Wilcox v. Gingrich, No. 25A-PL-1157 (Jan. 30, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Steve WILCOX and Melissa Wilcox v. Matthew A. GINGRINCH and Grateful Home Exteriors, LLC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Indiana (IN)
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided
Jan. 30, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Altice (J.); Foley (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
Wilcox v. Gingrinch, --- N.E.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 249093Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.Court of Appeals of Indiana.Steve WILCOX and MelissaWilcox, Appellants-Plaintiffsv.Matthew A. GINGRINCH and GratefulHome Exteriors, LLC, Appellees-DefendantsCourt of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-1157|Filed January 30, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the Morgan Superior Court, The Honorable SaraDungan, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 55D03-2310-PL-1842Attorneys and Law FirmsAppellants Pro Se: Steve Wilcox and Melissa Wilcox,Indianapolis, IndianaOpinionMay, Judge.*1 [1] Steve and Melissa Wilcox appeal from the trialcourt's judgment following a jury trial on their claimsfor breach of contract, violations of the Indiana HomeImprovement Contracts Act (“HICA”), and fraud againstGrateful Home Exteriors, LLC and Matthew Gingrich. TheWilcoxes raise several issues on appeal regarding juryinstructions, the sufficiency of evidence supporting thejury's verdicts, damages calculations, and cumulative error.However, the Wilcoxes’ arguments are waived due to theirsignificant noncompliance with Indiana Appellate Rule 46.We accordingly affirm.Facts and Procedural History[2] The Wilcoxes own property on Sichting Road inMartinsville, Indiana. The property includes a pole barnstructure that the Wilcoxes used as a retreat and forentertaining friends. In March 2023, the Wilcoxes metMatthew Gingrich, principal of Grateful Home Exteriors,LLC, and discussed converting the pole barn into a morefunctional residential dwelling by expanding it and improvingthe interior.[3] On or about March 31, 2023, the parties entered aconstruction contract under which Grateful Home Exteriorswould perform various improvements to the structure. Theinitial contract price was approximately $164,000. Thecontract contemplated a fifty percent down payment withprogress payments thereafter.[4] On March 31, 2023, the Wilcoxes paid Grateful HomeExteriors $90,000 as a down payment. This exceeded the fiftypercent contemplated in the contract. Work began in June2023. On July 17, 2023, the Wilcoxes made an additionalpayment of $50,000.[5] On July 31, 2023, the parties discussed updating thecontract to reflect an expanded scope of work. The updatedcontract price was $223,196.67. The expanded work includedadditional plumbing for two bathrooms, a kitchen, washer anddryer connections, garage floor drain, exterior spigots, anda French drain, which would all be connected to the septicsystem. The framing work was expanded to include interiorframing and windows. However, the Wilcoxes never signedthe July 31 updated contract.[6] Throughout the project, Steve Wilcox was present atthe property almost daily, often staying overnight in acamper on the premises. He repeatedly requested informationregarding scheduling, budgets, change orders, specifications,and permitting from Gingrich, project manager Chris York,and subcontractor William O'Neal. Steve Wilcox receivedno substantive responses to these requests. Grateful HomeExteriors did not obtain required building or septic permitsuntil after work stopped, despite repeated reminders. Workon the project ceased in late summer or early fall 2023 whenthe relationship between the parties deteriorated. At the timework stopped, significant portions of the contracted workremained incomplete, including the septic system installation,portions of the plumbing and electrical work, concrete workfor the kitchen addition, and other items.[7] In October 2023, the Wilcoxes filed a complaint in MorganSuperior Court No. 3 alleging three counts: (1) breach ofcontract against Grateful Home Exteriors, LLC; (2) violations
Wilcox v. Gingrinch, --- N.E.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2of HICA against Grateful Home Exteriors, LLC; and (3) fraudagainst Matthew Gingrich individually. Defendants answeredand filed a counterclaim, which they later withdrew.*2 [8] The matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial.Defendants offered no independent expert testimony ordocumentary evidence in rebuttal, relying solely on thetestimony of subcontractor William O'Neal, whose workwas the subject of the deficiencies alleged. The Wilcoxespresented evidence regarding what work had been completedand what remained undone when Grateful Home Exteriorsleft the project. William O'Neal, the primary subcontractorwho performed framing, plumbing, and other work, provideda September 2023 estimate to complete the unfinished work.This estimate included items from the original scope of workthat had not yet been completed, such as the septic systeminstallation ($22,000), French drain installation ($2,400),concrete work for the kitchen addition ($8,500), completionof electrical rough-in work, and other items.[9] The Wilcoxes also presented expert testimony from DanKatz and construction professional Brad Bales regardingdeficiencies in the workmanship and the costs to remedythem. Bales testified that corrections and repairs to the workperformed would cost $61,700. The Wilcoxes contendedthey paid Grateful Home Exteriors $140,000 in total butthat significant work remained incomplete or was performeddefectively.[10] Central to the Wilcoxes’ fraud claim was evidenceregarding misrepresentation of subcontractor costs. TheWilcoxes presented two different documents bearing WilliamO'Neal's company letterhead with different pricing for thesame scope of work. O'Neal testified at trial that he had neverbefore seen one of the documents, did not prepare it, andhad no knowledge of its contents, even though it appeared onhis letterhead. Gingrich testified that he and O'Neal togethercreated the revised document. The Wilcoxes alleged thatGingrich fabricated or altered O'Neal's bid to conceal thecost of project manager Chris York and to inflate the amountsubject to Gingrich's ten percent contractor fee.[11] On April 10, 2025, the jury returned a verdict in favorof the Wilcoxes on Count I (breach of contract) and awardingdamages in the amount of $67,825.44 against Grateful HomeExteriors, LLC. The jury found in favor of Defendants onCount II (HICA violations) and Count III (fraud). The trialcourt entered judgment on the jury verdict.Discussion and Decision[12] The Wilcoxes raise five issues on appeal regarding juryinstructions on HICA, the jury's verdict on fraud, damagescalculations, cumulative error, and attorney's fees. Theyrequest reversal of the judgments on HICA and fraud claims,and recalculation of damages on the breach of contractclaim. However, the Wilcoxes’ briefing fails to comply withAppellate Rule 46.[13] The purpose of our appellate rules – especially AppellateRule 46 governing the content of briefs – “is to aid andexpedite review and to relieve the appellate court of theburden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Millerv. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added)(quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind.Ct. App. 2021)). A party's analysis of an issue on appeal mustbe supported in relevant part by citations to the Appendix orparts of the Record on Appeal upon which the party relies.Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). “[W]e will not search therecord to find a basis for the party's argument.” Carter ex rel.CNO Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735, 755 (Ind. Ct.App. 2012). A party's arguments must be supported by cogentreasoning and citations to legal authority. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashionarguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to beunderstood.’ ” Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Dridi, 172N.E.3d at 364).[14] The Wilcoxes’ choice to proceed pro se does notminimize or negate these requirements. As pro se litigants,the Wilcoxes are “ ‘held to the same standards as a trainedattorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtueof being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)).*3 [15] The Wilcoxes’ brief contains significantdeficiencies. While their Statement of Facts includes somerecord citations, their reliance on nonexistent legal authoritiesas well as their incorrect citations to and descriptions of otherlegal authorities significantly impeded our review.1. Fabricated and Mischaracterized Legal Authorities[16] The Wilcoxes cite numerous legal authorities in theirBrief. Of the cases cited, a substantial number either donot exist or have nothing to do with the propositions theypurport to support. The Wilcoxes’ Table of Authorities lists 22
Wilcox v. Gingrinch, --- N.E.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3cases. However, the Wilcoxes cite additional cases throughoutthe body of their brief that do not appear in the Table ofAuthorities at all, in violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(2). Intotal, counting both the cases listed in the Table of Authoritiesand the additional cases cited only in the brief's text, amajority of the cases are completely fabricated – they do notexist at the citations provided. Of the cases that do exist, manyare grossly mischaracterized or cited for propositions they donot support.1.1. Completely Fabricated Cases[17] The Wilcoxes cite “Reed v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1186 (Ind.2004)” multiple times as primary authority for their argumentthat the trial court had a mandatory duty to provide juryinstructions on HICA. (Appellants’ Br. at 25, 26, 27, 35.)This case appears not to exist at that citation. The reportercitation provided leads to Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v.Indiana Utility Regulatory Comm'n, 810 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind.Ct. App. 2004), a utility rate-making case that has nothing todo with jury instructions, HICA, or any of the propositionsfor which the Wilcoxes cite it. No case named “Reed v. State”was decided by the Indiana Supreme Court in 2004.[18] Similarly, the Wilcoxes cite “Lacy v. State, 419 N.E.2d489 (Ind. 1981)” to support the proposition that trial courtshave “the inherent duty, but the unquestioned authority,to issue a curative instruction whenever juror confusionsurfaces, even mid-trial” and for “upholding judge's suasponte admonition to clarify law.” (Appellants’ Br. at 26.)The citation “419 N.E.2d 489” leads to People v. Harris, 419N.E.2d 489 (Ill. App. 1981), an Illinois criminal case aboutdenial of a continuance request. No case named “Lacy v.State” was decided by the Indiana Supreme Court in 1981.[19] The Wilcoxes also cite “Graves v. State, 773 N.E.2d 157,161 (Ind. 2002)” twice in their brief for the proposition thatthe “trial judge committed reversible error by withholding ajuror note and declining to solicit counsel's input” in violationof Indiana Jury Rule 20(b). (Appellants’ Br. at 26, 45.) Thiscase appears not to exist. The reporter citation “773 N.E.2d157” leads to People v. Johnson, 773 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App.2002). No case named “Graves v. State” was decided by theIndiana Supreme Court in 2002.[20] The Wilcoxes cite “Thompson v. Best” for theproposition that a jury's fraud verdict should be set aside whenunsupported by substantial evidence. (Appellants’ Br. at 30.)However, the brief's citation is internally inconsistent: theTable of Authorities lists the case as “989 N.E.2d 299 (Ind.Ct. App. 2013),” while the body of the brief on pages 30 and36 cites it as “118 N.E.3d 299, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).” Thereporter citation “989 N.E.2d 299” leads to People v. Pinkson,989 N.E.2d 298 (Ill. App. 2013). The reporter citation “118N.E.3d 299” leads to State of Ohio v. Tudor, 118 N.E.3d 297(Ohio App. 2019). No case named “Thompson v. Best” wasdecided by the Court of Appeals of Indiana in 2013 or 2019.*4 [21] Additional fabricated cases include:“Coomer v. Bd. of Transp. of Knox County, 247 N.E.2d 93(Ind. 1968)” (listed in the Table of Authorities as appearingat page 13 of the brief, but it actually appears on page 24).The actual citation leads to West v. Indiana Ins. Co., 247N.E.2d 90 (Ind. 1969). No case named “Coomer v. Bd. OfTransp. of Knox County exists in Indiana;“Ferro Corp. v. Cook, 548 N.E.2d 1088 (Ind. Ct. App.1990)” (listed in Table of Authorities as appearing at page22 of the brief, but appears nowhere in the brief, but itactually appears on page 35). The actual citation leads toIn Interest of R.B.W., 548 N.E.2d 1085 (Ill. App. 1989). Nocase named “Ferro Corp. v. Cook” exists in Indiana;“Ganger v. State, 776 N.E.2d 353 (Ind. 2002)” (listed inTable of Authorities as appearing at page 6). The brief isinternally inconsistent: the Table of Authorities attributes“776 N.E.2d” to “Ganger v. State” but the Wilcoxes latercorrectly cite “776 N.E.2d” as being Stonger v. Sorrell, 776N.E.2d 353 (Ind. 2002). No case named “Ganger v. State”exists in Indiana;“Gosman v. State Farm, 947 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. Ct. App.2011)” (listed in Table of Authorities as appearing at page18 of the brief, but actually appears on page 30). The actualcitation leads to American Serv. Ins. Co. v. United Auto.Ins. Co., 947 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. App. 2011). No case named“Gosman v. State Farm” exists in Indiana;“Heim v. Fletcher, 873 N.E.2d 725 (Ind. Ct. App.2007)” (listed in Table of Authorities as appearing at page25 of the brief, but is not actually cited in the brief). Theactual citation leads to Jones v. State, 873 N.E.2d 725 (Ind.Ct. App. 2007). No case named “Heim v. Fletcher” existsin Indiana;“Helmsing v. Fletcher, 871 N.E.2d 725 (Ind. Ct. App.2007)” (does not appear in the Table of Authorities, but iscited in the brief at page 35 for fraud evidence standards).The actual citation leads to People v. Urdiales, 871 N.E.2d
Wilcox v. Gingrinch, --- N.E.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4669 (Ill. 2007). No case named “Helmsing v. Fletcher”exists in Indiana;“Kovach v. State, 992 N.E.2d 409 (Ind. 2013)” (listed in theTable of Authorities as appearing at page 34, but is cited atpage 43 of the brief for cumulative error analysis standard).The actual citation leads to In re Dashawn W., 992 N.E.2d402 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). No case named “Kovach v.State” exists in Indiana;“Patton v. ALCOA, 861 N.E.2d 232 (Ind. Ct. App.2007)” (listed in the Table of Authorities as appearing atpages 27 and 34, but is cited at pages 39 and 44 of the briefinvolving discovery sanctions and exclusion of testimony).The actual citation leads to Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty.v. Illinois Lab. Rels. Bd., 861 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. App. 2006).No case named “Patton v. ALCOA” exists in Indiana;“Oddi-Sampson v. State, 201 N.E.3d 749 (Ind.2022)” (listed in the Table of Authorities as appearingat page 4, but does not appear in the body of thebrief) and “State v. Oddi-Sampson, 201 N.E.3d 749 (Ind.2022)” (listed in the Table of Authorities as appearing atpage 4, but is cited at page 18 of the brief for the propositionthat courts avoid absurd results). The actual citation leads toCommonwealth v. Kalila, 201 N.E.3d 748 (Mass. App. Ct.2023). No case named “Oddi-Sampson v. State” or “Statev. Oddi-Sampson” exists in Indiana;*5 “Clutter, 648 N.E.2d at 670” (does not appear in theTable of Authorities, is not a full citation, and is cited atpage 41 of the brief for expectation damages rule). Theactual citation leads to Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666(Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Without knowing the full case name,it is impossible to determine whether the “Clutter” caseexists in Indiana;“Flick v. Reichert, 119 N.E.3d 1244 (Ind. Ct. App.2019)” (listed in the Table of Authorities as appearing atpages 26 and 32, but is cited at pages 37 and 41 of the brief).The actual citation leads to State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino,119 N.E.3d 1238 (Ohio 2019). No case named “Flick v.Reichert” exists in Indiana.1.2. Mischaracterized Real Cases[22] Of the cases the Wilcoxes cite that do exist, manyare incorrectly described or cited for propositions they donot support. For example, the Wilcoxes cite “Harrison v.Thomas, 761 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)” in their Tableof Authorities as appearing on page 27 and at page 38 oftheir brief for the proposition that “when a party cannotprove the actual cost of services under a cost-plus or time-and-materials agreement, ‘the only proven cost is zero.’ ”The correct citation for Harrison is actually Harrison v.Thomas, 761 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2002). Harrison is an IndianaSupreme Court decision addressing the interpretation of a realestate purchase agreement's closing date provision. It containsno discussion of cost-plus or time-and-materials contracts,burden of proving costs, or any holding about unproven costsequaling “zero” recovery.[23] The Wilcoxes cite “Kapoor v. Dybwad, 49 N.E.3d108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)” in their Table of Authorities asappearing on page 18 and at page 30 for the propositionthat “[a] jury's fraud verdict is reviewed under the clearlyerroneous standard.” Kapoor actually involves appellatereview of a trial court's dismissal of fraud claims under TrialRule 12(B)(6), which is conducted de novo. The case containsno discussion of jury verdicts, the clearly erroneous standard,or setting aside verdicts.[24] Like Kapoor, the Wilcoxes cite “Weber v. Costin, 654N.E.2d 1130” at pages 30 and 34, not included in their Tableof Authorities, for the proposition that “[a] jury's fraud verdictis reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” They alsocite Weber, stating that “[a] fraud verdict cannot stand wherethe moving party's evidence is unchallenged.” (Appellants’Br. at 34.) Weber addresses summary judgment on counts offraud and waiver of right to trial by jury but does not addressa jury's fraud verdict.[25] The Wilcoxes cite “West v. State, 755 N.E.2d 173,185 (Ind. 2001)” at page 28, not included in the Tableof Authorities, for the proposition that “burden-shift errorsare structural and presumptively prejudicial.” However,“structural error” refers to fundamental constitutional errorsin criminal trials such as denial of counsel. See, e.g., Durdenv. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 653 (Ind. 2018). The Wilcoxes havecited no civil case in which the structural error doctrine hasbeen applied.[26] The Wilcoxes cite “J.S. Sweet Co., Inc. v. White CountyBridge Commission, 714 N.E.2d 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)”at page 39, not included in the Table of Authorities, for theholding that “the contractor's failure to provide detailed costbreakdowns undermined the legitimacy of the charges andjustified the owner's refusal to pay.” The actual J.S. SweetCo. case addresses mechanics’ liens and prejudgment interest,
Wilcox v. Gingrinch, --- N.E.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5and it contains no discussion of cost breakdowns in cost-pluscontracts.*6 [27] The Wilcoxes cite “Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d1258, 1271 (Ind. 2015)” at page 43, not included in theTable of Authorities, for the proposition that Indiana lawrequires appellate courts to consider the “combined impact”of multiple errors in cumulative error analysis. Pierce actuallydiscusses sentencing of a credit-restricted felon in a childmolesting case and includes no discussion of cumulative errordoctrine.[28] The Wilcoxes also cite “Butler Motors, Inc. v. Benosky,181 N.E.3d 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)” in their Table ofAuthorities as appearing on page 3 and on page 17 oftheir brief, but the actual case citation is at 181 N.E.3d304. The brief mischaracterizes the case as standing for theproposition that “Indiana's consumer-protection statutes areroutinely read in concert with fraud and unjust-enrichmentclaims,” (Appellants’ Br. at 17), when the case actuallyinvolved dismissal of claims involving the Deceptive ActsStatute, Ind. Code Sec. 24-5-0.5-3. See 181 N.E.3d at 309.2. Further Violation of Appellate Rule 46[29] In addition to citing fabricated and mischaracterizedcases, the Wilcoxes violated Appellate Rule 46(A)(2) byfailing to include numerous cases in their Table of Authoritiesthat they cite in the body of their brief. Appellate Rule 46(A)(2) requires the Table of Authorities to “list each case, statute,rule, and other authority cited in the brief, with references toeach page on which it is cited. The authorities shall be listedalphabetically or numerically, as applicable.” The followingcases (real and fabricated) are cited in the brief but do notappear in the Table of Authorities:Miller v. Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 878 N.E.2d 346 (Ind.Ct. App. 2007);Graves v. State, 773 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. 2002);West v. State, 755 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 2001);Weber v. Costin, 654 N.E.2d 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995);J.S. Sweet Co., Inc. v. White County Bridge Comm'n, 714N.E.2d 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999);Clutter, 648 N.E.2d at 670 (cited at page 41);Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258 (Ind. 2015);Helmsing v. Fletcher, 871 N.E.2d 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).The Wilcoxes’ failure to include cited authorities in the Tableof Authorities further impeded our review and violated theexpress requirements of the appellate rules.3. Presumed Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence[30] The pattern and nature of the citation errors in theWilcoxes’ brief strongly suggest the use of generativeartificial intelligence without adequate verification. Fourteencompletely fabricated cases, systematic mischaracterizationsof real cases, and citations leading to Illinois, New York,Ohio, and Massachusetts cases when Indiana authority isclaimed point to reliance on AI-generated research thatwas never independently confirmed. This case illustratesa troubling trend. Litigants – both represented and prose – increasingly rely on artificial intelligence tools toconduct legal research and draft briefs. While these toolscan be useful, they also generate fabricated citations. SeeWilliams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App.2025) (cautioning attorneys and pro se litigants against usingartificial intelligence tools to conduct legal research withoutindependent citation verification because of the increasingoccurrence of fictitious, AI-generated authorities).[31] Courts nationwide have confronted this problem andimposed sanctions on attorneys and pro se litigants alikewho file briefs containing fictitious authority. See, e.g., MidCent. Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVacLLC, No. 2:24-CV-00326-JPH-MJD, 2025 WL 1511211, at2 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2025); Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024); Shahid v. Esaam, 918 S.E.2d 198(Ga. Ct. App. 2025). The solution is straightforward: verifyevery citation before filing. A simple check of the reportervolumes or online databases would have revealed that “Reedv. State, 810 N.E.2d 1186 (Ind. 2004)” does not exist, andthat Graves v. State, 773 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind. 2002) leadsto an Illinois post-conviction relief case. Had the Wilcoxesperformed basic verification, the waiver we find today couldhave been avoided.*7 [32] The pattern of fabrication is particularly concerningbecause the Wilcoxes built their primary legal argumentson these nonexistent authorities. For instance, their entireargument regarding the trial court's alleged mandatory duty toprovide HICA jury instructions rests on the fabricated “Reedv. State, 810 N.E.2d 1186 (Ind. 2004)” case, which they citeas establishing that trial courts have a “non-delegable duty ‘to
Wilcox v. Gingrinch, --- N.E.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6see that the jury is properly instructed on all matters of law.’” (Appellants’ Br. at 25, 27.) When the foundational authorityfor a legal argument does not exist, we cannot evaluate themerits of that argument.4. Waiver is Warranted[33] We have a well-established preference for deciding caseson their merits, rather than on procedural grounds like waiver.Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015). “While weare often tolerant of minor infractions of the appellate rulesso that we may decide appeals on their merits, those rules arenonetheless binding on all persons bringing appeals to thiscourt.” Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Ramsey v. Rev. Bd.of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind.Ct. App. 2003)). As a result, if a party's failure to complywith the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impedeour consideration of the issue raised,” we will not addressthe merits of that issue. Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1267 (quotingGuardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1007 (Ind. 1978)).[34] The Wilcoxes’ briefing errors go far beyond minorinfractions. “A party waives an issue where the party failsto develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citationto authority and portions of the record.” In re Garrard,985 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Here, theWilcoxes’ lack of cogent argument – built as it is on fabricatedand grossly mischaracterized legal authority – impedes ourability to provide meaningful appellate review of any of theirissues. The pervasive reliance on nonexistent cases makesit impossible to assess whether the Wilcoxes have raisedmeritorious legal issues. We cannot step into the shoes ofadvocates and independently research and brief their casefor them. Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657. Because the Wilcoxes’noncompliance with the appellate rules substantially impedesus from reaching the merits of this appeal, we are compelled tofind that the issues the Wilcoxes attempted to raise are waived.See Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 366 (waiving claims when briefingfailures impeded review).[35] We acknowledge that pro se litigants face distinctchallenges when using generative artificial intelligence toolsfor legal research. Such litigants may be unaware that thesetools frequently generate fictitious case names and citations.Additionally, pro se litigants often lack access to professionallegal databases that would allow them to verify whether acitation actually exists. See Dukuray v. Experian Info. Sols.,No. 23 Civ. 9043, 2024 WL 3812259, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.July 26, 2024) (recognizing that pro se litigants may lackawareness of AI's tendency to fabricate citations and maynot have access to Westlaw or Lexis to verify case citations),adopted, 2024 WL 3936347 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2024). Thesepractical realities, however, do not excuse the filing of briefsthat rely on nonexistent legal authority. Pro se litigants areheld to the same standards as licensed attorneys, and courtsdo not accommodate litigants – whether represented or not– who support their arguments with fabricated cases. See id.(declining to impose sanctions but warning pro se plaintiffthat future filings with fabricated citations may result insanctions); Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 564 P.3d1117, 1124 (Colo. App. 2024) (holding that pro se litigantsmust follow the same procedural rules as attorneys and acceptthe consequences of their errors, including the submission ofAI-generated fictitious citations). The harms caused by suchfilings are significant: they waste the resources of opposingparties and the courts, and they erode public confidence inthe integrity of legal proceedings. See Dukuray, 2024 WL3812259, at *11 (observing that fabricated citations wastethe opposing party's time and resources, consume judicialresources, and cause reputational harm to the legal system).*8 [36] There is no appellee herein to request sanctions, andthe appellate record does not reflect that the Wilcoxes havepreviously filed documents containing fabricated citations.Under these circumstances, we decline to impose sanctions.We caution the Wilcoxes, however, as well as all litigants whoappear before this Court, that the submission of briefs citingnonexistent authorities in future proceedings may result insanctions. Such sanctions could include the striking of filings,restrictions on future submissions, monetary penalties, ordismissal of the appeal. See id. (discussing sanctions such asstricken submissions, filing restrictions, dismissal of the caseor monetary penalties).Conclusion[37] The Wilcoxes’ appellate brief containspervasive citations to fabricated legal authorities andmischaracterizations of real legal authorities that significantlyimpeded our review. These deficiencies, combined withsystemic violations of the Table of Authorities requirement,constitute substantial noncompliance with Appellate Rule46 warranting waiver. We therefore affirm the trial court'sjudgment.[38] Affirmed.Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.
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