In re M.H., No. 1-25-0013 (May 28, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Illinois (IL)
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Decided
May 28, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Quish (Justice), joined by Navarro (Justice), Ocasio (Justice)
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 IL App (1st) 250013-UUNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULESBEFORE CITING.NOTICE: This order was filed under SupremeCourt Rule 23 and is not precedent except in thelimited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).Appellate Court of Illinois, First District,FOURTH DIVISION.In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors(The People of the State ofIllinois, Petitioner-Appellee,v.M.H., Respondent-Appellant).No. 1-25-0013|Order filed: May 28, 2026Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Nos.23JA475, 23JA476, 23JA477 Honorable Lisa M. Taylor,Judge, presiding.Presiding Justice Navarro and Justice Ocasio concurred in thejudgment.ORDERJUSTICE QUISH delivered the judgment of the court.*1 1 Held: The circuit court's orders adjudicating childrenneglected due to an injurious environment and placing themin the care of the Department of Children and Family Serviceswere not against the manifest weight of the evidence whenthe children heard the physical abuse of their sibling, wereresiding in appropriate placements, and their mother had notcompleted all recommended services. 2 Respondent M.H. (“the Mother”) appeals the circuitcourt's adjudication and disposition orders adjudicatingher children, Mi.H., M.L., and Ma.H. (collectively “theChildren”) abused or neglected, making the Children wardsof the court, and placing the Children in the care of theDepartment of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”). Forthe following reasons, we affirm the court's orders.1 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 On July 11, 2023, the State filed petitions seeking to havethe Children adjudicated wards of the court under section 2-3of the Juvenile Court Act (“JCA”) (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West2022)). The State alleged that Mi.H. was found walking downthe street wearing only shorts or underwear and stated thathe left home because he was fearful of his Mother, who hadsprayed him in the face with bug spray and hit him severaltimes on various parts of his body with a belt and/or closedfists. The State further alleged that Mi.H. had a welt on hisarm, his Mother smoked marijuana in front of him, and theMother did not want Mi.H. to return to her home. The Statereported that Mi.H.’s siblings were at home with his Motherand DCFS was unable to assess their safety. Based on theseallegations, the State alleged that, under the JCA, all threechildren were neglected due to an injurious environment andabused due to a substantial risk of physical injury. The Statealso alleged that Mi.H. was abused due to the infliction ofphysical injury. At the time the petitions were filed, Ma.H.was 7 years old, M.L. was 14 years old, and Mi.H. was13 years old. During subsequent proceedings, Ma.H.’s andM.L.’s fathers were defaulted. Mi.H.’s father appeared, but isnot a party to this appeal. 5 After a temporary custody hearing held that same day,the court removed Mi.H. from his Mother's care and placedhim in the custody of the DCFS Guardianship Administrator.The court found probable cause to believe that Mi.H. hadbeen abused and neglected and there was an immediate andurgent necessity for removal. The court also found probablecause to believe that Ma.H. and M.L. had been abused orneglected, but it did not find that there was an immediateand urgent necessity to remove them from the Mother's care.The court entered an order of protection for Ma.H. and M.L.,which, among other things, required the Mother to ensurethat Ma.H. and M.L. attended school daily. The court alsoappointed the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian(“Public Guardian”) for the Children.*2 6 On October 4, 2023, the court found that the Motherhad violated the order of protection because Ma.H. was notattending school and the Mother was not cooperating withDCFS. The court ordered the Mother to ensure that Ma.H.attended school every day and to cooperate with DCFS’requests for records and in-home visits.
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2 7 On January 11, 2024, the Public Guardian filed amotion to violate and vacate the order of protection, assertingthat the Mother had again failed to ensure that Ma.H. andM.L. attended school daily. Specifically, the Public Guardianalleged that Ma.H. had 13 unexcused absences, 6 excusedabsences, and 47 unexcused tardies and that M.L. had 21unexcused absences, 3 excused absences, and at least 53unexcused tardies. The Public Guardian further alleged thatM.L. had attended only five full days during the entireschool year, was failing two classes, and had a D- inanother. The Public Guardian noted that M.L. was doingwell in other classes and was capable of achieving highergrades. The Public Guardian also noted that Ma.H.’s frequentabsences were particularly concerning because he is a “non-verbal autistic child, who has an extensive IEP [individualeducational program] to provide him with educational/learning support as well as Speech therapy, Occupationaltherapy, independent functioning training, and social worksupport,” and he misses those critical services when he isabsent from school. 8 At a hearing on the Public Guardian's motion on January12, 2024, the court admitted without objection Ma.H's andM.L.’s school records. The Mother testified that in October2023, she contacted Ma.H.’s school because she noticedthat “his behavior had started changing in the morning” andshe thought the guard was using a restraint that may behurting him. The Mother told Ma.H.’s school that she wouldhomeschool Ma.H. and find him another school. The Motherand Ma.H's school worked together to develop a plan toaddress the Mother's safety concerns, and Ma.H. then returnedto school. The Mother testified that she is often late gettingMa.H. to school because it is difficult to get him ready in themorning. The Mother stated that she was aware that she couldarrange for transportation for Ma.H., but she was waiting toarrange it because she was going to move to a new homein February and the registration process takes a long time.The Mother testified that she had a plan for getting Ma.H.to school on time after their move. According to the Mother,Ma.H. was doing well in school and had been student of themonth and on the honor roll for the first, second, and thirdquarters. The Mother stated that she spent a lot of time readingand working with Ma.H. at home. 9 The Mother further testified that M.L.’s absences weredue to sick days and “mental health days,” but she couldnot explain what that meant. The Mother stated that M.L.had been an honor roll student prior to the July incident thatprecipitated this case and that M.L.’s poor grades were aresult of her being overwhelmed with the DCFS case andnot being able to help M.L. The Mother planned to getresources to help M.L., including workbooks, “apps,” librarybooks, and a laptop. 10 DCFS caseworker Ashonte Winstontestified that she had been working on the case since July2023. When she checked with their respective schools onOctober 20, 2023, both Ma.H. and M.L. had no absences atthat time and their absences from school all occurred afterthat date. Winston last visited the family home on December27, 2023, and had no safety concerns. The children also didnot express any safety concerns regarding living with theirmother. Winston explained that DCFS had not assessed Ma.H.and M.L. for services because they were not in DCFS custody.Winston testified that the Mother became more cooperativeafter October 4, 2023, and generally answered Winston'sphone calls and questions.*3 11 The circuit court found that the Mother had violatedthe order of protection by failing to ensure that Ma.H. andM.L. attended school regularly. The court vacated the order ofprotection and entered a new temporary custody order placingMa.H. and M.L. in the custody of the DCFS GuardianshipAdministrator. The court also ordered Ma.H. and M.L. beassessed for services and therapy. The State asked for leave toamend Ma.H.’s and M.L.’s adjudication petitions to includeeducational neglect, which the court granted. 12 On January 31, 2024, the Public Guardian filed amotion to find Ma.H. and M.L.’s placement not necessaryand appropriate. Specifically, the Public Guardian allegedthat Ms. C., a friend of the Mother and the foster parentwith whom the Children had been placed, was not adequatelyadministering medication, Ms. C.’s home was too small anddid not have enough beds, Ms. C. had pushed Mi.H. onto acouch, and there was no adequate care plan for when Ms.C. went to work. On February 1, 2024, the court grantedthe Public Guardian's motion, and Ma.H. and M.L. wereeventually placed with their maternal grandmother. 13 On September 23, 2024, the court held an adjudicatoryhearing. At the outset, the court took judicial notice of theJanuary 12, 2024, proceeding in which the court found theMother violated the order of protection and placed Ma.H. andM.L. in the care of DCFS. 14 Uriah Baker testified that on July 7, 2023, he noticedMi.H. in an alley crying and wearing only his underwear.Baker provided some clothes to Mi.H. Mi.H. told Baker thathe did not want to go home because he was being harmed
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3by his mother. Baker was able to flag down a passing policeofficer, who called an ambulance. Baker observed that Mi.H.had bruises and scarring. 15 Officer Armando Zambrano testified that on July 7,2023, he was flagged down by an individual on the street, atwhich point he stopped and met with Mi.H. The individualinformed him that he found Mi.H. wearing only shorts.Zambrano observed bruising and scarring on Mi.H.’s arms.When Zambrano asked him what had happened to his arms,Mi.H. stated that his mother punched him with a closed fistand hit him with a belt. Zambrano called an ambulance, whichtook Mi.H. to the hospital. When Zambrano later went to theMother's home with a DCFS caseworker, the Mother refusedto let them in and slammed the door. 16 DCFS caseworker Juanita Irvin testified that she metMi.H. at the hospital on July 7, 2023, and observed that hehad circular bruises on his upper back. Irvin did not noticebruises anywhere else. Mi.H. told Irvin that his mother hadhit him with a belt on his arm and back, sprayed “chemicals”in his face, and threw him into the stairs. He reported that thishad happened before. Mi.H. also told Irvin that he had sicklecell anemia and that he had not taken his medication in a fewdays, which left him in pain. He was afraid of returning home. 17 Irvin called the Mother, who said, “I don't want rightswith my son” and that she did not want anything to do withhim. The Mother hung up on Irvin. Irvin called back to try toobtain a phone number for Mi.H.’s aunt, who was a familymember with whom Mi.H felt safe. The Mother told Irvin notto call back unless she was bringing Mi.H. home and hungup again. 18 The next day, Irvin went to the Mother's house with twopolice officers. The Mother spoke with Irvin from an upstairswindow and initially would not let her into the house. TheMother eventually allowed Irvin to enter without the policeofficers, but Irvin did not feel safe and refused to go in withoutthem, so she did not enter. The Mother refused to bring Ma.H.and M.L. to the door.*4 19 Irvin and her supervisor made the decision to takeprotective custody of Mi.H. After she obtained a court ordercompelling the Mother to allow her to meet with them, Irvinwas able to interview Ma.H. and M.L. Both children said theyheard the Mother hitting Mi.H., but they did not see it. Irvintestified that Ma.H. has special needs and was not able toverbalize what was happening to him. Irvin did not see anybruises or marks on either Ma.H. or M.L. 20 Following Irvin's testimony, the court admitted Mi.H.’shospital records into evidence without objection. The courtfound the witnesses to be credible and that the State metits burden by a preponderance of the evidence that Mi.H.was neglected due to an injurious environment and abuseddue to physical abuse and substantial risk of physical injuryas a result of abuse by the Mother. As to Ma.H. and M.L.,the court found that the State met its burden of proof by apreponderance of the evidence that they were neglected dueto an injurious environment, but the State had not met itsburden of showing that Ma.H. and M.L. were neglected dueto substantial risk of physical injury because it interpretedthe evidence as showing that the Mother “treated [Ma.H. andM.L.] differently” than Mi.H. The court entered adjudicationorders on September 23, 2024, memorializing its oral rulings. 21 The court then held dispositional hearings and tookjudicial notice of the testimony and findings from theSeptember adjudication hearing. 22 Guadalupe Rodriguez testified that she was Ma.H.and Mi.H.’s caseworker with Our Children Homestead. Shetestified that Ma.H. has been with his maternal grandmothersince March 2024. Rodriguez had visited with him recentlyand did not observe any signs of abuse or neglect. Ma.H.was attending school regularly and receiving speech andoccupational therapy services. When Rodriguez spoke withschool staff, they did not report any concerns. Rodriguez hadbeen attempting to find Applied Behavior Analysis (“ABA”)therapy services for Ma.H., but was having difficulty findingany that were covered by his insurance. She had recentlylocated such a service and expected to have Ma.H.’s referralpaperwork completed by the end of the month. Ma.H. wasalso seeing a mentor. 23 Rodriguez further testified that Mi.H. was in atherapeutic foster home. She did not see any signs of abuseor neglect. Rodriguez reported that Mi.H. liked his new homeand new school. According to Rodriguez, Ma.H. and Mi.H.were both having supervised visits with the Mother once aweek, but the Mother canceled the most recent visit withoutproviding a reason. Rodriguez testified that the Mother hadnot been consistent in attending her visits. She estimated thatthe mother had failed to attend three or four of the eightscheduled visits. Mi.H. was also having weekly phone callswith his father, who was incarcerated.
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4 24 DCFS child welfare specialist Maia Laville testifiedthat she was the caseworker for M.L. and the family. Lavillereported that M.L. was living with her maternal grandmother.Laville had last visited the home in October 2024 and did nothave any concerns. M.L. was having weekly sibling visits.M.L. was in the process of switching to a new school, andLaville had been informed by M.L. and her grandmother thather school attendance “wasn't as up to par as it should be” dueto “the grandmother's schedule, working, perhaps, also, heryounger brother needed to be watched” and other “glitches.”However, M.L. had been regularly attending school for thepast two months. M.L. had been referred for individualtherapy but had not begun. Laville hoped that M.L. wouldstart that month.*5 25 Laville testified that the Mother had been referred forindividual therapy and retained her own therapist, with whomshe claimed to have been engaged for about a year. However,despite requesting that the Mother provide her with a consentform for the release of information regarding that therapy,Laville had not received one. The Mother had been recentlyreferred for domestic violence classes but had not started. TheMother also told Laville that she had completed parentingclasses with a different agency, but Laville had not yet beenable to obtain proof of completion from the Mother or theagency, despite several attempts. The Mother was attendingweekly visits with all three children together. Her attendanceat the visits was “consistent at times,” but the Mother hadmissed two visits recently. Laville stated that the Mother'sconduct during the visits was appropriate. 26 DCFS supervisor Ketoya Sanders testified that DCFSrecommended that the Children be made wards of the courtand placed in the guardianship of DCFS with a permanencygoal of returning home within 12 months. 27 The Public Guardian noted in its argument that M.L.“has communicated on occasion that she would like to returnhome to her mother” and also expressed her desire to stay withMa.H. The Public Guardian recommended that both be keptin DCFS’ care with the goal of returning them home. 28 In its oral ruling on December 11, 2024, thecourt found that “[r]easonable efforts have been made toprevent or eliminate the need for removal of [the Children]from the home” and that “[a]ppropriate services aimedat family preservation and family reunification have beenunsuccessful.” The court further found that the Mother wasunable for some reason other than financial circumstancesalone to care for, protect, train or discipline the Childrenand that it was in the Children's best interest to be removedfrom the Mother's custody and placed in the custody of theDCFS Guardianship Administrator with the right to find anappropriate placement. 29 The court set a permanency goal of returning the Childrenhome within 12 months and deferred findings as to whetherthe Mother had made reasonable progress in her services.The court also found that DCFS made reasonable efforts toprovide services for Ma.H. and Mi.H., but had not madereasonable efforts for M.L. The court noted that M.L. wasnot enrolled in school at that time and was not yet attendingtherapy. 30 The Mother appeals the circuit court's September 23,2024, adjudication orders finding that Ma.H. and M.L. wereabused or neglected due to an injurious environment and thecourt's December 11, 2024, disposition orders finding that shewas unable to care for Ma.H. and M.L and that placement withDCFS was in their best interests. She does not appeal fromany orders as to Mi.H. The trial court appointed an attorneyto represent the Mother on appeal. 31 II. ANALYSIS 32 Before examining the merits of the Mother's appeal,we must address an issue that the Public Guardian raisedregarding numerous substantive inaccuracies in the Mother'sbrief. The Public Guardian points out that, throughout herbrief, the Mother misstates the facts or holdings of cases shecited in support of her arguments, incorrectly cites others, andreferences cases that do not exist. The Public Guardian arguesthat the Mother's reliance on fictitious case holdings violatesIllinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) andasks us to find the Mother's arguments forfeited. “ ‘[B]ecausethe merits of the case can be ascertained from the record andwe have the benefit of *** cogent brief[s]’ from the Stateand the Public Guardian, we will consider the merits” of theMother's arguments. In re Es. C., 2021 IL App (1st) 210197, 13 (quoting Antonson v. Department of Human Services,2021 IL App (1st) 192272-U, 18). However, simultaneouslywith this decision, we issued a rule to show cause order to theMother's counsel, requiring her to file a response addressingthese issues. In the event we find sanctions are warranted, wewill issue a separate written order imposing the sanction.
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5*6 33 “In proceedings under the [JCA], the paramountconsideration is the best interests of the child.” In re Z.L., 2021IL 126931, 58 (citing In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, 18). “‘[C]ases involving allegations of neglect and adjudication ofwardship are sui generis, and must be decided on the basisof their unique circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Arthur H.,212 Ill. 2d 441, 463 (2004)). The JCA sets forth a two-stepprocess the trial court must follow in determining whether aminor should be removed from his or her parents’ custody andmade a ward of the court. Id. (citing A.P., 2012 IL 113875, 18). 34 The first step is an adjudicatory hearing on the petitionfor adjudication of wardship where the court considers onlywhether the minor is abused, neglected or dependent. Id.at 59; 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2018). If the courtdetermines that a minor is abused or neglected, it then movesto the second step, which is the dispositional hearing. Id. 60(citing 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2018)). At that hearing,the trial court determines whether it is consistent with thehealth, safety, and best interests of the minor and the publicthat the minor be made a ward of the court. Id. (citing 705ILCS 405/2-21(2)). The court “may consider the acts and/oromissions of the parents” in making that determination. Id.(citing Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 466). 35 The State has the burden of proving its allegations ofabuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 60. We will not disturb the court's finding of abuse or neglectunless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.Id. 61 (citing A.P., 2012 IL 113875, 17). “A findingis against the manifest weight of the evidence only if theopposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Id. (citing A.P., 2012IL 113875, 17). Similarly, “[w]e will not reverse a court'sfindings of fact with regard to dispositional unfitness unlessthey are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and atrial court's dispositional order will not be reversed unless itis an abuse of discretion.” In re Zoey L., 2021 IL App (1st)210063, 38 (citing In re A.T., 2015 IL App (3d) 140372, 13). “ ‘Because a trial court is in a superior position toassess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence,a reviewing court will not overturn the trial court's findingsmerely because the reviewing court may have reached adifferent decision.’ ” In re A.S., 2020 IL App (1st) 200560, 22 (quoting In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 245, 257(2001)). Indeed, in child custody cases, “ ‘there is a strongand compelling presumption in favor of the result reached bythe trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting In re William H., 407 Ill. App.3d 858, 866 (2011)). 36 A. Adjudication 37 Although the Mother asserts in her brief that she iscontesting both the adjudication and disposition orders, shedoes not separate her arguments into distinct, structured legalchallenges to each order. Instead, the Mother's argumentseems to reflect three recurring contentions: (1) reunificationis in Ma.H.’s and M.L.’s best interests; (2) DCFS did not makereasonable efforts to provide her with services and support;and (3) she has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to herchildren and has substantially complied with her service plan.We will address these arguments where appropriate within ouranalysis of the two orders on review. 38 First, none of the Mother's arguments present anyrecognizable challenge to the court's adjudication ordersfinding Ma.H. and M.L. neglected due to an injuriousenvironment. Instead, her only argument on that issue consistsof conclusory assertions that “[t]he evidence presented onSeptember 23, 2024 by caseworker Rodriguez *** stronglysupports the defense of [the Mother] and demonstrates thatthe trial court's adjudication of neglect *** is not supportedby the record,” followed by a citation to four pages of therecord; “there is no credible evidence of abuse or neglect by[the Mother]”; and unspecified “unsubstantiated allegationsand isolated incidents do not justify the court's findings.”The Mother does not cite any cases addressing that groundor explain which part of Rodriguez's testimony she believessupports her defense. Due to the lack of substantive argumentand citation to supporting authorities, we would be justifiedin finding the Mother's challenge to the adjudication ordersforfeited. See In re Mi.R., 2022 IL App (5th) 210330-U, 22. However, due the important nature of the case, and withthe assistance of the thorough and cogent briefs of the PublicGuardian and the State, we will consider the merits of theissue. See id.*7 39 The trial court found Mi.H. to be abused due tophysical abuse and due to substantial risk of physical injuryas the result of abuse by the Mother, and neglected dueto an injurious environment. In her reply brief, the Mother“acknowledge[d] that there was sufficient evidence for theadjudication of neglect and a dispositional finding” as to Mi.Hand “makes no argument as to him for that reason.” Thus,although she challenges the adjudication findings as to Ma.H.and M.L., she admits there was sufficient evidence that sheabused and neglected their sibling.
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6 40 The trial court found Ma.H. and M.L. neglecteddue to an injurious environment. The concept of neglect “‘encompasses willful as well as unintentional disregard ofparental duties.’ ” In re K.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 240430, 88 (quoting In re S.D., 220 Ill. App. 3d 498, 502 (1991)).Section 2-3(1)(b) of the JCA provides that, among othergrounds, a minor may be adjudicated neglected when his orher “environment is injurious to the minor's welfare.” 705ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b). The “ ‘term “injurious environment”cannot be defined with particularity,’ but *** ‘it includes thebreach of a parent's duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelterfor his or her children.’ ” K.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 240430, 88 (quoting Z.L., 2021 IL 126931, 89). 41 A minor may be adjudicated neglected due to an injuriousenvironment when he or she has witnessed the abuse of asibling. See id. ¶¶ 91-92 (stating that “we have repeatedlyheld that evidence that a child witnessed the abuse of asibling may be sufficient to support a finding of neglect basedon an injurious environment” and holding that the evidencesupported such a finding of neglect); see also In re Gray, 131Ill. App. 3d 401, 409 (1985) (holding that a finding of neglectwas not against the manifest weight of the evidence whenthe children witnessed physical abuse of their stepsister).This principle is grounded in the idea that, when faced withevidence of prior abuse by a parent, “ ‘the juvenile courtshould not be forced to refrain from taking action until eachparticular child suffers an injury.’ ” Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at477 (quoting In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339 (1978)).Whether the abuse or neglect of one child constitutes neglectof a sibling depends on the unique facts of each case. Id. at468-69. 42 Here, we agree with the trial court that the State provedMa.H. and M.L. were subject to an injurious environmentby a preponderance of the evidence. The Mother admitsthe State proved that she physically abused Mi.H. Theevidence established that the Mother punched Mi.H. witha closed fist and hit him with a belt, leaving visiblemarks that Irvin, Uriah Baker, and Officer Zambrano eachobserved, and that this had happened before. Further, DCFScaseworker Juanita Irvin testified that both Ma.H. and M.L.heard the Mother physically abusing Mi.H. This evidencewas sufficient to support a finding of neglect based on aninjurious environment. See K.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 240430,¶¶ 91-92. Additionally, the emotional damage that resultsfrom witnessing the physical abuse of a sibling is a validconsideration and further supports the court's conclusion.See In re A.D.R., 186 Ill. App. 3d 386, 393-94 (1989).Accordingly, under the highly deferential standard of reviewthat we apply on this issue, we conclude that the Mother hasnot shown that the court's finding was against the manifestweight of the evidence. See Z.L., 2021 IL 126931, 61. 43 B. Disposition 44 We next examine the propriety of the court's dispositionorder. “Prior to committing a minor to the custody of athird party, such as DCFS, a trial court must first determinewhether the parent is unfit, unable, or unwilling to carefor the child, and whether the best interest of the minorwill be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custodyof his or her parents.” (Emphasis removed.) In re M.M.,2016 IL 119932, 21 (citing 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West2012)). The Mother contests the court's findings on bothprongs, arguing that reunification, rather than placement withDCFS, was in Ma.H.’s and M.L.’s best interests and that anyinability to show that she is able to care for them was due toDCFS’ failure to make “reasonable efforts” and “reasonableprogress” towards reunification.*8 45 We first observe that the Mother's argumentsregarding DCFS’ alleged duty to make “reasonable efforts”or “reasonable progress” towards reunification reflect amisunderstanding of the law. Notably, she does not cite anystatutory provision imposing such requirements on DCFS atthe disposition stage, and indeed, there does not appear to beone. Rather, while those terms do appear in various relatedcontexts, none are applicable here. 46 Specifically, section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act(“Adoption Act”) (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2024))provides that, in termination of parental rights proceedings,a parent may be deemed an “unfit person” whose parentalrights may be terminated if he or she fails “to make reasonableefforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for theremoval of the child” or “to make reasonable progress towardthe return of the child to the parent” during any 9-monthperiod following the adjudication of abuse or neglect. 750ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2024)); see also In re Jacorey, 2012IL App (1st) 113427, 21. Elsewhere, the JCA allows forthe expedited termination of parental rights “when reasonableefforts are inappropriate, or have been provided and wereunsuccessful, and there are aggravating circumstances.”705 ILCS 405/1-2(1)(a) (West 2024). Additionally, section2-10(2) of the JCA provides that, at a temporary custody
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7hearing, “[i]n determining the health, safety, and best interestsof the minor to prescribe shelter care, the court must *** findthat reasonable efforts have been made or that, consistent withthe health, safety and best interests of the minor, no effortsreasonably can be made to prevent or eliminate the necessityof removal of the minor from the minor's home.” 705 ILCS405/2-10(2) (West 2024). However, the Mother's challenge tothe court's disposition order in this case does not involve anyof those situations and thus, we reject her argument. 47 More to the point, this court has addressed this issueat the disposition stage and stated that “issues regardingwhether a minor should be adjudged a ward of the courtare not related to issues regarding reasonable efforts on thepart of DCFS toward reunification.” In re William H., 407Ill. App. 3d 858, 869 (2011). Rather, “[t]hese concepts areon two wholly different planes,” and it is the best interestanalysis “that is key to a wardship decision, not a findingregarding whether reasonable efforts toward reunificationwere employed by an agency involved in the cause.” Id.Indeed, section 2-27(1.5) of the JCA, which governs theplacement of a minor in the care of DCFS, requires the courtto consider whether “appropriate services aimed at familypreservation and family reunification have been unsuccessfulin rectifying the conditions that have led to a finding ofunfitness or inability to care for, protect, train, or disciplinethe minor,” or whether “no family preservation or familyreunification services would be appropriate,” but it does notimpose any requirement to consider the efforts of DCFS toassist the parent. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1.5) (West 2024). 48 The Mother cites several cases in support of herargument, but none are applicable here, as they all either relateto termination of parental rights proceedings and section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239(2004), In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985 (2004), In re C.N.,196 Ill. 2d 181 (2001), and In re A.J., 269 Ill. App. 3d 824(1995)), or include no relevant discussion of DCFS’ allegedduty to assist a parent with the completion of services (In reD.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347 (2004), In re K.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 830(2000)). Accordingly, we find the Mother's challenge to thedisposition orders on these grounds to be without merit.*9 49 The evidence supported the court's finding that theMother was unable to parent Ma.H. and M.L. This court hason many occasions affirmed a finding of parental inabilitywhen the parent had not completed recommended servicesand not addressed the reasons for the removal of his or herchild. See, e.g., In re Malik B.-N., 2012 IL App (1st) 121706,¶¶ 59-60; In re M.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 186, 199-200 (2008);In re Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d 785, 796 (2006). Notably,we have made that same determination even when the parentwas not entirely at fault for his or her failure to completeall services. See, e.g., In re Chelsea H., 2016 IL App (1st)150560, ¶¶ 87-90; In re Marianna F.-M., 2015 IL App (1st)142897, 36. 50 Rather, the evidence in this case showed that the Motherhad been referred to individual therapy, parenting classes,and domestic violence classes. The Mother first reported thatshe was not interested in therapy, but then claimed that shehad been seeing a privately-retained therapist. However, shedid not provide DCFS caseworker Laville consent to obtaininformation related to that therapy. The Mother also toldLaville that she had completed parenting classes with anotheragency, but she did not have a certificate of completionand Laville had been unsuccessful in obtaining one fromthe agency. Finally, although she was referred for domesticviolence counseling, the Mother denied needing such servicesand had not attended any such classes. As of March 2024,the Mother was noted to be inconsistent with parentingclasses and therapy. In July 2024, the Mother told her DCFScaseworker that she stopped therapy and was not interestedin resuming any referral services. The Mother was alsoinconsistent with her visits with Ma.H. and M.L. Because theMother had either not begun or not shown proof of completionof any of the recommended services, we cannot say that thecourt's finding that the Mother was unable to parent Ma.H.and M.L. was against the manifest weight of the evidence oran abuse of its discretion. See Chelsea H., 2016 IL App (1st)150560, ¶¶ 87-90 (holding that a circuit court's finding that amother was unable to parent her children was not against themanifest weight of the evidence when she had not completedall recommended services, even when one of the services hadnot been available, noting that the focus must remain on thebest interests of the children). 51 The final issue is “whether it is consistent with the health,safety and best interests” of Ma.H., M.L., and the publicthat Ma.H. and M.L. be made wards of the court. A.P., 2012IL 113875, 21 (citing 705 ILCS 405/2-21). The Motherargues that wardship and placement with DCFS was not inMa.H.’s and M.L.’s best interests. Primarily, she contends thatMa.H. and M.L. are experiencing emotional harm from theseparation and instability that comes with being placed infoster care and that DCFS has failed to adequately supportthem.
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8 52 In arguing that their foster placements have beeninadequate, the Mother notes that Ma.H. was not consistentlyreceiving his medication and had not yet begun ABA therapy,which she contends is vital to his development. She also notesthat M.L. has been sharing a sleeping space with her siblings,had missed school during a school transition, and often hadto stay at home to watch her younger brother. However, theMother's account of the facts is inaccurate in two respects.Contrary to the Mother's assertions, the issues related tothe improper administration of medication and inadequatesleeping space occurred with Ma.H.’s and M.L.’s earlierfoster parent, Ms. C. The evidence at the disposition hearingshowed that their move to their maternal grandmother's home,their current placement, had remedied those issues.*10 53 Caseworker Rodriguez testified that she didnot have any concerns with Ma.H.’s placement with hisgrandmother. Further, Ma.H. was regularly attending schoolwhere he received speech and occupational therapy services,and school staff did not have any concerns. Ma.H. wasalso seeing a mentor. While it is true that Rodriguezhad encountered difficulty finding ABA therapy servicesfor Ma.H., she had recently located one and expected tohave Ma.H.’s referral paperwork completed soon. As forM.L., caseworker Laville similarly testified that she had noconcerns with M.L.’s placement. Although M.L. had missedsome school due to a school transition and difficulties withscheduling or paperwork, M.L. had been attending schoolregularly for the preceding two months. Further, M.L. was dueto start therapy within a month. 54 Thus, the record does not reflect any significant concernswith Ma.H.’s or M.L.’s current placements. Further, the courtmade note of issues that DCFS needed to continue workingon, such as M.L.’s therapy, instructed DCFS to ensure thatall recommended services had been referred, and scheduled astatus hearing to review DCFS’ progress. 55 The record supports the trial court's decision to makeMa.H. and M.L. wards of the court and its findings thatplacement with DCFS was in their best interests and thatthe Mother was unable to parent them. As recounted above,both children were in an appropriate placement with a familymember and their caseworkers did not have any concerns.Both children were attending school regularly and eitherreceiving or due to begin receiving recommended services.Further, although the Mother contends that she made progressin her services and demonstrated a continued commitmentto regaining custody of Ma.H. and M.L., the fact remainsthat she had not provided proof of completion of any ofher recommended services, and her participation in visitationwas inconsistent and remained supervised. Additionally, bothDCFS and the Public Guardian recommended that Ma.H. andM.L. be made wards of the court and remain in the care ofDCFS. 56 Because Ma.H.’s and M.L.’s needs were being metand the Mother had not completed recommended services ordemonstrated that she had remedied the issues that led to theremoval of the Children, we conclude that the court's findingthat placement with DCFS was in Ma.H.’s and M.L.’s bestinterests was not against the manifest weight of the evidenceor an abuse of its discretion. See In re H.B.-H., 2025 ILApp (1st) 242275, 83 (holding that the evidence supportedthe circuit court's dispositional order placing the child in thecare of DCFS when, even though the Public Guardian hadraised complaints about DCFS’ placement of the child, thechild's mother had not completed recommended services); Inre V.S., 2023 IL App (1st) 220817, 65 (holding that thecircuit court's dispositional order placing the child in the careof DCFS was not against the manifest weight of the evidencewhen, although the parent and child had a strong bond andthe child's caseworker supported eventual reunification, theparent had not yet completed all recommended services). 57 Lastly, we note that the Mother raises new argumentsfor the first time in her reply brief regarding the court'salleged failure to make individualized findings as to eachchild before ordering removal and that the court must considerless restrictive alternatives before removal. Those argumentsare forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)(prohibiting a party from raising new arguments in a replybrief); Asher Farm Limited Partnership v. Wolsfeld, 2022 ILApp (2d) 220072, 38 (finding a new argument raised in areply brief to have been forfeited). 58 For the foregoing reasons we affirm the circuit court'sadjudication and disposition orders.*11 59 Affirmed.All CitationsNot Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U,2026 WL 1494268
In re M.H., M.L., and M.H., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,..., Not Reported inN.E. Rptr. (2026)2026 IL App (1st) 250013-U WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Footnotes1This matter qualifies for an accelerated disposition under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. Jul. 1, 2018). Basedon the date the notice of appeal was filed, a decision in this case was originally due on June 2, 2025. However, due toa protracted briefing process that involved multiple extensions of briefing deadlines for all parties, the withdrawal andrefiling of the Mother's brief due to a supplemental record, the filings of three separate supplements to the record, achange to the composition of the panel deciding this case, and a reassignment of the authorship of this order, we findgood cause to extend the deadline. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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