Mutugu v. Kiaraho, No. 25A-DC-1780 (Feb. 6, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Patrick MUTUGU v. Faith Brenda KIARAHO
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Indiana (IN)
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided
Feb. 6, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Panel
May (J.); Mathias (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
Mutugu v. Kiaraho, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 322741Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.(This disposition by unpublished memorandumdecision is referenced in the North Eastern Reporter.)Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this MemorandumDecision is not binding precedent for any court andmay be cited only for persuasive value or to establishres judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.Court of Appeals of Indiana.Patrick MUTUGU, Appellant-Respondentv.Faith Brenda KIARAHO, Appellee-PetitionerCourt of Appeals Case No. 25A-DC-1780|Filed February 6, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, The HonorableDarren Murphy, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 29D07-2302-DC-001963Attorneys and Law FirmsAppellant Pro Se: Patrick Mutugu, Indianapolis, IndianaAttorney for Appellee: Erik H. Carter, Carter Legal ServicesLLC, Noblesville, IndianaMEMORANDUM DECISIONFelix, Judge.Statement of the Case*1 [1] In its order dissolving the marriage of Patrick Mutugu(“Father”) and Faith Kiaraho (“Mother”), the trial courtawarded Mother sole legal and primary physical custody ofT.M. (“Child”), divided marital property equally, and orderedFather to pay both child support and Mother's attorneys’ fees.Father now appeals, raising 14 issues for our review regardingthe trial court's order. However, because Father's significantnoncompliance with Indiana Appellate Rule 46 substantiallyimpedes our review of all his claims, we dismiss Father'sappeal, grant Mother's request for appellate attorneys’ fees,and remand with instructions.Facts and Procedural History[2] On February 19, 2016, Mother and Father married, andon February 27, 2023, Mother filed a petition to dissolvetheir marriage. On June 27, 2025, after a hearing duringwhich Father appeared pro se, the trial court issued an orderawarding Mother sole legal and primary physical custody ofChild, and ordering Father to pay child support, backdatedto the date of filing. The trial court also ordered an equaldivision of the marital estate but expressly excluded themarital residence's mortgage: “If a mortgage exists, it is to bepaid from Father's half of the marital estate because of both hisfailure and unwillingness to disclose the lien during discoveryor present the lien during the final hearing.” Appellant's App.Vol. II at 130. The trial court then awarded Mother attorneys’fees because “Father's actions throughout this litigation havebeen obstructive and intentionally designed to cause delay.”Id. at 131. Finally, the trial court denied Father's 14 pendingmotions, which he filed after the final hearing but beforethe dissolution order. Father appealed pro se. Mother fileda motion to dismiss Father's appeal for noncompliance withthe Appellate Rules and requested appellate attorneys’ fees;Father filed a corresponding motion to amend his appellant'sbrief.Discussion and Decision1. Mother's Motion to Dismiss is Granted for Father'sNoncompliance with the Appellate Rules[3] Father raises 14 issues on appeal regarding the trialcourt's June 27 dissolution order. Due to Father's significantnoncompliance with Appellate Rule 46, we decline to reachthe merits of his appellate claims and instead grant Mother'smotion to dismiss this appeal. Although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their meritsrather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v.State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v.Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)),if a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is“sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of theissue raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue,id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind.1978)). We may dismiss an appeal when an appellant fails to
Mutugu v. Kiaraho, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2comply with the Appellate Rules. Miller v. Hague Ins. Agency,Inc., 871 N.E.2d 406, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “Althoughwe will exercise our discretion to reach the merits whenviolations are comparatively minor, if the parties commitflagrant violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure wewill hold issues waived, or dismiss the appeal.” Id.*2 [4] The purpose of our appellate rules—especiallyAppellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is toaid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court ofthe burden of searching the record and briefing the case.”Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasisadded) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364(Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). We will not search the record to find abasis for the party's argument. Carter ex rel. CNO Fin. Grp.,Inc. v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)(citing Nealy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 910 N.E.2d 842, 845n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied). Similarly, “[w]e willnot step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion argumentson his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘toopoorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’” Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at364).[5] As a pro se litigant, Father is “ ‘held to the same standardsas a trained attorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniencysimply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp.v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v.Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). Father's appellatebrief is deficient and violates Appellate Rule 46(A) in almostevery possible way. For instance, Appellate Rule 46(A)(4)provides that an appellant's brief shall contain a “Statementof Issues” section that “concisely and particularly describe[s]each issue presented for review.” Father's Statement ofIssues contains cut-off sentences that neither concisely norparticularly describe the issues he intends to raise. Father alsofails to provide citations to the record for all statements of factin his Statement of Case, and numerous statements of fact inhis Statement of Facts, as required by Appellate Rules 46(A)(5) and 46(A)(6)(a), respectively. Father's Statement of Facts,which is less than one page, is entirely argumentative andfails to provide a narrative “in accordance with the standardof review,” Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(b), which, in this case,requires the facts be stated in the light most favorable to thetrial court's ruling, see Goodman v. Goodman, 94 N.E.3d 733,742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting O'Connell v. O'Connell,889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)); see also Ramsey,789 N.E.2d at 488 (requiring Statement of Facts be devoid ofargument).[6] Turning to Father's Argument, he fails to cite legalauthority for the standard of review, relies on nonexistentlegal authorities, and provides incorrect citations for anddescriptions of existent legal authorities. In total, Fathercites 21 legal authorities in his Argument: 14 Indiana cases,2 Indiana statutes, and 5 Indiana rules. Of those 21 legalauthorities, 5 of the 14 cases do not exist. For example,in support of his statement “due process require[s] partiesto receive exhibits with sufficient time to review them,”Father cites to “Thompson v. State, 811 N.E.2d 501, 506 (Ind.Ct. App. 2004).” Appellant's Br. at 13. This case appearsto not exist. The reporter citation provided—“811 N.E.2d501”—leads to Lopes v. Commonwealth, 811 N.E.2d 501(Mass. 2004) (beginning on page 501, ending on page 512).The pincite provided—811 N.E.2d at 506—leads to Lopesv. Commonwealth, as well. A search of Indiana cases for“Thompson v. State” returned no relevant results.[7] Of the 16 legal authorities Father cites that do exist, 11 areincorrectly cited or described. For instance, Father cites “In reEstate of Brown, 587 N.E.2d 686, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)”for the proposition that exhibits, once admitted, “cannot laterbe deemed inadmissible.” Appellant's Br. at 12. The IndianaCourt of Appeals did decide a case named “In re Estate ofBrown” in 1992, however, that case did not address a trialcourt deeming exhibits inadmissible. See Brown, 587 N.E.2dat 689. Rather, the case, at Father's pincite, concerned subjectmatter jurisdiction and venue. See id.*3 [8] In addition to Father's deficient citations to legalauthorities, his Argument also contains incorrect citations tothe record. For instance, although there are several examples,Father cites to evidence in the Appellant's Appendix that thetrial court “dismissed” as “unreliable” or “unauthenticated.”Appellant's Br. at 12. In making this claim, Appellant fails tocite to the dissolution order for his quoted excerpts, and hiscitation to the transcript was to a nonexistent page—“371.” Id.[9] Given Father's citations to “nonexistent legal authoritiesand to real legal authorities that have nothing to do withthe propositions they purport to support,” Cingel v. Ferreri,269 N.E.3d 857, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. not sought,it is likely that Father used generative artificial intelligenceto draft his brief, either in whole or in part. “Citationsto fictitious, AI-generated authority is a growing problemnationwide. Courts have sanctioned both attorneys and pro selitigants for including them in briefs.” Id. (quoting Williamsv. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)). For
Mutugu v. Kiaraho, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3all the reasons stated above, we grant Mother's motion todismiss Father's appeal and deny Father's motion to amendhis appellant's brief.2. Mother is Entitled to Appellate Attorneys’ FeesPursuant to Appellate Rule 66(E)[10] Mother requests that she be awarded appellate attorneys’fees. This court “may assess damages if an appeal, petition,or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damagesshall be in the Court's discretion and may include attorneys’fees. The Court shall remand the case for execution.” App.R. 66(E). We limit application of Appellate Rule 66(E) to“instances when an appeal is permeated with meritlessness,bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose ofdelay.” Gallo v. Sunshine Car Care, LLC, 185 N.E.3d 392,404 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Wagler v. W. Boggs Sewer Dist.,Inc., 29 N.E.3d 170, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)), trans. denied,194 N.E.3d 599 (Ind. 2022). “We must use extreme restraintwhen exercising this power because of the potential chillingeffect upon the exercise of the right to appeal.” Id. (alterationomitted) (quoting Wagler, 29 N.E.3d at 174). Thus, we donot impose sanctions to punish mere lack of merit; rather, wedo so when faced with something more egregious. Bousum v.Bousum, 173 N.E.3d 289, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quotingTroyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),trans. denied).[11] Although Father chose to proceed pro se on appeal,this choice “afford[s] him no inherent leniency simply byvirtue of being self-represented,” and he is “held to the samestandards as a trained attorney.” Auto. Fin. Corp., 250 N.E.3dat 410 (quoting Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 266). Procedural badfaith “occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the formand content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure,omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record,and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require themaximum expenditure of time both by the opposing partyand the reviewing court.” Duncan v. Yocum, 179 N.E.3d 988,1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Boczar v. Meridian StreetFound., 749 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). In light ofFather's procedural bad faith as discussed above, we concludethat Mother is entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees, and weremand to the trial court to determine a reasonable amount ofthe attorneys’ fees.Conclusion[12] For the foregoing reasons, we grant Mother's motion todismiss Father's appeal, grant Mother's request for appellateattorneys’ fees, deny Father's motion to amend his appellant'sbrief, and remand for a determination of Mother's reasonableappellate attorneys’ fees.*4 [13] Dismissed and remanded with instructions.May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 322741 (Table)End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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