Strong v. Zubha Pop Foods LLC, No. 1-24-2451 (Apr. 15, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Stance Strong and Kinisha Strong v. Zubha Pop Foods LLC d/b/a Popeyes Chicken
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Illinois (IL)
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Decided
Apr. 15, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
STANCE STRONG and KINISHA STRONG..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (1st) 242451-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 IL App (1st) 242451-UUNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULESBEFORE CITING.NOTICE: This order was filed under SupremeCourt Rule 23 and is not precedent except in thelimited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).Appellate Court of Illinois, First District,Third Division.STANCE STRONG and KINISHASTRONG Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.ZUBHA POP FOODS LLC d/b/aPOPEYES CHICKEN Defendant-Appellee.No. 1-24-2451|Order filed April 15, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 22 L 2605Honorable Barbara N. Flores, Judge, presiding.Justices Lampkin and Rochford concurred in the judgment.ORDERPRESIDING JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment ofthe court.*1 1 Held: Plaintiffs’ briefs violate Illinois Supreme CourtRules. Plaintiffs’ briefs are hereby stricken and the appeal isdismissed, for failure to comply with Illinois Supreme CourtRule 341. 2 Plaintiffs Stance and Kinisha Strong, husband and wife,filed suit alleging Stance was injured after he fell outsidedefendant's restaurant, Zubha Pop Foods LLC, doing businessas Popeyes Chicken (Popeyes). Plaintiffs now appeal the trialcourt's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. Forthe following reasons, plaintiffs’ briefs are hereby strickenand the appeal is dismissed.1 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiffs filed a personal injury complaint in the lawdivision on March 17, 2022. Plaintiffs alleged Stance brokehis ankle due to defendant's negligence of “not throwingsalt around its premise who enter through front door.”Additionally, Kinisha alleged loss of consortium. Plaintiffscontended Stance slipped and fell outside of Popeyes onFebruary 27, 2022. Plaintiffs’ complaint included numerousgrainy, indiscernible black and white photographs. Attachedto the complaint were various affidavits and an after-visitsummary from a medical appointment. Thereafter, plaintiffsfiled copious motions, including, inter alia, emergencymotions for rule to show cause, motion for default judgment,a motion for summary judgment, and a “motion to pierce thecorporate veil.” 5 On September 20, 2022, the court entered an ordergranting plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment and set thecase for a prove-up hearing on damages. Plaintiffs allegeddamages in excess of $7 million dollars. The court entered adefault judgment in plaintiffs’ favor on May 10, 2023, in theamount of $575,000. 6 The following month, defendant filed a motion to vacatethe default judgment. The court granted defendant's motionon June 21, 2023. The parties thereafter engaged in discoveryand filed various motions. 7 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment onAugust 12, 2024, arguing there was no evidence (1) that itaggravated a natural accumulation or caused an unnaturalaccumulation of ice, and (2) of actual or constructive notice.Plaintiffs responded by filing a cross motion for summaryjudgment. 8 Following a hearing, the court issued a writtenmemorandum opinion and order on October 24, 2024,granting defendant's motion for summary judgment anddenying plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment. Thecourt held that plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate thatStance fell on an unnatural accumulation of ice and providedno evidence regarding who may have placed salt on theground near where he fell.
STANCE STRONG and KINISHA STRONG..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (1st) 242451-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2 9 Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied.This timely appeal followed. 10 II. ANALYSIS 11 After all briefing was filed with this court, defendantfiled a motion for sanctions pursuant to Illinois SupremeCourt Rule 375(a) and 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). The motionalleged various Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 violationsfor copious citations to hallucinated authority, improperpagination, and the inclusion of hyperlinks and references to“Centient AI” (some of which it appeared plaintiff had triedto obscure). Defendant asked this Court to strike plaintiffs’opening and reply brief, enter sanctions against plaintiffs, anddismiss the appeal. Plaintiffs were notified of the motion forsanctions and had an opportunity to respond. They chose notto. Accordingly, we entered a responsive order, striking bothplaintiffs’ opening and reply brief due to their repeated use ofhallucinated citations and apparent unchecked use of artificialintelligence (AI), and gave plaintiffs an opportunity to refiletheir opening brief in compliance with Illinois Supreme CourtRules 137 and 375.*2 12 Plaintiffs subsequently filed a new opening brief,a corrected opening brief, and an amended opening brief.Defendant filed its responsive brief and then a secondmotion for sanctions, noting plaintiffs’ continued use ofunsupported arguments and illegitimate citations, and theirattempt to include new photographic evidence in their brief.Defendant again asked this Court to strike plaintiffs’ briefsand dismiss his appeal, but additionally requested we imposemonetary sanctions including reasonable attorney fees andcosts. Plaintiffs again were given notice of the motion forsanctions and an opportunity to respond to the allegations.Again, they chose not to. Thereafter, we took defendant'smotion with the case. A month later, plaintiffs filed a newreply brief. Again, plaintiffs declined to address the pendingmotion for sanctions. It is through this lens that we limit ouranalysis. 13 We first note that plaintiffs appear before this Court aspro se litigants. However, plaintiffs’ status as self-representedlitigants does not relieve them of the burden to comply withsupreme court rules. People v. Shunick, 2024 IL 129244, 64. Pro se litigants are presumed to have “ ‘full knowledgeof applicable court rules and procedures.’ ” Id. (citingSteinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 528 (2001)).Further, a party's pro se status does not entitle them to moreleniency. Id. “ ‘[A] reviewing court is entitled to have theissues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority citedand a cohesive legal argument presented. The appellate courtis not a depository in which the appellant may dump theburden of argument and research.’ ” (Internal quotation marksomitted.) Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, 5 (quoting Gandy v. Kimbrough, 406 Ill. App. 3d 867, 875(2010)). 14 Plaintiffs’ opening and reply brief both thoroughly failto comply with the supreme court rules governing appellatebriefs. Initially, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(a) mandatesthat briefs conform to basic formatting requirements, suchas clear black text on white pages. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(a)(eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Throughout plaintiffs’ opening brief, bothsmall and large sections of text are inexplicably highlightedin yellow, lime green, orange, and neon green; and somewords are in blue text. Plaintiffs also make prolific use ofbolded text, which composes the majority of their brief. Theyswitch indiscriminately between text of differing fonts andsizes. Plaintiffs’ reply brief is rife with the same confusingand unnecessary departure from the mandated formattingrequirements. Additionally, substantial portions of the filingare on a light gray highlighted background, as if theyhave been simply cut and pasted from another (potentiallygenerative AI) source. 15 While the formatting alone is problematic and makesreview more difficult, plaintiffs’ failure to comply withIllinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) ismost concerning. Rule 341(h)(7) requires that an appellant'sbrief contain well-reasoned arguments supported by citationsto both the authorities and the record relied upon. Id. “Thisrule is especially important because, when reviewing a case,the appellate court starts with the presumption that thecircuit court's ruling was in conformity with the law andthe facts.” McCann v. Dart, 2015 Il App (1st) 141291, 15. “Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) donot merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected bythis court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, 43. 16 Plaintiffs’ convoluted briefs include abundant citations toboth hallucinated cases and fictitious holdings and quotationsfrom existent cases. Plaintiffs’ citations to fictitious authorityare too numerous to relay in their entirety. For instance, intheir corrected and amended opening brief, plaintiffs citeDunn v. Old Orchard Ctr., Ltd., 306 Ill. App. 3d 75 (1999).
STANCE STRONG and KINISHA STRONG..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (1st) 242451-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3While 306 Ill. App. 3d 75 is a legitimate citation, the caseassociated with it is People v. Maurice Dunn, and the casedoes not support the proposition for which plaintiff claims.Plaintiffs also cite Arnold v. Hoyt, 384 F. Supp. 566, 1974.Again, it appears that 384 F. Supp. 566 is a citation to alegitimate case. However, the case associated with the citationis titled Geldermann & Co., Inc. v. Dussault, and the quotecited is not found within that case.*3 17 In plaintiffs’ reply brief, they initially cite a case forwhich no caption is provided: “...we all know that appeals ,areremanded or reversed for the following reason was there aclear abuse of discretion ,and was there a material fact indispute,and Standing see: Fausett v. Walgreen Co?” On thefollowing page, plaintiffs state:“Defendant-Appellee's brief fails to contradict themetadata found in [ Appellate Exhibit ]Steven Hart isasking this Court to ignore the evidence just as thetrial court did. Under Murphy v. Corey Steel Co., if theevidence presents a conflict, Summary Judgment mustbe denied. [The “Vanishing” Lawyer and UnlawfulRepresentation].”No citation to the named case is given nor is any explanationprovided as to what appellate exhibit plaintiffs are referringto. For a further 14 pages, plaintiffs rely on case nameswith no citations, include quotes from “Illinois courts” forwhich they offer no citation to any case, provide entirelyfictitious citations, and offer incomprehensible argumentswith no authoritative support. 18 We note the possibility that plaintiffs’ fictitious casesand quotes were hallucinated by generative AI. In recentlyconsidering the issue, a panel of the fourth district appellatecourt noted:“[T]he Illinois Supreme Court AI policy explicitlypermits the use of AI. However, attorneys must useAI tools wisely. We reiterate the supreme court'sreminder that ‘[a]ll users must thoroughly review AI-generated content before submitting it in any courtproceeding to ensure accuracy and compliance withlegal and ethical obligations.’ [Ill. Sup. Ct., IllinoisSupreme Court Policy on Artificial Intelligence (Jan.1, 2025), https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/e43964ab-8874-4b7a-be4e-63af019cb6f7/Illinois %20Supreme %20Court%20AI %20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCE6-WZE5]].Flagrant and unprincipled use of AI without ensuring theaccuracy of the generated response ‘is an abuse of theadversary system’ (Mata [v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023]), as it wastes court resources thatwould be better spent elsewhere.” (Emphasis in original.)In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, 131. 19 The appellate court in Baby Boy held that the attorney“willfully” failed to comply with supreme court rules whenhe carelessly used AI to generate an appellate brief that citedto eight non-existent cases, such that attorney's conduct wassanctionable. While Baby Boy is distinguishable (as the caseinvolved an attorney who openly admitted to the use of AI),we do not believe plaintiffs’ status as pro se litigants excusestheir apparent reliance on AI. See Shunick, 2024 IL 129244, 64 (self-represented litigants are presumed to have fullknowledge of supreme court rules and procedures and mustcomply with them). 20 After plaintiffs’ initial convoluted briefs were filed,defendant put plaintiffs on notice that their briefs were“riddled with hallucinated cases.” In filing a motion forsanctions, defendant noted that “[t]he sheer volume of fakecases cited by Plaintiff—over twenty—is frankly absurd, andby itself warrants striking Plaintiff's filings.” Plaintiffs had anopportunity to file a response to the motion for sanctions butchose not to do so. In striking plaintiffs’ briefs and allowingplaintiffs another opportunity to file their briefs, this Courtinformed plaintiffs that future filings must be compliant withRules 137 and 375.*4 21 Rule 375(a) states as follows:“If after reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond,a party or an attorney for a party or parties is determinedto have willfully failed to comply with the appeal rules,appropriate sanctions may be imposed upon such a partyor attorney for the failure to comply with these rules.Appropriate sanctions for violations of this section mayinclude an order that a party be barred from presenting aclaim or defense relating to any issue to which refusal orfailure to comply with the rules relates, or that judgment beentered on that issue as to the other party, or that a dismissalof a party's appeal as to that issue be entered, or that anyportion of a party's brief relating to that issue be stricken.Additionally, sanctions involving an order to pay a fine,where appropriate, may also be ordered against any partyor attorney for a party or parties.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(a) (eff.Feb. 1, 1994).Rule 375(b) provides that sanctions may be imposed when aparty has taken an appeal that is frivolous. Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b)(eff. Feb. 1, 1994). It further explains that “[a]n appeal or other
STANCE STRONG and KINISHA STRONG..., Not Reported in N.E....2026 IL App (1st) 242451-U © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4action will be deemed frivolous where it is not reasonablywell grounded in fact and not warranted by existing lawor a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, orreversal of existing law.” Id. 22 Plaintiffs were clearly put on notice and made awareof the risks they faced in using authority without thoroughlyreviewing its accuracy. Nonetheless, despite defendant'sinitial motion for sanctions and receiving a liberal secondopportunity to comply with supreme court rules, plaintiffsagain chose to rely on hallucinated authority in compilingtheir opening (and corrected and amended opening) brief.Defendants then filed a second motion for sanctions, whichthis Court took with the case. Again, plaintiffs failed torespond to defendant's accusations. Nonetheless, plaintiffsproceeded to file a reply brief—a full month later—still ladenwith the same disregard for the supreme court rules andappellate procedure. 23 While we would be justified in dismissing this case asa sanction under Rule 375, we instead strike plaintiffs briefsand dismiss their appeal for failure to comply with Rule 341.Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Plaintiffs’ persistentdependence on incoherent arguments, hallucinated authority,and fictitious case holdings has rendered review impossible.We believe “[a] reasonable attorney would have thoroughlyreviewed the briefs he submitted to this court to ensure thathis arguments were meritorious and that his citations wereaccurate.” In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, 119. While plaintiffs may not have intentionally submittedfictitious cases to this Court, they intentionally neglected tocheck their citations to authority before filing their briefs, andthey repeatedly filed incomprehensible briefs unsupported bycase law and citations to the record. Accordingly, we strikeplaintiffs’ opening and reply brief and dismiss the appeal. See,e.g., Labell v. City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 181379, 51(noting arguments that fail to comply with Rule 341(h)(7) donot merit consideration on appeal); DiCristina v. Departmentof Employment Security, 2025 IL App (1st) 241462-U (notingthe appellate court may strike a brief and dismiss an appeal forfailure to comply with supreme court rules); Palsen v. WebbChevrolet, Inc., 2026 IL App (3d) 250498-U (dismissingappeal for failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule328); Pletcher v. Village of Libertyville Police Pension Board,2025 IL App (2d) 240416-U (granting appellee's request tostrike appellant's brief and dismiss the appeal where pro seappellant cited to fictitious cases).2 At this time, we declinedefendant's request to otherwise sanction the plaintiffs. 24 III. CONCLUSION*5 25 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal forfailure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341. 26 Appeal dismissed.All CitationsNot Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2026 IL App (1st) 242451-U,2026 WL 1030781Footnotes1In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolvedwithout oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.2Unpublished Rule 23 orders entered on January 1, 2021, or later “may be cited for persuasive purposes.” Ill. S. Ct. R.23(e)(1) (eff. June 3, 2025).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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