Slip Copy 2025 WL 2718488 Document Details Outline standard T.M. v. M.M, No. 25A-PO-677 (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Indiana (IN)
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-PetitionerCourt of Appeals of Indiana. | September 24, 2025 | Slip Copy | 2025 WL 2718488Document Detailsstandard Citation:T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner, No. 25A-PO-677, 2025 WL 2718488 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 2718488 (Table)Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:IndianaDelivery DetailsDate:October 2, 2025 at 3:48 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineAttorneys and LawFirms (p.1)MEMORANDUMDECISION (p.1)All Citations (p.6)
T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2718488Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.(This disposition by unpublished memorandumdecision is referenced in the North Eastern Reporter.)Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),this Memorandum Decision is not bindingprecedent for any court and may be citedonly for persuasive value or to establish resjudicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.Court of Appeals of Indiana.T.M., Appellant-Respondentv.M.M., Appellee-PetitionerCourt of Appeals Case No. 25A-PO-677|September 24, 2025Editor's Note: This decision contains citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist.These invalid citations appeared in the original courtopinion and have been preserved as written since theyare part of the official record. Any links to these invalidcitations have been removed.Appeal from the Marion Superior Court TheHonorable Beth L. Jansen, Magistrate Trial CourtCause No. 49D16-2503-PO-10218Attorneys and Law FirmsPro Se Appellant, Thomas Marshall, Indianapolis,IndianaAttorney for Appellee, Troy P. Tyson, Tyson Law Firm,P.C., Greenwood, IndianaMEMORANDUM DECISIONScheele, Judge.Case Summary*1 [1] T.M. appeals the trial court's grant of aprotective order to Appellee, M.M. He raises six issuesfor our review, which we consolidate and restate asthe following four issues: (1) whether the doctrineof judicial estoppel barred M.M.’s pursuit of thecurrent protective order; (2) whether the trial courtabused its discretion in issuing the protective order; (3)whether the issuance of the protective order violatedhis constitutional rights; and (4) whether Appellantwas prejudiced by judicial bias. We affirm.Facts and Procedural History[2] T.M. and M.M. were married in October 2021. InOctober 2022, T.M. and M.M. separated and petitionedfor dissolution of marriage, which remains pending.In March 2025, M.M. petitioned for a civil protectiveorder, and the trial court held a hearing on March18. M.M. testified about several incidents which shedescribed in her petition.[3] The first incident occurred in December 2021.After having an argument at their home, M.M.retreated to a bedroom, and T.M. texted her about theargument. In their basement, M.M. approached T.M. todiscuss the text messages. T.M. grabbed M.M. by herarms, began yelling at her, and told her that he hatedher. M.M., who was “scared” and “shaking[,]” wentback upstairs. Tr. Vol. II p. 11. Then, T.M. confrontedM.M. in their kitchen and threw a bag of biscuitsacross the room, which hit M.M. in the face. WhenM.M. retreated into a bedroom to call her mother, T.M.cornered her and yelled that “if [M.M.] ever called copsand reported false statements against him, ... he wasgoing to kill [M.M.] and [her] family.” Id. at 12.[4] In October 2022, M.M. was moving out of herhome with T.M. While she was inside waiting formovers to arrive, she saw T.M. remove a black boxfrom her car. She asked T.M. if it was a tracker. Inresponse to why it was on the car, T.M. told M.M.,“I don't know what you do while you go to work andwhile you're out running errands.” Id. at 13.[5] The next month, M.M. was driving to a storeand saw a yellow Jeep enter the store parking lot.Recognizing the vehicle as T.M.’s, M.M. left the store.T.M. followed her onto the highway and off at anotherexit. M.M. pulled her vehicle into a gas station andcalled the police because she “felt uncomfortable andunsafe.” Id. at 14. The police arrived and directed herto drive off in another direction. However, when sheentered her apartment complex about an hour later, the
T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2yellow Jeep was there. See id. at 22. She took a photo ofthe Jeep's license plate and with “no doubt” recognizedthat it was T.M. Id. She called the police again, andT.M. drove out of the apartment complex.[6] In the spring of 2023, M.M. successfully petitionedfor a protective order against T.M. based on theseincidents. After he violated the protective order, T.M.was charged with and pleaded guilty to invasion ofprivacy. As part of his plea agreement, a criminalno-contact order was issued that said, “[T.M.] shallhave no contact with [M.M.] for 360 days withthe exception of future civil legal proceedings andsettlement negotiations between the parties[.]” App.Vol. II p. 106. At the time the criminal no-contactorder was issued, the only pending legal proceedingbetween parties was the dissolution matter. At theadvice of her victim advocate, M.M. cooperated withthe plea agreement and agreed to dismiss the 2023 civilprotective order because a criminal no-contact orderwas issued.*2 [7] Finally, in January 2025, T.M. filed a civil tortclaim against M.M. Through this process, T.M. locatedM.M.’s home address, which she had not provided tohim and never wanted him to have. M.M. testified thatshe believed T.M. was trying to harass her using thediscovery process to obtain “very private information”about her. Tr. Vol. II p. 17. She was also concerned thatT.M. would have direct contact with her through civillitigation, like he had for the protective order hearing,because he was not represented by counsel. See id. at56. M.M. requested that the court issue a protectiveorder that “goes above and beyond” the civil litigationexception to the criminal no-contact order and wouldstop T.M. from contacting her directly in any wayexcept through her lawyer. Id. at 58.[8] Then, T.M., who proceeded pro se in the presentprotective order matter, cross examined M.M. Initially,T.M. questioned M.M. about protective orders shefiled previously and challenged whether M.M. couldnow accuse T.M. of continuing harassment.1 M.M.responded to T.M. that she currently felt a protectiveorder was necessary because “you are harassing me.”Id. at 30. T.M. also questioned M.M. about his civiltort claim. M.M. reiterated her concerns that he wasasking for sensitive information through discovery andhad obtained her home address.[9] T.M. next turned to questioning M.M. to revealinconsistencies between some of her current and priorstatements. Throughout T.M.’s cross-examination ofM.M., the trial court asked questions of T.M. and M.M.to guide the hearing and ensure T.M. was questioningM.M. rather than testifying. See e.g., id. at 42-43.The court repeatedly explained that it wanted T.M. tohave a “fair shake” and be able to present his case.Id. at 36; see id. at 33. However, the court did notpermit T.M. to ask questions about the marriage suchas “why a spouse would want to keep the contentsof their phone secret, the contents of their financialinformation secret, file their taxes separately,” and soon. Id. at 45. The court clearly explained those issueswere “not in [its] lane right now” and that it would onlyconsider the protective order during the hearing. Id.[10] Finally, T.M. presented his direct testimony. Heasserted he had no direct contact with M.M. since theno-contact order was issued, but felt it was his rightto be able to proceed in a civil action against M.M.To challenge M.M.’s position on the protective order,T.M. admitted several of his therapy records whereinhe told his therapist he was a victim of abuse during hismarriage. T.M. concluded “[t]here was no reason for[sic] to be fearful of me, I have not had any contact.”Id. at 64.[11] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial courtgranted the protective order, stating:I believe, I believe your actions taken in totalconstitute harassment.... I am going to order, sir, thatfor a period of two years, you not have contact withher. That you only contact her through her lawyer,and that, that other actions under the various civilmatters, will now be viewed through a lense [sic] ofis this, is this harassing, and does this constitute anabuse of process, I will have to look at that. And in,in the divorce as well. But yes, it is a low burden,and I believe that she has met that burden and hasshown me that it is more likely than not there hasbeen harassment.Id. at 70. T.M. asked for clarification on how he shouldparticipate in discovery for other proceedings. Thetrial court clearly responded that “[e]verything goesthrough him[,]” referring to M.M.’s attorney. Id. at 71.In the court's subsequent written order, the court foundthat T.M. “represents a credible threat to the safety of
T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3[M.M.] or a member of [her] household” and M.M.“has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, thatrepeated acts of harassment ha[ve] occurred sufficientto justify the issuance of this Order.” App. Vol. II p. 3.This appeal ensued.Discussion and DecisionI. Judicial Estoppel*3 [12] As a preliminary matter, T.M. alleges thatthe doctrine of judicial estoppel barred M.M. fromfiling the protective order.2 He claims that “[b]yvoluntarily dismissing her protective order with fullknowledge of the alleged incidents from 2021-2023,and accepting a no-contact order with an exception forcivil proceedings, [M.M.] took a clear position thatthese past incidents did not necessitate the broaderprotections of a protective order[.]” Appellant's Br.pp. 18-19. T.M. goes on, asserting M.M.’s currentposition is “directly contrary” to her previous positionand M.M. wants to “effectively nullif[y]” the civilproceedings exception to the no-contact order. Id.at 19. Finally, T.M. alleges M.M. benefited fromher previous position because T.M. pleaded guilty toinvasion of privacy. We disagree.[13] Our Supreme Court recently summarized theapplication of judicial estoppel:*4 Judicial estoppel is a judicially crafted doctrinederiving from courts’ inherent authority to protectthe judiciary's integrity by prohibiting litigants fromplaying fast and loose with the judicial process.The doctrine does that by preventing litigants fromprevailing on contradictory positions in the same orsubsequent proceedings. The rule is: Where a partyassumes a certain position in a legal proceeding,and succeeds in maintaining that position, he maynot thereafter, simply because his interests havechanged, assume a contrary position, especially if itbe to the prejudice of the party who has acquiescedin the position formerly taken by him.Red Lobster Rest. LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159,169-70 (Ind. 2024) (citations and quotations omitted).In reviewing whether a party is judicially estoppedfrom proceeding, courts tend to focus on threefactors: (1) “whether a litigant's argument is clearlyinconsistent with its earlier argument[,]” (2) “whetherthe litigant successfully persuaded a court to acceptits earlier argument, which means accepting the laterinconsistent position would create the perception thateither the first or the second court was misled[,]” and(3) “whether the litigant's actions would result in anunfair advantage or levy an unfair detriment on theopposition if the court did not apply estoppel.” Id. at170.[14] None of these factors are present here. M.M.’sposition has been clear and consistent in everyrelevant proceeding: that the courts should granther protection from T.M. based on her fear of hisprior and current unwanted contact. M.M. first madethat argument when the 2023 protective order wasgranted, and she supported her position with severalincidents involving T.M. She then cooperated with avictim advocate to obtain the continuing protectionof a criminal no-contact order after T.M. violatedthe 2023 protective order. Finally, M.M.’s positionin the current protective order proceeding remainedconsistent: based on the same previous incidents andadditional, recent incidents, M.M. argued the courtshould grant her protection from T.M. Because M.M.’sargument has been consistent, no court has accepteda contrary position, and T.M. has not been unfairlydisadvantaged. Nothing in the record supports T.M.’sassertion that M.M. took a clear position that she didnot need the broader protection of a protective order.Judicial estoppel does not apply.II. Protective Order[15] In reviewing a trial court's judgment entering aprotective order, “we apply a two-tiered standard ofreview—we consider whether the evidence supportsthe court's findings and, if so, whether those findingssupport the judgment.” S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494,497 (Ind. 2023). “In deference to the trial court'sproximity to the issues, we disturb the order only wherethere is no evidence supporting the findings or thefindings fail to support the order.” J.T. v. A.H., 255N.E.3d 512, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Fox v.Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)),trans. denied. “[W]e neither reweigh the evidencenor determine the credibility of witnesses, and weconsider only the evidence favorable to the trial court'sdecision.” S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 497 (citation omitted).Our Supreme Court further explained:
T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Indeed, our trial courts are far better than appellatecourts at weighing evidence and assessing witnesscredibility. And this is particularly true in protectiveorder cases, where our trial judges see and hearthe parties interact as they relay details aboutintensely personal, traumatic events. Our review ofthis evidence on appeal is far less clear from ourvantage point in the far corner of the upper deck.*5 J.T., 255 N.E.3d at 517 (citing S.D., 211 N.E.3d at497). In addition, the appellant must establish that thetrial court's findings are clearly erroneous, “meaning areview of the record leaves us firmly convinced that amistake has been made.” Id.[16] The Indiana Civil Protection Order Act (CPOA)provides that “[a] person who is or has been subjectedto harassment may file a petition for an orderfor protection against a person who has committedrepeated acts of harassment against the petitioner.”Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(b) (2021). Our legislature hasdefined “harassment” as “conduct directed toward avictim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated orcontinuing impermissible contact: (1) that would causea reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and(2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotionaldistress.” Ind. Code. § 34-6-2-51.5(a) (repealed).3But harassment “does not include statutorily orconstitutionally protected activity[.]” Ind. Code §34-6-2-51.5(b) (repealed).[17] Finally, “[t]o justify the issuance of a protectiveorder, the harassment must objectively include apresent and credible threat.” J.T., 255 N.E.3d at 517(citing S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220 (Ind. 2020)).“A credible threat is plausible or believable.” Id.(internal quotations omitted). “The burden is on thepetitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,that there are reasonable grounds to believe that therespondent presently intends to harm the petitioneror the petitioner's family.” Id. (internal quotationsomitted).[18] T.M. contends the trial court abused its discretionin granting a protection order because there isinsufficient evidence to support the court's findingthat his conduct constituted harassment of M.M.Specifically, T.M. alleges: (1) the evidence supportingthat finding was “largely stale[,]” (2) his filing ofa civil action was legitimate and did not constituteharassment, and (3) the court “failed to properly weighsignificant impeachment evidence[.]”4 Appellant's Br.pp. 20, 34. We disagree.[19] Our review of the record reveals M.M. testifiedthat T.M.’s conduct and interactions with her haveplaced her in fear and caused her emotional distress.She painstakingly recounted the details of severalincidents with T.M.: T.M. threatened to kill M.M.and her family following an argument; T.M. removeda tracker from M.M.’s car, of which she was notpreviously aware; T.M. followed M.M. in his carto various locations including to her then-currentapartment complex. After these incidents, M.M.sought a protective order to end the harassment,and T.M. ultimately pleaded guilty to violating thatprotective order. Then, although a no-contact orderpermitted contact for civil litigation proceedings, T.M.obtained M.M.’s home address against her wishes,utilizing the justice system as an avenue for contact.*6 [20] That M.M. relied on some of these incidentsin obtaining a previous protective order is of nomoment. These contacts occurred repeatedly overseveral years and established a pattern in T.M.’sbehavior. T.M.’s contact did not stop despite M.M.’sefforts to seek or accept protective relief throughprevious civil and criminal proceedings. This Courthas previously held that lapses in time do notnecessarily render a threat less credible. See S.D., 211N.E.3d at 499 (noting that lapses in time or interveningevents do not necessarily render a threat less credible).The CPOA itself provides that a “court may not denya petitioner relief ... solely because of a lapse of timebetween an act of ... harassment and the filing of apetition.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-13 (2019). We are notinclined to hold that a petitioner may not reiterateincidents of prior unwanted contact to establish ahistory of harassing behavior where evidence ofongoing unwanted contact is also provided.[21] T.M. also contends that “a legitimate exerciseof legal rights, such as filing a civil lawsuit throughproper channels, cannot constitute harassment underIndiana law absent evidence of objective baselessnessor malicious intent.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. However,T.M. provides no authority to support his assertion andhas, therefore, waived appellate review of that issue.
T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5See e.g., Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind.2015) (“A litigant who fails to support his argumentswith appropriate citations to legal authority and recordevidence waives those arguments for our review.”).In any event, T.M.’s assertion is incorrect: this courthas previously stated that a claim is frivolous if itis taken primarily for the purpose of harassment—hence, some claims can constitute harassment. SeeBertucci v. Bertucci, 177 N.E.3d 1211, 1225 (Ind. Ct.App. 2021) (citing Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1 (1998) andexplaining that a claim or defense is frivolous if takenprimarily for the purpose of harassment); see also J.T.,255 N.E.3d at 518 (where misuse of civil litigationcan constitute harassment within the meaning of theCPOA).[22] In addition, T.M.’s arguments about the stalenessof his contact with M.M., the method of his mostrecent contact, and the alleged impeachment evidenceof M.M., go to the weight the trial court gave theevidence rather than to its sufficiency. T.M. asks usto reweigh the evidence and judge M.M.’s credibility,which we will not do. See J.T., 255 N.E.3d at 517. Fromthis evidence, the court could reasonably conclude thatT.M.’s contacts with M.M. constituted harassment. Thecourt did not abuse its discretion by issuing a protectiveorder against T.M.III. Constitutionality[23] T.M. also contends the protective order violateshis First Amendment right to petition the courtsand impairs his ability to gather evidence, conductdiscovery, and present his case. In support of hisargument, T.M. reiterates alleged inconsistencies byM.M. and discusses his belief that her pursuit of aprotective order was retaliation for his pursuit of a civiltort against her. But we need not undertake analysis ofthis argument.[24] When granting the protective order, the trial courtclearly stated that T.M. may “only contact [M.M.]through her lawyer” and “other actions under thevarious civil matters, will now be viewed througha [lens] of is this, is this harassing, and does thisconstitute an abuse of process[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 70.When T.M. asked for clarification, the court againresponded clearly and told T.M. that “[e]verythinggoes through him[,]” referring to M.M.’s attorney.Id. at 71. Neither this statement nor the writtenorder prohibit T.M. from engaging in legitimate civillitigation via communication with M.M.’s attorney.Rather, T.M. is “enjoined from threatening to commitor committing acts of harassment against [M.M.]” and“prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning,contacting or directly or indirectly communicatingwith [M.M.]” App. Vol. II p. 3. Whether T.M.’s actionsin any civil matter constitute frivolity or harassment isleft for determination in the trial court with jurisdictionover such matters. T.M.’s constitutional rights have notbeen violated.IV. Judicial Bias*7 [25] Finally, T.M. alleges the trial court “exhibitedprejudicial bias” that deprived him of due processby interrupting him while he was cross-examiningM.M. and by prejudging the issues. Appellant's Br. p.23. Specifically, T.M. points to the court's followingremarks: that the court was “trying not to catch [its]foot on the first hurdle of what you are doing in theseother cases[,]” Tr. Vol. II p. 69, and “it's going to be anugly divorce[,]” Id. at 70. T.M. also alleges the court'sdecision to give less weight to his evidence than toM.M.’s constituted judicial bias. We cannot agree.[26] Because T.M. failed to object to the trial judge'scomments, he has waived the issue for our review.Woods v. State, 98 N.E.3d 656, 664 (Ind. Ct. App.2018) (the issue of bias is waived for our review wherea defendant fails to object to a judge's comments),trans. denied. To overcome waiver, an appellant mustdemonstrate fundamental error, “which is a blatanterror that denies the defendant due process.” Id.[27] Judges are presumed to be unbiased and, to rebutthis presumption, a mere assertion of judicial biasis insufficient. Rochefort v. State, 177 N.E.3d 113,118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Rather, one“must establish from the judge's conduct actual biasor prejudice that places the defendant in jeopardy.” Id.(citation omitted). Such bias or prejudice exists only“where there is an undisputed claim or where the judgeexpressed an opinion of the controversy over which thejudge was presiding.” Id. In reviewing allegations ofjudicial bias, “we examine both the judge's actions anddemeanor.” Id. at 118-19.[28] Here, T.M. cannot rebut the presumption. Therewas no undisputed claim at issue, and the court did
T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6not express an opinion on the merits of the case beforeit. In fact, the court's comment about T.M.’s othercases indicates that the court was carefully ensuring itdid not determine whether actions in the other casesconstituted harassment. Its remark about the divorcecase is inconsequential, as the divorce was not beforethe court. And, as we stated above, it is well withinthe court's discretion to determine the weight andcredibility it applies to the evidence. T.M. has failed tocarry his burden of proof and is not entitled to reliefon this claim.V. Conclusion[29] The court's actions and issuance of the protectiveorder neither violated T.M.’s constitutional rightsnor constituted judicial bias. Because the evidencesupports the court's finding that T.M.’s contacts withM.M. constituted harassment and the credible threatfinding is unchallenged, there is sufficient evidence tosupport the court's issuance of the protective order toM.M. We affirm the trial court's judgment.5[30] Affirmed.Judges Foley and Kenworthy concur.Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2718488 (Table)Footnotes1Without objection, T.M. admitted several protective order petitions filed by M.M. However, the only previouslygranted protective order that is discussed in the record was the 2023 protective order. Supra 6.2We note that T.M. cites to incorrect cases to support his contentions about judicial estoppel. For example,the quotation T.M. provides on judicial estoppel is not found at Morgan County v. Ferguson, 712 N.E.2d1038, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) nor anywhere in that case, Appellant's Br. p. 17.T.M.’s brief is rife with other significant errors. For example: (1) the introduction contains quotations with nocitations, Appellant's Br. p. 7; (2) the citation to Ind. Code § 33-25-1-2 establishes our Court's districts, notour jurisdiction over appeals, Appellant's Br. p. 8; (3) Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 2010), does notprovide authority on judicial bias, Appellant's Br. p. 9; (4) Reynolds v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App.2016) does not exist, Appellant's Br. p. 9; (5) many of T.M.’s citations to the transcript do not provide a basisfor the assertion he cites to (see e.g., Appellant's Br. p. 9, where citation Transcript page 31 does not discussinitiation of the parties’ divorce proceeding; Transcript page 37 does not discuss the number of petitions forprotection that M.M. has filed; the quote “future civil legal proceedings and settlement negotiations betweenthe parties” is not on page 25, 26, or 63 of the Transcript); (6) Robison v. Orthopedic & Sports MedicineCenter, 3 N.E.3d 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) does not exist, Appellant's Br. p. 17; (7) Bill v. Bill, 755 N.E.2d1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) does not exist, Appellant's Br. p. 19; (8) Wann v. Wann, 716 N.E.2d 612 (Ind.Ct. App. 1999) does not exist, Appellant's Br. p. 19; (9) the definition of harassment is not located at Ind.Code § 34-26-5-2(c)(2), Appellant's Br. p. 20; and (10) A.H.L. v. C.Y.L., 180 N.E.3d 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)does not exist, Appellant's Br. p. 21.We remind T.M. that pro se litigants are held to the same standard as licensed attorneys, bound to followthe procedural rules, and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so—includingwaiver for failure to present a cogent argument. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 981-82 (Ind. Ct. App.2016). Ind. Appellate Rule 46 provides the form and content that is required of each brief submitted to ourcourt, including that the argument must contain Appellant's contentions supported by cogent reasoning andcitations to authorities, statutes, and the Record. At some point, incorrect and invented citations like theexamples above makes a meritorious review of a case impossible. They may also result in reprimand orsanction. See e.g., Williams v. Kirch, 25A-SC-196, 2025 WL 2383623 (Ind. Ct. App. August 18, 2025) (self-represented litigant admonished for use of citations to fictitious cases); Mid Cent. Operating Eng'rs Health
T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7& Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac LLC, No. 2:24-cv-326, 2025 WL 1511211 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2025) (attorneyfined $6,000 for filing briefs with citations to non-existent cases on three occasions).3Effective July 1, 2025, the definition of harassment was moved from Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51.5 to Ind. Code§ 34-6-2.1-80, but the language did not change.4T.M. does not challenge the court's finding that he posed a credible threat to the safety of M.M. or a memberof her household. In his reply brief, T.M. mentions for the first time, in an issue heading, that there is “NoPresent Threat[.]” An issue raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived. Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville,755 N.E.2d 589, 593 n.6 (Ind. 2001); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C) (“No new issues shall be raisedin the reply brief.”).5T.M. has filed three notices of subsequent events, one motion for oral argument, three motions to supplementthe record, one motion for leave to supplement the record, one motion to stay the protective order pendingthe outcome of this appeal, one motion to expedite this appeal, and one motion to expedite considerationof his motion to stay the protective order, or in the alternative, to expedite this appeal. T.M.’s motions tosupplement seek to admit evidence that was not admitted before the trial court and request that we weighthat evidence in favor of reversal. His motions to stay do not comply with Ind. Appellate Rule 39. And hismotions to expedite are now moot. Each of T.M.’s notices, to the extent that they request relief, and eachof his motions is denied.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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