son on an average of two times a month immediately after his marriage with Christa was dissolved, and the visits increased to an average of five times a month by the time of the hearing.
On October 25, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Williams filed a petition for custody. On November 9, 1979 Jerry filed a petition for modification of the original custody decree. The trial court denied Mr. and Mrs. Williams’ petition for custody and granted Jerry’s petition for modification of custody.
Mr. and Mrs. Williams present on appeal the issue of whether or not the trial court abused its discretion by statements made at the end of the hearing. They contend the trial court abused its discretion by stating it had no discretion in awarding custody of the child, and thus its ruling was contrary to law.
This Court’s standard for reversal for abuse of discretion is clear. An abuse of discretion that would permit this Court to reverse a trial court’s determination must be an erroneous conclusion reached by the trial court with is clearly against logic and the facts and circumstances before the court or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Summerlot v. Summerlot (1980), Ind. App., 408 N.E.2d 820;
Dunbar v. Dunbar et al. (1969), 145 Ind. App. 479, 251 N.E.2d 468.
The manifest abuse of discretion standard is equally applicable to cases involving modification of child custody. D. H. v. J. H., supra.
The statements made by the trial court which are objected to by the Williams when read in context are not sufficient to establish that the trial court reached an erroneous conclusion in this case. The following are excerpts from statements made by the trial court:
“There can be no question, it’s uncontro-verted, that a change in circumstances occurred since the Court initially awarded custody to the mother. The whole situation is made more difficult because in this type of situation where grandparents are contesting against the biological parent, there is superimposed upon the Court the various findings and rulings which the Court dare not summarily reverse The case law in this area is so abundantly clear that the Court simply, except for applying the fact situation, has absolutely no discretion and any reading of case law in this area would clearly indicate that. .. .
The only way that the Court has a choice is if the facts prevent the Court from doing what the case law dictates.
“The law books clearly indicated that unless both biological parents are incapable of assuming the right, they have an abundance of rights which are difficult at best to understand.”
The Williams contend that the trial court either misunderstood or misapplied the law in Indiana. To begin with, this Court presumes that a trial court knows the law in Indiana. However, in this case counsel for Jerry quoted an Indiana case in his closing argument which advised the trial court of the presumption in favor of natural parents but that the presumption could be overcome if the parents were unsuitable.
In a case similar to the one before us, Hendrickson v. Binkley (1974), 161 Ind.App. 388, 316 N.E.2d 376, this Court set up a three-part test for rebutting the presumption in favor of natural parents. In Hen-drickson this Court held that although the child had been awarded to his mother by the court at the time of the divorce, after the death of the mother, the father was entitled to custody of the child over the maternal grandparent. The Court laid out the three-step test as follows:
“First, it is presumed it will be in the best interests of the child to be placed in the custody of the natural parent. Secondly, to rebut this presumption it must be shown by the attacking party that there is, (a) unfitness, (b) long acquiescence, or (c) voluntary relinquishment such that the affections of the child and third party have become so interwoven that to sever them would seriously mar and endanger