Donovan v. Assessor, No. 25T-TA-00002 (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Indiana (IN)
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
McAdam (J.) (unanimous Court)
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3705943Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.Tax Court of Indiana.Linda DONOVAN and William Donovan, Petitioner,v.CLARK COUNTY ASSESSOR, Respondent.Case No. 25T-TA-00002|December 22, 2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF THEINDIANA BOARD OF TAX REVIEWAttorneys and Law FirmsPETITIONERS APPEARING PRO SE: LINDADONOVAN, Jeffersonville, IN, WILLIAM DONOVAN,Jeffersonville, INATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: AYN K. ENGLE,ATTORNEY AT LAW, Indianapolis, INOpinionMCADAM, J.*1 Linda Donovan and William Donovan, appearing pro se,appeal the Indiana Board of Tax Review's final determinationthat increased the 2023 assessment of their condominiumto match the price they paid to purchase it just over fourmonths before the assessment date. The Donovans challengethe Board's determination as a matter of law and fact,arguing that their purchase price could not serve as reliablevaluation evidence. Instead, they provide evidence from thesales of other condos but do not compare them to their ownproperty. After reviewing the certified record, the Court isnot persuaded that the Board's decision was erroneous. Thereis no legal impediment to the use of a property's purchaseprice to value the property, and the totality of the evidence inthe record here can support the Board's inference of assessedvalue.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYThe Donovans own a condominium unit located inJeffersonville, Indiana, within a complex known as TheHarbours. The property is on the 11th floor—the top floorof the building. The Donovans purchased this property onAugust 24, 2022, for $810,000.For the January 1, 2023, assessment date, the Donovans’property was assessed at $700,000, which was approximately$300,000 more than the prior year. The increased assessmentled the Donovans to initiate an appeal. The Donovansappealed first to the Clark County Property Tax AssessmentBoard of Appeals (“PTABOA”), which affirmed the originalassessed value for 2023. The Donovans then appealed to theIndiana Board of Tax Review.At the hearing before the Indiana Board, the Assessor hadthe burden of proof because the assessment had increased bymore than 5% over the prior year and so presented first. TheAssessor presented the property record card for the subjectproperty as well as the Sales Disclosure Form and MLSlisting detailing the August 24, 2022, purchase of the condoby the Donovans.1 The Assessor presented testimony froman assessor-appraiser, who testified that the August 2022sale was an arm's-length transaction, was valid to be usedin the trending process for the 2023 assessment, and wasrepresentative of the market value-in-use of the property asof January 1, 2023.The Donovans presented evidence including sales andassessment data for other units in The Harbours building,property record cards, photographs, and information fromthe 2023 Clark County real property assessment records.The Donovans argued that their evidence indicated anassessed value of $558,800 for their unit and showed anunconstitutional lack of uniformity in their assessment whencompared to others in their complex. They also contended thatthe Assessor's evidence was not sufficient to prove the marketvalue-in-use of their condo.*2 In its final determination, the Board ordered the 2023assessment increased to $810,000 in accordance with IndianaCode § 6-1.1-15-20. The Board concluded that the totalityof the evidence submitted by the parties supported a finding
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2that the Donovans’ $810,000 purchase price represented theproperty's true tax value as of January 1, 2023. The Board alsofound that the Donovans failed to prove a lack of uniformityand equality in the assessment.STANDARD OF REVIEWThis Court's review of Indiana Board decisions is governed byIndiana Code § 33-26-6-6, which closely mirrors the languagegoverning judicial review of administrative decisionsfrom Indiana's Administrative Orders and Procedures Act.Compare IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e) (2025), with IND.CODE § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (2025). Under Indiana Code §33-26-6-6, the party seeking to overturn a final determinationof the Board bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity.IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(b). Challengers must demonstratethat they have been prejudiced by a final determinationof the Board that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse ofdiscretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contraryto constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; inexcess of or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, orlimitations; without observance of the procedure required bylaw; or unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence. IND.CODE § 33-26-6-6(e). The Board's legal conclusions arereviewed de novo and its factual determinations are affordeddeference when they are supported by substantial and reliableevidence. Majestic Props., LLC v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor,241 N.E.3d 642, 644 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024).DISCUSSIONThe Donovans claim that the Board's final determination iscontrary to law, unsupported by substantial evidence, an abuseof discretion, and a violation of the Indiana Constitution'sguarantee of uniform and equal assessments. They make fourarguments based on these assertions: First, they contend theBoard's decision is contrary to law, arguing that the purchaseprice of a property is distinct from its market value-in-useand cannot prove the property's true tax value without othersupporting evidence. Second, they contend that, even if theircondo's purchase price could be used to prove true tax value,the Board's decision is unsupported by substantial evidencebecause the evidence in the record contains factual errors andfails to account for the circumstances surrounding the saleand its proximity to the valuation date. Third, they contendthat the Board's decision is an abuse of discretion becausethe totality of the evidence compels an alternative assessmentof $558,800. Fourth, and finally, they contend that, evenif the Board's valuation is supported by the evidence, theresulting assessment creates a lack of uniformity and equalityin violation of the Indiana Constitution's Property Tax Clause,Article 10, Section 1. Ultimately, each of these four argumentsfail, as the Donovans did not accurately apply Indiana lawor demonstrate that the evidence in the record compelleda different result. As such, the Court affirms the Board'sdetermination.I. The Board's reliance on the purchase price was notcontrary to lawThe Donovans raise two arguments as part of their firstclaim that the Board's reliance on the purchase price of theDonovans’ condo was contrary to law: (1) They argue that thepurchase price represents the fair market value of the condorather than the market value-in-use, which is the standard forIndiana assessments. (2) They argue that this Court has heldthat the purchase price of a property, standing alone, is notsufficient to support an inference of value for the property.Both arguments, however, misapprehend the law.A. Fair market value and market value-in-use may converge when the pre- andpost-sale uses of a property are the same*3 The first contention—that the purchase price of aproperty cannot be used to value that property becausethe price reflects the property's fair market value whileIndiana's assessment system is founded on market value-in-use—fails to account for circumstances where fair marketvalue converges with market value-in-use. When such aconvergence occurs, a recent purchase of the property canreflect a property's value-in-use.Although true tax value does not mean “fair market value,”IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(c), regulations governing Indianaassessments acknowledge that true tax value and marketvalue overlap when there are regular exchanges of a type ofproperty for its current use. See 2021 REAL PROPERTYASSESSMENT MANUAL (“2021 Manual”) (incorporatedby reference at 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.4-1-2 (2020)) at 2.Property assessments in Indiana are based on “true tax value,”IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(b)(6), which simply means “[t]hemarket value-in-use of a property for its current use.” 2021Manual at 2. Put differently, a property's market value-in-use is “the price that would induce the owner to sell the real
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3property and ... the buyer would purchase the real property fora continuation of the use of the property for its current use.”Id. Market value focuses instead on the price resulting froma property's “reasonable exposure in a competitive marketunder all conditions requisite to a fair sale, with the buyerand seller each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and for self-interest,” regardless of the property's pre- or post-sale use.2021 Manual at 6. Market value-in-use therefore emphasizesthe specific use of the property, while fair market value doesnot. When the use of the property before and after its sale is thesame, fair market value and market value-in-use can convergewhen there are regular exchanges of the same type ofproperty, ensuring a competitive market. See generally THEAPPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REALESTATE 48–53 (15th ed. 2020) (defining, comparing, andcontrasting market value, fair value, use value, and marketvalue-in-use).Here, the record firmly supports the Board's determinationthat the Donovans’ purchase price represented the marketvalue-in-use of the property. The determination of whether asale represents the market value-in-use of a piece of propertyis a factual question because it turns, at least in part, on acomparison of the use of the property before and after sale.The Donovans do not claim that they used the condo for adifferent purpose than the previous owner. The record showsthat both the Donovans and the seller used the condo fora residential purpose. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 74, 128; seealso Cert Admin. R at 38 (showing that condo was classifiedas owner-occupied homestead property for tax cap purposesbeginning in 2018).) The Donovans also do not argue that thepurchase and sale of condos similar to the subject propertyare uncommon. The extensive sales evidence in this casesuggests that condos in the Donovans’ building are regularlyexchanged in the open market. The Donovans fail to identifyany evidence that would suggest that their purchase of thesubject property was not representative of a convergence offair market value and market value-in-use.2B. This Court's precedent does not preclude the useof a property's purchase price to value the property*4 The second contention is that existing precedentprecludes the use of the purchase price of a property to valuethat property, pointing to this Court's decision in HublerRealty Co. v. Hendricks Cnty. Ass'r, 938 N.E.2d 311 (Ind.Tax Ct. 2010). The Donovans argue that the purchase price ofthe property at issue in Hubler was “only persuasive becauseit was accompanied by appraisals, supporting testimony, anddocumentation of utility to the buyer.” (Pet'rs’ Reply at 6.)They maintain that “a property's sale price may be indicativeof market value-in-use only if it results from an arm's-length transaction and is supported by credible and probativeevidence.” (Pet'rs’ Reply at 6 (emphases removed).)The Donovans are correct that Hubler does not automaticallymake the purchase price of a property determinative ofassessed value, but they wrongly infer restrictions on the useof such evidence that are not found in the Court's decision.Hubler never reached the question of whether the purchaseprice of a property could support an inference of value for thesame property. The question before the Court in Hubler waswhether the evidence indicated that the assessor in that casehad engaged in the practice of selective reappraisal and saleschasing.3 Hubler, 938 N.E.2d at 313. The Court concludedthat the evidence did not support such a finding. Id. at 315.The Court also held that the use of the property's purchaseprice by the PTABOA and the Board to determine the valueof the property as part of an administrative assessment appealdid not amount to selective reappraisal or sales chasing. Id.Neither of these questions required the Court to consider theprobative value of a property's purchase price in determiningthe property's value.The price paid for a property can be used to prove the value ofthat property. See, e.g., Pachniak v. Marshall Cnty. Assessor,Case No. 49T10-0904-TA-18, 2010 WL 2284248, *2 (Ind.Tax Ct. June 8, 2010) (finding purchase price of subjectproperty “evidence as to its actual value” for purposes ofassessment). But like any other sale offered to prove value,the extent of a purchase price's persuasiveness turns on thefacts and circumstances surrounding the sale. These facts andcircumstances must be evaluated to determine whether theypermit an inference that the purchase price is representativeof market value-in-use at the time of assessment. See, e.g.,Millennium Real Est. Inv., LLC v. Assessor, Benton Cnty., 979N.E.2d 192, 194–95 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2012) (rejecting previouspurchase prices for a property for various reasons, includingthat a sale involved related parties and that a sale relatedto a foreclosure), trans. denied; cf. Shepard v. Clatsop Cnty.Assessor, No. TC-MD 170163R, 2018 WL 1299284, at *3,*8–9 (Or. Tax Ct. Mar. 13, 2018) (finding the purchase priceof a home unpersuasive because the home was not adequatelymarketed and was immediately relisted after purchase fornearly double the purchase price). In this regard, the purchaseprice of the subject property may represent the best indicationof value for that property because it eliminates the need to
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4adjust for differences between the subject and comparisonproperties.4*5 Ultimately, both the probative and persuasive value of aproperty's sale in determining that property's market value-in-use is a factual question, not a legal one. Such questions arecommitted to the discretion and judgment of the finder of fact.Hubler placed no restrictions or corroboration requirementson the use of a property's purchase price to infer the value ofthat property. The Board, as the trier of fact, is best equippedto examine the evidence underlying the purchase price anddetermine whether the sale represents the market value-in-useof the subject property.II. The Board's value determination is supported bysubstantial evidenceNotwithstanding their arguments that the use of a purchaseprice to value a property was legally erroneous, the Donovanslodge an alternative claim that the Board's conclusion ofvalue for their condo is unsupported by substantial evidence.The Donovans claim that the evidence of their purchaseprice contained three flaws that render it incapable ofsupporting the Board's value determination: (1) the MLSlisting contained unverified and inaccurate data, (2) thepurchase price was not adjusted for the time between the saleand the assessment date, and (3) the evidence failed to accountfor the Donovans’ atypical motivations as buyers. While theevidence in the certified record may be imperfect, the Courtwill uphold the Board's decision if there is more than a merescintilla of evidence to support the Board's findings. See CVSCorp. v. Searcy, 137 N.E.3d 1053, 1056 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019).Here, the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that theDonovans’ purchase of the subject property represented themarket value-in-use of the property for the 2023 assessmentdate.A. Evidence relied upon by theBoard to determine true tax valueThe Donovans first note that the MLS listing containedincorrect data pertaining to the square footage and numberof balconies for their condo. (Pet'rs’ Reply at 8; see Cert.Admin. R. at 67–69, 78.) But they do not explain why thesetwo inaccuracies preclude the Board from relying on the bodyof evidence surrounding the sale to infer a value. Determiningthe value of a property must often rely on imperfect marketdata. See Madison Cnty. Assessor v. Kohl's Indiana, LP,268 N.E.3d 873, 884 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2025) (citing Lake Cnty.Assessor v. O'Day Holdings, LLC, 249 N.E.3d 677, 688(Ind. Tax Ct. 2024)), opinion superseded on reh'g, No. 24T-TA-00009, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2025 WL 3202637 (Ind. Tax Ct.Nov. 17, 2025). The Donovans do not identify factual errorsin the other evidence detailing their purchase of the subjectproperty, nor do they explain how these two errors in the MLSlisting affected the price they paid for the property. The Boardfound the sale to be a “valid, arm's length transaction in whichboth parties were represented by realtors,” which is sufficientto overcome the minor inaccuracies contained in the MLSlisting. (Cert. Admin. R. at 108 24.)B. Difference between purchasedate and assessment dateThe Donovans next argue that the unique market conditionsprevailing at the time they purchased the condo and thelapse of time between their August 2022 purchase andthe January 1, 2023, assessment date deprive the saleprice of persuasive value absent adjustments. In its finaldetermination, the Board found that there was “no evidenceshowing a significant change in the market” between thesale date and the assessment date and concluded that thesale was “sufficiently close to the valuation date for it to bereliable evidence” of the condo's value as of the assessmentdate. (Cert. Admin R. at 108 24.) Although the Donovansoffered a different perspective in their testimony, the Board'sfinding is supported by the testimony of the Assessor's expertwho testified that the August 24, 2022, purchase price wasrepresentative of the market value-in-use for the January 1,2023, assessment date. This testimony combined with the factthat the sale occurred a little more than four months before theassessment date was sufficient to support an inference by theBoard that the sale price reflected the value of the Donovans’condo on the assessment date.C. The Donovans’ personalconsiderations at time of purchase*6 The Donovans also challenge the Board's findingthat their purchase is “reliable evidence of the subjectproperty's true tax value” by arguing that they were atypicallymotivated buyers, which led them to pay a price thatoutpaced the market. (Cert. Admin. R. at 108, 24.) Becauseof their age and health issues, the Donovans claim thatthey decided against buying another similarly sized condo
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5in the same complex that would have required severalmonths of renovation. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 127:22–31.) But the Donovans provided no evidence suggestingthat such motivations are atypical or demonstrating thatsuch motivations affected the eventual sale price. SeeDuSablon v. Kaufman, 160 N.E.3d 587, 595 (Ind. Tax Ct.2020) (rejecting taxpayer's claim that they overpaid forpersonal reasons because there was objective evidence thatthe purchase price resulted from an “open, competitive,fair, arm's-length transaction). Paying a premium for afully renovated property does not seem at all unusual, andbuyers are likely to be motivated by an array of factorswhen purchasing residential property.5 Notwithstanding theDonovans’ stated motivations, the Board was empowered toweigh that testimony against the other evidence of the sale.Here, the record contains substantial evidence supportingthe Board's determination that the sale was probative andreliable, as the sale bore many hallmarks of an arm's-lengthtransaction: the buyer and seller were unrelated parties (seeCert. Admin. R. at 74–75, 124); both were represented bytheir own agents from different brokerages (see Cert. AdminR. at 125–26); the property was actively marketed on the MLSfor 122 days (see Cert. Admin. R. at 78, 126); and the finalsale price was negotiated down from the asking price (seeCert. Admin. R. at 80). There was also testimony from theAssessor's expert that the transaction appeared to be a validarm's-length sale that was representative of the market value-in-use for the 2023 assessment date. (See Cert. Admin. R.at 124–25.) This evidence cuts against the Donovans’ statedmotivations and is capable of supporting a finding by theBoard that the Donovans’ purchase was not atypical. As such,the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that theDonovans’ purchase was indicative of the property's true taxvalue.III. The evidence does not compel a different resultThe Donovans contend that the Board abused its discretionby finding that the Donovans offered no reliable market-based evidence showing their condo's true tax value. On thecontrary, the Donovans claim that they submitted evidencethat conclusively demonstrates the value of their property in2023 was $558,800. Like its review for substantial evidence,the Court's review for an abuse of discretion sets a highlydeferential standard. “An abuse of discretion may occur ifthe Indiana Board's decision is clearly against the logic andeffect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the IndianaBoard misinterprets the law.” Hubler, 938 N.E.2d at 315 n.5.While the certified record contains several pieces of evidencewhich the Donovans believe support their argument, there aresubstantial differences between those units and the subjectproperty which the Donovans do not reconcile. The recordshows that units in The Harbours vary significantly in floorlevel, views, bedroom and bathroom counts, condition, andupgrade quality. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 39–65, 134–38.)While the Donovans estimated costs for some upgrades whencomparing properties, they did not establish how those coststranslated into value differences. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin.R. at 130.) Ms. Donovan confirmed this in her testimonyto the Board, agreeing when cross-examined that she didnot adjust any of the properties she offered as comparablesfor differences such as condition, location in the complex,number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and condition orquality of the amenities. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 134–35, 138.)More fundamentally, the Donovans did not establish that theyselected sales of comparable units when accounting for allvalue-affecting characteristics.*7 Rather than showing that the Board's conclusion isagainst the logic and effect of the facts and circumstancesbefore it, the evidence in the record supports the Board'sfinding that the Donovans’ evidence is unreliable. And whilethe Donovans demonstrate in their briefing that they arefamiliar with the concept of generally accepted appraisalprinciples, as the Board found, no evidence in the recordshows that the Donovans used these principles to explaintheir valuation method or analyze their data to support theirproposed valuation. Taken together, the evidence does notcompel a result different than the Board's, and the Court willnot disturb the Board's determination on this basis.IV. The Donovans failed to show entitlement to anequalization adjustmentThe Donovans contend that the assessment of their condois unconstitutional and requires an equalization adjustmentbecause it is abnormally high when compared to theaverage assessment of other properties in their complex. TheBoard found that the Donovans failed to complete a ratiostudy or compute an assessment-to-price ratio, which leftthe Donovans unable to demonstrate an entitlement to anequalization adjustment of the subject property's assessment.After reviewing the evidence, the Court finds ample supportfor the Board's finding against an equalization adjustment andis not persuaded by the Donovans’ ratio-study-type analysisthat a constitutional violation exists in this case.
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6An equalization adjustment provides a method to bringassessments into compliance with Article 10, Section 1 of theIndiana Constitution. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc. v. Matonovich,842 N.E.2d 901, 904 n.4 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006). That provision ofthe Constitution states, in part, that “[t]he General Assemblyshall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of propertyassessment and taxation.” IND. CONST. art. 10, § 1. Thisrequires a “uniform, equal, and just system” of assessmentand taxation in Indiana, where “each taxpayer's propertywealth bear[s] its proportion of the overall property taxburden.” State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Town of St. John,702 N.E.2d 1034, 1039–1040 (Ind. 1998) (internal citationomitted); accord Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318,327 (Ind. 1996). For the Donovans to prevail on such a claim,they must demonstrate that their property was “assessed andtaxed on a different basis as compared to taxpayers withsubstantially similar property.” Indianapolis Hist. Partners v.State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 694 N.E.2d 1224, 1229 (Ind. TaxCt. 1998).This Court has previously explained that one way to measureuniformity and equality in property assessment is through aratio study. Westfield Golf Practice Ctr., LLC v. WashingtonTwp. Assessor, 859 N.E.2d 396, 399 n.3 (Ind. Tax Ct.2007). A ratio study analyzes sales data to examine therelationship between an assessed value of a property andits market value-in-use. 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 27-2-10.This can demonstrate a lack of uniformity and equalityby “compar[ing] the assessed values of properties withinan assessing jurisdiction with objectively verifiable data.”Thorsness v. Porter Cnty. Assessor, 3 N.E.3d 49, 51 (Ind.Tax Ct. 2014). To do so accurately, a ratio study “mustbe based on data that has been both appropriately stratifiedand statistically analyzed” with “all the properties ... divided(i.e., stratified) into two or more subpopulations” before “astatistical measure of assessment uniformity [is] calculated.”Id. at 53–54. The coefficient of dispersion, which “indicatesthe average deviation from the median sale/assessment ratio,”is the most widely accepted statistical measure of taxassessment uniformity. Id. at 54.As the Board found in its determination, the Donovans“offered a significant amount of raw sales and assessmentdata” but failed to use the data to develop a ratio study orcompute an assessment-to-sales price ratio.6 (Cert. Admin R.at 111 33; see Cert. Admin. R. at 104–5 14.) The Assessor'sexpert witness testimony confirmed that the Donovans’calculations differed from those in a traditional ratio study.(See Cert. Admin. R. at 145:18–146:4.) Instead of calculatinga coefficient of dispersion, or another established measureof uniformity, the Donovans testified that they comparedsimilar-sized condos in their complex and calculated anaverage assessment, which they then compared to theirown assessment. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 52, 139–40.) TheDonovans also compared these assessments based on anassessment-to-area ratio. (See Cert. Admin. R. 39, 50.) Thesecomparisons were made without any adjustments to theprevious sales. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 138:23–24, 140:20–23, 143:29–30, 144:14–16, 147:22.)*8 Indiana law does not require taxpayers to present ratiostudies or present their findings in a particular format todemonstrate a constitutional infirmity in their assessment. SeeWestfield Golf, 859 N.E.2d at 399 n.3. But when the Donovans“present[ed] evidence to the Indiana Board, it [wa]s their dutyto walk the Indiana Board through every element of theiranalysis.” Blesich v. Lake Cnty. Assessor, 46 N.E.3d 14, 17(Ind. Tax Ct. 2015) (emphasis omitted).In this case, the Donovans relied on data from a previousratio study and applied basic statistical analysis to that data.If the Donovans were attempting to complete a ratio study,the Board correctly determined that they failed to conformwith professionally accepted standards for such a study. Ifinstead the Donovans were attempting to use another methodto demonstrate a lack of uniformity and equality, then theBoard correctly determined that the Donovans’ evidence wasinsufficient because it lacked the rigor and thoroughnessnecessary to demonstrate the validity of their alternativemethod for showing a lack of uniformity and equality. TheDonovans failed to explain how comparing the averageassessments of condos with square footage similar to theirown demonstrated a nonuniform or unequal assessment. Theynever explained how such measures related to the marketvalue-in-use of the analyzed properties.While the Donovans used techniques that may be somewhatsimilar to valuation statistics used in ratio studies, theydid not demonstrate that these alternative methods produceaccurate results for comparing uniformity. Furthermore, whilethe Donovans may have presented some probative evidenceof their property's value, the Board's findings against theDonovans are supported by substantial and reliable evidencein the certified record and did not violate the law. TheDonovans failed to sufficiently analyze their data or explaintheir methodology in such a way as to prove a lack ofuniformity and equality in their assessment. Because theBoard's findings in this case were not shown to be illegal,
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7unsupported by evidence, or unconstitutional, the Court willnot disturb the Board's resulting determination.V. Warning regarding the use of artificial intelligenceIn their briefing, the Donovans cited “Rawles v. Monroe Cnty.Ass'r, 48T10-1705-TA-00014, slip op. at 5–6 (Ind. Tax Ct.May 13, 2019)”—a case which neither the Court nor theDonovans were able to locate, because it does not exist.(Pet'rs’ Reply at 10; see generally Pet'rs’ October 6, 2025Memo.) Ms. Donovan confirmed at the hearing that she hadrelied on artificial intelligence to aid in drafting her briefs,leading the Court to believe that this citation was an AIhallucination. (Oral Arg. at 24:24–25:15.) The Donovansalso appear to quote this Court's Piotrowski, O'Donnell, andWestfield Golf cases in their reply brief, but the quotedlanguage is not present in any of these Indiana Tax Courtcases. Compare Piotrowski v. Shelby Cnty. Ass'r, 144 N.E.3d887, 892 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020), and O'Donnell v. Departmentof Local Government Finance, 854 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. Tax Ct.2006), and Westfield Golf Practice Ctr., LLC, 859 N.E.2d 396,with (Pet'rs’ Reply at 5, 9–10).Courts have sanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigantsfor citing fictitious cases in briefs. Williams v. Kirch, 268N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025); see also In re BabyBoy, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, ––––, 2025WL 2046315, at *23 (Ill. App. Ct. July 21, 2025) (requiring anattorney who cited fictious cases in his briefs to pay monetarysanctions and sending a copy of the opinion to the IllinoisAttorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission). Falsecitations may also have negative effects on the outcome ofa case. See, e.g., Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 52–53(Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (determining that the appellant's useof fictitious citations in his brief mandated a dismissal ofthe appeal), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Citing fictious casesadversely affects all parties in a case. See Mata v. Avianca,Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). It “wastestime and money in exposing the deception” and takes acourt's time “from other important endeavors.” Id. Moreover,“client[s] may be deprived of arguments based on authenticjudicial precedents.” Id.*9 The Court admonishes the Donovans for failingto confirm the accuracy of their legal presentations butwill impose no further penalties. Particularly when usinggenerative AI, attorneys and pro se litigants alike have aduty to independently verify the authenticity of authoritativesources cited to the Court and to ensure they are usedaccurately. Judges must be able to rely on the authenticityof the authorities cited by the parties to make just decisions.Williams, 268 N.E.3d at 288.CONCLUSIONThe Board's final determination in this matter is AFFIRMED.All Citations--- N.E.3d ----, 2025 WL 3705943Footnotes1A sales disclosure form is a document detailing a property sale that must be filed with the county auditor aftertransferring real property in a sale. See generally IND. CODE §§ 6-1.1-5.5-3, -5. MLS stands for “multiplelisting service” and acts as a private database for sharing property listings and storing information aboutthem. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, Multiple Listing Services (MLS): What Is It, availableat https://www.nar.realtor/mls-online-listings/multiple-listing-service-mls-what-is-it (last visited December 18,2025).2Residential sales are regularly used when determining true tax value for Indiana taxation purposes. See,e.g., Bougie v. Chapman, 244 N.E.3d 987, 991–92 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024) (affirming Board's value determinationthat relied on comparing recently-sold homes near the subject property); DuSablon v. Kaufman, 160 N.E.3d587, 589 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020) (same); Marinov v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 119 N.E.3d 1152, 1154 (Ind.Tax Ct. 2019) (same).
Donovan v. Clark County Assessor, --- N.E.3d ---- (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.83“Sales chasing, also known as selective reappraisal, is the practice of selectively changing values forproperties that have been sold, while leaving other values alone .... [s]elective reappraisal cases havebeen characterized as those in which either one taxpayer or a small group of taxpayers are singled-out forrevaluation or for first-time assessment when similar property is not assessed for any additional tax liability.”Big Foot Stores LLC v. Franklin Twp. Assessor, 919 N.E.2d 621, 623 n.5 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2009) (internal citationsand quotations omitted).4This principle has been formalized in other jurisdictions, such as Oregon, where “[a] recent sale of propertyis ‘very persuasive’ in determining the property's fair market value, if the sale was a voluntary, arm's-lengthtransaction between a knowledgeable and willing buyer and seller.” Miller v. Dep't of Revenue, State of Or.,327 Or. 129, 958 P.2d 833, 837 (1998).5Paying a premium for a renovated space is not only usual but also accounted for in standard valuationapproaches. “If the subject property requires some expenditure immediately after the purchase to reach itsfull utility, the adjustment amount is subtracted from the sale prices of all comparable sales that do not requirea similar expenditure to adjust those transactions for differences from the subject property.” THE APPRAISALINSTITUTE, supra, at 386.6Throughout the certified record, the Donovans conflate the term “ratio study” with the data used for sucha study, referred to by the Donovans as a “ratio file.” (E.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 34, 114, 133–34.) A ratiostudy is a form of applied statistics used to draw conclusions about a group of properties sold during a giventimeframe. INT'L ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, Standard on Ratio Studies 8 (2013), availableat https://www.iaao.org/wp-content/uploads/Standard_on_Ratio_Studies.pdf. While a ratio study can only beas accurate as its data, that data must be analyzed and used in calculations to derive meaningful conclusionsabout valuation levels or uniformity. See id. at 11, 13–14.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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