the statute does not say who can sue— it merely says ‘it shall be unlawful’ (to aid or abet). The courts have extended from the SEC to private plaintiffs a right of suit under a comparably general antifraud provision of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (sec. 10(b)).
• “Suggestions of industry agreeable to SEC. — Make it clear that no civil liability is intended.”
Hearings, supra at 370 and 288.
It should come as no surprise that “the industry” wanted to limit the liability of aiders and abettors, or that the SEC would be satisfied with a provision limited to a confirmation of its own powers. But the intent of the industry or the acquiescence of the SEC is not necessarily the intent of Congress. The SEC’s proposed amendment was modified in the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency as suggested by the New York Stock Exchange. The bill, favorably reported out of committee but never passed by the Congress, would have amended Section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as follows:
“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring, or is about to aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, or procure such a violation, it may in its discretion bring an action to enjoin such acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this title. * The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this title.”
S. 3770, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., § 20 (1960). This amendment was not enacted by Congress.
The conclusions drawn by the defendant from the legislative history of these amendments rest upon inferences drawn from Congress’ inaction on the proposed aider and abettor amendments. The defendant’s own line of reasoning could lead to the conclusion that Congress may have failed to enact the Senate Committee’s bill because the Committee’s modification was a rejection of civil liability on the part of aiders and abettors. See, e. g., the stated reason for the President’s veto of amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1960. 1 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, p. 1563 (1960). The more realistic view, however, is that the inferences from a mere failure to act are too elusive to provide any reliable guide to the intention of Congress. As Justice Frankfurter stated for the Court in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-120, 60 S.Ct. 444, 451, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368 (1940), “To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities.” The courts have wisely and consistently refused to draw such speculative inferences from Congressional non-action. When considering a legislative history strikingly similar to that urged upon this court by the defendant in the instant ease, Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, stated:
“We draw, therefore, no inference in favor of either construction of the Act — from the Department’s request for legislative clarification, from the congressional committee’s willingness to consider it, or from Congress’ failure to enact it.”
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47-48, 70 S.Ct. 445, 453, 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950). See also, FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 86 S.Ct. 453, 1738, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (June 13, 1966).
There may be many reasons why Congress fails to adopt proposed legislation. Particularly where, as in this case, an amendment is part of a package of amendments covering numerous and various aspects of securities regulation, Congress may fail to act for reasons entirely unrelated to many of the individual provisions included within that package. At the time these amendments were being considered, Congress was convened in special session late in the summer of a