Johnson v. Johnson, No. 25A-DR-416 (2025)

Case details
Full caption
In re: the Marriage of Melinda Johnson v. Sabastian Johnson
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Indiana (IN)
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Bradford (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
In re: the Marriage of: Melinda Johnson, Appellant-Petitioner v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3034722Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.(This disposition by unpublished memorandumdecision is referenced in the North Eastern Reporter.)Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this MemorandumDecision is not binding precedent for any court andmay be cited only for persuasive value or to establishres judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.Court of Appeals of Indiana.In re: the Marriage of: MelindaJohnson, Appellant-Petitionerv.Sabastian Johnson, Appellee-RespondentCourt of Appeals Case No. 25A-DR-416|October 30, 2025Appeal from the Bartholomew Superior Court The HonorableTimothy B. Day, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No.03D01-1608-DR-4557Attorneys and Law FirmsAppellant Pro Se, Melinda Johnson, Martinsville, IndianaAppellee Pro Se, Sabastian Johnson, Seymour, IndianaJudges Mathias and Bradford concur.MEMORANDUM DECISIONMay, Judge.*1 [1] Melinda Johnson (“Mother”), pro se, appeals thetrial court's order denying her motion to appoint a ParentingTime Coordinator and her motion to terminate a protectiveorder. She raises numerous arguments on appeal, includingclaims that the trial court violated her constitutional dueprocess rights, committed cumulative procedural errors, andimproperly rewarded Sebastian Johnson's (“Father”) allegedmisconduct. Many of these arguments relate to orders andproceedings that occurred years before the order on appealand are not properly before us.[2] We limit our review to the issues arising from theproceedings surrounding the trial court's order of February 3,2025, and we restate those issues as:1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion whenit denied Mother's motion to appoint a Parenting TimeCoordinator;2. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Mother'smotion to terminate the 2023 restraining order prohibitingMother from contacting Father's place of employment;3. Whether the trial court erred when it did not addressMother's motion for accommodations under the Americanswith Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and4. Whether the trial court's alleged cumulative errors deniedMother due process and a fair trial.Mother also asks us to award her appellate attorney's fees. Weaffirm the trial court's decision and deny Mother's request forappellate attorney's fees.Facts and Procedural History[3] Mother and Father married in February 2015 anddivorced in November 2016. During the marriage, Fatheradopted Mother's previously born child, A.J., and the couplehad another child, M.J. (collectively, “Children”). In thedissolution order, the trial court awarded Mother primaryphysical custody of Children.1 In 2018, Father marriedBrittany Johnson (“Stepmother”).[4] In September 2018, Father filed a petition for emergencycustody of A.J. On June 4, 2019, the trial court issued anamended order regarding Children's custody after the partiescame to a partial agreement on that issue. In that order, thetrial court ordered Mother to retain primary physical custodyof Children.2 On June 18, 2019, Mother filed a motion forcontempt and the trial court set a hearing for September 26,2019. Mother did not attend that hearing, and the trial courtissued an order awarding temporary custody of A.J. to Father.On October 4, 2019, the trial court held an emergency hearingregarding custody. After that hearing, the trial court issued anorder vacating the September 26 temporary custody order andreverting to the June 2019 custody order. In addition, the trialcourt appointed a Guardian ad Litem and ordered mediationto assist the parties in resolving the ongoing custody concerns.
In re: the Marriage of: Melinda Johnson, Appellant-Petitioner v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 [5] Mediation was unsuccessful. The Guardian ad Litemfiled her report, and the trial court held a hearing on custodyon February 13, 2020. On February 18, 2020, the trialcourt issued its order awarding Father temporary custody ofChildren. Both parties underwent psychological evaluations,and the Guardian ad Litem conducted additional investigationinto custody matters. February 11, 2021, after a hearingregarding custody, the trial court awarded Father sole legaland physical custody of Children.[6] In January 2022, Mother filed a motion to modify custodyof Children and requested a custody evaluation. Dr. KevinByrd conducted the evaluation and recommended that bothparents participate in therapy and coparent coaching. Healso suggested that Father complete a coparenting courseand a parenting course for Children's age group. In June2023, Father requested, and was granted, a restraining order3prohibiting Mother from contacting Father's workplace (the“2023 Restraining Order”).[7] In January 2024, the trial court held a hearing andsubsequently issued an order denying Mother's motionto modify custody. Mother appealed that decision, andwe affirmed the trial court's order. Johnson v. Johnson,03D01-1608-DR-4557 (Ind. Ct. App. June 28, 2024) (mem.dec.). When affirming the trial court's decision, we noted thatDr. Byrd had concluded: “Father should maintain sole legalcustody and that joint physical custody should be allowedonly after Mother resolves her personality and behavioralproblems that led to the initial custody change.” Id. at *2.[8] In October 2024, Mother filed a motion to appointa Parenting Time Coordinator and to terminate the 2023Restraining Order. On December 30, 2024, Mother filed amotion for relief alleging Father failed to comply with acustody exchange during Christmas break.[9] On January 24, 2025, the trial court held a hearing onMother's October 2024 and December 2024 motions. Mother,appearing pro se, argued the trial court should appoint aParenting Time Coordinator because the parties’ interactionsregarding parenting time had been high conflict. To supporther argument, Mother attempted to enter portions of Dr.Byrd's custody evaluation he completed as part of Mother'sJanuary 2024 motion to modify custody into evidence. Fatherobjected, arguing the excerpts did not comport with severalof the Indiana Rules of Evidence. The trial court sustainedFather's objection and did not admit the exhibits. Mother alsoargued at length about her past conflicts with Father andStepmother, including the parenting time exchange incidentduring the 2024 Christmas break that prompted her December2024 motion for relief. Regarding the 2023 Restraining Order,Mother contended there were several procedural errors whenthe 2023 Restraining Order was issued and thus it should beterminated.[10] Father testified he and Mother “really [had] not [had] anymajor issues” (Tr. Vol. II at 53), with coordinating parentingtime in the months leading to the hearing and his recentinteractions with Mother, including the Christmas breakexchange, were misunderstandings of custody exchangeschedules listed in the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines,which the parties were required to follow per the February2021 order. He contended that a Parenting Time Coordinatorwas not needed, and he did not want to pay for the ParentingTime Coordinator because the ongoing litigation had beencostly. Father expressed his concern that a Parenting TimeCoordinator would “only be another person to misinterpretanything we might have to say to each other about each otherand [Children.]” (Id.)*3 [11] On January 27, 2025, three days after the hearing,Mother filed a motion for disability accommodation underthe ADA based on her medical diagnoses of autism and post-traumatic stress disorder. She asserted these disabilities puther “at a clear disadvantage and effectively denied [her] fairand just proceedings at critical stages” of the case. (Mother'sApp. Vol. III at 2.) She asked the trial court for severalaccommodations, including the appointment of an attorneyand judicial notice of allegedly false and harmful accusationsagainst her.[12] On February 3, 2025, the trial court entered anorder that denied Mother's motion for a Parenting TimeCoordinator after noting Father's objection to the appointmentof a Parenting Time Coordinator, his testimony that recentdisagreements had been minor, and that the cost of aParenting Time Coordinator “would likely be an issue forboth parties.” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 55.) The trial courtalso expressed a concern that Mother would use a ParentingTime Coordinator to relitigate custody issues decided by pasttrial court orders. The trial court also denied Mother's requestto terminate the 2023 Restraining Order. It did not addressMother's request for disability accommodations.Discussion and Decision
In re: the Marriage of: Melinda Johnson, Appellant-Petitioner v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3[13] As an initial matter, we note Mother and Father eachproceed pro se4 in this appeal. “[A] pro se litigant is held tothe same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded noinherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.”Zavodinik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “[P]rose litigants are bound to follow the established rules ofprocedure and must be prepared to accept the consequencesof their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980,983-984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “One of the risks that a[litigant] takes when he decides to proceed pro se is that hewill not know how to accomplish all of the things that anattorney would know how to accomplish.” Smith v. Donahue,907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.We will not “become an advocate for a party, or addressarguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed orexpressed to be understood.” Perry v. Anonymous Physician1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.1. Denial of Motion for Parenting Time Coordinator[14] Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion whenit denied her motion for the appointment of a Parenting TimeCoordinator.5 We review a trial court's decision regarding theappointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator for an abuse ofdiscretion. In re Paternity of C.H., 936 N.E.2d 1270, 1274(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.*4 [15] Mother contends the trial court's order denying hermotion to appoint a Parenting Time Coordinator was an abuseof discretion because it did not address her assertion thatthe parties’ custody-related interactions were high conflictand did not take into account the portions of Dr. Byrd'scustody evaluation that supported her position at trial. Further,she argues that the trial court's reasons for denying hermotion for appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator werespeculative and not supported by the evidence. Additionally,she asserts the trial court's order rewards Father's allegedmisconduct6 during parenting time exchanges. Finally, sheargues the trial court's order violated the Indiana ParentingTime Guidelines.[16] The appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinatoris governed by Section 5 of the Indiana Parenting TimeGuidelines. Section 5(C)(2) provides that “the court maywith consent of the parties, or on its own motion, appoint aParenting Coordinator when it is in the child's best interestto do so.” “[A] Parenting Time Coordinator is appointedto assist high conflict parties by accessing and managingconflicts, redirecting the focus of the parties to the needsof the child, and educating the parties on how to makedecisions that are in the best interest of the child.” IPTG Sec.5(A)(1). “ ‘High conflict parties’ are parties who have hadongoing disagreements and conflict. The disagreements andconflict center on the parties’ inability to communicate andresolve issues regarding the care of the child, a parenting timeschedule, or any other issues that have adversely affected thechild.” IPTG Sec. 5(A)(3).[17] In its order denying Mother's motion for appointment ofa Parenting Time Coordinator, the trial court did not makea finding regarding whether the parenting time situation washigh conflict. Instead, the trial court made findings regardingwhy a Parenting Time Coordinator was not necessary.Specifically, the trial court noted Father's objection to theappointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator, including thathe “expressed his concern over the cost of a Parenting TimeCoordinator.” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 54.) In addition,the trial court noted that because Father has “primary legaland physical custody of [Children]” under the February2021 order, “[Mother] receives specified parenting time with[Children].” (Id.) It further stated that because parentingtime is so structured “there is little room for significantparenting time disputes between the parties.” (Id.) The trialcourt characterized the Christmas break 2024 parenting timeissue as a “misunderstanding” and reasoned that because thedispute took place on the Friday evening following Christmas,“[i]t [was] doubtful that a Parenting Time Coordinator wouldhave been available on that day and time to resolve theissue.” (Id.)*5 [18] In addressing Father's concern about the cost ofa Parenting Time Coordinator, the trial court acknowledgedthat Mother had “offered to cover the expense as long as aspecific agency could be appointed” but stated it had, in thepast “found it to be more beneficial for fees of this natureto be divided equally so that neither party can question theneutrality of the Parenting Time Coordinator and so thatneither party over-utilizes the services to financially harm theother party.” (Id. at 54-55.) The trial court's finding about thepossible abuse of the Parenting Time Coordinator's serviceswas additionally highlighted in its next finding where it statedthat it was concerned that if it appointed a Parenting TimeCoordinator, Mother would use that person's services “forthe purpose of re-litigating whether [Mother] was treatedunfairly and not provided due process in the previous custodylitigation.” (Id. at 55.) Based thereon, the trial court concludedthe appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator “would notbe in the best interest of [Children] or the parties.” (Id.)
In re: the Marriage of: Melinda Johnson, Appellant-Petitioner v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4[19] Mother's filings and arguments before the trial courtsupport the trial court's finding about the possibility ofMother using the Parenting Time Coordinator to relitigate oldallegations. For example, Mother's December 2024 motionfor relief regarding the Christmas break parenting timedispute included 305 extensive allegations of disputes andalleged incidents between the parties dating back to 2018.At the hearing, Mother argued that she wanted a ParentingTime Coordinator because of contentious incidents involvingthe children, Father, and Stepmother. Most of the evidenceshe presented regarding these alleged conflicts dated back to2019, with the exception of text messages regarding a custodyexchange during Christmas break. She also attempted to enterinto evidence portions of the custody evaluation completed byDr. Byrd as part of Mother's January 2024 motion to modifycustody, an issue upon which the trial court had ruled in earlierproceedings.[20] Father testified he felt a Parenting Time Coordinator wasunnecessary because there were “really not any major issueswith [their] parenting coordination outside of once in a bluemoon there's uh a calendar mishap on visitation but as a wholewe drop off at the same time, same place on Fridays, we pickup at the same time and same place on Sundays.” (Tr. Vol. II at53.) He stated that a Parenting Time Coordinator “would onlybe another person to misinterpret anything we might haveto say to each other about each other and [Children] and it'sanother financial burden for us both to take on[.]” (Id.)[21] The trial court received evidence and testimony thatsupported its denial of Mother's motion for appointment of aParenting Time Coordinator. Mother's characterizations of theevidence and her arguments are invitations for us to reweighthe evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, whichwe cannot do. See Samples v. Wilson, 12 N.E.3d 946, 950(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding appellate court cannot reweighevidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Therefore, weconclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when itdenied Mother's motion for appointment of a Parenting TimeCoordinator.2. Denial of Motion to Terminate 2023 RestrainingOrder[22] Mother argues the trial court erred when it denied hermotion to terminate the 2023 Restraining Order. In its orderdenying Mother's request to terminate the 2023 RestrainingOrder, the trial court found:6. Another issue raised in [Mother's]filings pertains to her request toterminate a restraining order issuedagainst her in favor of [Father].After some confusion on the Court'spart, it was determined that theOrder in [sic] issue was enteredon June 29, 2023. The orderrestrains [Mother] from interferingwith [Father's] employment. TheCourt did not hear sufficient evidenceto justify dissolving the previous ordersince there is no reason for [Mother]to contact [Father's] employer orinterfere with [Father's] employment.*6 (Mother's App. Vol. II at 55.)[23] Mother's arguments on appeal focus on alleged errorsthat she contends occurred when the trial court issued the2023 Restraining Order. For example, she claims Father'srequest for the 2023 Restraining Order was not supported bythe evidence and “has since functioned not to prevent harmbut to legitimize a false narrative.” (Mother's Br. at 38.) Shealso contends her due process rights were violated becausethe trial court did not hold a hearing or issue findings tosupport its issuance of the 2023 Restraining Order. Thesewere all issues to be decided as part of a direct appeal ofthe 2023 Restraining Order, which Mother did not file.7Thus, her arguments regarding due process are untimely andwe cannot review them. See, e.g., Kindred v. Townsend, 4N.E.3d 793, 795-796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (belated appealof preliminary injunction based on information known atthe time the injunction was entered was an impermissiblecollateral attack on the preliminary injunction).3. Mother's Motion for ADA Accommodations[24] Mother also argues the trial court erred when it didnot address her motion for accommodations under the ADA.However, that motion was filed three days after the trialcourt's hearing on Mother's motions to appoint a ParentingTime Coordinator and to dissolve the restraining order. “Trialcourts have the right and duty to manage proceedings beforethem to insure both expedition and fairness, and must begranted a wide discretion in carrying out that duty.” State
In re: the Marriage of: Melinda Johnson, Appellant-Petitioner v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Ind.2012) (quoting Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564,1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Given the timing of Mother's motionfor accommodations, we cannot say the trial court erred whenit issued its order on the issues it had already heard prior toaddressing Mother's new motion.4. Cumulative Errors[25] Mother also argues that “cumulative procedureviolations” such as alleged “denial of full evidentiaryprocedure, exclusion of critical evidence, failure to enforceprotective safeguards, selective enforcement of rules, judicialoutsourcing, and refusal to rule on dispositive motions ...resulted in structural unfairness, deprived Mother of herparental rights, and rendered post-2019 custody orders voidas a matter of law.” (Mother's Br. at 6.) However, Mother doesnot direct us to case law that renders the post-2019 custodyorders void based on those allegations. She instead relies onUnited States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), which doesnot apply here because it involves the ineffective assistanceof counsel, not alleged procedural errors by the trial court.8Therefore, Mother's argument regarding alleged proceduralviolations and their cumulative effect on the proceedingsis waived because Mother has failed to make a cogentargument with citations to relevant case law pursuant toIndiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). See, e.g., Martin v. Hunt,130 N.E.3d 135, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (failure to make acogent argument resulted in waiver of issues on appeal).5. Request for Appellate Attorney's Fees*7 [26] Mother also requests appellate attorney's fees. “The[appellate] Court may assess damages if an appeal, petition,or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damagesshall be in the [appellate] Court's discretion and may includeattorneys’ fees.” Ind. App. R. 66(E). Mother contends sheis entitled to attorney's fees “given the sustained pattern ofbad-faith litigation and judicial error that made this appealnecessary[.]” (Mother's Br. at 9.)[27] “Our appellate courts have formally categorized claimsfor appellate attorney fees into ‘substantive’ and proceduralbad faith claims.” Duncan v. Yocum, 179 N.E.3d 988, 1005(Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Boczar v. Meridian StreetFound., 749 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).To prevail on a substantive bad faithclaim, the party must show thatthe appellant's contentions are utterlydevoid of all plausibility. Proceduralbad faith, on the other hand, occurswhen a party flagrantly disregards theform and content requirements of therules of appellate procedure, omits andmisstates relevant facts appearing inthe record, and files briefs written ina manner calculated to require themaximum expenditure of time both bythe opposing party and the reviewingcourt. Even if the appellant's conductfalls short of that which is deliberateor by design, procedural bad faith canstill be found.Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasesadded).[28] Mother is the appellant in this case. As we have discussedin this opinion, many of Mother's arguments are attemptsto relitigate matters not before us. In her briefs, Mother'sarguments are rife with personal attacks and emotionalaccusations against Father and the judicial system. However,she does not characterize her behavior as such and claims “thisappeal is not about personal grievance – it is about systemicintegrity.” (Mother's Reply Br. at 12.) Further, she accusesFather of using his law enforcement role to “shield[ ] hismisconduct from scrutiny – allowing judicial outcomes tobe shaped not by evidence or child welfare, but by powerimbalance and systemic deference.” (Mother's Br. at 24.)[29] Additionally, as we noted above, Mother's brief containsmany errors, specifically concerning the legal authority uponwhich she relies. Many of her cases do not exist and one ofthe statutes she cites does not govern the point of law that sheinsists supports her argument. Further, her appendix includesan order for a matter that is not her own and was not partof the record before the trial court. Finally, her brief exceedsthirty pages, a limit set forth in Indiana Appellate Rule 44(D).These examples, which are just a snapshot of Mother's toneand vexatious legal arguments in this case, do not supportMother's request for attorney's fees. Thus, we decline her pleafor attorney's fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E).
In re: the Marriage of: Melinda Johnson, Appellant-Petitioner v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Conclusion[30] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when itdenied Mother's motion for appointment of a Parenting TimeCoordinator. Additionally, Mother's arguments regarding thetrial court's denial of her motion for termination of the2023 Restraining Order are impermissible collateral attackson the 2023 Restraining Order that do not demonstrate thetrial court erred by denying her motion to terminate it.Further, the trial court did not err by failing to addressMother's motion for ADA accommodations prior to enteringits order on the issues it had already heard. Mother's argumentregarding alleged cumulative errors is waived for failure tomake a cogent argument. Finally, Mother is not entitled toappellate attorney's fees. Accordingly, we affirm the trialcourt's decision.*8 [31] Affirmed.Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3034722 (Table)Footnotes1The record does not indicate who obtained legal custody of Children in the initial custody order.2The record also does not indicate whether the parties shared joint legal custody of Children after this neworder. The order stated Mother was to make all major decisions about healthcare and both parents couldaccess Children's medical records, but the order does not reference other issues involved in legal custodysuch as decisions involving schooling, religion, or participation in extracurricular activities.3While commonly referred to as a protective order under Indiana law, the terms “restraining order” and“protective order” may be used interchangeably. See, e.g., Hanauer v. Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind.Ct. App. 2013) (referencing the Black's Law Dictionary definitions of “restraining order” and “protective order”noting the two terms reference one another and are used interchangeably). As the trial court referred to theorder as a restraining order, that is the term we will use.4In their briefs, both parties cited legal authority that either does not exist or does not contain the point of law theparty indicates. Mother admitted at trial and in her motion for accommodations under the ADA that she usedChat GPT to prepare her pleadings. As we recently stated in Williams v. Kirch, --- N.E.3d ----, 25ASC-196,slip op. at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. August 18, 2025), “[w]e caution attorneys and pro se litigants alike against usingAI to conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated.” We similarly cautionthe parties here, as their errors have severely hindered our review of the issues.5In her brief, Mother cites Indiana Code section 31-17-2-16 and claims it “expressly authorizes courts to appointa parenting coordinator where high conflict interferes with custody or parenting time.” (Mother's Br. at 28.)However, Indiana Code section 31-17-2-16 concerns a child's counseling as part of child custody ordersand is not relevant here. We were unable to locate a statute regarding the appointment of a Parenting TimeCoordinator. That process is instead set forth in Section 5 of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.6Mother specifically argues that the trial court rewarded Father despite her feeling that he and Stepmother“created and sustained a high-conflict environment, weaponized evaluator input, and leveraged trial courtdeference to secure indefinite custody.” (Mother's Br. at 50.) She likens the situation here to that in Piercev. Pierce, 620 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied.
In re: the Marriage of: Melinda Johnson, Appellant-Petitioner v...., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7In Pierce, the father appealed the modification of joint legal custody to sole physical and legal custody ofthe parties’ children to their mother. Id. at 729. The father argued there had not been a substantial changein circumstances to modify custody. Id. at 730-731. However, our court disagreed, holding the trial court didnot err because the father's misconduct made joint legal custody unreasonable. Id. at 731. In so holding wenoted, “[a] parent may not sow seeds of discord and reap improved custody rights.” Id.Mother contends Pierce is applicable here because the trial court awarded Father sole custody of Childrendespite his alleged misconduct in contravention of our holding in Pierce. However, the order that grantedsole legal custody of Children to Father is not before us in this appeal. Instead, the order on appeal denieda motion for a Parenting Time Coordinator and denied a motion to dissolve a restraining order. Pierce doesnot address either of those issues and, thus, is not relevant.7Mother also claims the 2023 Restraining Order was void. Mother first presented this argument in her appellatereply brief and thus it is waived. See Akin v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“the law iswell settled that grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant's initial brief and if addressed for thefirst time in the reply brief, they are waived”).8Mother also argues for the first time in her reply brief that under the “Cumulative Error Doctrine” she was“deprived ... of a fair hearing and reliable outcome.” (Mother's Reply Br. at 10.) However, Mother introducedthis argument for the first time in her reply brief, and thus it is waived. See Akin, 180 N.E.3d at 375 (Ind. Ct.App. 2021) (“the law is well settled that grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant's initial brief andif addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived”).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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