Hunt v. True Sky Fed. Credit Union, No. 25-1209-JWB (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Roosevelt Hunt, Jr. v. True Sky Federal Credit Union
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Kansas (KS)
Court
Kansas Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
John W. Broomes (C. J.) (unanimous Court)
ROOSEVELT HUNT, JR., Plaintiff, v. TRUE SKY FEDERAL..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 516955Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Kansas.ROOSEVELT HUNT, JR., Plaintiff,v.TRUE SKY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Defendant.Case No. 25-1209-JWB|02/25/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsRoosevelt E. Hunt Jr., Bel Aire, KS, Pro Se.Vincent Edward Gunter, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani,LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.JOHN W. BROOMES, CHIEF UNITED STATESDISTRICT JUDGEMEMORANDUM AND ORDER*1 This matter is before the court on Defendant's motionto dismiss. (Doc. 18.) The motion has been fully briefedand is ripe for decision. (Docs. 19, 20, 22.) The motion isGRANTED IN PART and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENTIN PART for the reasons stated herein.I. FactsThe facts set forth herein are taken from the amendedcomplaint and the exhibits attached thereto. (Doc. 15.)Plaintiff obtained a car loan from Defendant for his 2020Toyota Camry. Plaintiff also had deposit accounts withDefendant in excess of $28,000 during the relevant timeperiod. (Id. 11.) On December 8, 2023, Plaintiff traded inhis vehicle to CarMax. CarMax agreed to pay off the loanbalance with Defendant. On January 5, 2024, CarMax issueda check to Defendant on the loan. The check, however, didnot cover the entire balance owed and there was a shortfall of$45.77. (Id. 7.) In February, Plaintiff contacted Defendantwho told Plaintiff that the account was late. On March 25,CarMax issued a supplemental payment of $290.65. This wasdeposited on April 2 and it was sufficient to cover the loan infull. (Id. 10.)Although the loan was paid off in April 2024, Defendantbegan reporting to TransUnion credit bureau that Plaintiff'saccount was 30-days delinquent. (Id. 14.) In January2025, Plaintiff discovered the derogatory tradeline during amortgage application. He then gathered records regarding thepayoff amounts. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied creditfrom multiple banks as a result. These actions occurred inJanuary, April, and June 2025. (Docs. 15-3, 15-4, 15-5.)Plaintiff repeatedly complained to Defendant that the loanwas paid off and the reporting was inaccurate but it was notcorrected. On July 3, Plaintiff submitted a written disputeto TransUnion. (Doc. 15 17.) On or about August 12, thetradeline was corrected.Plaintiff filed this action asserting a violation of the FairCredit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), aclaim for breach of contract, and a claim for breach of the dutyof good faith. Defendant now moves to dismiss.II. StandardIn order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state aclaim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain enoughallegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10thCir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544(2007)). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferencesderived from those facts are viewed in the light most favorableto Plaintiff. Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10thCir. 2008). Conclusory allegations, however, have no bearingupon the court's consideration. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla.,510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007).Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court is to liberallyconstrue his filings. United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972,975 (10th Cir. 2009). However, liberally construing filingsdoes not mean supplying additional factual allegations orconstructing a legal theory on Plaintiff's behalf. Whitney v.New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).III. Analysis
ROOSEVELT HUNT, JR., Plaintiff, v. TRUE SKY FEDERAL..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2A. FCRA Claim*2 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not plausibly stateda claim under the FCRA. The FCRA obligates furnishers ofinformation like Defendant to provide accurate informationto consumer reporting agencies, like TransUnion. 15 U.S.C.§ 1681s–2(a). After receiving notice of a dispute fromTransUnion, a furnisher is to “(1) investigate the disputedinformation; (2) review all relevant information providedby the CRA; (3) report the results of the investigationto the CRA; (4) report the results of the investigationto all other CRAs if the investigation reveals that theinformation is incomplete or inaccurate; and (5) modify,delete, or permanently block the reporting of the disputedinformation if it is determined to be inaccurate, incomplete,or unverifiable.” Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc.,316 F. App'x 744, 750–51 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting §1681s–2(b)). Once receiving such a notice, furnishers must“complete all investigations, reviews, and reports...before theexpiration of the period under section 1681i(a)(1)” which is30 days. § 1681s-2(b)(2). Notably, these duties only arise afterfurnishers like Defendant receive notice from a CRA and notnotice directly from the consumer. Pinson, 316 F. App'x at751. As such, Defendant's failure to take action after receivingverbal notice from Plaintiff is not actionable under the FCRA.In order to state a claim under § 1681s–2(b)(1), Plaintiff mustplausibly allege: (1) he notified a credit reporting agency(“CRA”) of a dispute; (2) the CRA notified Defendant, whowas the furnisher of the information of the dispute; and (3)after notification, Defendant failed to adequately investigate.Keller v. Bank of Am., N.A., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1255(D. Kan. 2017). Plaintiff has alleged that he notified a CRAof the dispute on July 3, 2025. Plaintiff also alleged thatDefendant failed to adequately investigate by failing to deletethe tradeline within 30 days.Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has failed to plausiblyallege that it was notified of the dispute and the contents ofthat notification. In response, Plaintiff asserts that Defendantwas notified by July 6. (Doc. 20 at 2.) Reviewing Plaintiff'sexhibits to his complaint, he has attached emails fromTransUnion reflecting that he submitted a dispute on July 3.On July 6, TransUnion informed him that they had contactedDefendant regarding the dispute. (Doc. 15-9.) Therefore, atthis stage of the proceedings the court finds that Plaintiffhas plausibly alleged a violation of the FCRA. Plaintiff'scomplaint and exhibits reflect that Defendant was notifiedof Plaintiff's dispute challenging the negative tradeline on orbefore July 6 and Defendant did not investigate the tradelinewithin 30 days as required by the FCRA.Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed tosufficiently allege an injury that occurred during the timeframe at issue: July 3 to August 12. Plaintiff must have aninjury in fact to have standing to bring his claim. TransUnionLLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). Plaintiff hasalleged that he was injured due to the denial of credit, creditscore deduction, increased loan interest rates, and loss offavorable credit terms. (Doc. 15 31.) Plaintiff's factualallegations and exhibits, however, relate to a time periodprior to July 3. (Id. 24, Doc. 15-3, 15-4, 15-5.) In hisresponse to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that he hassuffered injuries during the requisite time period. (Doc. 20at 2.) Therefore, the court will allow Plaintiff to amend hiscomplaint to allege injuries that occurred in the time periodrelevant to his FCRA claim. Should he fail to file an amendedcomplaint, his complaint will be dismissed without prejudicefor lack of standing.B. Breach of Contract and Breach of the Duty of GoodFaithPlaintiff has also alleged breach of contract and a separateclaim of breach of the duty of good faith. The court willaddress these claims together as a claim of breach of duty ofgood faith is simply another theory of breach of contract. Todetermine what law applies to Plaintiff's state law breach ofcontract claim, the court applies the substantive law of theforum state, including its conflict-of-laws rules. Emps. Mut.Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1170 (10thCir. 2010). Kansas “follows the general rule that the law ofthe state where the [ ] contract is made controls.” Safeco Ins.Co. of America v. Allen, 941 P.2d 1365 (1997). However,“[w]here the parties to a contract have entered an agreementthat incorporates a choice of law provision, Kansas courtsgenerally effectuate the law chosen by the parties to controlthe agreement.” Brenner v. Oppenheimer & Co., 44 P.3d 364,375 (Kan. 2002). Here, the agreement states that the law ofDefendant's headquarters will apply. (Doc. 15-7 at 3.) Bothparties agree that Defendant's headquarters are in Oklahomaand that Oklahoma law applies. Therefore, the court will lookto Oklahoma law.1*3 To prevail on his claim of breach of contract, Plaintiffmust show “(1) formation of a contract; (2) breach of thecontract; and (3) damages as a result of that breach.” Morganv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 488 P.3d 743, 748 (Okla.
ROOSEVELT HUNT, JR., Plaintiff, v. TRUE SKY FEDERAL..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.32021). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached theloan agreement by failing to apply the funds in his depositaccount to his outstanding car loan. In moving to dismiss,Defendant argues that it does not have a duty under theagreement to apply the deposit funds to the outstandingloan balance; rather, the provisions at issue are discretionary.(Doc. 19 at 7–8.) Plaintiff acknowledges that the dutieshe referred to in his amended complaint are discretionaryand fails to otherwise respond to Defendant's argument insupport of dismissal.2 (Doc. 20 at 3.) Plaintiff also fails toidentify a provision in the loan agreement that Defendant hasallegedly breached. Therefore, his claim of breach of contractis subject to dismissal as Plaintiff has not plausibly allegedthat Defendant breached the loan agreement.Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the contract byfailing to act in good faith in performing the loan agreement.Defendant argues that this claim is subject to dismissalbecause the provisions at issue are discretionary and it cannotbreach the duty of good faith by not undertaking an action itdid not agree to take.Oklahoma courts have recognized that “[e]very contract inOklahoma contains an implied duty of good faith and fairdealing.” Wathor v. Mutual Assur Adm'rs, Inc., 2004 OK 2, 5, 87 P.3d 559, 561. A party may not act in a way that wouldinjure the other party's reasonable expectations or impair theright of the other to receive the contractual benefits. First Nat'lBank & Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 1993 OK 96, 24, 859P.2d 502. However, “the obligation of good faith cannot beemployed to override express contract terms or to obligate aparty to accept additional terms or a material change in thecontract's terms.” Walker v. First Nat'l Bank of Med. Lodge,129 F. App'x 411, 414 (10th Cir. 2005). Further, “the conceptof good faith becomes irrelevant in the interpretation of acontractual provision which grants ‘uncontrolled discretion’to one of the parties.” Devery Implement Co. v. J.I. Case Co.,944 F.2d 724, 729 (10th Cir. 1991).In response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff agrees thatDefendant was not required to use the deposit funds forpayment of his car loan. Plaintiff asserts that Oklahoma“courts hold that when a contract grants one partydiscretionary authority, that discretion must be exercised ingood faith and not in a manner that frustrates the justifiedexpectations of the other party.” (Doc. 20 at 3.) Plaintiff citesto Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 713 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Okla.1985). Hall involved the termination of an employmentcontract and did not stand for the general proposition thatPlaintiff suggests.3 Rather, the Oklahoma Supreme Courtheld that the defendant in that case could not terminate anagreement in bad faith to deprive its agent of fees. Hall, 713P.2d at 1030.*4 Plaintiff's remaining arguments are entirely conclusory.Plaintiff also fails to identify the provisions at issue that werebreached by Defendant's conduct. The provisions allowingDefendant to set off its losses when Plaintiff defaults arediscretionary, i.e. “we may apply these shares and depositsto the payment of all sums due at the time of default.” (Doc.15-7 at 3.) Moreover, they are for the benefit of Defendant andnot Plaintiff. Plaintiff makes no colorable argument as to howDefendant's actions here breached the agreement by failing toact in good faith. In the absence of Oklahoma law in supportof his claim that Defendant's actions were a violation of itsduty to act in good faith, the court will not read the agreementto require Defendant to set off funds from Plaintiff's depositaccount to pay the outstanding balance on his car loan.IV. ConclusionDefendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 18) is GRANTEDIN PART and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT IN PART.Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract are dismissed.Defendant's motion is taken under advisement as to Plaintiff'sFCRA claim. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint settingfor his FCRA claim on or before March 1, 2026 to address thedeficiencies identified herein. Failure to do so will result in adismissal without further notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Datedthis 25th day of February, 2026.__s/ John W. Broomes __________JOHN W. BROOMESCHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 516955
ROOSEVELT HUNT, JR., Plaintiff, v. TRUE SKY FEDERAL..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Footnotes1The court notes that application of Kansas law in this case would also result in dismissal of the breach ofcontract claims.2Although Plaintiff's argument section is titled “Plaintiff's contract claims are properly pled,” Plaintiff onlyaddresses his claim of breach of the implied duty of good faith. (Doc. 20 at 3.)3Plaintiff also cites to a non-existent case in support of his arguments on the FCRA claim. (Doc. 20 at 1) (citingto Howard v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2019 WL 1401348 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2019)). There is no case with such acaption in Westlaw and Plaintiff has not provided a case number for the court to locate the case in its records.Since the filing of Plaintiff's brief, this court has entered a standing order on the use of Artificial Intelligence(“AI”) in court filings. Standing Order 26-01 (In Re: Use of Artificial Intelligence In Preparing Court Filings).This order requires a litigant to review and verify the accuracy of all content filed with the court that wasdrafted or assisted using an AI tool. Should Plaintiff violate this standing order in subsequent filings, he canbe subject to sanctions as set forth in the standing order.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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