In re S.A. (Dec. 29, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Illinois (IL)
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Decided
Dec. 29, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Mullen (Justice), joined by Kennedy (Justice), Jorgensen (Justice)
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 IL App (2d) 250280-UUNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULESBEFORE CITING.NOTICE: This order was filed under SupremeCourt Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in thelimited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors(The People of the State ofIllinois, Petitioner-Appelleev.Diamond H., Respondent-Appellant).Nos. 2-25-0280, 2-25-0281, 2-25-0282 cons.|Order filed December 29, 2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Nos. 23-JA-93 23-JA-94 23-JA-95 Honorable Kathryn D. Karayannis,Judge, Presiding.Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Jorgensen concurredin the judgment.ORDERJUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court.*1 1 Held: The trial court's finding that the State proved byclear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit forfailure to make reasonable progress toward the return of thechildren was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.As such, and because respondent does not challenge the best-interest phase of the analysis, the trial court's decision toterminate respondent's parental rights is affirmed. 2 In this case, respondent appeals the trial court's decisionfinding her unfit for failure to make reasonable progresstoward the return of the children. For the reasons that follow,we affirm. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Respondent is the biological mother of C.L. (born April20, 2010), D.L. (born June 24, 2011), S.A. (born March2, 2018), D.H. (born November 6, 2020), and B.M. (bornJanuary 16, 2023). Only S.A., D.H., and B.M. were namedin the instant proceedings. Respondent's parental rights wereterminated with respect to S.A., D.H., and B.M. on May 20,2025. The rights of Brennon A., the biological father of S.A.and D.H., as well as the rights of Bryan M., the biologicalfather of B.M., were terminated in the same proceedings butare not at issue in this appeal. 5 A. THE NEGLECT PETITION 6 On June 30, 2023, the State filed petitions to adjudicateS.A., D.H., and B.M., alleging that they were neglectedminors and that their environment is injurious to their welfare(705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)). That same day, thetrial court placed S.A. and D.H. in the temporary custodyof the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS). S.A. and D.H. were placed in the care of respondent'saunt. B.M. was placed in the temporary custody of Bryan M.on June 30, 2023. On July 18, 2023, B.M. was placed in thetemporary custody of DCFS. DCFS placed B.M. in the careof his paternal grandmother. 7 This case originated following a domestic violenceincident between respondent and Bryan M. on June 26, 2023.At the time of the incident, respondent was violating an orderof protection she had against Bryan M. During the domesticviolence incident, B.M. was in the room and S.A. and D.H.were outside unsupervised. Following the incident, policearrived at respondent's home. Respondent resisted arrest,pushing S.A. and D.H. out of her way, and barricaded herselfin a neighboring apartment. 8 A service plan, dated August 7, 2023, was filed withthe trial court. The service plan provided that respondentwould keep her caseworker informed of her place of residenceand contact information, complete an integrated assessment,comply with recommended services, cooperate with her
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2caseworker, sign all releases of information for serviceproviders, maintain stable housing and employment, andattend drug drops as requested. A permanency goal of returnhome within 12 months was established. 9 On September 22, 2023, orders were entered adjudicatingS.A., D.H., and B.M. as neglected because respondent failedto protect them from an environment injurious to theirwelfare.*2 10 Respondent completed an integrated assessmentwith DCFS on October 3, 2023. Of note, respondent hadmultiple instances of prior contact with DCFS. As a child,respondent was placed in DCFS care due to concernsof physical abuse and neglect. However, when discussingher childhood during the integrated assessment, respondent“stated that she was ‘spoiled’ and had everything she neededas a child.” Additionally, respondent's eldest two children,C.L. and D.L. had lived with their biological father followingDCFS involvement. Respondent reportedly struck C.L. witha belt and was involved in a domestic violence incidentwith Brennon A. During investigations, respondent was notcompliant in that she prevented police from seeing herchildren and kept her children out of school. Another reportfrom January 2023 noted the respondent had a history ofdomestic violence. In a February 2023 intake, it was notedthat respondent was involved in an altercation with BryanM. and the two had a history of domestic violence. Further,in 2020, DCFS became involved when respondent struckS.A. “in the face with an open hand.” DCFS received videosof respondent “cutting her own stomach with a knife” andtaking a “handful of white pills.” The integrated assessmentindicates that respondent was recommended to complete apsychiatric assessment and treatment, engage in individualtherapy, complete domestic violence treatment, comply witha substance abuse assessment and treatment, comply withrandom drug drops, participate in supervised visitation withher children, and complete parenting classes. 11 B. THE PERMANENCY REVIEWS 12 On October 11, 2023, a Court Appointed SpecialAdvocate (CASA) report was filed in the trial court. Thereport indicated that the case came into care after a domesticviolence incident between respondent and Bryan M. onJune 26, 2023. Bryan M. called the police and alleged thatrespondent had attacked him. The police noted that Bryanhad a swollen and red right eye, hair missing from his scalp,and broken eyeglasses. When police went to her residence toarrest respondent, she pushed S.A. and D.H. out of her waybefore running into a neighboring apartment. 13 On October 13, 2023, a service plan dated October3, 2023, was filed in the trial court. The service planwas updated to reflect respondent's completion of theintegrated assessment. It required respondent to keep hercaseworker informed of her place of residence and contactinformation, cooperate with her caseworker, sign all releasesof information for service providers, maintain stable housingand employment, attend drug drops as requested, complete apsychiatric evaluation with an approved provider, participatein psychotherapy to acknowledge past and present parentingexperiences, demonstrate progress in the goals and objectivesidentified in her mental health treatment plan, and gainknowledge and perceptiveness with how her choices andbehaviors put her children's safety, health, and well-being atrisk. 14 That same day, Lutheran Social Services of Illinois(LSSI) filed a dispositional hearing report. It noted thatrespondent remained in contact with her caseworker butsometimes struggled with appropriate communications.Respondent contacted an advocacy group and reported thather caseworker was not helping her find suitable housingafter respondent was evicted from her apartment. However,respondent never informed her caseworker that she had beenevicted. Respondent was attending visits with her children. Atone point, visitation time was increased. However, respondentended a visit early, telling her caseworker that “it was not rightthat her baby was crying for 2 hours straight.” Respondentthen accused her caseworker of mistreating B.M. 15 A dispositional order was entered on October 17, 2023.The trial court found that for reasons other than financialcircumstances alone, respondent is unfit and unable to carefor, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline the minorsand placement with her was contrary to their best interests.The trial court also found the service plan appropriate andadmonished the parties to cooperate with DCFS, comply withthe terms of the service plan, and correct the conditions thatbrought the minors into care. 16 On January 31, 2024, CASA filed a report in the trialcourt. It noted that respondent had begun individual therapywith LSSI and had attended two sessions. The sessionswere in the intake stage, so no substantive progress hadbeen made. Although respondent completed a psychiatric
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3evaluation with the Ecker Center, she was informed that shedid not meet requirements for their services and none wereprovided. Additionally, respondent had begun engaging withdomestic violence services. She underwent a substance abuseevaluation but was not recommended for treatment.*3 17 That same day, a DCFS service plan datedDecember 5, 2023, was filed in the trial court. Respondentwas rated as satisfactory regarding updating her caseworkeron employment and place of residence. Her cooperation wasrated as unsatisfactory because respondent “ha[d] struggled toremain professional and respectful” when she disagreed withher caseworker. Respondent “continually made allegationsagainst the worker and the agency and continues to threatenlawsuits when she is unhappy with something.” Respondentdid maintain stable housing and employment and sign allreleases of information. Respondent had not yet begun parentcoaching. 18 An LSSI report was additionally filed on January 31,2024. The report noted an incident following a meeting whererespondent was looking at vehicles in the LSSI parking lot.Respondent began taking pictures of an agency vehicle thathad been in a car accident. About a week later, respondenttexted a picture of the vehicle to her caseworker and askedif it was the reason why her children were late for a visit.She accused the agency of getting into a car accident whileher children were in the vehicle and not reporting it to her.Respondent then called the police to take a report of theaccident. The police confirmed that no children were in thevehicle at the time of the accident. The report did note thatrespondent was very consistent with weekly visits. She wasattentive to her children and brought gifts, clothes, and food. 19 Additionally, the report noted that respondent'scaseworker had been contacted by the police on December14, 2023. A detective informed the caseworker that “therehad been an incident” between respondent and Bryan M. Thecaseworker then learned that respondent had offered $3,000 tothe brother of Bryan M. in exchange for killing Bryan M. Thecaseworker was provided with a photo of the text messagesent by respondent offering the money to kill Bryan M. Thecase was later closed without charges. On December 17, 2023,it was reported that respondent was harassing Bryan M.’smother and his sister, who later obtained orders of protectionagainst respondent. Respondent further sent Bryan M. a textmessage stating, “I'm killing you bitch that's on my grandmaI'll do the time proudly long as u dead I'm gone show uhow much I hate u,” among other threats. On December 25,2023, Bryan M. called the police to report that respondent hadvandalized his home. 20 Finally, the report noted that respondent had completeda psychiatric assessment with the Ecker Center on December11, 2023, and received no treatment recommendations. Dueto concerns with respondent's behavior, she was referred fora psychological assessment. 21 On February 6, 2024, the matter came before the trialcourt for post-disposition status of services. In an orderentered that same day, the trial court noted that respondent's“reports are not great regarding communication and stability.”It admonished respondent to do her services, cooperate withthe agency, and correct the conditions that brought herchildren into care. The trial court specifically noted that theparties were “reminded again not to just attend services butto attend them consistently and demonstrate that they havelearned from them.” 22 On June 17, 2024, a CASA report was filed inthe trial court. The report first noted that respondent hadbeen attending individual therapy, but the sessions were“slow moving.” The therapist attempted to get respondentto acknowledge how trauma in her life had impacted her asa parent, but it was difficult for respondent to acknowledgethis. Respondent had also been attending domestic violencecounseling. She had completed parent education. CASA alsoreported that the psychological evaluation referral had notyet been approved for respondent, “despite seven monthselapsing.” Respondent had no obstacles to child visitation.Despite progress in some categories, the report noted thaton June 11, 2024, respondent had filed a domestic violencecomplaint against Bryan M.*4 23 On June 18, 2024, a service plan dated June 12, 2024,was filed with the trial court. Respondent continued to keepher caseworker up to date regarding employment and housing.However, it was noted that there continued to be ongoingissues with respect and cooperation between respondent andher caseworker. Respondent was still on a waitlist for herpsychological evaluation. Although respondent was attendingtherapy, it was noted that she was argumentative at timesand did not like to delve into her trauma history. She was,however, starting to demonstrate progress in her treatmentgoals. The agency noted that it had seen “little progress in thatbeing applied to her everyday life and/or actions.” Further,the service plan indicated that respondent “may not havebeen completely honest” when completing her psychiatric
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4assessment at Ecker Center, in that she reported that shewas involved with DCFS due to post-partum depressionafter the birth of B.M. and Bryan M. had recorded videosof her and submitted them to the court. She was stillwaiting to undergo a psychological evaluation. Additionally,respondent had completed domestic violence courses andwas able to verbalize what characteristics of her previousrelationships had been unhealthy. However, she had notverbalized an understanding of how domestic violence in herrelationships affects her children. Further, DCFS had set agoal to refrain from further incidents of domestic violenceand report domestic violence within 24 hours should it occur.The report noted that there were multiple incidents betweenrespondent and Bryan M. over the reporting period andthat respondent had been arrested for domestic battery onMarch 21, 2024. Respondent completed a second substanceabuse evaluation in an attempt to complete her psychologicalevaluation. The assessment recommended that respondentcomplete a substance abuse outpatient treatment program.Respondent reported that she would not complete it becauseher initial evaluation returned no recommendations. 24 That same day, an LSSI report was filed in thetrial court. The report noted that respondent continued tobe argumentative with her caseworker and accused thecaseworker of having “malicious motives against her.”Respondent did attend her weekly visits with her childrenand completed 8 of 10 random drug drops. She had alsosuccessfully completed parenting classes. 25 A permanency order was entered by the trial courton June 24, 2024. The court found that the appropriatepermanency goal was return home within 12 months. The trialcourt did not make a finding regarding reasonable effort orsubstantial progress. It did note in the order that respondentwas “making some efforts and some progress.” It was notedthat while respondent had been consistent in therapy, she hadnot made progress in discussing her own past trauma. 26 On August 23, 2024, a CASA report was filed in thetrial court. Respondent continued to attend therapy but stillstruggled to make progress in her treatment goals. She hadnot yet been able to undergo a psychological evaluation.However, she had completed her domestic violence courses. 27 On August 29, 2024, Roan Solutions filed in the trialcourt a discharge report. The report detailed respondent'sprogress and successful discharge from parenting classes. 28 That same day, an LSSI report was filed in the trial court.The report noted that respondent had moved and kept hercaseworker informed of the move. Respondent continued toattend weekly visits and the quality of the visits had improved.Additionally, respondent was discharged from individualtherapy. The therapist noted that respondent, “in spite ofunderstanding her goals of treatment, resisted resolving it.” InJune of 2024, respondent requested a new therapist, allegingthat her current therapist was “rude, disrespectful, and neverlet her talk in sessions.” She also alleged that her therapistwas submitting false reports “and did not have professionalintentions towards her.” Respondent was reassigned to anew therapist. Respondent had completed her psychologicalevaluation, but results were still pending. 29 The matter came before the trial court on September 3,2024. The trial court noted that respondent had completeda substance abuse assessment, psychiatric evaluation, andpsychological evaluation. Her individual therapy had been onhold due to respondent requesting a different therapist butwas set to resume. The trial court did note concern due to therepeated incidents of domestic violence between respondentand Bryan M. 30 On December 10, 2024, a service plan dated December3, 2024, was filed in the trial court. The plan noted thatrespondent had refused to sign a release of information for theEcker Center to share reports with DCFS regarding dialecticalbehavior therapy (DBT) respondent was set to begin. Further,respondent's progress in mental health treatment was rated asunsatisfactory. Respondent had been assigned a new therapistafter reporting that her initial therapist was “disrespectful andmaking up lies.” When respondent began sessions with a newtherapist, her progress stagnated when the therapist beganexploring the reasons this case came into care. Respondentagain requested to change therapists. Additionally, afterrespondent's psychological evaluation, she was recommendedto complete DBT in an individual and group setting. Shewas rejected from group therapy because “it was clear to theprovider that she was not interested in completing servicesand was just trying to check a box for court.” This caused theprovider concern that respondent “would disrupt the progressof other group participants.”*5 31 That same day, an LSSI report was filed in the trialcourt. The report indicated that respondent's psychologicalevaluation had been completed. Of note, respondent told theevaluator that her case came into care because “her ‘ex’somehow got an Order of Protection she had against him
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5reversed to be an Order of Protection against her.” Respondentstated that all the allegations against her are false and shedoes not know why her case is still active. Respondentwas diagnosed with borderline personality disorder withnarcissistic traits. It was noted that her “thoughts werelogical in that they consistently demonstrated an excessivelypositive portrayal of herself, and a denial of any negativityassociated with her.” However, “her thoughts were sograndiose and so self-inflated that they broke with realitywhen compared with the incidents described in DCFSrecords.” Additionally, the evaluator reported that the safetyrisks to the minors should they be returned to respondent'scare “include exposure to domestic violence, acts of self-injurious behavior, exposure to dangerous paramours, andchronic emotional instability” and that respondent “appearsto lack empathy for the children.” The LSSI report alsonoted that despite successfully completing parenting classes,respondent was not recommended to complete a parentingcapacity assessment. This is because respondent continuallyprovided inconsistent information and would potentiallythreaten the testing provider if she did not agree with theassessment results. It was noted that after respondent receivedthe results of her psychological evaluation, the providerreceived multiple threatening phone calls from respondent.Due to the continued threats and inappropriate calls fromrespondent, that provider will no longer complete testing forDCFS. 32 The LSSI report also noted difficulties respondentwas facing with therapy. Respondent began therapy with anew provider, Perspectives Counseling, in August 2024. Sheengaged in therapy there until November 2024. Althoughrespondent initially was compliant in therapy, she wasnot open to conversations about past trauma. She becameaccusatory towards the therapist and accused the therapist oflying, bias, and acting unprofessionally. At the last session,respondent continued to deny all DCFS allegations andrevoked her release of information. 33 On December 11, 2024, CASA filed a report in the trialcourt. The report noted that respondent denied a history ofdomestic violence with previous romantic partners and couldnot explain why her children were in DCFS care. Respondentreferred herself to therapy at NICASA. However, NICASAexplained they are not the appropriate resource for her mentalhealth needs and agreed to provide therapy for a maximum ofsix months until a DBT-trained therapist is located. 34 The trial court entered a permanency order on December18, 2024. The court changed the permanency goal tosubstitute care pending termination of parental rights andfound that respondent had not made reasonable efforts orsubstantial progress towards returning the minors home. Assupport for its findings, the trial court stated that respondenthad engaged in services but was not aware why her childrenwere in care and believed everyone was against her. Shewas in individual therapy at multiple locations and did notmake progress. She was unsuccessfully discharged fromtherapy. The court noted that although respondent completedsubstance abuse counseling, domestic violence counseling,and parenting courses, its biggest concern was with her mentalhealth. 35 C. THE TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS 36 On December 26, 2024, the State filed a petition fortermination of parental rights with respect to S.A. and D.H.The petitions alleged that respondent was unfit because she:(1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concernor responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2024)); (2) failed to protect the children fromconditions within their environment injurious to the children'swelfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West2024)); (3) failed to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were thebasis for the removal of the children from her during thenine-month period between September 23, 2023, and June23, 2024 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2024)); and (4)failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of thechildren to her during the nine-month period from September23, 2023, through June 23, 2024 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii)(West 2024)). On March 24, 2025, the State filed a petition fortermination of parental rights with respect to B.M., assertingthe same four grounds of unfitness as the petitions for S.A.and D.H. 37 1. Unfitness Hearing 38 The unfitness phase of the proceedings to terminaterespondent's parental rights commenced on April 14, 2025. Atthe outset, the trial court took judicial notice of the following:the minors’ birth certificates; the adjudicatory orders; theOctober 17, 2023, dispositional order; the permanency ordersof June 24, 2024, and December 18, 2024; the family serviceplans; psychological reports; mental health assessments; the
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6integrated assessment; the Roan Solutions discharge report;visitation plans; police reports; and therapy reports.*6 39 The State's first witness was Blanquita De Loera,a clinical therapist with Perspectives Counseling. De Loeratestified that she received respondent's referral in August2024. Respondent was referred by LSSI. De Loera indicatedthat respondent's children came into care due to several riskfactors noted in the referral, including domestic violence,inadequate supervision, physical abuse toward one child, andmental health. 40 De Loera testified that the two met for individualsessions from August 2024 to November 2024. At first,respondent was very cooperative and excited to participatein treatment. During these sessions, De Loera was focusedon building rapport with respondent. However, when thesessions began to focus on respondent's therapeutic goalto understand and acknowledge the risk factors that ledto her children being removed from her care, respondentstopped making progress. Ultimately, De Loera testified thatrespondent did not meet the goal. She believed respondent'smental health symptoms impacted her ability to makeprogress towards that goal. As the sessions progressed,respondent became “emotionally dysregulated, combative,argumentative, [and] very distrustful.” If De Loera attemptedto review respondent's integrated assessment or the policereports filed, respondent would state that she was “triggered”by the content. Later, she would deny having experiencedsymptoms of trauma. Respondent also could not articulatehow domestic violence put her children at risk. She refusedto discuss the matter and denied that her children had beenpresent during incidents of domestic violence. De Loeratestified that her services with respondent ended when sheattempted to review her therapy report with respondent.Respondent became “combative,” stating that De Loera wasdiscriminating against her and threatening to sue De Loera.The situation became “uncomfortable” and led De Loera toterminate the session. 41 De Loera recounted some strengths respondent presentedin their sessions. She noted that respondent was available andalways willing to schedule. She was attentive to her children'sstrengths and spoke highly of them. 42 The State next called respondent to testify. Respondenttestified that she is mother to five children. She stated thatthe two oldest, C.L. and D.L., are 14 years old and 13 yearsold respectively. Respondent claimed that C.L. and D.L. livedwith her aunt, as they were supposed to live with their fatherbut he “is a deadbeat.” Respondent stated that in 2021, C.L.,D.L., S.A., and D.H. were removed from her care due todomestic violence between her and Brennon A. She testifiedthat she only had one experience of domestic violence withBrennon A. She stated that she could not recall if Brennon A.had been convicted of domestic battery against her in 2019.She could not recollect any allegations of physical abusetoward C.L. 43 Regarding the incident that led to S.A., D.H., and B.M.being removed from her care, respondent testified that therewas an incident of domestic violence between her and BryanM. She stated that he struck her in the nose and she contactedthe police. She also reported that Bryan M. grabbed herby the throat. Respondent testified that her children werenot present during this incident but were with her aunt.However, she also alleged that she was not violating theorder of protection between her and Bryan M. because itallowed parenting exchanges, and that's why she was at hishome. When questioned why she was at Bryan M.’s homefor a parenting exchange if the children were with her aunt,respondent stated that “the children were dropped off afterthe incident” and did not elaborate. Respondent alleged thatthis was the only time she and Bryan M. were involved in adomestic dispute.*7 44 Respondent recalled that she was required tocomplete several services to be reunited with her children.She claimed that as the case continued, her caseworkers“kept continuously adding services no matter what.” Shebelieved that her caseworkers were “out to get her” from thestart because she voiced concerns about her children beinginvolved in a car accident in an agency vehicle. She assertedthat the foster parents of S.A., D.H., and B.M. reached outto her wondering why the children returned from their visithours late and “hysterical.” 45 Regarding her services, respondent testified that shecompleted domestic violence services at Community CrisisCenter. She reported that Community Crisis Center was notbiased. According to respondent, whether a provider wasbiased depended on if her caseworkers had built a relationshipwith the provider prior to her sessions. 46 With respect to her mental health, respondent deniedever receiving a diagnosis of PTSD. She further stated shehad never been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and did notrecall telling the Ecker Center that she had previously been
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7misdiagnosed with bipolar. She testified that prior to thecase, she had never been diagnosed with any mental healthcondition. She worked as a certified nursing assistant (CNA),and as a CNA she could not have any mental health diagnoses.Respondent additionally testified that she did not believethat the psychologist performing her psychological evaluationhad any intention of conducting a thorough examination.Respondent stated she could tell by the psychologist's bodylanguage. Respondent stated that the examination was “abunch of puzzles, words, things she just was throwing in frontof me and picking back up as she was going.” Respondentwas required to read passages and answer questions at the end,“like little tests.” Respondent believed that the examinationwas 20 minutes. 47 Prior to attending therapy with De Loera, respondentrecalled attending therapy sessions with Cristina Maria.Respondent testified that they never worked on her therapygoals in those sessions. She requested a new therapist whenMaria told her that she needed to learn how to “kiss butt.” Atsome point after her sessions with Maria ended, respondentprotested outside of the LSSI offices. She stated she protestedbecause she “felt lost” and “couldn't go to the media like[she] wanted to.” Respondent testified that she threatenedher caseworkers with lawsuits because they were “veryunprofessional.” She also threatened to sue the psychologistwho performed her psychological evaluation, De Loera, andthe police officers that arrested her. 48 Respondent additionally testified that she attendedparenting classes at Roan Solutions. She denied that she toldRoan that her ex-boyfriend had put his hands on her in frontof her children. She did recall telling them that Bryan M. hadpushed her head into a staircase. She contended this incidentwas part of the same altercation that led to the case cominginto care. She could not recall the last time she spoke withBryan M. 49 On cross-examination by counsel for Bryan M.,respondent testified that she recalled a second incident whereBryan M. assaulted her. She stated that it happened veryrecently, but she could not remember exactly when. She thenstated that it had happened a while back. Respondent allegedthat Bryan M. gave her a black eye during this altercation.Respondent testified that this incident occurred when she wasat Bryan M.’s residence. 50 Bryan M. was next called by the State. Bryan M. testifiedthat he is the father to three children, Ky. M., Ki. M., and B.M.Respondent is the mother to only B.M. Ky. M. and Ki. M.live with their biological mother and DCFS has never beeninvolved in their care.*8 51 Regarding B.M., Bryan M. testified that the minorwas taken into protective custody due to a domestic violenceincident in June 2023. Bryan M. testified that at the time heand respondent had an open case in the family court systemfor parenting time with B.M. That day, he had picked up thechildren from his aunt's house, went back to his residence,and an argument ensued. Bryan M. indicated that at thatpoint, he contacted Uber to transport respondent home, butshe did not want to get into the vehicle. Respondent wasstanding outside his door with S.A., D.H., and B.M. BryanM. recalled that it had begun to rain, so he brought B.M.inside. Respondent followed him in, and when Bryan M.placed B.M. on the couch, respondent “started swinging.”Respondent made physical contact with Bryan M. He testifiedthat at this time, B.M. was present in the room and S.A. andD.H. were playing outside. 52 Bryan M. further testified that he had custody of B.M.at the outset of the case, but B.M. was moved to a fosterplacement after Bryan M. was arrested with a firearm. Heindicated that he previously had a concealed carry license, butthe license was revoked due to an order of protection. He hadforgotten that he kept a firearm in his vehicle and was arrestedfor keeping a firearm in the glovebox of his vehicle withouta valid license. 53 Bryan M. recalled an instance in December 2023 whenhe was contacted by the police. He was informed at the timethat respondent had contacted his brother, who had mentaldisabilities, and offered to pay him to kill Bryan M. Laterthat month, on Christmas Day, Bryan M. called the policebecause respondent was sending him threats and damaged hisproperty. He recalled seeing respondent on his video-enableddoorbell and observed her put a red, sticky substance on hisdoor. She also damaged his door handle. He recalled thatwhile he was at his family's house for Christmas, respondenttexted him threats that she was going to kill the mother ofhis other children, shoot Bryan M., and shoot his mother. Shestated that she would “do time proudly” as long as Bryan M.was dead. 54 Bryan M. recalled another altercation between him andrespondent on March 19, 2024. Bryan M. stated that the twohad gone to a restaurant on a date. They had a disagreementwhile at dinner and Bryan M. left to go home. When he got
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8home, respondent was at his house and threw something outof his window. He got in his car and left. 55 In April 2024, respondent appeared at Bryan M.’sworkplace because he was supposed to give her a title to a car.While he was talking to respondent, she stabbed him with anunknown object. Bryan M. testified that he called the policeand respondent was arrested. He believed that the case wasultimately dismissed. 56 In June 2024, Bryan M. was arrested for the incident inMarch 2024. He stated that respondent claimed that Bryan M.punched her when she was at his house. Bryan M. testifiedthat he did not punch respondent. That same month, BryanM. was served with an order of protection respondent enteredagainst him. Despite this, Bryan M. testified that respondentcontinued to contact him “[a] lot.” He estimated that shecalled him around five times. She has also appeared at hishome, which he saw on the video doorbell footage. 57 Bryan M. further testified that throughout the casehe engaged in domestic violence courses. He identifiedthat he had learned to create boundaries to avoid conflict.With respect to respondent, this meant he needed to “[s]topthe unnecessary contact.” He made police reports whenrespondent continued to contact him. 58 On cross-examination by counsel for respondent, BryanM. testified that he never witnessed respondent abuse thechildren. On cross-examination by his own counsel, Bryan M.testified that he pleaded guilty to the charges that arose fromthe March 2024 altercation. His gun charges were dismissed.He explained that he did not fight the last order of protectionentered against him because he did not want to have contactwith respondent.*9 59 On redirect examination, Bryan M. explained thathe pleaded guilty to the charges based on the March 2024altercation because of new charges against him. He explainedthat respondent reported that he had threatened to kill her ifshe did not drop the charges against him. 60 The State next called Julie Traskaski, a parent supportspecialist with Roan Solutions. Traskaski testified that shefacilitated the parenting group respondent engaged in as wellas respondent's one-on-one parenting. Traskaski stated thatshe spoke with respondent regarding why her children hadcome into care. Respondent stated it was because “her ex hadput his hands on her *** in front of her children.” Traskaskidocumented this explanation at the time. 61 Traskaski indicated that at the beginning of her sessionswith respondent, the two encountered scheduling issues andmisunderstanding. When this happened, respondent accusedTraskaski of discriminating against her and acting unfairly. 62 On cross-examination by respondent's counsel,Traskaski clarified that respondent did successfully completeparenting classes. She stated that respondent participated and“absolutely showed up.” 63 The State also called Faith Cavender, respondent'scaseworker, to testify. Cavender was assigned to respondent'scase on July 14, 2023. She recalled that the case came intocare after there was a domestic violence incident betweenrespondent and Bryan M. During the incident B.M. was insidethe room and S.A. and D.H. were outside unsupervised. Whenpolice arrived at respondent's residence later that day to arresther for violating an order of protection, she pushed S.A. andD.H. out of her way and barricaded herself in a neighbor'sapartment. 64 Cavender testified that respondent completed anintegrated assessment in August 2023. Based upon theintegrated assessment, respondent was recommended tocomplete a substance abuse evaluation, a psychiatricevaluation, parenting education and coaching, domesticviolence courses, and individual therapy. Respondentcompleted random drug drops, which were negative for thepresence of drugs. She also successfully completed parentingclasses and domestic violence counseling. 65 Cavender stated that respondent had completed apsychiatric assessment as recommended in October 2023at the Ecker Center. When the psychiatric examinationyielded no treatment recommendations, the agency referredrespondent to obtain a psychological assessment. At somepoint after the psychological evaluation, respondent soughta second psychiatric evaluation to replace the results ofthe psychological evaluation. Cavender explained that shereferred respondent to a psychological evaluation basedupon concerning behavior by respondent. She noted thatone day when respondent was unhappy with her services,respondent began sending text messages to Cavender allegingthat respondent's children were in an agency vehicle when itwas involved in a car accident. When Cavender stated that
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9respondent's children were not in the car at the time of theaccident, respondent called the police to take a report. 66 After the psychological evaluation, respondentwas diagnosed with borderline personality disorder withnarcissistic traits. She was recommended to attend DBTtherapy. Respondent was referred to Family CounselingService for a DBT group. However, respondent could not starttherapy there. When she did not hear back about the referralwithin a week, respondent called the Family CounselingService offices and accused them of lying to her and beingdishonest about the therapy. She accused the supervisor of“being in cahoots with DCFS and working against her.” Shealso told the supervisor that “she just wanted to get it doneand she was required to engage due to court and it was clearshe didn't have much willingness to engage.” As a result, thesupervisor told respondent she was not appropriate for theprogram because it was “voluntary and they were concernedthat if she was just there to check a box, she would disrupt therest of the group who were choosing to be there and wantingto make progress.”*10 67 Cavender further testified that throughout thecase, communication with respondent was difficult. At times,respondent “could be completely appropriate and respectful.”However, “probably 75 percent of the time there was somesort of accusatory tone” telling the agency that they “werebiased against her, discriminating against her, working withproviders who were also biased.” At no time did respondentacknowledge any reason on her behalf that her children werein care. 68 Cavender testified that respondent was in contact withthe agency throughout the case. She would bring items toher visits, including clothes, toys, and food. Nonetheless,Cavender expressed safety concerns if the children werereturned to respondent's care due to respondent's stability andmental health and her ability to provide a safe environment forher children. Cavender noted that respondent demonstratedinstability by calling the police to visits and reporting abusetowards her children in care. She noted that on one occasion,respondent called the police because she showed up late fora visit and the children were no longer there. Additionally,respondent continued to engage with Bryan M. and therewere repeated instances of domestic violence throughout thependency of the case. 69 On cross-examination by respondent's counsel, Cavenderstated she was unaware that the order of protection inplace in June 2023 allowed the parties to communicatefor parenting time drop-offs and pick-ups. Additionally, thecriminal charges against respondent based on the June 2023domestic violence incident were vacated. Cavender alsotestified that she believed respondent's parental rights shouldbe terminated. 70 Respondent then testified in her case in chief. Regardingthe incident that brought her children into care, respondenttestified that the State was incorrect and S.A. and D.H. wereinside, not outside. She further alleged that it was just her andher children present, Bryan M. was not there. 71 Respondent also testified that she underwent apsychiatric evaluation in October 2024 and was notrecommended any follow-up treatment. Additionally, she wasenrolled in nursing school at Harper College, and to enrollshe needed to pass a psychological evaluation. Respondentalleged that she had received an updated psychologicalexamination after the DCFS psychological. The individualwho performed her follow-up psychological told her that theDCFS psychological was “inappropriate” and disagreed withthe results. The results of her second psychological were thatshe was a fit parent and that her caseworker “has a personalvendetta against” her. 72 On cross-examination by the State, respondent indicatedthat her children were not with her at the time of the domesticviolence incident with Bryan M. 73 On May 20, 2025, the court rendered its decision, findingthat the State met its burden of proving respondent unfiton all four counts alleged in each petition for terminationof parental rights. In issuing its oral ruling, the trial courtspecifically noted that it found all the State's witnesses,except for respondent, to be credible. The trial court statedthat respondent's testimony was not credible and based thisupon “her manner while testifying” which was at times as if“she was being put off by being asked questions” and “likeshe didn't care about the questions.” Further, respondent'stestimony was full of “repeated inconsistencies” that were“clearly rebutted by exhibits and witnesses who had no reasonto misrepresent the facts of the case.”*11 74 The trial court found that respondent “showed noreasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility forthe children, and she failed to protect them from conditionsin their environment which were injurious to their welfare.”It noted that while respondent clearly loved her children,
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10that in itself was not sufficient to show interest, concern,or responsibility. Respondent testified that there was onlyone instance of domestic violence between her and BrennonA. and one or two instances of domestic violence betweenher and Bryan M. However, the record showed multipleinstances of domestic violence between her, Brennon A., andBryan M., including verbal and physical arguments, threats,stabbing, and pulling of hair. The reports also indicate thatrespondent was uncooperative and that her children werepresent for these instances of domestic violence. Respondent'stestimony regarding the June 2023 domestic violence incidentwas further lacking in credibility given that respondent statedthat the incident occurred during a pickup and drop-off ofthe children, and she was thus not violating her order ofprotection, but also that the children were not present becausethey were with her aunt. 75 The trial court further identified that respondent did makesome efforts and some progress, but it was neither reasonablenor substantial. It noted that respondent attempted to hireBryan M.’s mentally handicapped brother to kill him, and sentthreats to kill Bryan M., his mother, and sister. It stated thatrespondent's statement that she would be happy to serve timeas long as Bryan M. was dead was not indicative of interest,concern, or responsibility for her children's welfare. 76 The court noted that after respondent completedthe integrated assessment, she was recommended tocomplete a substance abuse evaluation, a psychiatricevaluation, domestic violence services, and parenting classes.She testified that her caseworkers never treated herappropriately and kept adding services. However, the onlyadditional service added was a psychological evaluation.The psychological evaluation was added due to respondent'srepeated allegations that everyone was biased and prejudicedagainst her, as well as the allegations that her children werein an undisclosed car accident. When respondent received herpsychological evaluation in August 2024, she reported thatshe did not understand why her children came into care. 77 Although respondent completed her parenting classesand domestic violence courses, the trial court emphasized thatshe did not make substantial progress, especially with respectto her domestic violence services. She “did not make progressin learning to stay away from the abuse or the effect it had onher children[,] as she continually returned and was abused”by Bryan M. Respondent was discharged unsuccessfully fromtwo therapists and despite the treatment goal of understandingand acknowledging the risk factors that led to the childrenbeing removed from her care, respondent was unable toarticulate how domestic violence put her children at risk.Respondent was additionally denied a referral to a DBTtherapy group because she indicated she was only there to“check boxes” and was not interested in participating. 78 Upon finding respondent unfit, the court proceeded withthe best-interest phase of the termination proceedings. Thetrial court found it in the best interest of S.A., D.H., andB.M. to terminate respondent's parental rights. This appealfollowed. 79 II. ANALYSIS 80 At the outset, we note that throughout her brief,respondent cites to actual cases with fictitious quotes andholdings. 81 Her first fictitious quote is In re Brianna B., 334 Ill. App.3d 651, 657 (2002), asserting that “[a] parent is not requiredto parrot the agency's exact narrative.” In Brianna B., theappellate court affirmed a trial court ruling that the respondentparents did show a reasonable degree of interest in the minorchild. Id. at 659. Brianna B. never addresses, as respondentcontends, whether the parent agreed with the agency's statedreason for the child coming into care. 82 Next, respondent cites a fictitious quote from In re A.S.,2014 IL App (3d) 140060, 27, stating that “Reasonableprogress does not require complete agreement with theDepartment's version of events.” In A.S., 2014 IL App (3d)140060, 14, the respondent mother argued generally thatthe trial court erred in finding her unfit but did not disputethe reasons that her children came into care. She additionallyargued that the trial court erred in starting the relevant 9-month period when the children were adjudicated and in notletting her present certain evidence at the unfitness hearingand considering evidence of her drug drops. Id. ¶¶ 21, 27, 29,34. Again, at no time did the respondent mother argue withthe Department's version of events.*12 83 Respondent's next fictitious quote is attributed toIn re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 345 (2010) for the propositionthat “Parents may dispute details of the incident while stillmaking progress toward correcting the conditions that led toremoval.” In J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 343, our supreme courtconsidered whether the Act created a legal basis for theconclusion that time spent in prison tolls the nine-month
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11period during which reasonable progress must be made. It didnot address whether the details of the incident that brought thechildren into care were disputed, as respondent claims. 84 Finally, respondent draws a fictitious conclusion fromIn re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001), proposing thatthe decision to terminate one's parental rights cannot “rest ona parent's personality traits or imperfect cooperation unlessthose conditions prevent the parent from safely parenting andremain unaddressed despite reasonable opportunity.” In M.A.,325 Ill. App. 3d at 392, the child was taken into care dueto a lack of care, an injurious environment, and being bornexposed to drugs. The trial court terminated the respondentmother's parental rights because she failed to make reasonableprogress when she continued with criminal activity after thechild was adjudicated neglected, became incarcerated for anumber of years, and failed to complete any services whileincarcerated. Id. At no time did the case involve whetherthe respondent's case involved a conflict of personalities or“imperfect cooperation” as respondent asserts. 85 Respondent's fictitious language was likely hallucinatedby artificial intelligence (AI). The Illinois Appellate Court,Fourth District, recently considered this issue, stating:“[T]he Illinois Supreme Court AI policy explicitlypermits the use of AI. However, attorneys must useAI tools wisely. We reiterate the supreme court'sreminder that ‘[a]ll users must thoroughly review AI-generated content before submitting it in any courtproceeding to ensure accuracy and compliance withlegal and ethical obligations.’ [Ill. Sup. Ct., IllinoisSupreme Court Policy on Artificial Intelligence (Jan.1, 2025), https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/e43964ab-8874-4b7a-be4e-63af019cb6f7/Illinois% 20Supreme% 20Court%20AI% 20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCE6-WZE5]].Flagrant and unprincipled use of AI without ensuring theaccuracy of the generated response ‘is an abuse of theadversary system’ (Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), as it wastes court resources thatwould be better spent elsewhere.” In re Baby Boy, 2025 ILApp (4th) 241427, 131. 86 Rule 375(a) states as follows:“If after reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond,a party or an attorney for a party or parties is determinedto have willfully failed to comply with the appeal rules,appropriate sanctions may be imposed upon such a partyor attorney for the failure to comply with these rules.Appropriate sanctions for violations of this section mayinclude an order that a party be barred from presenting aclaim or defense relating to any issue to which refusal orfailure to comply with the rules relates, or that judgment beentered on that issue as to the other party, or that a dismissalof a party's appeal as to that issue be entered, or that anyportion of a party's brief relating to that issue be stricken.Additionally, sanctions involving an order to pay a fine,where appropriate, may also be ordered against any partyor attorney for a party or parties.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(a) (eff.Feb. 1, 1994).*13 87 Respondent's use of fictitious quotations fromactual cases violates our supreme court rules and could begrounds for striking and dismissing her appeal. See Pletcherv. Village of Libertyville Police Pension Board, 2025 IL App(2d) 240416-U, 29 (granting appellee's request to strikeappellant's brief and dismiss the appeal where pro se appellantcited to fictitious cases and fictitious quotes from real cases).However, because a biological parent's right to raise his orher child is a fundamental liberty interest and involuntarytermination of parental rights is a drastic measure (In reGwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 353 (2005)), we will addressthe arguments of respondent on the merits. In re C.R., 2024IL App (4th) 231441-U, 20 (addressing termination on themerits despite briefing failures); see also In re Tamera W.,2012 IL App (2d) 111131, 30, (trial error found forfeited butstill addressed on the merits). 88 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial courterred in granting the State's petition for termination ofparental rights with respect to its finding that respondentfailed to make reasonable progress toward the return ofthe children during the nine-month period from September23, 2023, through June 23, 2024. Specifically, respondentargues that the trial court's findings were against the manifestweight of the evidence because: (1) respondent “repeatedlyand consistently articulated a clear understanding of thecircumstances surrounding removal;” (2) her disagreementwith mental health diagnoses did not equate to a failure toacknowledge responsibility; (3) she completed a significantnumber of services and demonstrated behavioral change;and (4) the trial court “improperly substituted a subjectivepsychological interpretation for evidence-based progress.” 89 The Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.(West 2024)) sets forth a two-stage process for the involuntarytermination of parental rights. In re Keyon R., 2017 IL App
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12(2d) 160657, 16. Initially, the State has the burden ofproving by clear and convincing evidence that the parent isunfit under any single ground set forth in section 1(D) ofthe Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). See 705ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2024); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d329, 337 (2010). If the trial court finds the parent unfit, theState must then show by a preponderance of the evidence thattermination of parental rights is in the child's best interest.See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d347, 367 (2004). On appeal, this court will not disturb a trialcourt's finding with respect to parental unfitness or a child'sbest interest unless it is against the manifest weight of theevidence. In re N.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 180797, ¶¶ 30, 43. Adecision is against the manifest weight of the evidence “onlyif the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the decision isunreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” KeyonR., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, 16. 90 Respondent alleges that the trial court erred in findingher unfit pursuant to section 1D(b)(m)(ii) of the AdoptionAct. That section provides that a parent may be found unfitfor failure “to make reasonable progress toward the return ofthe child to the parent during any 9-month period followingthe adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS50/1D(b)(m)(ii) (West 2024). Reasonable progress “is judgedby an objective standard based upon the amount of progressmeasured from the conditions existing at the time custodywas taken from the parent.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App.3d 1052, 1067 (2006). “At a minimum, reasonable progressrequires measurable or demonstrable movement toward thegoal of reunification.” Id.*14 91 Respondent first argues that the record reflectsthat she “did acknowledge: that a domestic-violence incidentoccurred, that the children were affected by the instabilityassociated with domestic violence, and that she neededto improve her parenting skills, emotional regulation, andcommunication.” The record clearly contradicts this claim.While respondent at times acknowledged that the incidentcame into care after a domestic violence incident, suchas during her intake with Traskaski, she later contradictedthose statements and testified that her children were notpresent at the time the June 2023 domestic violence incidentoccurred. She also testified that she either did not recallcertain domestic violence incidents or that those incidentsnever occurred, despite being backed up by police reportsand criminal convictions. Further, respondent was dischargedfrom two therapists and never made progress with eitherin understanding how her decisions impacted her children.When she underwent a psychological evaluation over a yearafter the case came into care, she still reported that she did notknow why her children were in care. 92 Respondent next argues that “a parent's disagreementwith some aspects of the narrative does not equal a failure toacknowledge responsibility.” She argues that “Illinois law isexplicit a parent is not required to admit every allegation, norto concede to the correctness of every agency interpretation,to demonstrate progress.” Even if we agree with theproposition that a “parent's disagreement with some aspectsof the narrative does not equal a failure to acknowledgeresponsibility,” we find that contention meritless here. In thiscase, respondent did not just disagree with the reason herchildren came into care. Rather, the record reflects that sherepeatedly demonstrated that she did not understand whyher children came into care and failed to make progress inunderstanding how domestic violence affected her children.Accordingly, respondent failed to address the major concernsraised by DCFS, not just “peripheral details” as she attemptsto argue. 93 Next, respondent argues that the “trial court's relianceon ‘failure to acknowledge’ ignores [respondent's] significantservice completion and behavioral change.” In support, shenotes that she completed most of her services, includingparenting classes, domestic violence services, psychiatric andpsychological evaluations, visitation, drug screens (whichwere negative), and tasks associated with stable housing andemployment. 94 While respondent did complete some services, therecord demonstrates that she did not make “measurable ordemonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.”Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. Here, respondentcompleted a psychiatric evaluation, but the informationprovided about the evaluation shows that she was likelydishonest with the details she provided to the evaluator.When she was referred for a psychological evaluation due tocontinued concerns about her mental health, respondent triedto replace her results with different evaluations. Respondentwas also unsuccessfully discharged from multiple therapistsbecause she began to act combatively when the therapistsattempted to make progress on the goals of understandingwhy her children came into care and the effects exposure todomestic violence could have on her children. Respondentwas declined a referral into a DBT group because shemade it clear she was not interested in truly participatingbut only wanted to “check boxes” to finish the case.
In re S.A., D.H., and B.M., Minors (The People of the..., Not Reported in N.E....2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13Further, although respondent completed domestic violenceservices, her continued conflict with Bryan M. throughoutthe pendency of this case demonstrates that she did not makeprogress from the conditions that brought her children intocare. 95 Finally, respondent argues that the trial court “improperlysubstituted a subjective psychological interpretation forevidence-based progress.” The record belies respondent'sclaims that the “court relied heavily on a single evaluator'sinterpretation of [respondent's] mental-health presentation.”Rather, the trial court clearly indicated that it found each ofthe State's witnesses credible except for respondent. Here,there were several instances where respondent failed to makeprogress. Her therapists testified that there was conflict whenthey tried to address the reasons why the minor childrenwere brought into care and Bryan M. testified about thedomestic violence incidents between the two while the casewas pending.*15 96 Respondent cites In re K.E.S., 2018 IL App(2d) 170907, for the proposition that “a mental-health [sic]diagnosis is not evidence of parental incapacity, nor does iteliminate the parent's right to the State's reasonable efforts.”We find K.E.S. distinguishable. In K.E.S., 2018 IL App(2d) 170907, 28, the respondent mother was diagnosed assuffering with bipolar disorder and PTSD. The trial courteventually found the respondent unfit, stating that she “suffersfrom severe mental health issues,” despite making “evident”progress. Id. 43. The appellate court reversed, finding that“[n]one of the evidence regarding [the respondent's] conditionat the time of the dispositional hearing demonstrated” that therespondent was unable to care for the minor child. Id. 64.Additionally, the appellate court found that the “evidence wasuncontradicted that [respondent] had diligently complied withall aspects of her service plan and had corrected all of theconditions that caused [the minor] to be removed from hercare.” Id. 97 In the present situation, respondent failed to correct theconditions that brought her children into care and she did notdiligently comply with the aspects of her service plan. Rather,respondent refused to cooperate with aspects of the serviceplan she disagreed with and continued to engage in domesticdisputes with Bryan M. 98 Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trialcourt's determination that respondent was unfit for failing tomake reasonable progress was unreasonable, arbitrary, or notbased on the evidence. As such, and because respondent didnot appeal the trial court's decision that it was in the minor'sbest interest that her parental rights be terminated, the trialcourt's decision to terminate respondent's parental rights isaffirmed. 99 III. CONCLUSION 100 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of thecircuit court of Kane County. 101 Affirmed.All CitationsNot Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2025 IL App (2d) 250280-U, 2025WL 3754426End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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