Cingel v. Ferreri, No. 25A-DC-500 (Sept. 19, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Bethany CINGEL v. Gregory FERRERI
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Indiana (IN)
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided
Sept. 19, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Vaidik (J.); Tavitas (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
Cingel v. Ferreri, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2680017Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.Court of Appeals of Indiana.Bethany CINGEL, Appellant-Petitionerv.Gregory FERRERI, Appellee-RespondentCourt of Appeals Case No. 25A-DC-500|Filed September 19, 2025Editor's Note: This decision contains citation referencesthat are incorrect or do not actually exist. These invalidcitations appeared in the original court opinion and have beenpreserved as written since they are part of the official record.Any links to these invalid citations have been removed.Appeal from the Kosciusko Superior Court, The HonorableChristopher Kehler, Judge, Trial Court Cause No.43D04-2401-DC-000022Attorneys and Law FirmsAppellant pro se: Bethany Cingel, Indianapolis, IndianaAttorneys for Appellee: Elizabeth A. Deckard, DelaneyM. Mayer, Bloom Gates Shipman & Whiteleather, LLP,Columbia City, IndianaFelix, Judge.Statement of the Case*1 [1] In the order dissolving the marriage of BethanyCingel and Gregory Ferreri, the trial court awarded the partiesjoint legal custody and Ferreri primary physical custodyof their two children, and it denied Cingel's request torelocate with the children. The trial court also denied Cingel'ssubsequent motion to correct error. Cingel now appealsand raises several issues for our review regarding the trialcourt's decisions on custody, relocation, and the motion tocorrect error, but Cingel has waived her argument due toher significant noncompliance with Indiana Appellate Rule46. Waiver notwithstanding, Cingel's arguments are withoutmerit.[2] We affirm.Facts and Procedural History[3] On April 13, 2016, Cingel and Ferreri married, andon January 17, 2024, Cingel filed a petition to dissolvetheir marriage. On December 26, 2024, after a hearing,the trial court awarded the parties joint legal custodyand Ferreri primary physical custody of the parties’ twochildren (the “Children”), finding in relevant part that Cingelhad repeatedly disregarded court orders and “seems moreconcerned with making [Ferreri] ‘look bad’ ” than “with howher actions are affecting the children,” Appellee's App. Vol.II at 62, 100. The trial court also denied Cingel's motion torelocate with the Children to Brownsburg, Indiana, finding inrelevant part that Cingel's “desire to relocate is realistically anattempt to thwart [Ferreri]’s parenting time.” Id. at 58, 96.[4] Thereafter, Cingel filed a motion to correct error, primarilyasking the trial court to “reevaluate the weight and credibilitygiven to certain evidence received throughout the pendencyof the divorce and at the Final Hearing” and to “award herprimary physical custody of the Children.” Appellee's App.Vol. II at 124. The trial court denied that motion. This appealensued.Discussion and DecisionCingel Has Waived Her Appellate Claims by Failing toSubstantially Comply with the Indiana Appellate Rules[5] Cingel raises several issues on appeal regarding custodyof the Children, her motion to relocate with the Children, andher motion to correct error. However, Cingel's arguments arewaived due to her significant noncompliance with AppellateRule 46. Although we have a well-established preferencefor deciding cases on their merits rather than on proceduralgrounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267(Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party's failure to complywith the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impedeour consideration of the issue raised,” we will not address themerits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 268 Ind.404, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (1978)).[6] The purpose of our appellate rules—especially AppellateRule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid andexpedite review and to relieve the appellate court of theburden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Millerv. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added)(quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind.Ct. App. 2021)). For instance, a party's analysis of an issue
Cingel v. Ferreri, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2on appeal must be supported in relevant part by citations tothe Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal upon whichthe party relies. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We will notsearch the record to find a basis for the party's argument.Carter ex rel. CNO Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735,755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Nealy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.,910 N.E.2d 842, 845 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied).A party's arguments must be supported by cogent reasoningand citations to legal authority. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). “We willnot step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion argumentson his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘toopoorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’” Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at364).*2 [7] Cingel's choice to proceed pro se does not minimizeor negate these requirements. As a pro se litigant, Cingelis “ ‘held to the same standards as a trained attorney’ and‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410(Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266(Ind. 2014)).[8] Cingel fails to provide citations to the record for numerousstatements of fact in her Statement of Case, and Statement ofFacts, as required by Appellate Rules 46(A)(5) and 46(A)(6)(a), respectively. To the extent Cingel does provide citationsto the record, many of those citations are to individualdocuments rather than the record.1 While these failuresalone likely would not have significantly impeded our reviewof Cingel's appellate claims, her reliance on nonexistentlegal authorities as well as her incorrect citations to anddescriptions of other legal authorities did significantly impedeour review.[9] Cingel cites 23 legal authorities in her Argument: 12Indiana cases, 6 Indiana statutes, and 5 Indiana rules. Ofthose 23 legal authorities, 14 do not exist. The 14 nonexistentauthorities include 11 cases, 2 statutes, and 1 trial rule. Forexample, in support of her statement that custody decisionsare reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Cingel cites “In reMarriage of Dunston, 989 N.E.2d 830, 835 (Ind. Ct. App.2013).” Appellant's Br. at 9. This case appears to not exist.The reporter citation provided—“989 N.E.2d 830”—leads toCole v. State, 989 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (beginningon page 828, ending on page 831). The pincite provided—989N.E.2d at 835—leads to Parish v. State, 989 N.E.2d 831 (Ind.Ct. App. 2013) (beginning on page 831, ending on page 839).A search of Indiana cases for “Dunston” returned no relevantresults.[10] Additionally, Cingel asserts that “[u]nder Ind[iana] Code§ 31-17-2.5-1, the court must determine custody based onthe best interests of the child,” and in support, she cites to“McCain v. State, 924 N.E.2d 56, 60 (Ind. 2009).” Appellant'sBr. at 9; see also id. at 14. Indiana Code section “31-17-2.5-1”does not exist; the applicable statute is Indiana Code section31-17-2-8. Moreover, “McCain v. State, 924 N.E.2d 56,60 (Ind. 2009)” appears to not exist. The reporter citationprovided—“924 N.E.2d 56”—leads to White v. GarlockSealing Technologies, LLC, 398 Ill.App.3d 610, 338 Ill.Dec.193, 924 N.E.2d 53 (2010) (beginning on page 53, endingon page 67). The Indiana Supreme Court has decided severalcriminal cases with the name “McCain v. State,” but none ofthose cases were decided in 2009. See McCain v. State, 148N.E.3d 977 (Ind. 2020); McCain v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1066(Ind. 2018); see also McCain v. State, 962 N.E.2d 642 (Ind.2011) (denying transfer); McCain v. State, 841 N.E.2d 184(Ind. 2005) (denying transfer).[11] Cingel also cites to and purports to quote from “IndianaCode § 31-17-2.2-23(a),” Appellant's Br. at 16, but no suchstatute exists. Likewise, Cingel cites to “Trial Rule 60.1”and “Trial Rule 60.1(A)” in support of statements concerningalleged procedural requirements for custody modifications.Appellant's Br. at 11. “Trial Rule 60.1” does not exist, andthe Indiana Trial Rules do not include any requirements forcustody modification procedures.*3 [12] Of the nine legal authorities Cingel cites that doexist, six are incorrectly cited or described. For instance,Cingel cites “Bowman v. Bowman, 682 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ind. Ct.App. 1997)” to support statements regarding (1) admissibilityof guardian ad litem reports, (2) a trial court's relianceon such reports, and (3) the specificity with which a trialcourt must make findings regarding a substantial change incircumstances justifying a custody modification. Appellant'sBr. at 9–10. The reporter citation provided for “Bowman v.Bowman”—“682 N.E.2d 23”—leads to Fowler v. WilliamsCounty Commissioners, 113 Ohio App.3d 760, 682 N.E.2d20 (1996) (beginning on page 20, ending on page 31). TheIndiana Court of Appeals did decide a case named “Bowmanv. Bowman” in 1997, and that case did deal in part with theadmission of a guardian ad litem report: Bowman v. Bowman,686 N.E.2d 921, 924–25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). However, thatcase did not concern how specific a trial court's findings need
Cingel v. Ferreri, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3to be concerning the occurrence of a substantial change incircumstances. See Bowman, 686 N.E.2d at 925–27.[13] Furthermore, Cingel states that Indiana Code section31-17-2.2-1(a) provides that “a custodial parent seeking torelocate must provide sixty days’ notice to the noncustodialparent.” Appellant's Br. at 14. Indiana Code section31-17-2.2-1(a) does not address when a notice of intent torelocate must be filed; instead, it addresses where such anotice must be filed. Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-3 is thestatute governing when a notice of intent to relocate mustbe filed. Similarly, Cingel relies on Indiana Code section31-17-2.2-1(b) for the proposition that the noncustodialparent “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the move is harmful to the child's bestinterests,” and for the factors the court considers in decidingon the relocation. Appellant's Br. at 14. Indiana Code section31-17-2.2-1(b) concerns only the circumstances in whicha relocating individual is not required to file a notice ofintent to relocate. Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-5 is thestatute governing the noncustodial parent's burden of proof,and Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(c) is the provisiongoverning the factors a court considers in determiningwhether to grant a relocation request.[14] Cingel also states Trial Rule 59(G) “requires expresswritten orders or hearings on motions to correct errors,” thetrial court “must either conduct a hearing or enter a writtenorder specifying the grounds for its ruling,” and compliancewith that rule is “reviewed for [an] abuse of discretion.”Appellant's Br. at 17. Trial Rule 59(G) stands for none of thesepropositions; instead, it concerns cross errors.[15] Given Cingel's citations to nonexistent legal authoritiesand to real legal authorities that have nothing to do with thepropositions they purport to support, it is likely that Cingelused generative artificial intelligence to draft her brief, eitherin whole or in part. “Citations to fictitious, AI-generatedauthority is a growing problem nationwide. Courts havesanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigants for includingthem in briefs.” Williams v. Kirch, ––– N.E.3d ––––, ––––,2025 WL 2383623, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing MidCent. Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVacLLC, No. 2:24-CV-00326-JPH-MJD, 2025 WL 1511211, at*2 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2025); Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024), reh'g and/or trans. denied (Apr.9, 2024)); see also Shahid v. Esaam, 918 S.E.2d 198 (Ga.Ct. App. 2025); Garces v. Hernandez, No. 25-50342, 2025WL 2401001, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025), cert. pending,No. 25-5558; In re S.M., 2025 WL 2301801, at *6–7, No.4-25-0277, slip op. at ¶¶ 28–34 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 7, 2025).“We caution attorneys and pro se litigants alike against usingAI to conduct legal research without independently verifyingthe citations generated. Judges must be able to rely on theauthenticity of the authorities cited by the parties to make justdecisions.” Williams, ––– N.E.3d at ––––, 2025 WL 2383623,at *2.*4 [16] Waiver notwithstanding, even if we were ableto move past all these procedural deficiencies, Cingel'sunsupported arguments are groundless. For example, Cingelexplicitly asks us to reassess witness credibility and giveher testimony more weight than that of other witnesses,Appellant's Br. at 13–14, but it is well-established that we canneither reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibilitywhen reviewing custody and relocation decisions, Steele-Giriv. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 125 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Best v. Best,941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)).[17] In addition, Cingel asserts that the trial court's December26 order “denied relocation without any evidentiary hearingor consideration of the statutory factors.” Appellant's Br. at11 (citing “Final Findings ¶¶ 3, 6”); see also id. at 12. Thisis patently untrue. On October 22, 2024, the trial court heldan evidentiary hearing—beginning at 8:58 a.m. and ending at4:20 p.m.—on Cingel's notice of intent to relocate with theChildren, among other pending matters. Cingel testified atthis hearing, and her testimony spans more than 130 pages ofthe 202-page transcript of this hearing. Approximately threepages of the trial court's December 26 order were dedicatedto Cingel's requested relocation and include the followingrelevant findings and conclusions:38. Mother has no significant family supports and noemployment prospects in Brownsburg, Indiana. Motherhas no significant connection to the Brownsburg, Indianacommunity.39. Mother testified that one of the reasons she moved toBrownsburg was to be near her friend. She also testifiedthat she is no longer friends with that individual.40. In order to maintain consistent therapy for the children,Mother's relocation of the parties’ minor children toBrownsburg will undoubtedly necessitate a change incounselor(s).
Cingel v. Ferreri, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.441. Mother testified that commuting from Brownsburg toWarsaw for purposes of meeting Father to exchange thechildren for parenting time is difficult for the children.42. The Court has considered all factors set forth in I.C.31-17-2.2-1(c).43. The Court has also considered and weighed the shiftingburden set forth in I.C. 31-17-2.2-5(e) and (f).* * *45. Having heard the evidence and testimony presentedby all witnesses, ... the Court does not believe Mother'srelocation with the minor children to Brownsburg, Indianawas made in good faith and does not believe it was madefor a legitimate reason, and is not in the best interest of thechildren....46. Even if it were determined that Mother had presentedthat her desire to relocate was in good faith and for alegitimate reason ..., the Court finds that Father has met hisburden and has shown that Mother's proposed relocation isnot in the children's best interest.Appellee's App. Vol. II at 57–58, 95–96. Cingel's blatantmisrepresentation of the trial court's December 26 orderviolates Appellate Rules 22(C) and 46(A)(8)(a).[18] Cingel's briefing errors are significant and substantiallyimpeded our review of her claims, so her claims are waived.Waiver notwithstanding, Cingel's claims are without merit.We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.[19] Affirmed.Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.All Citations--- N.E.3d ----, 2025 WL 2680017Footnotes1Despite relying on materials in the Clerk's Record, Cingel failed to file an appendix in this case as requiredby Appellate Rule 50(A).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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