M.H. v. C.S., No. 25A-PO-1492 (Nov. 24, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Slip Copy 2025 WL 3267448 Document Details Outline standard M.H. v. C.S
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Indiana (IN)
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided
Nov. 24, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Weissmann (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.M.H. v. C.S.Court of Appeals of Indiana. | November 24, 2025 | Slip Copy | 2025 WL 3267448Document Detailsstandard Citation:M.H. v. C.S., No. 25A-PO-1492, 2025 WL 3267448 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov.24, 2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 3267448 (Table)Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:IndianaDelivery DetailsDate:November 27, 2025 at 12:24 PMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineAttorneys and LawFirms (p.1)MEMORANDUMDECISION (p.1)All Citations (p.3)
M.H. v. C.S., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3267448Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.(This disposition by unpublished memorandumdecision is referenced in the North Eastern Reporter.)Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),this Memorandum Decision is not bindingprecedent for any court and may be citedonly for persuasive value or to establish resjudicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.Court of Appeals of Indiana.M.H., Appellant-Respondentv.C.S., Appellee-PetitionerCourt of Appeals Case No. 25A-PO-1492|Filed November 24, 2025Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, TheHonorable Ian Stewart, Magistrate, Trial Court CauseNo. 49D05-2504-PO-17994Attorneys and Law FirmsAppellant Pro Se: M.H.MEMORANDUM DECISIONDeBoer, Judge.Case Summary*1 [1] Following a couple of incidents at their place ofwork, M.H. filed petitions for protective orders (POs)against C.S. and A.M. C.S. then filed for a PO againstM.H. After a hearing at which both M.H. and C.S.appeared and testified, the trial court entered a POfor C.S. against M.H, and it denied M.H.’s petitionsfor POs against C.S. and A.M. M.H. now appeals,asserting the judgment is void for myriad reasons. Weaffirm.Facts and Procedural History[2] M.H., C.S., and A.M. work at the same branch ofthe United States Postal Service (USPS) in downtownIndianapolis. On April 5, 2025, M.H. filed PO petitionsagainst C.S. and A.M., and about two weeks later, C.S.filed a petition for a PO against M.H. An evidentiaryhearing was held on all three petitions at the same time.M.H. and C.S. appeared in person, but A.M. did notappear.[3] After the court informed the parties of the formatof the hearing, M.H. and C.S. testified to their versionof events. They both testified that M.H. was in arelationship with another worker at the post office,J.M., who C.S. also began dating at some point. Thiscaused tension between the parties.[4] Both parties agreed and testified about twoincidents relevant to the PO—the first having occurredin February 2025. The first incident involved M.H.approaching C.S. in a part of the facility where C.S.worked and M.H. was not permitted to be. M.H.peppered C.S. with questions about what was going onbetween her and J.M., and C.S. told her she had met hisfamily and they were “cool,” meaning she was friendswith J.M. Transcript at 14. M.H. left after three to fourminutes.[5] Then one morning in April, M.H. went into hersupervisor's office and found C.S. and J.M. sitting inthere as well. She told J.M. that she was “sick of [him]and [his] bitch” and got into a shouting match with C.S.that only dissipated when the supervisor told everyoneto go home. Id. at 29. That incident was still underinvestigation by management on the day of the hearing.C.S. introduced into evidence a document signed bytheir supervisor describing this incident. M.H. had noobjection to its admission.[6] M.H. testified about three other incidents involvingC.S. C.S. denied these accusations. In August 2024,M.H.’s engine was ruined after someone shoved acandy bar inside her gas tank. M.H. testified that shebelieved it was C.S. who had done it. She introducedinto evidence a photograph of a text message fromC.S. sent to J.M.’s phone in which C.S. admitteddamaging M.H.’s car. C.S. denied damaging M.H.’scar or sending any such texts.[7] The next incident M.H. described involved bothC.S. and A.M. She testified that the day before theshouting match in the supervisor's office, A.M., C.S.,and an unnamed coworker sought out M.H. at her work
M.H. v. C.S., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2trailer. She said the unnamed coworker approachedher and began to call her “bitch[ ]” and “tr[ied]to antagonize” her. Tr. at 18. She saw the grouplaughing and joking about it afterward and informeda supervisor of the incident. C.S. testified that thisincident never occurred. M.H. also accused C.S. ofbusting out someone's car windows believing it to beM.H.’s car,1 but again C.S. denied doing so.*2 [8] After hearing all the evidence, the trial courtdenied both of M.H.’s PO petitions. The court grantedC.S.’s petition for a PO against M.H., finding C.S.showed M.H. had harassed her on more than oneoccasion. M.H. subsequently filed a motion to vacatethat PO for lack of due process based on insufficientservice of process, and it was denied. She appeals.Discussion and Decision[9] To the extent M.H. has presented any cogentargument on appeal, she appears to contend the trialcourt's judgment is void for multiple reasons, includinglack of service, consolidation of the cases withoutnotice, improper judicial conduct, and the court'sreliance on false evidence.[10] As an initial matter, we note that C.S. did notfile an appellee's brief. In such circumstances, we willnot develop arguments on her behalf and will onlyreverse if the appellant's brief shows prima facie error.Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind.Ct. App. 2024). “Prima facie error means ‘at first sight,on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quotingJenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App.2014)). We also note that M.H. proceeds in this matterpro se. It is well established that pro se litigants donot receive special consideration by virtue of suchstatus but rather “are bound to follow the establishedrules of procedure and must be prepared to accept theconsequences of their failure to do so.” Kelley v. State,166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quotingBasic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App.2016), reh'g denied).[11] We must first address the procedural issues withM.H.’s appeal. The arguments she raises are notsupported by relevant case law or any standards ofreview. A majority of the case law she cited in her briefis irrelevant to the legal assertions that precede it, andone case she cited simply does not exist. Despite beinga pro se litigant, M.H. is required to adhere to the legalrules, including our appellate rules. Indiana AppellateRule 46(A)(8) requires that an appellant's arguments“be supported by citations to the authorities ...relied on” and “concise statement[s] of the applicablestandard[s] of review[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), (b). Because non-existent and irrelevant case lawcannot support a party's contentions and her brief isdevoid of any standards of review, M.H. has failedto adhere to our appellate rules. See Martin v. Hunt,130 N.E.3d 135, 137-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Whilefailure to comply with the Indiana Rules of AppellateProcedure does not necessarily result in waiver of aclaim, waiver is appropriate when ... the violation ofthose rules substantially impedes our review of theissues alleged.”).[12] Nonetheless, because her failure to adhere to theappellate rules has not so substantially impeded ourreview and “Indiana law strongly prefers disposition ofcases on their merits[,]” we turn to M.H.’s arguments.Coslett v. Weddle Brothers Constr. Co., 798 N.E.2d859, 861 (Ind. 2003), reh'g denied. However, uponreview, they are neither supported by the case law northe record.[13] First, M.H. asserts she was not properly servedwith C.S.’s petition for a PO and thus, the judgmentis void for lack of personal jurisdiction. However,M.H. failed to timely raise this objection, and insteadproceeded with the presentation of her evidenceand the cross-examination of C.S.’s evidence. “Anuntimely defense of insufficient service of process iswaived.” B.A. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 134, 139 (Ind.Ct. App. 2023) (finding the appellant waived herinsufficient service claim because she appeared inperson, did not object at the commencement of thehearing, expressly told the court she was ready toproceed, and objected after both parties had presentedevidence). Here, M.H. did not raise an issue withservice until the end of the hearing after the evidencehad been presented and the court had come to adecision. See Tr. at 52. Given her failure to timelyobject, M.H. did not preserve the issue below and thuswaived it for appellate review.*3 [14] Similarly, M.H. asserts that the judgmentwas void because the trial court did not provide her
M.H. v. C.S., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3with notice before consolidating the three PO cases forpurposes of conducting the hearing. Similar to her firstargument, M.H. never objected to addressing all threeof the petitions at the same hearing, and argumentsnot preserved below cannot be raised for the first timeon appeal. Hochstetler v. State, 215 N.E.3d 365, 376(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“It is well-established that anappellant may not raise issues for the first time onappeal and that failure to raise an issue in the trial courtresults in waiver of an issue for our consideration.”),reh'g denied. Thus, M.H. has also waived this issue onappeal.2[15] M.H. also contends the judge showed bias inviolation of Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct Rule2.3. As evidence of this bias, she points to the judge'sstatement at the beginning of the hearing that she“might want to pay attention to what [the court is]saying instead of looking at [her] phone,” and hisstatement that she “had a full opportunity to litigate”the claim against her when she voiced that she had notbeen properly served. Tr. at 7, 57. These unremarkablestatements were made by the judge to ensure the partiesfollowed courtroom procedures, the hearing produceda fruitful and complete record, and the pro se litigantsunderstood the court's reasons for its decisions. Thesestatements did not indicate the judge was biased orprejudiced against M.H. See Chappey v. Storey, 204N.E.3d 932, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (noting that toshow prejudice or bias, “a party must show that thetrial judge's action and demeanor crossed the barrier ofimpartiality and prejudiced that party's case.” (quotingHarris v. Lafayette LIHTC, LP, 85 N.E.3d 871, 878(Ind. Ct. App. 2017)), trans. denied.[16] Lastly, M.H. contends that the judgment is voidunder Trial Rule 60(B)(3) because it was based onC.S.’s “materially false” evidence. Appellant's Briefat 9. However, M.H. did not seek relief from the trialcourt on that basis pursuant to Rule 60(B) and thus herlast argument is nothing more than a request for thiscourt to reweigh evidence. M.H.’s final argument fails,as it is not the role of appellate courts to review andweigh evidence, see P.D. v. D.V., 172 N.E.3d 306, 310(Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that appellate courts “donot reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of[ ] witnesses”).Conclusion[17] Because M.H. failed to prove the trial court'sjudgment is void, we affirm.[18] Affirmed.Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3267448 (Table)Footnotes1M.H. intentionally listed the wrong address on her PO filing because she “didn't want [C.S. and A.M.] to know[her] physical address[.]” Tr. at 42. She alleged that C.S. and two other girls went to that address in April andbusted out the windows of the car parked there, believing it was M.H.’s car. She claimed they were caughton camera but did not produce any such video or photographic evidence.2M.H. claims she was not given the opportunity to present evidence against A.M., but this is not supportedby the record. She was given the opportunity, and was in fact told, to present evidence supporting her claimagainst both C.S. and A.M. And although she claims that she did not present any such evidence as to A.M.,the record shows otherwise. See Appellant's Brief at 8; see also Tr. at 8 (the trial court explaining to M.H.that she will present evidence first and that she “need[ed] to offer testimony as to why [she] believe[ed][she] should have a protective order against [C.S.] and [A.M.]”); see also Tr. at 16-18 (M.H. testifying aboutA.M.’s actions).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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