see
705
ILCS
405/2-3(1)(b)
(West
2022)),
and
(3)
E.H.'s
"environment
is
injurious
[**5]
to
his
welfare
as
evidenced
by
the
minor's
sibling
being
adjudicated
neglected
and
Mother's
failure
to
make
reasonable
progress
towards
having
the
minor's
sibling
returned
to
her
care"
(see
705
ILCS
405/2-3(1)(b)
(West
2022)).
On
August
3,
2023,
the
trial
court
held
a
shelter
care
hearing
in
connection
with
E.H.'s
case
and
determined
there
was
probable
cause
to
believe
E.H.
was
neglected.
The
court
granted
DCFS
temporary
custody
and
guardianship
of
E.H.
The
court
appointed
Young
to
represent
respondent
over
respondent's
objection.
[*P9]
The
trial
court
began
the
adjudicatory
hearing
in
connection
with
E.H.'s
case
on
August
24,
2023,
and
then
continued
it
to
a
later
date.
At
the
hearing,
respondent
was
represented
by
Sean
Liles.
The
court
entered
an
order
on
October
5,
2023,
and
determined
that
E.H.
was
neglected
based
on
respondent's
failure
to
make
a
proper
care
plan,
"mental
instability/health
issues,"
and
failure
to
make
reasonable
progress
in
the
juvenile
case
as
to
A.H.
The
court
noted,
"mother
had
no
plan
for
where
child
would
go
after
birth,
mother
was
in
[federal]
custody
at
the
time,
[previous]
adjudication
re
mother's
mental
health,
other
child
not
returned
to
mother's
care."
[*P10]
In
November
2023,
respondent
[**6]
was
convicted
of
cyberstalking.
[*P11]
The
trial
court
entered
an
order
on
November
1,
2023,
finding
that
it
was
in
E.H.'s
best
interest
that
he
be
made
a
ward
of
the
court,
respondent
was
unfit
and
unable
to
care
for
E.H.,
and
reasonable
efforts
and
appropriate
services
aimed
at
family
preservation
had
been
unsuccessful
in
rectifying
the
conditions
leading
to
the
finding
of
unfitness
or
inability.
The
order
states:
"mother
in
federal
custody
awaiting
sentencing;
mother
must
cooperate
with
recommended
services
including
mental
health
treatment
and
parenting."
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**2
Page
3
of
21
[*P12]
The
trial
court
held
two
permanency
hearings
as
to
A.H.
between
May
and
August
2023
and
four
as
to
both
A.H.
and
E.H.
between
December
2023
and
August
2024.
The
court
ordered
custody
and
guardianship
of
the
minors
to
remain
with
DCFS
each
time.
[*P13]
The
State
filed
motions
for
termination
of
parental
rights
on
May
7,
2024,
as
to
A.H.,
and
July
10,
2024,
as
to
E.H.
The
petitions
alleged
that
respondent
(1)
failed
to
maintain
a
reasonable
degree
of
interest,
concern,
or
responsibility
as
to
the
minors'
welfare
(
750
ILCS
50/1(D)(b)
(West
2024)),
(2)
failed
to
make
reasonable
efforts
to
correct
the
conditions
that
were
the
basis
for
the
removal
of
the
minors
from
[**7]
her
custody
within
nine
months
following
the
adjudication
of
neglect
(
750
ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(i)
(West
2024)),
and
(3)
failed
to
make
reasonable
progress
toward
the
return
of
the
minors
to
her
during
any
nine-month
period
following
the
adjudication
of
neglect
(
750
ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii)
(West
2024)).
The
nine-month
periods
alleged
by
the
State
as
to
A.H.
were
(1)
November
17,
2022,
to
August
17,
2023,
and
(2)
August
7,
2023,
to
May
7,
2024.
The
nine-month
period
as
to
E.H.
was
October
5,
2023,
to
July
5,
2024.
[*P14]
1.
Fitness
Hearing
[*P15]
The
trial
court
held
the
fitness
hearing
on
October
17,
2024.
At
the
beginning
of
the
hearing,
respondent's
counsel,
Liles,
indicated
that
he
sent
a
video
writ
to
the
federal
prison
in
Waseca,
Minnesota,
and
followed
up
to
request
that
respondent
attend
the
proceedings
by
video,
but
the
prison
ultimately
told
him
it
was
only
possible
for
respondent
to
appear
telephonically,
which
she
did.
The
evidence
presented,
as
relevant
to
this
appeal,
is
as
follows.
[*P16]
Laura
Kuehnel
was
a
caseworker
with
Family
Service
Center
(FSC)
assigned
to
A.H.'s
and
E.H.'s
cases
as
of
October
2022.
Kuehnel
testified
that
A.H.
came
into
care
in
May
2022
due
to
mental
health
concerns
with
respondent,
and
E.H.
came
into
care
when
he
was
[**8]
born
in
May
2023
because
of
those
same
concerns
and
because
A.H.
was
already
in
care.
At
the
time
E.H.
came
into
care,
respondent
was
incarcerated
in
federal
prison
for
cyberstalking
her
previous
caseworker.
At
this
point
in
the
hearing,
respondent
began
interrupting
the
testimony,
and
the
trial
court
attempted
to
explain
to
respondent
that
her
attorney
was
going
to
object
and
cross-examine
the
witness
on
her
behalf.
The
court
informed
respondent
that
it
would
mute
her
if
she
continued
interrupting.
Returning
to
the
testimony,
Kuehnel
stated
that
as
of
July
2022,
respondent
was
required
to
engage
in
mental
health
services,
substance
abuse
services,
drug
testing,
and
parenting
classes.
However,
respondent
had
been
terminated
from
Parent
Place,
Family
Guidance
Center,
and
FSC
due
to
her
verbal
aggression.
[*P17]
Kuehnel
testified
that
respondent's
visitation
was
suspended
in
September
2022
due
to
threats
respondent
made
against
her
previous
caseworker.
As
of
September
2022,
respondent
had
not
signed
any
consent
forms
or
releases
of
information,
as
required
under
her
service
plan.
Respondent
was
arrested
on
federal
charges
in
October
2022.
While
respondent
was
in
custody
in
Sangamon
County,
[**9]
Kuehnel
facilitated
two
visits
with
A.H.
in
December
2022.
Kuehnel
facilitated
two
additional
visits
in
February
2023,
after
respondent
was
transferred
to
the
Macon
County
jail,
but
there
was
a
plastic
screen
between
respondent
and
A.H.
at
that
facility,
which
made
visitation
difficult
for
both
of
them,
and
they
both
just
cried.
Respondent
requested
not
to
have
visits
at
that
point
and
chose
to
talk
to
A.H.
only
by
phone.
Kuehnel
testified
that
contacting
respondent
while
she
was
in
jail
was
difficult
but
was
made
easier
when
Corporal
Gatts
was
assigned
to
respondent's
case
as
a
point
of
contact
in
April
2023.
[*P18]
Kuehnel
testified
that
Gatts
was
able
to
facilitate
a
child
and
family
team
meeting
in
May
2023.
Kuehnel
mailed
the
integrated
assessment
and
service
plan
to
respondent
prior
to
the
May
2023
meeting,
but
respondent
mailed
the
documents
back
to
her
with
additional
writing,
"stating
that
we
were
trying
to
take
her
children
away,
we
were
kidnapping
her
children,
that
she
was
not
signing
her
rights
away,"
and
"a
bunch
of
writings
regarding
the
same
things
over
and
over
pretty
much."
Kuehnel
testified
that
she
discussed
the
service
plan
with
respondent
during
the
May
2023
meeting.
[**10]
Respondent
stated
that
"she
was
just
there
because
she
had
to
be
there,"
then
refused
to
speak,
and
once
Kuehnel
brought
up
signing
the
releases
of
information,
respondent
"became
verbally
aggressive
and
ended
the
call."
On
the
State's
motion,
the
trial
court
admitted
respondent's
integrated
assessment
and
service
plans
into
evidence.
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**6
Page
4
of
21
[*P19]
Kuehnel
testified
that
because
respondent
had
not
signed
any
releases,
she
could
not
get
any
information
about
respondent's
progress
in
completing
her
services.
The
only
information
Kuehnel
obtained
was
that
respondent
was
participating
in
Alcoholics
Anonymous
(AA),
a
women's
group,
and
going
to
church;
however,
Kuehnel
was
told
that
respondent
was
not
in
mental
health
treatment
because
"she
had
been
kicked
out
due
to
verbal
aggression."
In
June
2023,
E.H.'s
foster
parent
attempted
to
talk
with
respondent
and
send
her
pictures,
but
respondent
"cussed
him
out,
and
they
ended
the
call."
At
some
point,
A.H.'s
foster
parent,
who
is
respondent's
mother,
was
taken
off
of
the
jail's
call
list
because
respondent
was
yelling
and
threatening
her.
[*P20]
Kuehnel
testified
that
respondent
was
convicted
of
the
federal
cyberstalking
charges
in
November
2023
and
transferred
[**11]
to
a
federal
prison
in
Waseca
in
January
2024.
At
this
point
in
the
hearing,
the
trial
court
momentarily
halted
testimony
due
to
some
background
noise
from
respondent's
phone
and
asked
her
to
mute
herself
while
the
noise
was
ongoing.
Respondent
informed
the
court
the
noise
was
her
crying,
saying,
"I
can't
control
it.
I
already
know
where
this
is
going,"
and,
"I
really
am
trying
to
keep
it
together,
but
I'm
so
hurt
that
I
cannot
stop
crying
because
I
am
so
hurt,
I'm
so
hurt."
[*P21]
When
testimony
resumed,
Kuehnel
stated
that
she
was
unable
to
have
contact
with
respondent
between
October
2023
and
January
2024
because
respondent
refused,
and
between
January
and
March
2024
due
to
communication
issues
with
the
federal
prison.
Kuehnel
stated
that
the
"one
and
only
thing
[she]
received"
about
respondent's
mental
health
treatment
was
a
note
from
a
psychiatrist
in
March
2024,
which
merely
stated
"that
they
had
concerns
and
just
kind
of
that
she
was
attending."
Kuehnel
explained
that
respondent
had
her
contact
information
but
never
took
the
initiative
to
reach
out
to
her.
[*P22]
Kuehnel
was
finally
able
to
have
another
child
and
family
team
meeting
with
respondent
in
May
2024.
At
that
meeting,
they
reviewed
[**12]
the
service
plan,
visitation,
and
releases
of
information.
Kuehnel
testified
that
respondent
"was
cooperative
with
the
entire
thing
and
with
setting
up
visits
until
we
asked
her
about
signing
consents.
Then
she
became
very
verbally
aggressive
and
yelling
and
screaming
and
wanted
to
never
see
us
or
talk
to
us
or
have
contact
with
us
and
didn't
want
to
do
visits.
She
wanted
nothing
to
do
with
us."
[*P23]
Kuehnel
testified
that
respondent
reported
that
she
was
either
doing
parenting
classes
or
trying
to
sign
up
for
parenting
classes,
but
Kuehnel
was
not
able
to
verify
that
because
respondent
had
not
signed
any
releases
of
information.
Kuehnel
did
not
have
any
contact
with
respondent
between
May
and
August
2024,
except
receiving
from
respondent's
prison
caseworker
"some
certificates
of
her
completing
parenting
phase
1
and
some
ACE
classes"
and
participation
in
"some
groups."
Kuehnel
did
not
know
what
an
"ACE
class"
was
and
could
not
verify
respondent's
engagement.
Kuehnel
testified
that
even
if
respondent
had
engaged
in
those
services
and
they
were
satisfactory,
she
would
have
needed
to
make
more
progress
after
being
released
to
complete
her
service
plan.
[*P24]
Kuehnel
testified
that
respondent's
last
[**13]
in-person
visit
with
A.H.
was
in
February
2023.
Although
respondent
refused
in-person
visitation
after
that
point,
she
had
phone
calls
with
A.H.
until
May
2024.
Kuehnel
testified
that
DCFS
identified
Thomas
H.,
who
was
deceased,
as
the
putative
father
for
E.H.
Thomas
H.'s
grandparents
were
tested
for
paternity
in
his
stead
and
were
found
to
be
a
99.9%
genetic
match.
[*P25]
Before
respondent's
counsel
started
his
cross-examination,
the
trial
court
allowed
respondent
and
her
counsel
to
enter
a
Zoom
breakout
room
to
confer
to
ensure
that
he
could
address
all
of
her
concerns
during
his
cross-examination.
Upon
resuming
cross-examination,
Kuehnel
testified
that
respondent
said
she
would
not
sign
any
consent
forms
because
she
believed
she
was
signing
her
rights
away
and
that
it
was
a
violation
of
federal
health
privacy
laws,
despite
Kuehnel
explaining
several
times
that
was
not
the
case.
Kuehnel
explained
that
she
had
mailed
the
consent
forms
to
respondent
before
the
May
2023
child
and
family
team
meeting.
She
stated
that
there
were
several
services
available
to
respondent
while
incarcerated,
including
AA,
a
women's
group,
church,
counseling,
and
psychiatric
services,
which
the
agency
likely
would
[**14]
have
accepted.
Respondent
reported
to
Kuehnel
that
she
was
engaged
in
these
services,
but
Kuehnel
was
unable
to
determine
how
much
she
engaged
or
the
content
of
any
of
the
classes.
At
some
point,
Kuehnel
learned
that
respondent
had
been
dismissed
from
telehealth
psychiatric
appointments
due
to
verbal
aggression.
Kuehnel
stated
that
she
had
not
had
any
contact
with
respondent
since
May
2024.
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**10
Page
5
of
21
[*P26]
Kuehnel
further
testified
that
she
believed
respondent
was
diagnosed
with
depression
and
"something
like
schizophrenia."
Kuehnel
stated
that
respondent
believed
she
had
been
misdiagnosed
and
did
not
have
mental
health
problems.
The
integrated
assessment
noted
that
respondent
had
a
history
of
psychiatric
concerns,
including
severe
depression,
attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder
(ADHD),
and
bipolar
disorder.
The
assessment
also
reported
that
the
interview
had
to
be
terminated
after
respondent
"became
agitated
and
her
responses
became
more
hostile."
The
May
2024
service
plan
likewise
stated
that
respondent
had
a
documented
diagnosis
of
bipolar
disorder
but
added
that
respondent's
mother
reported
that
respondent
told
her
that
she
had
been
diagnosed
with
schizoaffective
disorder.
Kuehnel
testified
[**15]
that
respondent
was
not
taking
any
medications.
Kuehnel
stated
that
respondent
had
never
addressed
her
mental
health
concerns.
Kuehnel
explained
that
she
was
concerned
about
respondent's
mental
health
because
"she
could
go
from
being
calm
one
minute
to
very
aggressive
in
wording
the
next
minute
and
screaming
and
yelling.
She
didn't
really
seem
to
have
control
over
any
emotions."
[*P27]
Respondent
testified
that
she
was
advised
by
her
mother,
who
was
the
foster
parent
of
A.H.,
as
well
as
her
criminal
attorneys
from
her
federal
case,
not
to
communicate
with
Kuehnel.
She
did
talk
with
Kuehnel
on
the
phone
in
December
2023
and
told
Kuehnel
that
she
would
not
complete
the
integrated
assessment
because
of
"[t]he
clause
that
says
I
am
asking
the
Court
to
permanently
terminate
my
rights."
She
said
she
was
"also
concerned
about
the
fact
that
I
have
been
under
psych
malpractice,"
as
she
believed
she
had
been
misdiagnosed
and
did
not
want
the
trial
court
and
DCFS
to
receive
mental
health
documentation
she
believed
to
be
incorrect.
She
accused
the
psychiatrist
under
whose
care
she
had
been
between
2020
and
2022
of
forcing
medication
and
"not
actually
providing
the
care
that
I
found
to
be
a
fiduciary
[**16]
relationship
as
he
was
very
narcissistic,
condescending,
very
unprofessional,
refused
to
actually
treat
the
patient
and
instead
wanted
to
force
a
diagnosis
on
me."
She
said
that
she
filed
a
malpractice
suit
against
him.
She
claimed
that
she
had
never
been
removed
from
mental
health
services
while
at
the
Sangamon
County
or
Macon
County
jails.
She
also
filed
malpractice
suits
against
the
providers
she
had
while
incarcerated
in
Sangamon
and
Macon
Counties,
as
well
as
at
the
federal
prison
in
Waseca.
[*P28]
Respondent
testified
that
she
signed
up
for
services
at
the
prison
in
Waseca
as
soon
as
she
arrived
there,
but
they
had
waiting
lists
for
every
class.
She
said
that
she
was
admitted
to
some
of
these
classes
in
July
2024
only
after
she
filed
a
grievance
about
the
issue.
She
claimed
to
have
completed
phase
two
parenting
classes
and
several
ACE
classes,
which
she
said
were
intended
to
lower
recidivism
levels.
She
said
she
had
been
attending
AA
classes
since
she
got
to
prison
and
had
been
sober
from
alcohol,
marijuana,
and
nicotine
for
two
years.
She
acknowledged
she
previously
had
an
addiction
to
"air
duster"
that
"led
to
an
addiction
of
cocaine
to
get
off
the
air
duster."
[*P29]
Respondent
testified
[**17]
that
she
did
not
object
to
engaging
in
any
of
the
services
required
by
DCFS
and
believed
she
already
completed
all
the
services
in
her
service
plan.
When
her
attorney
asked
if
she
would
be
willing
to
sign
the
releases
of
information
after
going
over
the
clause
with
him,
respondent
expressed
hesitation
because
of
her
"concerns
with
these
providers"
and
would
want
the
clause
to
be
removed.
She
also
claimed
that
she
never
refused
visitation,
but
that
"[t]he
limited
visitation
has
been
all
on
DCFS's
deciding
that
the
relationship
between
me
and
my
children
and
the
physical
contact
and
the
bond
is
not,
is
not
relevant,"
and
"[t]he
foster
parents
are
unwilling
to
work
with
me
half
the
time."
She
stated
that
her
conditional
release
date
was
supposed
to
be
March
31,
2025.
She
also
maintained
that
"there's
a
chance
that
I
have
been
wrongly
incarcerated
for
the
last
two
years
of
my
life,"
and
she
was
appealing
her
federal
criminal
conviction.
She
refused
to
discuss
the
events
that
led
to
her
conviction.
[*P30]
When
asked
if
she
thought
her
caseworker's
concerns
about
her
mental
health
were
accurate,
respondent
stated,
"I
am
very
frustrated
because
whenever
I
express
concerns,
there's
a
statute,
a
clause,
[**18]
there
is
like,
you
are
wrong,
you're
delusional
that
is
counteracting
every
emotion
that
I
have."
She
expressed
that
she
felt
justified
in
her
frustration,
saying,
"I
believe
that
there
is
a
vendetta
that's
against
me"
and
"an
agenda
that
you
guys
are
trying
to
reach
or
somebody
is
that's
trying
to
terminate
my
parental
rights."
She
reported
that
she
was
working
with
a
mental
health
provider.
She
stated
that
the
only
mental
health
issue
she
had
was
posttraumatic
stress
disorder
(PTSD),
which
she
was
being
treated
for,
but
any
other
diagnoses
were
the
result
of
psychiatric
malpractice.
When
asked
by
the
State
whether
she
had
a
doctorate
or
medical
degree,
respondent
said,
"I
plead
the
Fifth"
(see
U.S.
Const.,
amend.
V
).
She
explained
that
she
disputed
the
doctors'
diagnoses
"because
I
know
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**14
Page
6
of
21
what
I
suffer
from"
and
"I
read
what
they
charted
about
me,
and
I
mean,
I
clinically
disagree."
She
continually
repeated
her
belief
that
her
providers
violated
their
fiduciary
relationships
with
her.
She
stated
that
she
was
not
taking
any
medications.
[*P31]
The
trial
court
ultimately
found
that
respondent
was
unfit
because
she
failed
to
(1)
show
a
reasonable
degree
of
interest,
concern,
or
responsibility
to
her
children's
welfare
[**19]
"by
engaging
in
acts
which
lead
[
sic
]
to
her
being
criminally
convicted
and
sentenced"
and
(2)
make
reasonable
progress
during
any
nine-month
period
following
the
adjudication
of
neglect
of
either
child.
The
court
explicitly
said
it
was
not
finding
that
respondent
was
unfit
because
she
failed
to
make
reasonable
efforts.
The
court
emphasized
that
"[i]t's
very
clear
to
the
Court
that
there
are
mental
health
issues."
The
court
noted
that
respondent
had
been
psychiatrically
hospitalized
several
times
and
that
she
filed
malpractice
suits
against
multiple
psychiatrists
who
treated
her
both
before
and
during
her
incarceration.
The
court
pointed
out
that
"it's
very
clear
to
the
Court
that
you
cannot
make
progress
on
mental
health
issues
when
you're
suing
your
psychiatrist."
[*P32]
The
trial
court
reiterated
several
additional
facts
it
believed
to
be
relevant.
Respondent
was
aggressive
during
the
integrated
assessment,
which
consequently
had
to
be
ended
early.
She
refused
to
sign
the
integrated
assessment.
She
had
not
consistently
participated
in
mental
health
treatment
or
complied
with
treatment
recommendations.
The
court
also
noted
that
it
was
not
as
concerned
with
whether
respondent
had
completed
[**20]
parenting
classes,
maintained
contact
with
her
caseworker,
or
had
visitation,
as
the
primary
issue
was
her
mental
health.
The
court
pointed
out
that
"[d]espite
whether
or
not
she's
talking
to
someone,
meeting
with
someone
at
any
of
these
facilities,
even
if
you
could
try
and
say
there's
some
effort
there,
there
is
clearly
no
progress."
The
court
also
mentioned
that
respondent
was
incarcerated
for
cyberstalking
and
threatening
a
caseworker.
[*P33]
2.
Best-Interest
Hearing
[*P34]
The
trial
court
held
the
best-interest
hearing
on
October
31,
2024.
The
following
evidence
was
presented.
Kuehnel
testified
that
she
observed
the
minors
once
a
month
in
their
respective
homes.
A.H.
was
placed
with
his
maternal
grandmother,
who
was
in
her
forties,
and
E.H.
was
placed
with
his
paternal
aunt
and
uncle.
At
the
time
of
the
hearing,
A.H.
was
two
years
old,
and
E.H.
was
one
year
old.
A.H.
lived
with
his
grandmother,
grandfather,
uncle,
and
two
dogs.
E.H.
lived
with
his
aunt,
uncle,
some
of
his
cousins,
and
a
dog.
Each
of
them
had
their
own
room.
Both
had
strong
bonds
with
their
respective
foster
parents,
who
met
all
their
needs.
Every
other
week,
A.H.
and
E.H.
had
an
overnight
visit
together.
Kuehnel
testified
that
[**21]
both
boys
were
happy,
always
smiling,
seemed
very
loved
in
their
homes,
went
to
their
foster
parents
willingly
for
anything,
and
were
very
attached
to
the
other
family
members
in
their
homes.
The
foster
parents
of
both
children
"have
been
very
adamant"
about
maintaining
their
sibling
relationship.
Both
foster
parents
were
willing
to
adopt
the
children
and
signed
permanency
commitment
forms.
Kuehnel
believed
it
was
in
the
children's
best
interest
to
have
respondent's
parental
rights
terminated,
as
respondent
"still
needs
significant
mental
health
treatment."
[*P35]
On
cross-examination,
Kuehnel
testified
that
she
was
previously
able
to
observe
A.H.
with
respondent,
but
A.H.
"was
very,
very
young
and
[respondent]
cried
most
of
the
time
and
[A.H.]
slept
a
lot
of
the
time,"
so
she
could
not
say
whether
there
was
a
bond
between
A.H.
and
respondent.
Respondent
had
phone
calls
with
A.H.,
and
his
foster
parents
"say
that
[respondent]
talks
to
[A.H.]
a
lot,"
but
he
"doesn't
respond
much"
because
he
is
"still
kind
of
young"
and
"otherwise
he
still
runs
and
plays
while
she
talks."
Kuehnel
noted
that
E.H.'s
foster
parents
"made
an
attempt
to
talk
with
[respondent]
and
she
had
cussed
[them]
out."
Kuehnel
[**22]
stated
that
the
children
live
in
different
neighborhoods
and
would
not
be
in
the
same
school
district.
She
testified
that
both
foster
parents
"have
stated
that
if
[respondent]
got
the
help
she
needs
***
then
they
would
be
willing
to
involve
her"
in
the
children's
lives
after
she
was
released
from
prison.
[*P36]
Respondent
called
Valerie
Kessler
Mathis
as
a
witness.
However,
Kessler
Mathis
never
observed
respondent
with
her
children,
so
she
was
quickly
dismissed
from
the
witness
stand.
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**18
Page
7
of
21
[*P37]
Respondent
testified
next.
She
began
her
testimony
by
referencing
statistics
about
children
in
DCFS's
custody.
Respondent
expressed
her
concerns
that
A.H.
and
E.H.
were
separated
and
only
reunited
briefly,
which
"puts
biological
strain
on
the
emotional
well-being
of
the
children
on
the
antisocial
behaviors."
She
believed
that
A.H.
was
"walking
around
with
a
picture
of
his
mother
crying
that
he
wants
her"
and
"showing
behaviors
that
I'm
concerned
about."
She
also
felt
that
there
was
hostility
between
her
and
E.H.'s
foster
parents.
When
asked
whether
Kuehnel's
explanation
for
that
hostility
was
accurate,
respondent
testified,
"I
did
not
cuss
out
the
foster
parents.
I
possibly
used
colorful
words."
She
also
expressed
[**23]
her
belief
that
the
foster
parents
and
DCFS
workers
were
committing
a
crime
by
interfering
with
her
visitation
rights.
She
believed
that
A.H.
was
"having
a
meltdown
when
[E.H.]
leaves
him"
but
acknowledged
that
she
is
"only
allowed
to
observe
over
the
phone."
She
expressed,
"I
myself,
have
been
a
victim
of
the
state
family
courts
for
now
23
years."
She
further
testified
that
if
released
from
custody,
she
would
go
home;
when
asked
where
home
is,
she
said,
"[T]he
home
is
the
home
address
that
I
have,"
though
she
could
not
remember
the
address.
She
said
that
she
would
reside
with
Daniel
K.,
her
fiancé,
with
whom
she
had
been
in
a
relationship
for
three
years.
[*P38]
Daniel
K.
testified
next.
He
stated
that
he
had
been
in
a
relationship
with
respondent
for
"[o]ver
two
years"
but
could
not
remember
the
actual
date
that
they
got
engaged.
He
had
observed
respondent
talking
to
A.H.
over
the
phone
but
had
never
had
any
interaction
with
the
children
himself.
He
admitted
to
pleading
guilty
to
misdemeanors
in
2016
and
2024.
[*P39]
The
trial
court
found
that
it
was
in
the
children's
best
interest
that
respondent's
parental
rights
be
terminated.
The
court
noted
the
various
factors
it
was
required
to
consider
[**24]
under
the
statute.
In
its
analysis,
the
court
reiterated
several
salient
facts.
Both
children
had
been
living
in
their
respective
homes
for
a
significant
time,
given
their
ages.
They
were
both
placed
with
family
members,
though
not
together.
They
appeared
to
be
smiling
when
Kuehnel
saw
them,
and
Kuehnel
did
not
report
that
A.H.
was
upset
when
he
was
separated
from
E.H.,
as
respondent
stated.
The
court
also
acknowledged
that
"at
two
years
old,
everything
is
going
to
upset
the
two-
year-old."
Both
children's
foster
parents
stated
they
would
adopt
the
children.
Respondent
was
convicted
and
serving
a
sentence
in
federal
prison,
and
she
was
"not
here
for
her
children,"
who
deserved
permanency.
The
court
noted
it
was
the
first
time
that
it
heard
that
respondent
was
engaged
and
that
Daniel
K.
had
never
even
met
either
child.
The
court
also
emphasized
that
with
respondent's
"longstanding
and
severe"
mental
health
issues,
"it's
going
to
take
quite
a
bit
of
therapy
and
treatment
and
progress
for
her
to
address
those
issues
to
the
point
where
she
would
be
ready
to
have
a
child
returned
to
her
care
even
if
at
this
point
to
have
unsupervised
visits."
How
long
that
would
take
was
"a
complete
unknown
[**25]
at
[that]
point."
[*P40]
The
trial
court
thus
entered
an
order
terminating
respondent's
parental
rights.
This
appeal
followed.
[*P41]
B.
Attorney's
Conduct
on
Appeal
[*P42]
The
circuit
court
of
Sangamon
County
appointed
Mr.
Panichi
on
November
4,
2024,
to
represent
respondent-appellant
in
this
accelerated
appeal
from
the
termination
of
respondent's
parental
rights
filed
under
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
311(a)
(eff.
July
1,
2018).
After
an
in-depth
review
of
the
briefs,
this
court
recognized
that
Mr.
Panichi
cited
eight
apparently
nonexistent
cases
in
respondent's
opening
and
reply
briefs.
In
one
instance,
he
provided
a
direct
quote
from
one
of
these
cases.
Concerned
that
respondent's
briefs
contained
citations
to
apparently
nonexistent
cases,
this
court,
on
its
own
motion,
ordered
Mr.
Panichi
to
file
copies
of
"
In
re
M.F.
,
2022
IL
App
(2d)
210614";
"
In
re
A.G.
,
2022
IL
App
(1st)
220119";
"
In
re
R.C.,
195
Ill.
App.
3d
827
(1st
Dist.
1990)
";
"
In
re
R.D.S.
,
2021
IL
App
(2d)
200092";
"
In
re
M.H.,
Jr.,
196
Ill.
App.
3d
976
(1st
Dist.
1990)
";
"
In
re
Brandon
E.,
382
Ill.
App.
3d
389
(2d
Dist.
2008)
";
"
In
re
K.L.P.,
381
Ill.
App.
3d
817
(4th
Dist.
2008)
";
and
"
In
re
Ca.
B.,
386
Ill.
App.
3d
507
(2d
Dist.
2008)
."
We
further
ordered
Mr.
Panichi
to
appear
before
this
court
personally
and
show
cause
why
he
should
not
be
sanctioned
.
[*P43]
On
June
16,
2025,
Mr.
Panichi
filed
a
two-page
response
to
this
court's
rule
to
show
cause
entitled
"Verified
Memorandum
and
Response
to
June
10,
2025,
Order
re
Rule
375
Sanctions
."
He
stated
in
paragraph
2(a)
of
his
response
that
"the
following
two
cases
are
valid,
published
Illinois
[**26]
Appellate
Court
decisions
and
were
properly
cited,"
and
he
cited
"
In
re
Brandon
A.,
395
Ill.
App.
3d
224
(4th
Dist.
2009)
,"
and
"
In
re
Adoption
of
K.L.P.,
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**22
Page
8
of
21
316
Ill.
App.
3d
110
(4th
Dist.
2000)
."
In
paragraph
2(b),
he
stated
that
"the
following
case
is
a
valid
published
decision
but
was
incorrectly
cited
in
the
brief,"
and
he
cited
"
In
re
M.F.,
304
Ill.
App.
3d
236
(5th
Dist.
1999)
."
In
paragraph
2(c)
of
his
response,
he
admitted
that
the
"remaining
five
citations
contained
in
the
Appellant's
Brief
were
determined
to
be
invalid
or
nonexistent."
He
attached
copies
of
the
first
three
decisions
referenced
in
his
response.
[*P44]
Mr.
Panichi
appeared
before
this
court
personally
on
June
18,
2025.
The
proceedings
were
recorded.
He
acknowledged
that
he
was
familiar
with
the
principles
of
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
341(h)
(eff.
Oct
1,
2020)
and
the
principles
of
Illinois
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct
of
2010
Rules
1.1,
3.1,
3.3
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2010),
and
Rule
8.4
(eff.
July
1,
2024).
He
stated
that
he
had
been
appointed
to
handle
this
appeal
by
the
circuit
court
of
Sangamon
County
and
was
compensated
for
his
work
at
the
rate
of
$150
per
hour,
for
a
total
of
$6,925.
He
did
not
intend
to
submit
any
further
invoices
for
this
case.
He
later
addressed
this
amount,
explaining
that
it
"was
more
than
[he]
usually
charge[s]"
and
this
case
"was
out
of
the
ordinary
in
terms
of
time
spent"
because
his
office
"did
some
exceptional
work
trying
to
get
some
other
information
before
[**27]
the
court"
by
filing
"a
brief
trying
to
open
up
the
proofs,"
but
he
did
not
remember
the
matter
exactly.
[*P45]
Regarding
his
response
in
paragraph
2(a),
the
court
pointed
out
to
Mr.
Panichi
that
despite
his
claim
that
Brandon
A.,
395
Ill.
App.
3d
224
,
and
Adoption
of
K.L.P.,
316
Ill.
App.
3d
110
,
were
"valid"
cases
that
"were
properly
cited,"
he
had
actually
cited
in
his
brief
"
In
re
Brandon
E.,
382
Ill.
App.
3d
389
(2d
Dist.
2008)
,"
and
"
In
re
K.L.P.,
381
Ill.
App.
3d
817
(4th
Dist.
2008)
,"
which
were
completely
different
citations.
(We
also
noted
that
Adoption
of
K.L.P.
is
a
Second
District
case,
not
a
Fourth
District
case,
as
Mr.
Panichi
wrote
in
his
response.)
The
court
further
observed
that
neither
Brandon
A.
nor
Adoption
of
K.L.P.
supports
the
propositions
for
which
"
Brandon
E.
"
and
"
K.L.P.
"
were
originally
cited
in
his
opening
brief.
Mr.
Panichi
stated
that
he
was
not
currently
familiar
with
the
content
of
the
cases
but
claimed
that
he
had
been
so
at
one
time.
He
admitted
that
he
did
not
read
either
of
these
decisions
before
filing
his
response
to
the
court's
rule
to
show
cause.
He
later
admitted
that
he
misread
the
court's
rule
to
show
cause
as
citing
"
Brandon
A.
,"
when
it
cited
"
Brandon
E.
"
He
acknowledged
that
he
did
not
list
a
citation
for
"
Brandon
E.
"
in
his
response
and
never
looked
up
whether
"
Brandon
E.
"
existed.
[*P46]
Regarding
his
response
in
paragraph
2(b),
the
court
noted
[**28]
during
the
hearing
that
M.F.,
304
Ill.
App.
3d
236
,
the
case
Mr.
Panichi
claimed
to
have
intended
to
cite,
did
not
contain
the
quotation
for
which
he
cited
"
In
re
M.F.
,
2022
IL
App
(2d)
210614,"
in
his
reply
brief.
Mr.
Panichi
admitted
that
he
did
not
know
where
he
obtained
the
quotation
and
did
not
believe
it
was
accurate.
The
court
stated
that
Mr.
Panichi
may
have
persisted
in
misleading
the
court
in
his
statements
in
paragraphs
2(a)
and
2(b)
of
his
response.
[*P47]
Mr.
Panichi
later
explained
that
his
miscitation
in
his
briefs
of
the
three
cases
he
attached
to
his
response
to
the
rule
to
show
cause
"might
be
an
example
of
poor
lawyering,
poor
arguing,
stretching
principles,
I
don't
have
an
answer
for
that."
However,
he
then
claimed
that
"to
the
best
of
[his]
knowledge,
[these
cases]
were
cited
for
the
appropriate
principles."
He
admitted,
though,
that
he
had
read
only
one
of
the
three
cases
he
attached
to
his
response
and
could
not
remember
which
one.
He
further
explained
that
he
believed
that
the
court's
rule
to
show
cause
asked
only
for
him
to
identify
which
cases
existed,
not
to
argue
how
those
cases
applied.
[*P48]
The
court
then
turned
to
Mr.
Panichi's
response
in
paragraph
2(c)
and
asked
how
those
five
admittedly
nonexistent
citations
came
to
appear
[**29]
in
his
brief.
Mr.
Panichi
initially
clarified
that
he
did
not
claim
to
have
an
"excuse,"
just
an
"explanation."
He
also
informed
the
court
that
he
had
already
notified
Judge
Karen
Tharp,
who
appointed
him
as
counsel
in
this
appeal,
as
well
as
his
private
clients
whose
appeals
were
pending,
about
these
proceedings.
He
then
admitted
that
in
preparing
the
briefs
and
conducting
research
in
this
case,
he
used
artificial
intelligence
(AI)
to
write
a
draft
of
the
brief,
then
"looked
it
over
and
[he]
did
not
read
the
cases
that
were
in
support
of
the
brief."
He
further
explained
that
at
the
time
he
filed
the
briefs
in
this
case,
he
was
"extremely
busy"
and
"was
not
thorough
enough."
He
stated
that
his
use
of
AI
was
prompted
by
"a
perfect
storm"
of
"temptation
of
AI
out
there
at
a
time
when
[he]
was
busy
and
trying
to
meet
deadlines."
He
had
since
learned
about
AI
"hallucinations,"
in
which
the
AI
"dreams
things
up
when
it
doesn't
have
an
answer."
He
acknowledged
that
he
should
have
read
the
cases
that
the
AI
presented
to
him.
He
additionally
admitted
that
he
was
"between
research
software"
at
the
time
he
prepared
the
briefs
in
this
case
but
had
since
signed
up
with
Westlaw.
He
informed
the
[**30]
court
that
he
did
not
intend
to
use
AI
going
forward.
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**26
Page
9
of
21
[*P49]
Mr.
Panichi
admitted
that
"the
whole
thing
stems
from
the
fact
that
[he]
barely
did
any
personal
work
[him]self
on
this
appeal."
He
stated
that
he
"was
careless"
and
"reckless
when
[he]
did
it"
and
"was
wrong
to
do
that."
Mr.
Panichi
then
stated:
"I
don't
have
any
reason
that
the
court
shouldn't
sanction
me,
except
for
the
fact
that
I
didn't
do
it
intentionally.
I
did
it
carelessly,
and
recklessly,
I
hadn't
done
it
before,
and
if
I'm
lucky
enough
to
be
able
to
continue
practicing
before
the
appellate
court,
I'm
not
going
to
do
it
again."
He
acknowledged
that
while
he
relied
on
the
legal
assistant
in
his
office
a
great
deal,
he,
as
the
attorney,
was
ultimately
responsible
in
this
matter.
He
stated,
"[W]hatever
happens,
I
deserve
whatever
consequences
fall,
and
I'm
willing
to
accept
them."
Mr.
Panichi
asked
that
no
sanctions
be
imposed
against
respondent,
as
he
was
responsible,
and
further
asked
the
court
to
consider
allowing
him
to
file
an
amended
brief.
He
stated
that
if
he
were
allowed
to
file
an
amended
brief,
he
would
essentially
cite
all
new
cases
and
read
them.
[*P50]
This
court
informed
Mr.
Panichi
that
when
it
was
discovered
that
[**31]
the
cases
cited
in
his
briefs
apparently
did
not
exist
and
did
not
support
the
assertions
in
his
briefs,
the
court
felt
compelled
to
leave
no
stone
unturned
to
determine
whether
these
cases
existed.
The
court
noted
the
research
done
"was
significant
and
time
consuming."
As
an
example,
the
court
explained
that
when
looking
into
the
citation
of
"
In
re
M.F.
,
2022
IL
App
(2d)
210614,"
Westlaw
and
the
Illinois
Courts
website
confirmed
that
no
case
matching
that
citation
existed.
There
were
20
Illinois
cases
titled
"
In
re
M.F.
,"
but
none
of
those
cases
contained
the
quotation
included
in
Mr.
Panichi's
reply
brief
or
any
similar
statement.
Moreover,
no
Second
District
case
existed
under
case
No.
21-0614,
though
there
was
a
Fourth
District
case
with
case
No.
21-0614,
People
v.
Taylor,
2022
IL
App
(4th)
210614-U
,
which
was
irrelevant.
The
quote
included
in
Mr.
Panichi's
brief
and
attributed
to
"
In
re
M.F.
,
2022
IL
App
(2d)
210614,"
"incarceration
does
not
preclude
a
finding
of
reasonable
progress
if
efforts
are
made,"
did
not
exist
in
any
case
from
Illinois,
any
other
state,
or
any
federal
court,
in
its
entirety.
Even
a
part
of
the
quote—"incarceration
does
not
preclude"—did
not
exist
in
any
Illinois
cases,
but
it
did
exist
in
57
cases
across
the
country,
most
of
which
were
to
the
effect
of
"incarceration
[**32]
does
not
preclude
termination
of
parental
rights."
This
was
the
breadth
of
the
work
the
court
did
in
relation
to
just
one
of
the
eight
nonexistent
cases
Mr.
Panichi
cited
in
his
brief.
The
court
noted
that
it
was
explaining
this
process
to
Mr.
Panichi
to
illustrate
how
seriously
the
court
took
this
matter,
as
well
as
the
impact
of
Mr.
Panichi's
actions
on
the
court's
ability
to
do
its
other
work
efficiently.
[*P51]
When
asked
during
the
proceedings
if
he
had
any
infirmities
that
would
contribute
to
his
carelessness
in
this
case
and
his
ability
to
practice
law,
Mr.
Panichi
stated
that
other
than
a
hearing
loss,
he
had
"typical
short
term
memory
loss"
and
was
overwhelmed
by
paperwork,
but
"to
the
best
of
[his]
knowledge,
[he]
retain[s]
80,
90%
of
[his]
faculties
and
memory
on
other
matters"
and
believed
he
is
competent
to
practice
law.
[*P52]
On
June
27,
2025,
this
court
ordered
Mr.
Panichi
to
file
an
affidavit
with
a
copy
of
any
petition
for
fees
and
costs
that
he
filed
in
the
Sangamon
County
circuit
court
pursuant
to
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
299
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2024),
along
with
documentation
of
his
receipt
of
payment.
He
did
so
on
June
30,
2025.
His
affidavit
and
petition
confirmed
that
he
was
compensated
in
the
amount
of
$6,925.62
[**33]
by
the
Sangamon
County
treasurer
for
his
work
in
connection
with
his
appointment
in
this
appeal.
[*P53]
II.
ANALYSIS
[*P54]
A.
Underlying
Action
[*P55]
On
appeal,
respondent's
contentions
are
that
(1)
the
trial
court's
unfitness
finding
was
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence,
(2)
the
court's
best-interest
finding
was
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence,
(3)
the
court
violated
her
right
to
self-representation,
(4)
the
State
failed
to
provide
reasonable
accommodations
for
her
during
her
incarceration,
and
(5)
she
was
denied
effective
assistance
of
counsel.
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**30
Page
10
of
21
[*P56]
Initially,
we
note
that
this
is
an
accelerated
appeal
under
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
311(a)
(eff.
July
1,
2018).
Under
that
rule,
this
court
is
required
to
issue
its
decision
within
150
days
after
the
filing
of
the
notice
of
appeal
unless
there
has
been
"good
cause
shown."
Ill.
S.
Ct.
R.
311(a)(5)
(eff.
July
1,
2018).
Here,
respondent's
notice
of
appeal
was
filed
on
November
4,
2024,
and
this
court's
disposition
was
due
to
be
filed
by
April
3,
2025.
That
filing
deadline
has
passed.
However,
this
delay
is
due
to
respondent's
counsel
requesting
and
this
court
granting
four
extensions
of
time
to
file
the
opening
brief.
Even
with
four
extensions,
Mr.
Panichi
missed
the
final
extended
filing
deadline,
[**34]
which
was
March
24,
2025,
and
subsequently
filed
a
motion
for
leave
to
file
the
brief
late
on
March
27,
2025.
This
court
granted
that
motion,
and
he
ultimately
filed
respondent's
opening
brief
on
March
31,
2025.
Briefing
was
not
complete
until
he
filed
the
reply
brief
on
May
1,
2025.
In
light
of
the
delay
resulting
from
the
extensions
of
time,
we
find
that
good
cause
exists
to
issue
our
disposition
after
the
150-day
deadline.
[*P57]
We
also
note
that
respondent's
counsel's
appellate
brief
is
highly
deficient.
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
341(h)(7)
(eff.
Oct.
1,
2020)
establishes
that
an
appellant's
brief
"shall
contain
the
contentions
of
the
appellant
and
the
reasons
therefor,
with
citation
of
the
authorities
and
the
pages
of
the
record
relied
on."
The
supreme
court
rules
"are
not
mere
suggestions."
(Internal
quotation
marks
omitted.)
In
re
Denzel
W.,
237
Ill.
2d
285,
294
(2010)
.
"[T]hey
have
the
force
of
law
and
are
to
be
construed
in
the
same
manner
as
statutes."
Denzel
W.,
237
Ill.
2d
at
294
;
see
Obert
v.
Saville,
253
Ill.
App.
3d
677,
682
(1993)
("A
reviewing
court
is
entitled
to
have
issues
clearly
defined
with
pertinent
authority
cited
and
cohesive
arguments
presented
[citation],
and
it
is
not
a
repository
into
which
an
appellant
may
foist
the
burden
of
argument
and
research
***.").
Respondent's
brief
does
not
comply
with
these
requirements,
[**35]
as
counsel,
Mr.
Panichi,
does
not
cite
the
record
at
all
in
the
argument
section,
provides
only
one
or
two
paragraphs
of
argument
per
issue,
and
cites
one
or
two
cases
per
issue
only
for
boilerplate
legal
principles.
Even
more
concerning,
some
of
counsel's
cited
cases
do
not
support
the
legal
principle
for
which
he
is
citing
them,
and
eight
of
the
cases
that
counsel
cites
do
not
exist
,
which
is
a
very
serious
issue
that
this
court
will
address
separately
below.
[*P58]
This
is
not
the
level
of
advocacy
we
expect
in
accelerated
cases
dealing
with
a
parent's
fundamental
rights.
Nor
is
it
the
legal
representation
that
respondent
deserves.
We
considered
striking
the
briefs
and
ordering
the
trial
court
to
appoint
new
counsel
for
respondent
to
begin
briefing
anew.
However,
we
have
decided
that
doing
so
would
not
be
the
appropriate
remedy
for
the
rule
violations
under
the
specific
facts
presented.
The
resolution
of
this
appeal
has
already
been
significantly
delayed
by
numerous
briefing
extensions.
After
having
reviewed
the
record
thoroughly
and
researched
the
numerous
issues
that
respondent's
counsel
raises,
it
is
clear
that
there
is
no
nonfrivolous
issue
that
warrants
further
briefing
on
respondent's
[**36]
behalf.
Given
these
circumstances,
further
delaying
the
resolution
of
this
appeal
plainly
would
not
serve
the
best
interest
of
the
children.
We
will
thus
address
the
merits
of
each
of
respondent's
issues
despite
the
violations
of
supreme
court
rules
in
respondent's
brief.
[*P59]
1.
Neglect
Finding
[*P60]
Respondent
contends
in
passing
that
"there
was
no
direct
evidence
of
abuse
or
neglect."
To
the
extent
she
attempts
to
challenge
the
trial
court's
dispositional
orders
finding
E.H.
and
A.H.
neglected
and
adjudicating
them
wards
of
the
court,
we
lack
jurisdiction.
In
juvenile
neglect
cases,
dispositional
orders
adjudging
the
minor
to
be
a
ward
of
the
court
are
final,
appealable
judgments.
In
re
Leona
W.,
228
Ill.
2d
439,
456
(2008)
(noting
that
a
dispositional
order
removing
a
minor
child
from
her
parents'
custody
is
"regarded
as
final
and
appealable
as
of
right"
and
appealing
such
an
order
"is
the
proper
vehicle
for
challenging
a
finding
of
abuse
or
neglect").
Respondent
already
appealed
the
court's
dispositional
order
as
to
A.H.,
which
this
court
affirmed
(see
A.H.,
2023
IL
App
(4th)
230131-U,
¶
33
),
and
she
did
not
file
a
notice
of
appeal
from
the
dispositional
order
as
to
E.H.
We
thus
lack
appellate
jurisdiction
to
review
those
orders.
See
In
re
S.P.,
2019
IL
App
(3d)
180476,
¶
47
;
Leona
W.,
228
Ill.
2d
at
456-57
.
[*P61]
2.
Unfitness
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**33
Page
11
of
21
[*P62]
The
involuntary
[**37]
termination
of
parental
rights
involves
a
two-step
process
pursuant
to
section
2-
29(2)
of
the
Juvenile
Court
Act
of
1987
(Juvenile
Court
Act)
(705
ILCS
405/2-29(2)
(West
2024)).
The
State
must
first
prove
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence
that
the
respondent
is
unfit.
In
re
C.M.,
305
Ill.
App.
3d
154,
163
(1999)
.
The
trial
court
found
that
respondent
was
unfit
based
on
her
failure
to
(1)
maintain
a
reasonable
degree
of
interest,
concern,
or
responsibility
as
to
the
minors'
welfare
(
750
ILCS
50/1(D)(b)
(West
2024))
and
(2)
make
reasonable
progress
toward
the
return
of
the
minors
within
nine
months
following
the
adjudication
of
neglect
(
750
ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii)
(West
2024)).
[*P63]
We
will
not
reverse
a
trial
court's
finding
of
unfitness
unless
it
is
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence.
In
re
Dar.
H.,
2023
IL
App
(4th)
230509,
¶
54
.
A
court's
finding
is
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence
"when
the
opposite
conclusion
is
clearly
apparent."
Dar.
H.,
2023
IL
App
(4th)
230509,
¶
54
.
Under
this
standard,
"we
give
deference
to
the
trial
court
as
the
finder
of
fact
because
it
is
in
the
best
position
to
observe
the
conduct
and
demeanor
of
the
parties
and
the
witnesses
and
has
a
degree
of
familiarity
with
the
evidence
that
a
reviewing
court
cannot
possibly
obtain."
In
re
D.F.,
201
Ill.
2d
476,
498-99
(2002)
.
We
"must
not
substitute
[our]
judgment
for
that
of
the
trial
court
regarding
the
credibility
of
witnesses,
the
weight
to
be
given
to
the
evidence,
or
the
inferences
to
be
drawn."
[**38]
D.F.,
201
Ill.
2d
at
499
.
Ultimately,
"[a]
parent's
rights
may
be
terminated
if
a
single
alleged
ground
for
unfitness
is
supported
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence."
In
re
D.C.,
209
Ill.
2d
287,
296
(2004)
.
[*P64]
Respondent
posits
that
the
trial
court
erred
in
finding
her
unfit
for
failing
to
make
reasonable
efforts
and
progress,
as
the
"trial
court's
findings
failed
to
reflect
the
substantial
efforts
made
by
Respondent."
However,
the
court
did
not
find
that
respondent
failed
to
make
reasonable
efforts;
rather,
it
found
that
respondent
(1)
failed
to
maintain
a
reasonable
degree
of
interest,
concern,
or
responsibility
and
(2)
failed
to
make
reasonable
progress.
Respondent's
arguments
addressing
her
reasonable
efforts
are
therefore
irrelevant.
As
we
may
affirm
the
trial
court's
judgment
"if
the
evidence
supports
the
finding
of
unfitness
on
any
one
of
the
alleged
statutory
grounds"
(
In
re
H.D.,
343
Ill.
App.
3d
483,
493
(2003)
),
we
will
focus
our
analysis
only
on
whether
respondent
made
reasonable
progress.
[*P65]
Reasonable
progress,
which
is
assessed
under
an
objective
standard,
exists
when
a
parent's
compliance
with
the
service
plan
and
the
trial
court's
directives
"is
sufficiently
demonstrable
and
of
such
a
quality
that
the
court,
in
the
near
future
,
will
be
able
to
order
the
child
returned
to
parental
[**39]
custody."
(Emphasis
in
original.)
In
re
L.L.S.,
218
Ill.
App.
3d
444,
461
(1991)
.
A
parent
fails
to
make
reasonable
progress
toward
the
return
of
the
child
when
the
parent
fails
"'to
substantially
fulfill
his
or
her
obligations
under
the
service
plan
and
correct
the
conditions
that
brought
the
child
into
care.'"
In
re
C.N.,
196
Ill.
2d
181,
217
(2001)
(quoting
750
ILCS
50/1(D)(m)
(West
Supp.
1999)).
Importantly,
there
is
"a
significant
difference
between
going
through
the
motions,
checking
off
the
boxes,
and
mechanically
doing
what
is
asked
of
the
parent
and
actually
changing
the
circumstances
that
brought
the
children
into
care."
In
re
Ta.
T.
,
2021
IL
App
(4th)
200658,
¶
56.
A
finding
of
unfitness
is
appropriate
if
"the
court
will
not
be
able
to
return
the
child
home
in
the
near
future,
despite
ample
time
and
opportunity
for
compliance
with
the
court's
directives."
Ta.
T.
,
2021
IL
App
(4th)
200658,
¶
55.
[*P66]
The
trial
court's
unfitness
finding
in
this
case
was
not
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence.
A.H.
came
into
care
in
May
2022,
and
E.H.
came
into
care
in
June
2023
due
to
concerns
about
respondent's
mental
health
impacting
her
ability
to
care
for
the
minors.
Respondent
was
taken
into
federal
custody
in
October
2022.
When
the
fitness
hearing
took
place
in
October
2024,
A.H.
had
been
in
care
for
over
two
years
and
E.H.
for
over
one
year,
and
respondent
had
[**40]
been
incarcerated
for
almost
that
entire
time.
The
primary
recurring
issue
in
assessing
respondent's
progress
was
her
refusal
to
sign
releases
of
information,
which
prevented
Kuehnel
from
verifying
respondent's
engagement
in
the
services
she
claimed
to
have
engaged
in
and
completed.
Moreover,
the
court
was
correct
that
respondent
failed
to
make
any
progress
on
her
mental
health
issues,
which
was
the
primary
reason
that
the
minors
came
into
care.
[*P67]
Kuehnel
testified
that
she
learned
that
respondent
had
been
removed
from
mental
health
treatment
while
incarcerated
due
to
her
verbal
aggression.
It
was
not
the
first
time
that
respondent's
instability
resulted
in
her
being
removed
from
services,
as
by
July
2022,
she
had
already
been
removed
from
three
service
providers
for
the
same
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**36
Page
12
of
21
reason.
Kuehnel
testified
that
respondent
"didn't
really
seem
to
have
control
over
any
emotions"
and
"could
go
from
being
calm
one
minute
to
very
aggressive
in
wording
the
next
minute
and
screaming
and
yelling."
This
issue
occurred
repeatedly.
The
interview
with
respondent
for
the
integrated
assessment
in
July
2022
had
to
be
cut
short
due
to
respondent's
agitation
and
hostility.
Child
and
family
team
meetings
in
[**41]
May
2023
and
May
2024
had
to
be
terminated
early
when
respondent
became
irate
with
her
caseworkers
for
requesting
that
she
sign
releases
of
information.
Respondent
was
verbally
aggressive
toward
her
children's
foster
parents,
including
her
own
mother,
resulting
in
the
foster
parents
limiting
contact
and
being
removed
from
the
prison
call
list.
Respondent's
behavior
in
court
was
similarly
uncontrolled
and
aggressive
at
times,
as
she
interrupted
the
trial
court
and
the
attorneys
repeatedly
with
her
own
interjections.
[*P68]
The
integrated
assessment
noted
that
respondent
has
documented
diagnoses
of
severe
depression,
ADHD,
and
bipolar
disorder.
However,
respondent
staunchly
denied
having
any
mental
health
issues
other
than
PTSD
and
maintained
that
any
other
diagnoses
were
psychiatric
malpractice.
She
reported
she
was
not
taking
any
medications.
She
testified
that
she
believed
that
people
had
a
vendetta
against
her
with
the
intent
of
terminating
her
parental
rights
and
that
she
was
justified
in
her
frustration
throughout
the
case
and
was
herself
a
"victim
of
the
state
family
courts
for
now
23
years."
She
stated
that
she
had
sued
at
least
four
psychiatrists
for
malpractice:
one
who
provided
care
[**42]
prior
to
her
incarceration,
one
at
the
Macon
County
jail,
one
at
the
Sangamon
County
jail,
and
one
at
the
federal
prison
in
Waseca.
She
explained
that
one
reason
for
her
refusal
to
sign
releases
of
information
was
her
concern
that
DCFS
would
obtain
access
to
her
prior
psychiatric
records
that
reflected
what
she
believed
to
be
misdiagnoses.
[*P69]
All
these
facts
reflect
that
throughout
the
pendency
of
these
two
cases,
respondent
never
addressed
her
mental
health
issues,
and
the
children
plainly
could
not
return
to
her
care
in
the
near
future.
The
evidence
showed
that
respondent
had
access
to
mental
health
treatment
during
the
entire
time
she
was
incarcerated.
However,
the
record
also
shows
that
respondent
resisted
treatment
and
refused
medication.
The
trial
court
correctly
pointed
out
that
"it's
very
clear
to
the
Court
that
you
cannot
make
progress
on
mental
health
issues
when
you're
suing
your
psychiatrist."
[*P70]
Respondent
has
thus
failed
"to
substantially
fulfill
***
her
obligations
under
the
service
plan
and
correct
the
conditions
that
brought
the
child
into
care."
(Internal
quotation
marks
omitted.)
C.N.,
196
Ill.
2d
at
217
.
She
was
no
closer
to
the
return
of
her
children
in
October
2024
than
she
was
when
the
children
[**43]
were
removed
from
her
custody
in
May
2022
and
June
2023.
As
"the
court
will
not
be
able
to
return
the
child[ren]
home
in
the
near
future,
despite
ample
time
and
opportunity
for
compliance
with
the
court's
directives"
(
Ta.
T.
,
2021
IL
App
(4th)
200658,
¶
55),
the
trial
court's
finding
of
unfitness
was
not
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence.
[*P71]
3.
Best-Interest
Finding
[*P72]
In
her
opening
brief,
respondent
does
not
expressly
challenge
the
best-interest
finding;
rather,
she
obliquely
states
that
the
"trial
court's
findings
were
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence."
The
words
"best
interest"
do
not
appear
in
the
opening
brief
at
all.
Respondent's
counsel
addressed
the
court's
best-interest
finding
for
the
first
time
in
the
reply
brief.
The
State
is
correct
that
this
argument
is
forfeited.
See
Ill.
S.
Ct.
R.
341(h)(7)
(eff.
Oct.
1,
2020)
("Points
not
argued
are
forfeited
and
shall
not
be
raised
in
the
reply
brief
***.").
However,
forfeiture
of
an
issue
"is
a
limitation
on
the
parties
and
not
on
this
court."
People
v.
Hanson,
212
Ill.
2d
212,
216
(2004)
.
Because
we
have
elected
not
to
dismiss
the
appeal
or
order
rebriefing
despite
the
pervasive
violations
of
Rule
341(h),
we
will
address
the
evidence
supporting
the
court's
best-interest
finding
despite
forfeiture
of
the
issue.
[*P73]
If
a
parent
is
found
[**44]
to
be
unfit,
the
State
must
then
prove
that
terminating
parental
rights
is
in
the
minor's
best
interest.
In
re
J.B.,
2019
IL
App
(4th)
190537,
¶
31
.
At
this
step,
the
focus
shifts
from
the
parent
to
the
child.
The
burden
on
the
State
at
the
best-interest
hearing
is
a
preponderance
of
the
evidence.
See
In
re
D.T.,
212
Ill.
2d
347,
366
(2004)
.
When
determining
a
minor's
best
interest,
the
trial
court
must
consider
the
following
factors,
"in
the
context
of
the
child's
age
and
developmental
needs:
(a)
the
physical
safety
and
welfare
of
the
child,
including
food,
shelter,
health,
and
clothing;
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**40
Page
13
of
21
(b)
the
development
of
the
child's
identity;
(c)
the
child's
background
and
ties,
including
familial,
cultural,
and
religious;
(d)
the
child's
sense
of
attachments,
including:
(i)
where
the
child
actually
feels
love,
attachment,
and
a
sense
of
being
valued
(as
opposed
to
where
adults
believe
the
child
should
feel
such
love,
attachment,
and
a
sense
of
being
valued);
(ii)
the
child's
sense
of
security;
(iii)
the
child's
sense
of
familiarity;
(iv)
continuity
of
affection
for
the
child;
(v)
the
least
disruptive
placement
alternative
for
the
child;
(e)
the
child's
wishes
and
long-term
goals;
(f)
the
child's
community
ties,
including
church,
school,
and
friends;
(g)
the
child's
need
for
permanence
[**45]
which
includes
the
child's
need
for
stability
and
continuity
of
relationships
with
parent
figures
and
with
siblings
and
other
relatives;
(h)
the
uniqueness
of
every
family
and
child;
(i)
the
risks
attendant
to
entering
and
being
in
substitute
care;
and
(j)
the
preferences
of
the
persons
available
to
care
for
the
child."
705
ILCS
405/1-3(4.05)
(West
2024).
[*P74]
The
trial
court's
best-interest
determination
will
not
be
disturbed
on
appeal
unless
it
is
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence.
J.B.,
2019
IL
App
(4th)
190537,
¶
33
.
We
afford
great
deference
to
the
court's
determination,
as
it
is
in
the
best
position
to
view
the
witnesses
and
judge
their
credibility.
In
re
C.P.,
2019
IL
App
(4th)
190420,
¶
71
.
[*P75]
The
trial
court's
best-interest
finding
in
this
case
was
not
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence.
Both
A.H.
and
E.H.
had
been
in
foster
care
for
almost
their
entire
lives—A.H.
was
two
months
old
when
he
was
taken
into
care,
and
E.H.
was
taken
into
care
immediately
after
his
birth.
While
not
placed
together,
both
children
were
placed
with
family,
with
whom
they
were
bonded
and
who
provided
for
their
safety
and
welfare.
See
705
ILCS
405/1-3(4.05)(a)
,
(d)
(West
2024).
After
years
in
foster
care,
the
court
reasonably
placed
significant
weight
on
the
minors'
need
for
permanence,
which
was
not
likely
to
be
with
[**46]
respondent
due
to
her
incarceration
and
failure
to
address
her
mental
health
issues.
See
705
ILCS
405/1-3(4.05)(g)
(West
2024).
The
court
correctly
pointed
out
that
with
respondent's
"longstanding
and
severe"
mental
health
issues,
"it's
going
to
take
quite
a
bit
of
therapy
and
treatment
and
progress
for
her
to
address
those
issues
to
the
point
where
she
would
be
ready
to
have
a
child
returned
to
her
care
even
if
at
this
point
to
have
unsupervised
visits."
The
last
time
that
respondent
had
seen
A.H.
in
person
was
in
February
2023.
Respondent
had
not
seen
E.H.
in
person
since
his
birth
in
May
2023.
The
minors'
foster
parents
arranged
biweekly
overnight
visits
between
the
minors
to
ensure
that
they
maintained
their
sibling
bond.
See
705
ILCS
405/1-3(4.05)(c)
,
(g)
(West
2024).
Both
foster
parents
had
already
signed
permanency
commitment
paperwork.
[*P76]
Though
respondent
testified
that
the
minors
could
live
with
her
when
she
was
released
from
prison,
she
could
not
remember
the
address
of
that
home.
She
also
stated
that
Daniel
K.,
her
fiancé,
would
live
with
them
and
help
care
for
the
minors.
However,
the
trial
court
correctly
pointed
out
that
Daniel
K.
had
never
met
or
interacted
with
the
minors
and
only
observed
some
of
respondent's
phone
calls
[**47]
with
A.H.
There
is
also
no
indication
in
the
record
that
DCFS
screened
Daniel
K.
Thus,
the
children
would
have
no
attachment
to
or
familiarity
with
Daniel
K.,
while
they
did
have
demonstrable
bonds
with
their
foster
families.
Considering
all
these
factors,
the
court's
finding
that
it
was
in
the
minors'
best
interest
to
terminate
respondent's
parental
rights
was
not
against
the
manifest
weight
of
the
evidence.
[*P77]
4.
Self-Representation
[*P78]
Respondent
next
argues
that
the
trial
court
violated
her
right
to
self-representation
where
she
"repeatedly
and
clearly
expressed
her
desire
to
represent
herself."
After
only
three
sentences
of
argument,
with
no
citations
to
the
record
or
any
supporting
cases,
respondent
makes
the
conclusory
assertion
that
the
denial
of
her
right
to
self-
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**44
Page
14
of
21
representation
constituted
structural
error
and
violated
her
constitutional
rights.
The
State
responds
that
this
issue
lacks
merit
because
respondent
never
expressed
dissatisfaction
with
Liles,
who
represented
her
during
the
termination
proceedings,
or
asked
to
represent
herself
in
the
termination
proceedings.
[*P79]
First,
we
find
respondent's
argument
clearly
violates
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
341(h)(7)
(eff.
Oct.
1,
2020)
(stating
the
argument
section
"shall
[**48]
contain
the
contentions
of
the
appellant
and
the
reasons
therefor,
with
citation
of
the
authorities
and
the
pages
of
the
record
relied
on").
Moreover,
our
own
review
of
the
record
confirms
the
State's
contention
that
respondent
never
asked
to
represent
herself
in
the
termination
proceedings
that
are
the
subject
of
this
appeal.
While
respondent
made
a
request
to
represent
herself
during
the
adjudication
of
wardship
of
A.H.
and
the
temporary
shelter
care
hearing
as
to
E.H.,
those
hearings
are
not
the
subject
of
this
appeal.
As
the
dispositional
order
is
a
final
judgment
in
juvenile
neglect
cases
(see
Leona
W.,
228
Ill.
2d
at
456
),
respondent
should
have
asserted
that
argument
in
her
appeal
from
the
dispositional
order
as
to
A.H.
and
again
if
she
had
appealed
from
the
dispositional
order
as
to
E.H.
As
a
result,
we
have
no
jurisdiction
to
review
this
argument
in
an
appeal
from
the
termination
of
her
parental
rights.
See
Leona
W.,
228
Ill.
2d
at
456-57
.
[*P80]
5.
Accommodations
During
Incarceration
[*P81]
Respondent
contends
that
the
State
and
DCFS
failed
to
provide
reasonable
efforts
and
accommodations
during
her
incarceration.
She
relies
on
two
cases,
D.T.
and
In
re
M.J.,
314
Ill.
App.
3d
649
(2000)
,
to
support
the
boilerplate
statement
that
"the
State
must
make
reasonable
efforts
to
reunify
families,
even
[**49]
when
a
parent
is
incarcerated."
Respondent
did
not
provide
pinpoint
citations
of
those
cases.
Thereafter,
respondent's
entire
argument
consists
of
three
conclusory
sentences:
"DCFS
failed
to
facilitate
consistent
visitation,
ignored
her
parenting
program
completions,
and
failed
to
accommodate
communication
and
video
calls
consistently.
[Respondent's]
incarceration
was
used
as
a
basis
to
limit
services
and
support.
The
State
did
not
tailor
its
reunification
efforts
to
her
circumstances,
denying
her
the
tools
needed
to
demonstrate
progress."
Respondent
also
did
not
identify
any
remedy
for
this
purported
error.
[*P82]
Neither
D.T.
nor
M.J.
supports
respondent's
contention
that
the
State
must
make
reasonable
efforts
to
reunify
families
even
when
a
respondent
is
incarcerated;
in
fact,
these
cases
do
not
discuss
a
respondent's
incarceration
or
efforts
by
the
State
and
DCFS
at
all.
We
also
note
that
in
her
reply
brief,
respondent
ostensibly
relied
on
a
case
called
"
In
re
M.F.
,
2022
IL
App
(2d)
210614,"
for
the
proposition
that
"incarceration
does
not
preclude
a
finding
of
reasonable
progress
if
efforts
are
made."
However,
no
such
case
appears
to
exist,
and
we
can
find
no
case
that
contains
that
quote.
[*P83]
Respondent's
argument
also
plainly
[**50]
fails
on
the
merits.
As
compared
to
reasonable
efforts,
reasonable
progress,
as
discussed
above,
is
"an
objective
standard
that
is
not
concerned
with
a
parent's
individual
efforts
and
abilities."
In
re
Nevaeh
R.,
2017
IL
App
(2d)
170229,
¶
21
.
It
is
true
that
"incarceration
can
impede
progress
toward
the
goal
of
reunification."
Nevaeh
R.,
2017
IL
App
(2d)
170229,
¶
21
.
However,
the
Juvenile
Court
Act
contains
"no
exception
for
time
spent
in
prison,"
and
"[i]ndeed,
no
mention
is
made
of
incarceration"
in
the
statute.
In
re
J.L.,
236
Ill.
2d
329,
340
(2010)
.
Thus,
"time
spent
incarcerated
is
included
in
the
nine-month
period
during
which
reasonable
progress
must
be
made
under
section
1(D)(m)(ii)."
J.L.,
236
Ill.
2d
at
343
.
[*P84]
Similar
to
Nevaeh
R.,
2017
IL
App
(2d)
170229,
¶
24
,
"respondent's
incarceration
did
not
prevent
[her]
from
complying
with
the
service
plan.
[Her]
failure
to
apply
for
the
services
is
what
resulted
in
[her]
noncompliance."
Kuehnel
testified
that
respondent
had
many
services
available
to
her
during
her
incarceration,
which
likely
would
have
been
sufficient
to
meet
the
requirements
of
her
service
plan,
and
she
engaged
in
at
least
some
of
them.
However,
Kuehnel
also
testified
that
the
main
barrier
to
assessing
respondent's
progress
was
respondent's
refusal
to
sign
releases
of
information.
That
DCFS
lacked
critical
information
about
respondent's
progress
was
thus
not
the
State's
[**51]
or
DCFS's
fault,
but
respondent's.
Moreover,
as
discussed
above,
the
primary
reason
that
the
trial
court
found
respondent
unfit
was
her
failure
to
make
reasonable
progress
in
addressing
her
mental
health
issues,
not
her
engagement
in
other
services
or
lack
of
visitation.
Mental
health
care
was
available
to
respondent
during
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**47
Page
15
of
21
her
incarceration;
however,
rather
than
using
these
services
to
address
her
mental
health
concerns,
respondent
denied
that
she
had
any
issues
and
sued
her
psychiatric
care
providers
for
malpractice
for
misdiagnosing
her
with
mental
illnesses
she
"clinically
disagreed"
that
she
had.
DCFS
and
the
State
did
not
deny
respondent
the
accommodations
she
needed
to
progress
toward
completing
her
service
plan
while
incarcerated—respondent
denied
herself
the
opportunity
to
make
progress
by
failing
to
take
responsibility
for
and
address
her
significant
mental
health
concerns.
[*P85]
6.
Ineffective
Assistance
of
Trial
Counsel
[*P86]
Respondent
lastly
argues
that
she
was
denied
effective
assistance
of
trial
counsel
where
counsel
failed
to
call
key
witnesses,
object
to
"inflammatory
testimony,"
or
advocate
for
meaningful
accommodations
during
incarceration.
[*P87]
We
"apply
the
same
standard
utilized
[**52]
in
criminal
cases
to
determine
a
parent's
claim
of
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel
appointed
under
the
Juvenile
Court
Act."
In
re
A.P.-M.,
2018
IL
App
(4th)
180208,
¶
39
.
Under
that
standard,
the
respondent
must
show
that
her
counsel's
performance
was
both
deficient
and
prejudicial.
A.P.-M.,
2018
IL
App
(4th)
180208,
¶
39
.
An
attorney's
performance
is
deficient
where
it
"fell
below
an
objective
standard
of
reasonableness."
A.P.-M.,
2018
IL
App
(4th)
180208,
¶
40
.
To
establish
prejudice,
the
respondent
must
show
that
"but
for
counsel's
errors,
there
is
a
reasonable
probability
that
the
result
of
the
proceeding
would
have
been
different."
A.P.-M.,
2018
IL
App
(4th)
180208,
¶
41
.
[*P88]
Respondent
has
not
shown
that
her
trial
counsel's
performance
was
deficient
or
prejudicial.
As
the
State
correctly
points
out,
respondent
does
not
identify
which
witnesses
her
counsel
failed
to
call,
what
testimony
counsel
failed
to
object
to,
or
what
accommodations
counsel
failed
to
request.
Moreover,
respondent
was
represented
by
two
different
attorneys
during
the
proceedings
below—Young
and
Liles—and
she
does
not
specify
which
attorney
allegedly
provided
ineffective
assistance.
Our
review
of
the
record
suggests
respondent
took
issue
with
Young
rather
than
Liles.
However,
Young
did
not
represent
respondent
at
the
termination
hearing
and
had
not
represented
her
since
[**53]
Liles
appeared
at
the
adjudicatory
hearing
as
to
E.H.
in
October
2023,
a
year
prior
to
the
termination
hearing.
Young's
performance
thus
could
not
have
changed
the
result
of
the
termination
proceedings.
[*P89]
To
the
extent
that
respondent
instead
intended
to
challenge
Liles's
representation,
the
record
does
not
support
her
contention
that
Liles
provided
ineffective
assistance.
Liles
vigorously
represented
respondent
throughout
the
termination
proceedings
as
to
both
children,
repeatedly
contacted
respondent's
prison
to
try
to
secure
respondent's
appearance
via
videoconference
rather
than
phone,
frequently
conferred
with
respondent,
even
in
the
middle
of
a
hearing,
to
ensure
he
was
addressing
her
concerns,
objected
to
the
admission
of
evidence
and
testimony
during
the
hearings,
called
the
witnesses
that
respondent
wanted,
and
vehemently
argued
against
the
termination
of
her
parental
rights.
His
performance
was
neither
deficient
nor
prejudicial.
[*P90]
B.
Sanctions
[*P91]
The
use
of
AI
in
the
preparation
of
legal
filings
has
not
been
previously
addressed
by
the
Illinois
Appellate
Court.
The
American
Bar
Association
(ABA)
has
explained
that
generative
AI
(GAI)
tools,
such
as
ChatGPT,
present
a
"risk
of
producing
[**54]
inaccurate
output"
because
GAI
is
"prone
to
'hallucinations,'
providing
ostensibly
plausible
responses
that
have
no
basis
in
fact
or
reality."
ABA
Comm.
on
Ethics
&
Pro.
Resp.,
Formal
Op.
512
(2024).
The
ABA
explained
that
GAI
tools
"cannot
replace
the
judgment
and
experience
necessary
for
lawyers
to
competently
advise
clients
about
their
legal
matters
or
to
craft
the
legal
documents
or
arguments
required
to
carry
out
representations."
ABA
Comm.
on
Ethics
&
Pro.
Resp.,
Formal
Op.
512
(2024).
It
also
emphasized
that
"[i]n
judicial
proceedings,
duties
to
the
tribunal
likewise
require
lawyers,
before
submitting
materials
to
a
court,
to
review
these
outputs,
including
analysis
and
citations
to
authority,
and
to
correct
errors,
including
misstatements
of
law
and
fact,
a
failure
to
include
controlling
legal
authority,
and
misleading
arguments."
ABA
Comm.
on
Ethics
&
Pro.
Resp.,
Formal
Op.
512
(2024).
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**51
Page
16
of
21
[*P92]
Likewise,
in
its
recent
AI
policy,
the
Illinois
Supreme
Court
explained
that
while
the
use
of
AI
is
authorized
while
practicing
in
Illinois
courts,
users
must
understand
its
capabilities
and
thoroughly
review
any
AI-generated
content.
Ill.
Sup.
Ct.,
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Policy
on
Artificial
[**55]
Intelligence
(Jan.
1,
2025),
https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/e43964ab-8874-4b7a-be4e-
63af019cb6f7/Illinois%20Supreme%20Court%20AI%20Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WCE6-WZE5]
(hereinafter
AI
Policy).
The
court
emphasized
that
"[u]nsubstantiated
or
deliberately
misleading
AI-generated
content
that
perpetuates
bias,
prejudices
litigants,
or
obscures
truth-finding
and
decision-making
will
not
be
tolerated."
AI
Policy,
supra
.
[*P93]
Though
the
Illinois
Appellate
Court
has
not
yet
dealt
with
the
issue
of
litigants
submitting
fictitious
AI-
generated
case
law,
courts
from
other
jurisdictions
have.
The
federal
district
court
for
the
Southern
District
of
New
York
emphasized:
"Many
harms
flow
from
the
submission
of
fake
opinions.
The
opposing
party
wastes
time
and
money
in
exposing
the
deception.
The
Court's
time
is
taken
from
other
important
endeavors.
The
client
may
be
deprived
of
arguments
based
on
authentic
judicial
precedents.
There
is
potential
harm
to
the
reputation
of
judges
and
courts
whose
names
are
falsely
invoked
as
authors
of
the
bogus
opinions
and
to
the
reputation
of
a
party
attributed
with
fictional
conduct.
It
promotes
cynicism
about
the
legal
profession
[**56]
and
the
American
judicial
system.
And
a
future
litigant
may
be
tempted
to
defy
a
judicial
ruling
by
disingenuously
claiming
doubt
about
its
authenticity."
Mata
v.
Avianca,
Inc.,
678
F.
Supp.
3d
443,
448-49
(S.D.N.Y.
2023)
.
[*P94]
1.
Mr.
Panichi's
Conduct
[*P95]
a.
Paragraph
2(a)
and
(b)
of
Mr.
Panichi's
Response
[*P96]
In
his
response
to
this
court's
rule
to
show
cause
ordering
him
to
file
copies
of
the
eight
apparently
nonexistent
cases,
Mr.
Panichi
claimed
in
paragraph
2(a)
that
two
of
these
cases
did
exist
and
"were
properly
cited"
in
the
brief
and
claimed
in
paragraph
2(b)
that
a
third
case
existed
but
"was
incorrectly
cited."
He
attached
copies
of
these
three
cases
to
his
response.
[*P97]
A
review
of
the
three
purportedly
valid
cases
reveals
that
Mr.
Panichi's
claims
are
false.
He
claims
that
he
correctly
cited
the
existing
cases
of
Brandon
A.,
395
Ill.
App.
3d
224
,
and
Adoption
of
K.L.P.,
316
Ill.
App.
3d
110
.
In
his
briefs,
however,
he
cited
"
In
re
Brandon
E.,
382
Ill.
App.
3d
389
(2d
Dist.
2008)
,"
and
"
In
re
K.L.P,
381
Ill.
App.
3d.
817
(4th
Dist.
2008)
."
As
this
court
pointed
out
at
the
hearing
on
June
18,
2025,
these
are
clearly
different
cases
with
different
names
and
different
citations.
Thus,
despite
his
claim
to
the
contrary,
these
cases
were
not
"properly
cited"
in
his
briefs.
As
to
the
third
case,
he
claimed
to
have
incorrectly
cited
"
In
re
M.F.
,
2022
IL
App
(2d)
210614,"
when
the
correct
citation
was
to
M.F.,
304
Ill.
App.
3d
236
.
[*P98]
However,
none
of
these
three
existing
cases
support
the
propositions
[**57]
for
which
Mr.
Panichi
purportedly
cited
them
in
his
briefs.
In
his
opening
brief,
Mr.
Panichi
cited
"
In
re
Brandon
E.,
382
Ill.
App.
3d
389
(2d
Dist.
2008)
,"
to
support
the
statements
that
(1)
"This
Court
also
reviews
de
novo
any
constitutional
issues
raised,
such
as
denial
of
the
right
to
self-representation
or
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel"
and
(2)
"Due
process
includes
the
right
to
self-representation
in
civil
proceedings
where
fundamental
liberty
interests
are
at
stake."
The
decision
in
Brandon
A.,
395
Ill.
App.
3d
224
,
which
he
claimed
to
have
cited
correctly
all
along,
does
not
discuss
constitutional
issues
or
self-representation.
[*P99]
Mr.
Panichi
then
cited
in
his
opening
brief
"
In
re
K.L.P,
381
Ill.
App.
3d.
817
(4th
Dist.
2008)
,"
for
the
statement
that
"Ineffective
assistance
of
counsel
applies
in
parental
rights
cases
and
is
evaluated
under
the
Strickland
v.
Washington
standard:
deficient
performance
and
resulting
prejudice."
In
his
response
to
the
rule
to
show
cause,
he
claimed
to
have
properly
cited
the
decision
"
In
re
Adoption
of
K.L.P.,
316
Ill.
App.
3d
110
(4th
Dist.
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**54
Page
17
of
21
2000)
,"
which
is
actually
a
Second
District
case;
however,
that
case
does
not
discuss
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel.
[*P100]
Lastly,
in
his
reply
brief,
Mr.
Panichi
purported
to
quote
"
In
re
M.F.
,
2022
IL
App
(2d)
210614,
¶
38,"
as
stating
"incarceration
does
not
preclude
a
finding
of
reasonable
progress
if
efforts
are
made."
In
his
response
to
[**58]
the
rule
to
show
cause,
he
claimed
this
was
an
incorrect
citation
of
M.F.,
304
Ill.
App.
3d
236
.
However,
the
language
that
Mr.
Panichi
quoted
appears
nowhere
in
that
decision.
The
case
does
not
discuss
a
respondent's
incarceration
at
all.
He
admitted
at
the
hearing
that
he
did
not
know
where
he
obtained
the
quotation
and
did
not
believe
it
was
accurate.
As
the
court
detailed
in
the
hearing
on
June
18,
2025,
not
only
is
the
originally
cited
2022
case
nonexistent,
but
no
such
quote
exists
in
any
case,
either
in
whole
or
in
part,
that
would
support
the
same
proposition.
Moreover,
the
quote
itself
seems
nonsensical,
as
it
confuses
the
separate
principles
of
"reasonable
progress"
and
"reasonable
efforts"
applicable
in
termination
of
parental
rights
cases.
[*P101]
When
asked
why
he
cited
these
cases
in
his
response,
Mr.
Panichi
first
claimed
it
was
due
to
"poor
lawyering,
poor
arguing,
stretching
principles,"
but
later
claimed
that
"to
the
best
of
[his]
knowledge,
[these
cases]
were
cited
for
the
appropriate
principles."
However,
during
the
hearing,
Mr.
Panichi
admitted
that
he
did
not
read
at
least
two
of
the
three
cases
that
he
attached
to
his
response.
He
explained
that
he
believed
that
he
was
asked
only
to
identify
[**59]
which
cases
existed,
not
to
argue
how
those
cases
applied.
[*P102]
This
court
finds
Mr.
Panichi's
response
inadequate
and
not
credible.
That
Mr.
Panichi
did
not
read
these
decisions
before
attaching
them
in
his
response
to
this
court's
rule
to
show
cause
is
clear.
It
is
also
clear
to
this
court
that
Mr.
Panichi
neither
"properly
cited"
two
cases
nor
"incorrectly
cited"
the
third;
rather,
his
claims
of
doing
so,
as
the
court
pointed
out
at
the
hearing
on
June
18,
demonstrate
his
persistence
in
misleading
this
court.
He
admitted
that
he
mistook
the
court's
order
as
referencing
"
Brandon
A.
,"
rather
than
"
Brandon
E.
,"
meaning
that
he
did
not
look
back
at
the
briefs
he
filed
in
this
court
to
check
whether
he
correctly
cited
this
case
or
even
meant
to
cite
this
case
in
the
first
instance.
Though
he
could
not
explain
how
he
arrived
at
providing
these
cases,
it
is
obvious
that
Mr.
Panichi
simply
looked
up
the
case
name
and
provided
any
existing
Illinois
case
that
happened
to
have
the
same
or
a
similar
name.
Moreover,
he
could
not
have
intended
to
cite
any
of
these
three
cases
in
the
first
place,
as
he
admitted
that
he
used
AI
to
generate
a
draft
of
the
brief
and
did
not
check
the
citations
in
the
AI-
generated
[**60]
response.
Despite
his
claims
to
the
contrary,
the
three
cases
that
Mr.
Panichi
originally
cited
in
his
briefs
appear
to
be
three
examples
of
AI
"hallucinations."
That
he
did
not
admit
the
nonexistence
of
the
cases
originally
cited
in
his
brief
is
a
serious
matter.
[*P103]
b.
Paragraph
2(c)
of
Mr.
Panichi's
Response
[*P104]
In
paragraph
2(c)
of
his
response,
Mr.
Panichi
admitted
that
the
remaining
five
cases
identified
by
this
court
do
not
exist.
As
discussed
above,
he
admitted
that
he
used
AI
to
generate
a
draft
of
the
brief,
along
with
the
supporting
citations,
and
that
he
did
not
independently
verify
any
of
these
citations
himself.
He
now
believed
these
five
cases
were
AI
"hallucinations."
[*P105]
Not
only
do
these
specific
cases
not
exist,
but
in
some
instances,
there
are
no
existing
cases
that
support
Mr.
Panichi's
arguments
on
appeal
at
all.
As
an
example,
Mr.
Panichi
cited
"
In
re
R.D.S.
,
2021
IL
App
(2d)
200092,
¶
49,"
in
support
of
his
assertion
that
the
trial
court
erred
by
failing
to
conduct
an
inquiry
under
Faretta
v.
California,
422
U.S.
806
(1975)
,
when
respondent
asserted
her
right
to
represent
herself
in
the
proceedings.
Mr.
Panichi
admitted
this
Second
District
case
does
not
exist.
Even
worse,
however,
is
that
there
are
no
Illinois
cases
requiring
the
application
of
Faretta
to
parental
[**61]
rights
cases.
Thus,
not
only
did
the
AI
"
hallucinate
"
the
case
name,
it
also
apparently
"
hallucinated
"
this
point
of
law.
Other
citations
are
similarly
unfounded
and
misleading.
[*P106]
2.
Rule
Violations
[*P107]
Under
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
375
(eff.
Feb.
1,
1994),
this
court
may,
on
its
own
initiative,
impose
appropriate
sanctions
upon
a
party
or
attorney
if
this
court
determines
that
they
"have
wilfully
failed
to
comply
with
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**57
Page
18
of
21
the
appeal
rules"
or
if
"the
appeal
or
other
action
itself
is
frivolous."
For
the
following
reasons,
we
determine
that
sanctions
against
Mr.
Panichi
under
Rule
375
are
appropriate
based
on
his
conduct
in
connection
with
his
representation
of
respondent
on
appeal.
[*P108]
a.
Rule
375(a)
[*P109]
There
are
myriad
rules
that
apply
to
appeals,
including
the
Illinois
Supreme
Court
rules
and
Illinois
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct
of
2010.
Mr.
Panichi
has
violated
many
of
them.
[*P110]
By
citing
cases
that
do
not
exist
for
principles
of
law
that
do
not
exist,
Mr.
Panichi
violated
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
341(h)(7)
(eff.
Oct
1,
2020),
which
requires
that
an
appellant's
brief
contains
"citation
of
the
authorities
***
relied
on."
[*P111]
We
are
also
concerned
about
Mr.
Panichi's
disregard
of
several
Illinois
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct
of
2010.
By
using
AI
to
generate
a
draft
of
the
briefs
and
not
verifying
the
generated
output,
Mr.
Panichi
[**62]
made
the
same
mistake
as
the
attorneys
in
Mata
,
who
admitted
to
"'operating
under
the
false
assumption'"
that
AI
would
not
"'produce
completely
fabricated
cases.'"
Mata,
678
F.
Supp.
3d
at
451
.
Illinois
Rule
of
Professional
Conduct
of
2010
Rule
1.1
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2010)
requires
lawyers
to
"provide
competent
representation
to
a
client."
Competent
representation
"requires
the
legal
knowledge,
skill,
thoroughness
and
preparation
reasonably
necessary
for
the
representation."
Ill.
R.
Prof'l
Conduct
(2010)
R.
1.1
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2010).
Part
and
parcel
of
maintaining
such
competence
is
"keep[ing]
abreast
of
changes
in
the
law
and
its
practice,
including
the
benefits
and
risks
associated
with
relevant
technology."
Ill.
R.
Prof'l
Conduct
(2010)
R.
1.1,
Committee
Comments
(eff.
July
6,
2023);
see
ABA
Comm.
on
Ethics
&
Pro.
Resp.,
Formal
Op.
512
(2024)
("To
competently
use
a
GAI
tool
in
a
client
representation,"
"lawyers
must
have
a
reasonable
understanding
of
the
capabilities
and
limitations
of
the
specific
GAI
technology
that
the
lawyer
might
use.").
By
failing
to
educate
himself
prior
to
using
AI
about
the
risks
inherent
in
the
technology,
such
as
"hallucinations"
of
false
information,
Mr.
Panichi
failed
to
maintain
his
competence
to
represent
his
client.
[*P112]
Mr.
Panichi's
conduct
also
implicates
professional
conduct
rules
3.1,
3.3,
and
8.4(c)
by
using
nonexistent
cases
[**63]
in
his
briefs
and
thus
making
false
statements
and
misrepresentations
of
the
applicable
law
to
this
court.
See
Ill.
R.
Prof'l
Conduct
(2010)
R.
3.1
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2010)
("A
lawyer
shall
not
bring
or
defend
a
proceeding,
or
assert
or
controvert
an
issue
therein,
unless
there
is
a
basis
in
law
and
fact
for
doing
so
that
is
not
frivolous,
which
includes
a
good-faith
argument
for
an
extension,
modification
or
reversal
of
existing
law.");
R.
3.3(a)(1)
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2010)
("A
lawyer
shall
not
knowingly
***
make
a
false
statement
of
fact
or
law
to
a
tribunal
or
fail
to
correct
a
false
statement
of
material
fact
or
law
previously
made
to
the
tribunal
by
the
lawyer[.]");
R.
8.4(c)
(eff.
July
1,
2024)
("It
is
professional
misconduct
for
a
lawyer
to"
"engage
in
conduct
involving
dishonesty,
fraud,
deceit,
or
misrepresentation.").
[*P113]
Moreover,
by
obtaining
these
nonexistent
case
citations
and
accompanying
quotations
using
AI
without
independently
verifying
their
accuracy,
Mr.
Panichi
failed
to
comply
with
the
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Policy
on
Artificial
Intelligence,
which
emphasizes
that
attorneys
"are
accountable
for
their
final
work
product"
and
"must
thoroughly
review
AI-generated
content
before
submitting
it
in
any
court
proceeding
to
ensure
accuracy
[**64]
and
compliance
with
legal
and
ethical
obligations."
AI
Policy,
supra
.
[*P114]
Although
it
is
indisputable
that
Mr.
Panichi
violated
numerous
rules
governing
the
conduct
of
attorneys
representing
clients
in
appeals,
such
violations
must
be
willful
to
be
sanctionable
under
Rule
375(a).
Black's
Law
Dictionary
defines
"willful"
as
"voluntary
and
intentional,
but
not
necessarily
malicious"
and
clarifies
that
"[a]
voluntary
act
becomes
willful,
in
law,
only
when
it
involves
conscious
wrong
or
evil
purpose
on
the
part
of
the
actor,
or
at
least
inexcusable
carelessness,
whether
the
act
is
right
or
wrong."
Black's
Law
Dictionary
(12th
ed.
2024).
[*P115]
Mr.
Panichi
may
not
have
intentionally
chosen
to
submit
fictitious
cases
to
this
court,
but
he
intentionally
generated
briefs
using
AI
tools
and
intentionally
did
not
check
any
of
the
citations
that
were
generated
by
AI
before
filing
the
briefs.
At
a
minimum,
this
conduct
constitutes
inexcusable
carelessness.
Mr.
Panichi
acknowledged
at
the
hearing
that
he
was
familiar
with
the
principles
of
Rule
341(h)
and
the
principles
of
Illinois
Rules
of
Professional
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**61
Page
19
of
21
Conduct
of
2010
Rules
1.1,
3.1,
3.3,
and
8.4.
He
admitted
that
he
(1)
was
"reckless,"
"careless,"
and
"negligent";
(2)
did
not
read
any
of
the
cases
cited
in
the
AI-generated
briefs
and
did
[**65]
not
do
any
independent
research;
(3)
did
not
read
the
cases
that
he
attached
to
his
response
to
this
court's
rule
to
show
cause;
and
(4)
"barely
did
any
personal
work
[him]self
on
this
appeal."
He
also
continued
to
mislead
the
court
by
maintaining
that
he
properly
cited
two
existing
cases
in
his
brief,
even
though
the
cases
he
identified
in
his
response
did
not
match
the
citations
or
even
the
case
names
of
the
cases
cited
in
his
briefs.
See
Mata,
678
F.
Supp.
3d
at
457
("These
misleading
statements
support
the
Court's
finding
of
subjective
bad
faith.");
United
States
v.
Hayes,
763
F.
Supp.
3d
1054,
1064
(E.D.
Cal.
2025)
(finding
the
attorney's
"inaccurate
and
misleading
statements
were
not
inadvertent
as
claimed,
but
knowing
and
made
in
bad
faith").
Mr.
Panichi
even
maintained
during
the
hearing
that
"to
the
best
of
[his]
knowledge,
[these
cases]
were
cited
for
the
appropriate
principles,"
despite
the
court
explicitly
and
thoroughly
explaining
that
they
were
not.
While
we
certainly
believe
that
Mr.
Panichi's
conduct
was
not
intentionally
malicious
and
appreciate
his
candor,
he
chose
to
ignore
his
professional
obligations.
Mr.
Panichi
has
thus
willfully
failed
to
comply
with
appeal
rules
under
Rule
375(a).
[*P116]
b.
Rule
375(b)
[*P117]
Mr.
Panichi
has
also
violated
Rule
375(b),
as
his
arguments
on
appeal
were
frivolous.
An
[**66]
appeal
is
deemed
frivolous
where
it
is
"not
warranted
by
existing
law
or
a
good-faith
argument
for
the
extension,
modification,
or
reversal
of
existing
law."
Ill.
S.
Ct.
R.
375(b)
(eff.
Feb.
1,
1994).
"In
determining
whether
an
appeal
is
frivolous,
we
apply
an
objective
standard;
the
appeal
is
considered
frivolous
if
it
would
not
have
been
brought
in
good
faith
by
a
reasonable,
prudent
attorney."
(Internal
quotation
marks
omitted.)
In
re
Marriage
of
Lindell,
2023
IL
App
(2d)
220055,
¶
25
.
[*P118]
Mr.
Panichi
cited
fictitious
cases
for
propositions
that
were
not
supported
by
existing
law.
"A
fake
opinion
is
not
'existing
law'
and
citation
to
a
fake
opinion
does
not
provide
a
non-frivolous
ground
for
extending,
modifying,
or
reversing
existing
law,
or
for
establishing
new
law."
Mata,
678
F.
Supp.
3d
at
461
.
[*P119]
Aspects
of
this
appeal
are
frivolous
because
they
would
not
have
been
brought
in
good
faith
by
a
reasonable,
prudent
attorney.
A
reasonable
attorney
would
have
thoroughly
reviewed
the
briefs
he
submitted
to
this
court
to
ensure
that
his
arguments
were
meritorious
and
that
his
citations
were
accurate.
Mr.
Panichi
failed
to
do
so.
Instead,
Mr.
Panichi
misled
the
court
about
the
applicable
law,
in
effect
perpetrating
a
fraud
upon
the
court.
See
Mata,
678
F.
Supp.
3d
at
461
("An
attempt
to
persuade
a
court
or
oppose
an
adversary
[**67]
by
relying
on
fake
opinions
is
an
abuse
of
the
adversary
system.").
Consequently,
Mr.
Panichi's
conduct
violated
Rule
375(b).
[*P120]
c.
Appropriate
Attorney
Sanctions
[*P121]
Sanctions
for
violations
of
Rule
375(a)
may
include
"an
order
to
pay
a
fine,
where
appropriate,
***
against
any
party
or
attorney
for
a
party
or
parties."
Ill.
S.
Ct.
R.
375(a)
(eff.
Feb.
1,
1994).
In
turn,
sanctions
for
violations
of
Rule
375(b)
"may
include
an
order
to
pay
to
the
other
party
or
parties
damages,
the
reasonable
costs
of
the
appeal
or
other
action,
and
any
other
expenses
necessarily
incurred
by
the
filing
of
the
appeal
or
other
action,
including
reasonable
attorney
fees."
Ill.
S.
Ct.
R.
375(b)
(eff.
Feb.
1,
1994).
The
committee
comments
to
Rule
375
add
that,
"Under
paragraph
(b),
a
penal
fine
may
be
imposed
if
the
conduct
in
a
particular
case
also
constitutes
a
violation
of
the
civil
appeals
rules
as
set
forth
in
paragraph
(a)
above."
Ill.
S.
Ct.
R.
375,
Committee
Comments
(adopted
Aug.
1,
1989).
See
Sterling
Homes,
Ltd.
v.
Rasberry,
325
Ill.
App.
3d
703,
709
(2001)
("The
purpose
of
Rule
375(b)
is
to
condemn
and
punish
the
abusive
conduct
of
litigants
and
their
attorneys
who
appear
before
us.").
[*P122]
The
Illinois
Appellate
Court
apparently
has
not
yet
addressed
in
a
published
opinion
the
imposition
of
sanctions
under
Rule
375
against
an
attorney
who
submitted
fictitious
cases
generated
by
AI
to
the
court.
However,
the
court
[**68]
has
imposed
a
variety
of
sanctions
on
attorneys
for
other
misconduct
under
Rule
375.
See
Board
of
Managers
of
Northbrook
Country
Condominium
Ass'n
v.
Spiezer,
2018
IL
App
(1st)
170868,
¶
27
(imposing
a
$750
fine
and
requiring
the
attorney
to
attend
six
hours
of
civility
and
professionalism
courses
for
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**64
Page
20
of
21
making
disparaging
statements
against
the
court
and
opposing
party);
Mote
v.
Estate
of
McManus,
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241307,
¶
85
(ordering
the
appellant
and
his
counsel
to
pay
the
appellee
$5,250
for
attorney
fees
and
costs
for
bringing
a
frivolous
appeal
aimed
only
to
delay,
harass,
or
cause
needless
expense
to
the
appellant);
Parkway
Bank
&
Trust
Co.
v.
Korzen,
2013
IL
App
(1st)
130380,
¶¶
9-10,
84,
86,
92,
101-02
(
sanctioning
the
appellant
$5,000
and
increasing
the
money
judgment
in
favor
of
the
appellee
by
$23,432.05,
the
attorney
fees
for
the
case
below,
rather
than
dismissing
the
appeal,
for
filing
a
frivolous
appeal
and
filing
a
brief
with
numerous
violations
of
Rule
341).
[*P123]
Additionally,
though
not
under
Rule
375,
at
least
one
Illinois
circuit
court
has
sanctioned
an
attorney
under
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
137
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2018)
for
citing
a
nonexistent
case.
See
D'Angelo
v.
Vaught
,
No.
21-CH-29
(Cir.
Ct.
Williamson
County,
Apr.
2,
2025)
(imposing
sanctions
of
$2,000
against
an
attorney
"for
citing
a
non-existent
case
to
the
Court
on
two
separate
occasions").
[*P124]
Furthermore,
federal
and
state
courts
across
the
country
have
imposed
sanctions
on
attorneys
who
submitted
fictitious
cases.
See
Mata,
678
F.
Supp.
3d
at
466
(imposing
a
$5,000
penalty
against
attorneys
who
cited
fictitious
[**69]
cases
generated
by
ChatGPT);
Wadsworth
v.
Walmart
Inc.,
348
F.R.D.
489
(D.
Wyo.
2025)
(
sanctioning
an
attorney
who
cited
fictitious
cases
generated
by
AI
by
revoking
his
pro
hac
vice
status
and
imposing
a
$3,000
fine);
Garner
v.
Kadince,
Inc.
,
No.
20250188-CA,
2025
WL
1481740
(Utah
Ct.
App.
May
22,
2025)
(
sanctioning
an
attorney
who
cited
fictitious
cases
by
ordering
him
to
pay
the
opposing
party's
attorney
fees,
refund
his
client
all
fees
charged
and
paid,
and
pay
$1,000
in
the
form
of
a
donation
to
a
nonprofit);
Lacey
v.
State
Farm
General
Insurance
Co.
,
No.
CV
24-5205,
2025
WL
1363069
(C.D.
Cal.
May
5,
2025)
(
sanctioning
attorneys
who
cited
fictitious
cases
by
striking
their
briefs,
paying
$26,100
to
the
defense
as
reimbursement
for
the
costs
of
the
Special
Master,
and
paying
$5,000
to
the
defense
for
legal
fees
incurred);
Hayes,
763
F.
Supp.
3d
at
1073
(imposing
a
$1,500
fine
where
the
attorney
submitted
a
motion
quoting
language
from
a
nonexistent
case
and
initially
attempted
to
claim
that
he
had
mistakenly
cited
that
case
in
place
of
another,
which
also
did
not
contain
that
quote);
Shahid
v.
Esaam,
No.
A25A0196,
2025
WL
1792657
(Ga.
Ct.
App.
June
30,
2025)
(imposing
a
$2,500
fine
where
the
attorney
cited
nonexistent
cases
but
did
not
admit
to
using
AI).
[*P125]
Turning
to
the
case
at
bar,
this
court
appreciates
and
takes
into
consideration
Mr.
Panichi's
candor
that
he
used
AI
to
generate
the
briefs,
as
well
as
his
acceptance
of
responsibility
for
his
conduct
and
any
consequences.
We
also
note
that
Mr.
Panichi
told
this
court
[**70]
that
he
has
not
previously
been
disciplined
or
sanctioned
by
any
court
or
other
disciplinary
body.
However,
not
only
did
Mr.
Panichi
cite
fictitious
cases
in
submissions
to
this
court,
he
was
also
not
entirely
honest
with
this
court,
as
discussed
above,
when
he
maintained
that
two
existing
cases
had
been
properly
cited
and
one
had
been
incorrectly
cited.
[*P126]
As
we
discussed
above,
though
this
court
considered
striking
Mr.
Panichi's
briefs
in
this
appeal
under
Rule
375(a)
because
of
his
citation
to
fictitious
cases,
we
chose
not
to
do
so
and
addressed
the
merits
above.
Mr.
Panichi's
request
to
file
an
amended
brief
"citing
only
verified
case
law"
is
therefore
denied.
[*P127]
This
court,
instead,
chooses
to
impose
monetary
sanctions
against
Mr.
Panichi
under
Rule
375(a)
and
(b).
Mr.
Panichi
is
responsible
for
his
conduct
in
preparing
these
legal
filings,
and
we
have
no
reason
to
believe
respondent
was
aware
of
or
played
any
role
in
his
conduct.
Mr.
Panichi
submitted
to
this
court
a
copy
of
the
petition
for
attorney
fees
that
he
filed
in
the
Sangamon
County
circuit
court,
along
with
further
documentation
confirming
that
he
had
been
paid
$6,925.62
by
the
Sangamon
County
treasurer.
He
was
paid
at
a
rate
of
$150
per
hour
under
[**71]
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
299
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2024).
At
the
hearing
on
June
18,
he
claimed
that
this
amount
"was
more
than
[he]
usually
charge[s]"
and
this
case
"was
out
of
the
ordinary
in
terms
of
time
spent"
because
his
office
"did
some
exceptional
work
trying
to
get
some
other
information
before
the
court"
by
filing
"a
brief
trying
to
open
up
the
proofs."
However,
he
simultaneously
admitted
to
using
AI
to
generate
the
briefs,
not
doing
any
of
his
own
independent
research,
and
even
that
he
"barely
did
any
personal
work
[him]self
on
this
appeal."
These
statements
contradict
not
only
each
other,
but
the
itemization
of
time
he
attached
to
his
petition
for
attorney
fees.
[*P128]
Mr.
Panichi's
petition
for
attorney
fees
reflects
that
he
billed
(1)
four
hours
for
"Legal
research
re
:
fitness
findings
and
reasonable
efforts,"
(2)
five
hours
for
"Draft[ing]
Argument
sections
and
compil[ing]
authority,"
(3)
two
and
a
half
hours
for
"finaliz[ing]
and
fil[ing]
Appellant's
Opening
Brief,"
(4)
four
and
a
half
hours
for
"Draft[ing]
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**68
Page
21
of
21
Appellant
Reply
Brief,"
and
(5)
another
four
hours
for
"Draft[ing]
and
fil[ing]
Appellant
Reply
Brief."
There
is
no
reference
in
the
petition
to
"a
brief
trying
to
open
up
the
proofs"
or
any
motion,
proceeding,
[**72]
or
brief
other
than
the
opening
and
reply
briefs.
Given
that
Mr.
Panichi
admitted
that
he
relied
entirely
on
AI
to
draft
the
brief
and
conduct
research,
did
not
do
any
research,
drafting,
or
citation
verification
himself,
and
"barely
did
any
personal
work
[him]self
on
this
appeal,"
these
billing
statements
are
not
credible.
He
thus
billed
Sangamon
County
for
up
to
20
hours
of
legal
research
and
drafting
that
appear
questionable.
[*P129]
We
therefore
rule
that
Mr.
Panichi
must
disgorge
the
payment
of
$6,925.62
that
he
received
from
the
Sangamon
County
treasurer
under
Illinois
Supreme
Court
Rule
299
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2024)
for
being
appointed
to
represent
respondent
in
this
appeal.
He
must
issue
payment
of
this
amount
to
the
Sangamon
County
treasurer
within
30
days
of
this
order
and
submit
within
5
days
after
payment
a
receipt
to
this
court
reflecting
said
payment.
[*P130]
We
also
choose
to
impose
an
additional
fine
under
Rule
375(a)
and
(b).
See
Ill.
S.
Ct.
R.
375(a)-(b)
(eff.
Feb.
1,
1994);
Ill.
S.
Ct.
R.
375,
Committee
Comments
(adopted
Aug.
1,
1989).
Mr.
Panichi
misled
this
court,
as
discussed
above,
by
citing
eight
fictitious
cases
and
maintaining
that
three
of
them
existed
when
confronted
about
it.
Moreover,
this
appears
to
be
the
first
issued
opinion
in
the
Illinois
Appellate
Court
[**73]
addressing
the
citation
of
fictitious
cases
generated
by
AI,
and
an
additional
penalty
will
help
deter
other
attorneys
from
following
in
Mr.
Panichi's
footsteps.
We
impose
an
additional
$1,000
penalty
for
Mr.
Panichi's
violation
of
Rule
375(a)
and
(b).
[*P131]
To
be
clear,
nothing
in
this
opinion
is
intended
to
categorically
forbid
attorneys
from
using
AI
tools—in
fact,
the
Illinois
Supreme
Court
AI
policy
explicitly
permits
the
use
of
AI.
However,
attorneys
must
use
AI
tools
wisely
.
We
reiterate
the
supreme
court's
reminder
that
"[a]ll
users
must
thoroughly
review
AI-generated
content
before
submitting
it
in
any
court
proceeding
to
ensure
accuracy
and
compliance
with
legal
and
ethical
obligations."
AI
Policy,
supra.
Flagrant
and
unprincipled
use
of
AI
without
ensuring
the
accuracy
of
the
generated
response
"is
an
abuse
of
the
adversary
system"
(
Mata,
678
F.
Supp.
3d
at
461
),
as
it
wastes
court
resources
that
would
be
better
spent
elsewhere.
[*P132]
We
are
cognizant
of
our
responsibility
under
the
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct
to
"inform
the
Illinois
Attorney
Registration
and
Disciplinary
Commission"
if
"a
lawyer
has
committed
a
violation
of
the
Illinois
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct
of
2010
that
raises
a
substantial
question
regarding
the
lawyer's
honesty,
trustworthiness,
[**74]
or
fitness
as
a
lawyer
in
other
respects."
Ill.
Code
Jud.
Conduct
(2023),
Canon
2,
R.
2.15(B)
(eff.
Jan.
1,
2023).
Accordingly,
a
copy
of
this
opinion
shall
be
sent
to
the
Illinois
Attorney
Registration
and
Disciplinary
Commission
by
the
clerk
of
the
Fourth
District
Appellate
Court.
[*P133]
III.
CONCLUSION
[*P134]
For
the
reasons
stated,
we
affirm
the
trial
court's
judgment.
We
also
order
the
following
sanctions
against
attorney
William
Panichi:
(1)
Mr.
Panichi
must
disgorge
the
payment
of
$6,925.62
he
received
for
his
work
on
this
appeal
to
the
Sangamon
County
treasurer
within
30
days
of
the
filing
of
this
opinion
and
must
submit,
within
5
days
after
payment,
a
receipt
to
this
court
reflecting
said
payment;
(2)
Mr.
Panichi
shall
pay
$1,000
as
monetary
sanctions
to
the
clerk
of
the
Fourth
District
Appellate
Court
within
30
days
of
the
filing
of
this
opinion;
and
(3)
The
clerk
of
the
Fourth
District
Appellate
Court
shall
send
a
copy
of
this
opinion
to
the
Illinois
Attorney
Registration
and
Disciplinary
Commission.
[*P135]
Affirmed.
End
of
Document
2025
IL
App
(4th)
241427,
*241427
;
2025
Ill.
App.
LEXIS
1008,
**71
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