A.K. v. M.R., No. 25A-PO-2249 (2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Indiana (IN)
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Vaidik (J.); Scheele (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
A.K., Appellant-Petitioner v. M.R., Appellee-Respondent, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 672475Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.(This disposition by unpublished memorandumdecision is referenced in the North Eastern Reporter.)Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this MemorandumDecision is not binding precedent for any court andmay be cited only for persuasive value or to establishres judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.Court of Appeals of Indiana.A.K., Appellant-Petitionerv.M.R., Appellee-RespondentCourt of Appeals Case No. 25A-PO-2249|March 10, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court The HonorableJulianne K. Havens, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No.46C01-2506-PO-245Attorneys and Law FirmsAppellant Pro Se, A.K., New Carlisle, IndianaAttorney for Appellee, Guy S. DiMartino, Guy S. DiMartino,PC, Valparaíso, IndianaJudges Vaidik and Scheele concur.MEMORANDUM DECISIONBailey, JudgeCase Summary*1 [1] A.K. filed a petition for a protective order against anearby neighbor, M.R. After an evidentiary hearing, the trialcourt denied the petition. On appeal, A.K., appearing pro se,argues that the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous. Wedisagree and therefore affirm.Facts and Procedural History[2] A.K. lives down the street from M.R. in New Carlisle. InJune 2025, A.K., pro se, filed a petition for a civil protectiveorder against M.R. A.K. alleged that he, his partner, and histhirteen-year-old daughter had been victims of stalking andrepeated acts of harassment. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9. Hefurther described several incidents that had allegedly occurredearlier that month that served as the basis for his petition.1[3] In August, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing onthe petition, at which A.K. appeared pro se and M.R. appearedin person and by counsel. A.K. testified on his own behalf andcalled no other witnesses. M.R. testified on her own behalfand also called her husband as a witness.2 Later that month,the trial court issued an order that reads in pertinent part asfollows:3Parties presented testimony and exhibits as evidencefor this Court to consider, including documents and aflash drive containing video. The Court reviewed all theevidence submitted.[4]....3. The evidence presented to the Court established:(a) [T]he Parties’ homes are not immediately next to oracross from one another. Rather the homes have a house inbetween them and across the dividing road(s).(b) [O]n or around June 14, 2025, M.R. called police aboutA.K. playing loud music for hours. At that time, A.K. wasunaware which neighbor called in the complaint.(c) A.K. posted a sign in his yard that said either, “My houseis under constant surveillance by a nosey neighbor” or “Ihave a neighbor who is a ‘Karen’.”[5](d) On June 14, 2025, M.R. posted her own sign and facedthe sign in the direction of A.K.’s home. M.R. clearly meantfor A.K. to be able to see the sign versus for the purpose ofpublic information, since M.R. lives at the end of a dead-end street. Even though the sign only appeared to be 2′ × 1″in size, and hand-written, M.R. chose to retaliate by usingvulgar or offensive language, as the sign said: “I have aneighbor with little d**k syndrome”.
A.K., Appellant-Petitioner v. M.R., Appellee-Respondent, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2(e) M.R.’s sign remained posted for four days.(f) On June 15th, 19th, and 20th, 2025, M.R. made morecalls to police, reporting that A.K. continues to play loudmusic every day from afternoon until late into the night.M.R.’s calls to police also referenced smelling marijuana,and/or suspect[ed] potential drug activity happening at thathome.(g) On June 20, 2025, M.R. posted a second sign whichread: “Everyone out here hates the little d**k a*****e inthe s**t hole red house.”*2 (h) M.R. admitted to posting the signs, blaming herconduct on her frustration over the loud music being playedby A.K.(i) M.R. further admitted to having a camera mountedon the corner of their home, which faces in the directionof A.K.’s home. However, M.R. said the camera merelycaptures the part of the road that leads to her driveway(which is the only way a person would enter onto theirproperty by car).(j) A.K. testified that he has partial custody of his daughter,who [sic] he shares parenting time, and that his daughtersaw the signs and expressed her discomfort and upset aboutthe signs as well as the camera that faces her father's house.(k) M.R. testified that she was not aware A.K. had adaughter, that the signs were not intended to threatenanyone, and that she has no intention of causing harm toA.K. or his family.In weighing the evidence and applying the law, the Courtconcludes that M.R.’s conduct could be described asjuvenile, annoying and unneighborly behavior, and despitethe vulgar language used by M.R. in her signs, her conductfails to rise to the level of a “credible threat” to establishharassment for the purposes of issuing a protection order.The camera on M.R.’s house is situated in a place commonfor a homeowner to be able to see who may be enteringupon their property. A.K. did not prove by a preponderanceof the evidence that the camera is meant to harass the victimor his family.IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED ANDDECREEED by the Court that the Petition for Order forProtection is hereby DENIED.Appealed Order at 1-3. A.K. now appeals, pro se.Discussion and Decision[4] Before we address A.K.’s arguments, we note that “[i]tis well settled that pro se litigants are held to the samelegal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro selitigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedureand must be prepared to accept the consequences of theirfailure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).6 “Theseconsequences include waiver for failure to present cogentarguments on appeal.” Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “Although we prefer to decideissues on the merits, where the appellant's noncompliancewith the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial that itimpedes our appellate consideration of the errors, we maydeem the alleged errors waived.” Id.*3 [5] The purpose of our appellate rules, Indiana AppellateRule 46 in particular, is to aid and expedite review andto relieve this Court of the burden of searching the recordand briefing the case. Id. “We will not become an advocatefor a party, nor will we address arguments which are eitherinappropriate, too poorly developed or improperly expressedto be understood.” Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 483N.E.2d 749, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied.[6] Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b) provides that an appellant's“argument must contain the contentions of the appellanton the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning.Each contention must be supported by citations to theauthorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts on the Recordon Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.” Manyof the authorities cited in A.K.’s brief do not support thepropositions that he claims they do.7 And multiple NorthEastern Reporter citations do not correspond to the casenames stated in the brief.8 These errors could be chalked upto mere carelessness, but we think it more likely that they are aresult of legal research using generative artificial intelligence(“AI”).[7] We recently observed that “[c]itations to fictitious, AI-generated authority is a growing problem nationwide” andthat “[c]ourts have sanctioned both attorneys and pro selitigants for including them in briefs.” Williams v. Kirch,268 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “Judges must beable to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited bythe parties to make just decisions.” Id. Because M.R. doesnot request any sanction or relief for this conduct, we deem
A.K., Appellant-Petitioner v. M.R., Appellee-Respondent, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3it sufficient to admonish A.K. for his problematic citationsand caution him “against using AI to conduct legal researchwithout independently verifying the citations generated.” Id.[8] A.K.’s overarching argument is that the trial court erredin denying his petition for a civil protective order againstM.R. Civil protective orders are governed by the CivilProtection Order Act (“the Act”), Indiana Code Chapter34-26-5, which we construe to promote the “protection andsafety of all victims of harassment in a fair, prompt, andeffective manner” and the prevention of future harassment.Ind. Code § 34-26-5-1. Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-2(a)provides that a person who is or has been a victim ofdomestic or family violence may file a petition for a protectiveorder against a person who has committed stalking. Forpurposes of the Act, domestic or family violence includesstalking, as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-45-10-1,regardless of whether the stalking is committed by a familyor household member. I.C. § 34-6-2-34.5 (2019).9 IndianaCode Section 35-45-10-1 defines “stalk” as “a knowingor an intentional course of conduct involving repeated orcontinuing harassment of another person that would cause areasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated,or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feelterrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.”*4 [9] Furthermore, Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-2(b)provides that “[a] person who is or has been subjected toharassment may file a petition for an order for protectionagainst a person who has committed repeated acts ofharassment against the petitioner.” For purposes of theAct, “harassment” means “conduct directed toward a victimthat includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuingimpermissible contact: (1) that would cause a reasonableperson to suffer emotional distress; and (2) that actuallycauses the victim to suffer emotional distress.” I.C. §34-6-2.1-80(a). “Impermissible contact” includes followingor pursuing the victim or communicating with the victim. I.C.§ 35-45-10-3(a).[10] To justify the issuance of a protective order, “theharassment must objectively include a present and crediblethreat.” E.W. v. J.K., 253 N.E.3d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App.2025) (citing S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220 (Ind. 2020)),trans. denied. “A credible threat is ‘plausible or believable.’” Id. (quoting S.H., 139 N.E.3d at 220). The petitioner mustestablish harassment by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C.§ 34-26-5-9(h). If the petitioner meets his burden, “the courtshall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of theviolence or threat of violence.” Id.10[11] In reviewing a trial court's judgment regarding aprotective order, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor resolvequestions of credibility.” N.E. v. L.W., 130 N.E.3d 102,107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “We consider only the probativeevidence and reasonable inferences that support the trialcourt's judgment.” Id. We will reverse the judgment only ifit is clearly erroneous. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneouswhen a review of the record leaves us with a firm convictionthat a mistake has been made.” Todd Heller, Inc. v. Ind. Dep'tof Transp., 819 N.E.2d 140, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.denied. “We define the clearly erroneous standard based onwhether the party is appealing a negative judgment or anadverse judgment.” Id. “Where, as here, the party who had theburden of proof at trial appeals, he appeals from a negativejudgment and will prevail only if he establishes that thejudgment is contrary to law.” Id. “A judgment is contrary tolaw when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonableinferences to be drawn from the evidence lead to only oneconclusion, but the trial court reached a different conclusion.”Id.[12] First, A.K. complains that the trial court “minimized”M.R.’s conduct by characterizing it as “juvenile[.]”Appellant's Br. at 15. But this is simply an invitation toreweigh the evidence and reassess credibility in his favor,which we may not do. More specifically, A.K. asserts thatM.R.’s noise complaints were “unfounded[,]” id. at 17, butthis assertion is misleading. The 911 call report for the firstcomplaint indicates that the responding officer noted thatA.K. and his family were “playing music and doing yardwork” when he arrived, that he advised them “that a neighborwas upset about the noise level,” and that he “informed themthere is no enforceable county ordinance.” Ex. Vol. at 16.This report does not establish that A.K. was not playing loudmusic, only that the noise level did not violate any ordinances.The same may be said for the subsequent 911 call reportsregarding loud music.11*5 [13] A.K. further asserts that the signs that M.R. “directedat [his] home ... constitute[d] harassment and serve[d] nolegitimate purpose.” Appellant's Br. at 17 (citing Costellov. Zollman, 51 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016),trans. denied). But Costello says nothing about signage andharassment, and it is not our job to do further research onA.K.’s behalf. Terpstra, 483 N.E.2d at 754.
A.K., Appellant-Petitioner v. M.R., Appellee-Respondent, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4[14] A.K. also complains about the placement of M.R.’ssurveillance camera, but we cannot second-guess the trialcourt's finding that the camera “is situated in a place commonfor a homeowner to be able to see who may be enteringupon their property” and that A.K. “did not prove by apreponderance of the evidence that the camera is meant toharass [him] or his family.” Appealed Order at 3.12[15] Next, A.K. focuses on instances of M.R.’s alleged“[v]erbal harassment and confrontational driving” and“repeated stop-sign violations in front of [his] home[.]”Appellant's Br. at 18 (bold omitted). But A.K. did not mentionthese incidents in his petition for a protective order, and hecites no authority for the proposition that the trial court erredin not addressing them in its order denying his petition.13[16] Finally, A.K. raises claims of due process violations andjudicial bias, which are waived because he failed to raise thembelow. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A]party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, includinga claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for thefirst time on appeal.”); Husainy v. Granite Mgmt., LLC, 132N.E.3d 486, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding that appellantwaived claim of judicial bias “by raising it for the first timeon appeal”).14*6 [17] In sum, A.K. has failed to establish that the trialcourt's denial of his petition for a protective order is clearlyerroneous. Therefore, we affirm.[18] Affirmed.Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 672475 (Table)Footnotes1A.K. submitted a USB drive containing “digital evidence” with his petition. Tr. Vol. 2 at 13. The transcript ofthe evidentiary hearing indicates that A.K. mistakenly believed that the trial court would review the evidencebefore the hearing and that the files on the USB drive would “be admitted into evidence” as a matter of course.Id. at 13, 19-20.2A.K. did not object to M.R.’s husband's testimony. Contrary to his assertion on appeal, A.K. was not preventedfrom objecting.3Where appropriate, we have replaced “Petitioner” and “Respondent” with the parties’ initials.4Among the evidence that A.K. submitted was a written statement from his thirteen-year-old daughter. M.R.objected to the statement on hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. Tr. Vol. 2 at 9.On appeal, A.K. offers no cogent argument that this ruling was erroneous. A.K. also submitted a writtenstatement from his partner; although M.R. did not specifically object to this statement on hearsay grounds, itis clear from the trial court's order that the court afforded it no weight, which it was entitled to do.5A.K. claims that “this finding is unsupported by any evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 24. On the contrary, M.R.testified to this fact, and A.K. did not object. Tr. Vol. 2 at 53. Moreover, A.K. admitted in his petition that heposted this sign. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 11.6To be fair, M.R.’s appellate submissions are also not without fault. For example, her brief does not includea statement of the case (or, in the alternative, an agreement with A.K.’s statement of the case) as requiredby Indiana Appellate Rule 46(B)(1), and her appendix includes a transcript of the evidentiary hearing incontravention of Appellate Rule 50(F).
A.K., Appellant-Petitioner v. M.R., Appellee-Respondent, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.57See, e.g., S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 219 (Ind. 2020) (does not state that the Civil Protection Order Act“is remedial and must be liberally construed to prevent escalation and protect victims from harassment andintimidation[,]” Appellant's Br. at 15); C.H. v. A.R., 72 N.E.3d 996, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (does not containa quote that harassment must be evaluated “in context and as a course of conduct[,]” Appellant's Br. at 15,and trial court was affirmed, rather than reversed, as A.K. claims); R.H. v. S.W., 142 N.E.3d 1010, 1014-15(Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (does not state that “[p]ublic messages, repeated police contacts, and indirect contactthrough third parties all fall within” statutory definitions of impermissible contact, harassment, and stalking,Appellant's Br. at 16); J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (does not state that “[r]epeateddrive-bys and traffic violations directed at the victim's home constitute harassment[,]” Appellant's Br. at 18).8See, e.g., 994 N.E.2d 228 (links to People v. Carter from the Appellate Court of Illinois, rather than Maurerv. Cobb-Maurer from this Court); 106 N.E.3d 400 (links to Vassell v. Presence St. Francis Hosp. from theAppellate Court of Illinois, rather than L.G. v. S.L. from this Court); 212 N.E.3d 768 (links to Commonwealthv. Pfeiffer from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, rather than Torres v. Ind. Fam. & Social Servs.Admin. from this Court).9This statute was recodified as Indiana Code Section 34-6-2.1-50 effective July 1, 2025.10Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9(h) also states, “A finding that domestic or family violence or harassment hasoccurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents acredible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner's household.” A.K. fixates on this phraseand repeatedly asserts that “[o]nce harassment is established, the statute imposes a mandatory presumptionof credible threat, removing judicial discretion to minimize or reinterpret the conduct.” E.g., Appellant's Br. at15. He then castigates the trial court for “fail[ing] to apply these statutory requirements.” Id. But this argumentpresupposes that A.K. carried his burden to establish harassment by a preponderance of the evidence.The trial court concluded that A.K. failed to carry this burden, and A.K. has failed to persuade us that thisconclusion is clearly erroneous.11As for the complaints that referenced the smell of marijuana, the fact that the responding officer(s) did notdetect the scent upon arrival does not establish that no marijuana had recently been consumed in the vicinity.More concerning are complaints that A.K. was selling drugs out of his home and that A.K. “is on a governmentwatch list[,]” Ex. Vol. at 19, which A.K. denied. Tr. Vol. 2 at 45. But A.K. did not rely on any of the foregoingas a basis for a protective order in his petition.12A.K. asserts that the trial court improperly failed to consider the impact of M.R.’s conduct on his daughter.Appellant's Br. at 38. Given that his daughter did not testify, and that the trial court excluded her writtenstatement on hearsay grounds, we find no merit in this assertion.13A.K. sought to document the alleged “confrontational driving” with low-quality video clips that do not, ashe claims, show that M.R. “swerved her vehicle toward [his] partner while making obscene gestures[.]”Appellant's Br. at 18. And the stop sign at issue is at the end of A.K.’s street, not in front of his home.14Waiver notwithstanding, we emphasize that A.K.’s claims of judicial bias are wholly unwarranted. Contrary toA.K.’s assertions, the record establishes that the trial court treated both sides with courtesy and respect andin full accordance with the Rules of Trial Procedure, the Rules of Evidence, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.A.K.’s unfounded contention that the court treated the parties “asymmetrically” (Appellant's Br. at 27) is basedon M.R.’s counsel's good-faith objections to A.K.’s evidentiary presentation and the legally unsophisticatedA.K.’s lack of objections to M.R.’s presentation. We note that A.K. has demonstrated a penchant for engagingin scorched-earth tactics against members of the legal profession who he feels have treated him unfairly: (1)he filed a disciplinary complaint against a magistrate who dismissed his petitions for protective orders againsttwo other respondents, one of whom was M.R.’s husband, because the magistrate “was also set to hear
A.K., Appellant-Petitioner v. M.R., Appellee-Respondent, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6this case” and he “felt that [he] was going to get an unfair hearing”; and (2) he filed a disciplinary complaintagainst M.R.’s counsel because he “felt that [counsel was] being used as a weapon.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 24-25.A.K.’s gratuitous personal attack on the trial court is consistent with his past conduct. We caution A.K. thatraising meritless claims of judicial bias is not a recipe for success on appeal.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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