Queen v. Kansas City, No. 25-2292-JAR-TJJ (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Douglas Stuart Queen v. Kansas City et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Kansas (KS)
Court
Kansas Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Julie A. Robinson (J.) (unanimous Court)
DOUGLAS STUART QUEEN, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS CITY, KANSAS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2845025Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Kansas.DOUGLAS STUART QUEEN, Plaintiff,v.KANSAS CITY, KANSAS POLICE DEPARTMENT,CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, UNIVERSITYOF KANSAS MEDICAL CENTER, KANSASCITY, KANSAS FIRE/EMS RESCUE,MISSION ROAD STUDIOS, LLC, Defendants.Case No. 25-2292-JAR-TJJ|10/07/2025JULIE A. ROBINSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGEMEMORANDUM AND ORDER*1 Plaintiff Douglas Stuart Queen, proceeding pro se andin forma pauperis, filed this action on May 29, 2025,alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americanswith Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Kansas law againstthe following Defendants: Kansas City, Kansas PoliceDepartment; City of Kansas City, Kansas; University ofKansas Medical Center; Kansas City, Kansas Fire/EMSRescue; and Mission Road Studios, LLC. Before the Courtare Defendant Mission 200, LLC's Motion to Dismiss CountIV of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 41) and Motion to Dismissby University of Kansas Hospital Authority (Doc. 36).1 Alsobefore the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment(Doc. 45) and Amended Motion for Default Judgment (Doc.55), seeking default against the City of Kansas City, Kansas;Kansas City, Kansas Police Department; and Kansas City,Kansas Fire/ EMS Rescue. These motions are ripe, and theCourt is prepared to rule. For the reasons stated below,the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss and deniesPlaintiff's motion for default judgment against the KansasCity, Kansas municipal entities.I. Motions to DismissA. BackgroundThe following facts are alleged in the Complaint and assumedto be true for purposes of deciding this motion. On May 15,2025, Kansas City, Kansas police officers arrested Plaintiffbased on false statements reported by his landlord, MissionRoad Studios, LLC, that he stole lumber from the apartmentdumpster. Police used excessive force during his arrest.Kansas City, Kansas EMS eventually arrived and transportedPlaintiff to the University of Kansas Medical Center where hewas never seen by a provider and quickly discharged. Plaintiffwas forced to walk home with no shoes, cane, or escort.When he was in custody, police took his motorcycle keysand $10,000 in cash from his wallet. Sheriff's DepartmentMental Health Officer Natalie Canale told Plaintiff that hisarrest was based on mistaken identity and told him that hiscitation would be disposed of, but “Plaintiff has received noformal record or correction.”2Plaintiff alleges six claims in the Complaint: (1) false arrestand excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against theKansas City Kansas Police Department; (2) Civil Theftand Property Deprivation against the Kansas City, KansasPolice Department and the City; (3) deliberate indifferenceto medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “Jailand EMS”; (4) ADA violation and disability discriminationagainst all Defendants; (5) negligent medical dischargeagainst University of Kansas Medical Center; and (6) falsearrest and defamation against Mission Road Studios, LLC.B. Standard*2 To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegationsthat, assumed to be true, “raise a right to relief above thespeculative level”3 and include “enough facts to state aclaim to relief that is plausible on its face.”4 The plausibilitystandard does not require a showing of probability that “adefendant has acted unlawfully,” but requires more than“a sheer possibility.”5 “[M]ere ‘labels and conclusions,’and ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause ofaction’ will not suffice; a plaintiff must offer specific factualallegations to support each claim.”6 The Court must acceptthe nonmoving party's factual allegations as true and may notdismiss on the ground that it appears unlikely the allegationscan be proven.7 The Court will view all well-pleaded factualallegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.8 Andbecause Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must construe hisfilings liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard thanformal pleadings drafted by attorneys.9 However, Plaintiff's
DOUGLAS STUART QUEEN, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS CITY, KANSAS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2pro se status does not excuse him, from complying withfederal and local rules.10C. DiscussionBoth Defendants move to dismiss Count IV, and UKHAmoves to dismiss Count V. The Court addresses each claimbelow.1. Count IV, ADA ClaimBoth Defendants move to dismiss the ADA claims allegedagainst them in Count IV. They argue that Plaintiff failsto allege what specific provision of the ADA was violatedor identify any other applicable law that he relies onfor this claim. They also argue that the claim should bedismissed because he has failed to allege facts that supportdiscriminatory conduct by them. Plaintiff wholly fails toaddress this claim in either of his responses to the motions todismiss. His responses only address his constitutional claims,none of which are the subject of these Defendants’ motionsto dismiss, and none of which are alleged against these twoDefendants.11Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual witha disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excludedfrom participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjectedto discrimination by any such entity.”12And the SupremeCourt has held that “failure to accommodate persons withdisabilities will often have the same practical effect as outrightexclusion,” thus, Title II imposes “an affirmative obligation toaccommodate persons with disabilities.”13 To state a claimunder Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must allege facts tosupport the following elements:(1) that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability;(2) that he or she was either excluded from participationin or denied the benefits of some public entity's services,programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminatedagainst by the public entity; and(3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discriminationwas by reason of the plaintiff's disability.14Courts recognize two types of claims under the secondelement: “(1) exclusion from or denial of benefits and (2)discrimination.”15*3 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following factsrelevant to his ADA claim: (1) he is a disabled individual;(2) when he was arrested, the arresting officer mocked hisdisability; and (3) at the hospital, Plaintiff was not seen by adoctor and was quickly discharged, “despite his condition,”causing him to walk home with no shoes or escort, whichendangered his health. Although Count IV is alleged againstall Defendants, he fails to allege any facts to support an ADAclaim against Mission Road Studios—he alleged a policeofficer mocked his disability, and that UKHA improperlydischarged him. Thus, the ADA claim against DefendantMission Road Studios must be dismissed.16As to UKHA, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support thesecond or third elements of a Title II ADA claim. Theonly conduct Plaintiff alleges by UKHA is that he wasnever seen by a doctor, and that he was quickly dischargedand forced to walk home. Plaintiff does not allege thatthe hospital refused to treat him. Nor does Plaintiff allegeany facts that would lead to the reasonable inference thatUKHA discharged him or declined to provide him withservices because of his disability. He alleges that he told EMSthat he “was not allowed on KU campus and specificallyrequested to be taken to St. Luke's Hospital,” but “EMSignored this request.”17This fact belies a claim that Plaintiffwas discharged due to his disability; instead suggesting thatPlaintiff was prohibited from KU property before the May15 incident even happened. Because Plaintiff fails to allegea plausible ADA claim against UKHA, that claim must bedismissed.2. Count V, Negligent Medical Discharge Against UKHAOnlyPlaintiff alleges a claim against UKHA for negligentlydischarging him from the hospital on May 15. Liberallyconstruing Count V as a claim for medical malpractice,18Plaintiff must allege facts to support the following elements:(1) a duty existed; (2) Defendant breached that duty; and(3) causation between the duty breached and the injurysuffered.19 UKHA moves to dismiss because Plaintiff failsto allege what act or omission constituted a breach of thestandard of care, and because he fails to allege an injury thatresulted from the alleged breach. As with Count IV, Plaintifffails to address this claim in his response to UKHA's motionto dismiss.
DOUGLAS STUART QUEEN, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS CITY, KANSAS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3The Court agrees that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that wouldsupport a medical malpractice claim against UKHA. Plaintifffails to identify a decision, treatment, or lack thereof by amedical professional that constitutes a breach of the hospital'sduty of care to Plaintiff. And the facts alleged suggest that itwas not necessarily the discharge decision that Plaintiff takesissue with, but the fact that he had to walk home withoutshoes, a cane, or an escort. Without facts to support the natureof the breach and that it caused him an injury, he cannot statea plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.II. Leave to AmendWhile the Court recognizes the general rule that pro se partiesshould be allowed leave to amend, it may appropriatelydismiss a claim without allowing an amendment “where it isobvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he hasalleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity toamend.”20 “[T]he district court should allow a plaintiff anopportunity to cure technical errors or otherwise amend thecomplaint when doing so would yield a meritorious claim.”21*4 Here, Plaintiff does not move to amend, nor does hesuggest any changes to his pleading that would cure the errorsidentified in this opinion. In fact, Plaintiff fails to even addressthe claims upon which these Defendants move to dismiss.The Court determines for the reasons explained in this Orderthat Plaintiff cannot prevail on any of the facts alleged in theComplaint, and finds that it would be futile to allow him leaveto amend.III. Motions for DefaultPlaintiff moves for default against the three Kansas City,Kansas entities. In his amended motion for default filed onAugust 5, 2025, Plaintiff asserts that these Defendants wereserved with process but failed to plead or otherwise defend.A defendant must serve an answer within 21 days after beingserved with the summons and complaint or within 60 days ifthe defendant waives service.22 When a party fails to plead orotherwise defend, and that fact is made to appear by affidavitor otherwise, default should be entered against the party.23Obtaining default judgment is a two-step process: (1) theplaintiff must obtain an entry of default, and (2) then theplaintiff may move for the entry of a default judgment.24Judge James conducted a status conference with the partiesafter Plaintiff filed his motions for default judgment. JudgeJames explained in her follow-up order that the addressesPlaintiff had provided for the Kansas City, Kansas municipalentities appeared incorrect and ordered him to file a noticewith the correct addresses by August 29, 2025, after whichthe Clerk would issue new summons for each Defendant.25That same day, Plaintiff submitted his notice, and summonsissued to these entities on August 27, 2025. Thus, Plaintiff'smotions for default judgment must be denied as premature.These Defendants had not been properly served at the timethe motions for default were filed, and their answer deadlinehas not yet expired.26IV. Admonition to PlaintiffPlaintiff proceeds pro se and, as explained by Judge James,he does not meet the standards for appointment of counsel.Nonetheless, Plaintiff is subject to the same rules as attorneyswho appear before this Court. Given the nonresponsive natureof Plaintiff's responses to these motions to dismiss, the Courtis concerned that he may be relying on artificial intelligenceto assist him with his many filings in this case. Plaintiffis cautioned against using artificial intelligence for draftinghis legal documents or citing cases without confirming theiraccuracy. Plaintiff is further directed to review Fed. R. Civ. P.11, which applies to both attorneys and unrepresented parties.IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT thatDefendant Mission 200, LLC's Motion to Dismiss CountIV of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 41) and UKHA's Motionto Dismiss (Doc. 36) are granted. The Clerk is directed toterminate Defendant University of Kansas Medical Center asa party to the action.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT thatPlaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 45) is mootand his Amended Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 55) isdenied.*5 IT IS SO ORDERED.Dated: October 7, 2025S/ Julie A. RobinsonJULIE A. ROBINSONUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DOUGLAS STUART QUEEN, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS CITY, KANSAS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2845025Footnotes1University of Kansas Hospital Authority (“UKHA”) points out in its motion that University of Kansas MedicalCenter is not the correct entity for suit; UKHA operates the hospital and is a separate entity. UKHA appearsfor the limited purpose of responding to the Complaint's pleading deficiencies and does not concede that ithas been properly named or served in this action. Doc. 37 at 2 n.1.2Doc. 1 21.3Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).4Id. at 570.5Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).6Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).7Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.8Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Arapahoe, Colo., 633 F.3d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir.2011).9Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).10Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994); see D. Kan. Rule 83.5.4(f) (“Any partyappearing on his or her own behalf without an attorney is expected to read and be familiar with the Rules ofPractice and Procedure of this court [and] the relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure....”).11See Doc. 1 at 3–5 (stating constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in Counts I, II, and III, against themunicipal Defendants only).1242 U.S.C. § 12132. Only Title II of the ADA could apply to Plaintiff under the facts alleged. Title I coversemployment discrimination, and Plaintiff does not allege that he was an employee of UKHA. See 42 U.S.C. §12112. Title III applies where there is discrimination by a private entity that owns, leases, or operates placesof public accommodation engaged in interstate commerce. See id. § 12182. UKHA is not subject to Title III.Thus, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff's ADA claim as arising under Title II.13Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531, 533 (2004).14J.V. v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 813 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999)).15Id.16In its Answer, Mission 200, LLC states that Plaintiff improperly named it Mission Road Studios, LLC in theComplaint. Doc. 39 at 1.
DOUGLAS STUART QUEEN, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS CITY, KANSAS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.517Doc. 1 18.18“Medical malpractice is negligence of a healthcare professional in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of apatient.” Perkins v. Susan B. Allen Mem'l Hosp., 146 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).19Id. (quoting Watkins v. McAllister, 59 P.3d 1021, 1023 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002)).20Knight v. Mooring Cap. Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (alteration omitted) (quoting Geev. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010)).21Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001).22Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1).23Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).24See Watkins v. Donnelly, 551 F. App'x 953, 958 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Entry of default by the clerk is a necessaryprerequisite that must be performed before a district court is permitted to issue a default judgment.”).25Doc. 77 at 2; see Doc. 20 (listing addresses in Kansas City, Missouri).26Docs. 96–99 (showing summons returned executed for municipal entities by certified mail, with service dateson September 10 and 12, 2025).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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