Riverchase v. Goldwyn (Jan. 16, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Riverchase v. Paula Goldwyn
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Kansas (KS)
Court
Kansas Supreme Court
Decided
Jan. 16, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Warner (C.J.); Arnold-Burger (J.); Pickering (J.)
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 123280Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATIONCourt of Appeals of Kansas.Riverchase, LLC, Appellee,v.Paula Goldwyn, Appellant.No. 128,338|Opinion filed January 16, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from Riley District Court; JEREMY LARCHICK,magistrate judge. Submitted without oral argument.Affirmed.Attorneys and Law FirmsPaula Goldwyn, appellant pro se.Jared R. Muir, of Topeka, for appellee.Before Warner, C.J., Arnold-Burger and Pickering, JJ.MEMORANDUM OPINIONArnold-Burger, J.:*1 Missing a court date can have disastrous consequences.It can result in your case being dismissed if you broughtthe lawsuit or it can result in a judgment against you if youare defending the lawsuit. The latter is what happened toGoldwyn.Riverchase mobile home park sought to evict Paula Goldwynfrom the park due to the aggressive behavior of her GermanShepherd dog toward other residents. When Goldwynmiscalendared the trial date and failed to appear, the districtcourt granted a default judgment of eviction for Riverchase.The district court denied her request a week later to set asidethe default. Because we find the district court did not abuseits discretion in entering a default judgment, we affirm. Wealso find that Goldwyn has abandoned her claim that the courterred in failing to set aside the default judgment due to herfailure to adequately brief the issue and to pinpoint in therecord where she preserved it for appellate review.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYGoldwyn and her roommate, 86-year-old Leon Sanders, hada month-to-month lease for a lot space at Riverchase mobilehome park.Complications emerged about 18 months after they movedin, involving their German Shepherd dog. Riverchase beganreceiving complaints alleging the German Shepherd exhibitedaggressive behaviors toward other residents and their petswithin the community. Riverchase's governing rules requirethat residents ensure their pets neither make disturbing noisesnor perform acts that other residents or management couldconstrue as annoying or aggressive. The provisions specifiedthat repeated violations would trigger mandatory pet removalor resident eviction.Riverchase served Goldwyn with a notice of breach ofagreement and termination, alleging her German Shepherd“perform[ed] aggressive behaviors towards other residentsand their pets in the community.” The notice cited specificlease provisions requiring residents to keep pets restrained,prevent them from making noise or engaging in aggressiveacts toward others, and warned that repeated violations wouldresult in the removal of the pet or eviction. The notice affordedGoldwyn 14 days to remove the animal or 30 days to vacatethe premises.After Goldwyn did not remedy the violation, Riverchaseinitiated eviction proceedings on July 19, 2024.Goldwyn and Sanders were served with the eviction summonsand filed answers denying the allegations. Sanders describedhimself as a “a disabled 86 year old” for whom the dog servedas both a companion and a service animal. He acknowledgedthe dog's behavior “is sometimes misinterpreted” andsuggested that “[c]ommon sense would suggest that peopleshould avoid walking past our yard if they feel [the dog] is adisturbance to them.”
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Goldwyn's answer alleged discrimination against Sandersbased on his disability. She claimed that at a prior hearingon April 4, 2024, “[Riverchase's] manager (Keri) testifiedbefore Judge Larchick ... that there were ‘no complaints’about [the dog] from any resident.” She alleged thatRiverchase staff started recruiting other residents to fabricateaccusations about the dog's aggressiveness after she andSanders requested accommodation to erect a fence on theirlot.*2 Goldwyn further asserted that the Riverchase staff neverinformed her of what any of the aggressive behaviors wereor asked her side of the story. She claimed that after repeatedcalls to the office, the Riverchase manager told her about“only two complaints, one being that [the dog] was outsideon her tie-out with nobody there to observe her and theother claim was that she had attacked some mysteriouspoodle,” which she claims she told the manager “were 100%false.” She concluded by leveling accusations of harassment,fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress againstRiverchase management.The district court issued a notice scheduling trial for August12, 2024, at 10:30 a.m. Court staff supplemented writtennotices via eFlex and U.S. mail with telephone calls andemails to Goldwyn and Sanders. The court received noresponse suggesting Goldwyn or Sanders sought a delay orcontinuance. There is no dispute that Goldwyn received thenotices of trial and understood she had to appear.On the morning of August 12, 2024, Riverchase appearedthrough counsel and with witnesses. At the appointed timeof 10:30 a.m., neither Goldwyn nor Sanders appeared. Thedistrict court asked that the hallways be checked at 10:35a.m. and again at 10:40 a.m. Not finding Goldwyn orSanders present and having received no continuance request,the district court granted Riverchase's motion for defaultjudgment. That evening, Sanders died.Eight days later, Goldwyn filed a motion to set aside thedefault judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b) (relief from ajudgment). She attributed her absence to misreading the trialdate and erroneously setting her phone alarm for August 14instead of August 12. She expressed bewilderment at her ownerror, writing that “GOD ONLY KNOWS” why she put thewrong date in her cell phone calendar.Goldwyn provided an extensive contextual explanation forher error. She detailed severe back pain and flu-like symptomsin the days before trial, including graphic descriptions ofvomiting, diarrhea, and incontinence. She also explained hercaregiving responsibilities for Sanders, who was likewisegravely ill and ultimately died on the night of the trial, August12.Riverchase contested Goldwyn's claim of no prejudice,explaining that its witnesses had taken time from workto attend the trial, and their future availability remaineduncertain. Riverchase further noted that conducting anothertrial would impose additional costs, including counsel's two-hour round trip to attend.Riverchase also challenged Goldwyn's professed ignoranceabout the complaints in her answer. It highlighted Sanders’answer, which acknowledged that people felt disturbed bythe dog and suggested they should avoid walking past theiryard. This statement, Riverchase argued, demonstrated thatthe defendants knew their dog was causing problems.Two days later, the district court issued its ruling. Theorder proved terse and conclusory: “[a]fter considering thearguments of the Defendant, and the response by the Plaintiff,the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Set Aside DefaultJudgment.” The court provided no detailed findings oranalysis of the factors germane to its decision.Goldwyn appeals.ANALYSISThe District Court Did Not Err in Granting Riverchase aDefault Judgment When Goldwyn failed to Appear at TrialOur standard of review for default judgment is whether thedistrict court abused its discretion.Appellate courts review a district court's grant of defaultjudgment for abuse of discretion. Garcia v. Ball, 303Kan. 560, 565-66, 363 P.3d 399 (2015). A judicial actionconstitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful,or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3)it is based on an error of fact. In re A.S., 319 Kan. 396,400, 555 P.3d 732 (2024). As the party asserting abuse ofdiscretion, Goldwyn bears the burden of showing such abuseof discretion. 319 Kan. at 400. Here, Goldwyn does notclaim a legal or factual error, so we are left with determining
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3whether Goldwyn has met her burden to show that the districtcourt's action was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.We briefly review the requirements of the Kansas MobileHome Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.*3 The Kansas Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlordand Tenant Act (Act), K.S.A. 58-25,100 et seq., governsmost mobile home rental agreements in Kansas. TheAct establishes nonwaivable rights and responsibilities forlandlords and tenants in mobile home parks. Tenantsmust comply with applicable health and safety ordinances,maintain their lots in reasonably safe and clean condition, andadhere to park rules, including those regulating pets. K.S.A.58-25,113, K.S.A. 58-25,114. When tenants materially breachthe rental agreement or create noncompliance that materiallyaffects health and safety, landlords may deliver written noticespecifying the breach and stating that the rental agreementwill terminate after 30 days if the breach remains unremediedwithin 14 days. K.S.A. 58-25,120(a).Complementing these substantive obligations, Kansaseviction statutes establish specific procedures for limitedactions proceedings. K.S.A. 61-3801 through K.S.A. 61-3808“govern lawsuits brought to evict a person from possessionof real property.” K.S.A. 61-3801. Within this proceduralstructure, K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 61-3301(a)(1) authorizes defaultjudgment when a defendant “fails to either appear or filea written answer on or before the time specified in thesummons.” And K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 61-3301(a)(2) authorizesdefault judgment when the defendant “fails to appear at thetime set for a pretrial or trial.”These default provisions operate amid the eviction process’compressed timelines. K.S.A. 61-3805 requires the summonsto provide a date for answer or appearance, which is 3 to 14days after the summons is issued. And K.S.A. 2024 Supp.61-3807(a) directs courts to conduct a trial within 14 daysafter the appearance date stated in the summons. K.S.A. 2024Supp. 61-3807(a). These “aggressive timelines for evictioncases set by Kansas statutes” create practical pressures onboth courts and litigants. Washburn South Apartments v.Hession, 65 Kan. App. 2d 626, 641, 570 P.3d 1268 (2025).If a defendant fails to appear at the time set for trial, “judgmentmay be entered against the defendant at the request of theplaintiff without further notice to the defendant.” K.S.A. 2024Supp. 61-3301(a)(2).The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting adefault judgment when Goldwyn failed to appear for trial.There is no dispute that Goldwyn received the notice of trialelectronically the same day it was sent to her and immediatelyentered it in her phone—albeit mistakenly as August 14.The district court confirmed it had provided proper noticethrough multiple channels—the original summons, writtennotice from the deputy clerk on July 31, and phone calls andemails from court staff. When neither defendant appeareddespite the court's patience in checking hallways and waitingpast the scheduled time, the district court properly exercisedits discretion to enter default judgment.Thus, the district court properly entered default judgmentunder K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 61-3301(a)(2). Goldwyn receivednotice of the August 12 trial through four methods,and she acknowledged receiving notice. These multiplenotices exceed the notice requirements for limited actionsproceedings. The district court also demonstrated patience,checking hallways twice past the scheduled time.We are not blind to the fact that pro se litigants facegenuine challenges navigating procedural legal requirements,particularly in expedited eviction proceedings. But whiledefaults are disfavored and courts prefer resolution ofdisputes on the merits, procedural rules must be enforced.Garcia, 303 Kan. at 565-66. Pro se litigants receive leewayin the construction of their pleadings, but this leniencydoes not absolve pro se parties from adhering to proceduralrequirements or meeting substantive legal standards. Joritz v.University of Kansas, 61 Kan. App. 2d 482, 498, 505 P.3d 775(2022).*4 When the district court provides clear notice throughmultiple channels a litigant must appear for trial. Goldwyn'sabsence, attributed to her own calendaring error, left thedistrict court no alternative but to enter a default judgment.Goldwyn has failed to meet her burden to show the districtcourt's dismissal was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.Goldwyn Failed to Establish That She Properly PreservedHer Challenge to the Motion to Set Aside Judgment andFails to Adequately Brief the Issue Even if She DidGoldwyn's second issue asserts that even if the court properlyentered a default judgment when she failed to appear, it erredwhen it failed to set it aside.
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Our review of Goldwyn's argument is limited for two reasons.The first reason rests on Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2025Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36) which requires facts to be “keyed to therecord on appeal by volume and page number” and warns thecourt “may presume that a factual statement made without areference to volume and page number has no support in therecord on appeal.” The rules also require “a pinpoint referenceto the location in the record on appeal where the issue wasraised and ruled on.” Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at36). Goldwyn provides neither.Goldwyn correctly focuses on the three necessary elements toestablish that the court should set aside a default: no prejudiceto the opposing party, a meritorious defense to the underlyingclaims, and the default resulted from excusable neglectrather than inexcusable neglect or willful conduct. Failure toestablish all three elements would “doom [the] appeal.” Stateex rel. Stovall v. Alivio, 275 Kan. 169, 172-73, 61 P.3d 687(2003) (citing Montez v. Tonkawa Village Apartments, 215Kan. 59, 64, 523 P.2d 351 [1974]). And she generally claimsin her brief, that she read the notice of hearing wrong, the dogwas not aggressive, and Riverchase will not suffer prejudice.Yet, she fails to cite to the location in the record where sheraised those issues to the district court, and she fails to cite toany evidence in the record to support each claim. That alonedooms her appeal.But if that were not enough, the second reason involves hercomplete failure to adequately brief the issues raised. Suchfailure requires this court to find the issues to be waived orabandoned. In re Marriage of Williams, 307 Kan. 960, 977,417 P.3d 1033 (2018). A point raised incidentally in a briefand not argued therein is also deemed waived or abandoned.Russell v. May, 306 Kan. 1058, 1089, 400 P.3d 647 (2017).And, failure to support a point with pertinent authority orfailure to show why a point is sound despite a lack ofsupporting authority or in the face of contrary authority is alsoakin to failing to brief the issue. In re Adoption of T.M.M.H.,307 Kan. 902, 912, 416 P.3d 999 (2018). Goldwyn's briefingsuffers from all of these infirmities.Goldwyn's legal analysis consists entirely of a list of 10cases, numbered 1-10, without analysis or application to thefacts in this case. Nor does she cite to the record where shemade these arguments to the trial court. Moreover, her briefcontains numerous citation errors, mischaracterizations, andeven citations to cases that appear not to exist or have norelevance to default judgments. We will break that down inmore detail.*5 First, Goldwyn's case citations are duplicative orerroneous. Goldwyn's use of “Garcia v. Ball“ appears threetimes, erroneously cited or relied on each time.As Case No. 1, “Garcia v. Ball, 50 Kan. App. 2d 197, 323 P.3d872 (2014),” she claims that “[t]he court reversed a defaultjudgment due to an error in the journal entry of sentencing,”but this is not accurate. Although the underlying malpracticeaction against Ball involved his failure to timely correct asentencing journal entry, that had nothing to do with whyGarcia was granted default judgment. Garcia was granteddefault judgment against Ball when he failed to file an answerin the civil malpractice lawsuit. Moreover, the case citationprovided is for the Court of Appeals decision, which has noprecedential value because it was overruled on appeal by theKansas Supreme Court. See Garcia v. Ball, 303 Kan. 560,571, 363 P.3d 399 (2015). We could proceed to analyze theKansas Supreme Court decision in Ball and its application tothese facts, but again, Goldwyn has abandoned any such claimby failing to make that argument herself.Case No. 5, “John Arthur Boyd v. Charles Ball, No. 108,817(Kan. Sup. Ct. 2014),” the second Ball citation, does not existalthough it cites the same case number as Case No. 1. AndCase No. 9, “State v. White, No. 108,817 (Kan. Ct. App.2014),” also cites the same case number as Ball. Yet, there areactually many cases captioned State v. White, the most recentof which is a criminal case involving indecent liberties with achild that has nothing to do with default judgments. 316 Kan.208, 514 P.3d 368 (2022).Second, multiple cases are completely mischaracterized orirrelevant. Goldwyn cites Case No. 8, “Wiles v. AmericanFamily Insurance Co., 302 Kan. ___, 355 P.3d 667 (2015),”as reversing “a default judgment based on inadvertence,”but Wiles is actually an insurance coverage dispute aboutintoxication exclusions with no default judgment involved.See Wiles v. American Family Life Assurance Co., 302 Kan.66, 350 P.3d 1071 (2015). The citation given by Goldwyn forCase No. 8, is actually for another case, Mashaney v. Boardof Indigents’ Defense Services, 302 Kan. 625, 355 P.3d 667(2015), which is Case No. 3 on appellant's case list. However,as pointed out below, appellant also mischaracterized theholding in Mashaney. So neither the case name, nor thecitation given by Goldwyn here, refer to an applicable case.
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Case No. 10, listed as “Smith v. Kansas Department ofRevenue, No. 119,429 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018),” appears not toexist with that case number. There is an actual Smith v. KansasDept. of Revenue, 291 Kan. 510, 242 P.3d 1179 (2010), butthe case involves a driver's license suspension for DUI andhas nothing to do with default judgments or clerical mistakes.Third, Goldwyn fundamentally misrepresents the holdings ofcases she cites. The citation given by Goldwyn for “Smithv. Kansas Department of Revenue,” is actually the citationto a divorce case, In re Marriage of Schultz, No. 119,429,2019 WL 5089859 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion),involving a motion to set aside a divorce decree as animproper default judgment. Goldwyn listed In re Marriageof Schultz as Case No. 2 on her case list. However, whileGoldwyn states the Schultz “court reversed a default judgmentin a divorce case due to a clerical error,” the Court ofAppeals in Schultz actually ruled that the divorce decreewas not, in fact, a default judgment, and affirmed the trialcourt. In re Marriage of Schultz, 2019 WL 5089859, at *1.Similarly, she claims Case No. 3, “Mashaney v. Board ofIndigents’ Defense Services, 302 Kan. [625], 355 P.3d 667(2015),” involved reversing “a default judgment based ona recent holding regarding the exoneration rule,” when thatcase actually involved judgment on the pleadings in a legalmalpractice suit, not a default judgment at all.*6 Fourth, two cases that she cites involve the specializedexoneration rule for legal malpractice claims againstcriminal defense attorneys, which is not relevant to evictionproceedings. Case No. 3, Mashaney, 302 Kan. at 651, heldthat criminal defendants need not prove actual innocence topursue malpractice claims. And Case No. 4, Canaan v. Bartee,276 Kan. 116, 120, 72 P.3d 911 (2003), required criminaldefendants to obtain postconviction relief before maintainingmalpractice actions against defense counsel.Fifth, the cases she cites that do address excusable neglectundermine her position. Case No. 7, First Management v.Topeka Investment Group, 47 Kan. App. 2d 233, 239-40,277 P.3d 1150 (2012), affirmed the denial of a motionto set aside, emphasizing that the movant must proveall three Alivio/Montez elements “by clear and convincingevidence” and that “ ‘[w]hen a defaulting party has shown nomeritorious defense, a trial court is precluded from grantingrelief.’ ” See Alivio, 275 Kan. at 173.Similarly, Case No. 6, White's Roofing, L.L.C. v. Vitolas,No. 119,957, 2019 WL 2306608, at *2 (Kan. App. 2019)(unpublished opinion), affirmed denial where the defendant“fail[ed] to provide any argument or analysis on how the citedcases apply to her case” and failed to show excusable neglectand a meritorious defense.The rules related to adequately citing cases upon whicha litigant's argument relies are there for a reason. Theyhelp courts understand the precise legal basis for a party'sargument and assess whether the cited authority supports theclaims made. It also allows opposing counsel to understandand distinguish their authority or argument. Unsupported orirrelevant citations waste judicial resources and hinder thecourt's and the opposing litigant's ability to address the issueseffectively.We pause here, to discuss what could explain thesenonexistent case citations or misstated and unhelpfulholdings. Some cases cited could be sham cases that Goldwynsimply created out of whole cloth in a fraudulent attempt tosupport her desired point with opposing counsel or the court.Or, with only a slightly less nefarious purpose, they couldhave been generated from various artificial intelligence toolsthat can result in what are referred to as hallucinated casesand holdings.“The use of non-existent case citations and fake legalauthority generated by artificial intelligence programs hasbeen the topic of many published legal opinions andscholarly articles as of late. Courts that have addressedthe practice consistently agree that the use of fake legalauthority is problematic and warrants sanctions. ‘Manyharms flow from the submission of fake opinions. Theopposing party wastes time and money in exposing thedeception. The Court's time is taken from other importantendeavors .... There is potential harm to the reputation ofjudges and courts whose names are falsely invoked ....’Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448–49(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (also explaining that fictious citationspromote ‘cynicism about the legal profession and theAmerican judicial system [because] ... a future litigant maybe tempted to defy a judicial ruling by disingenuouslyclaiming doubt about its authenticity.’). O'Brien’s pro sestatus does not absolve him of the responsibility to abideby a duty of candor to the Court. See Kendrick v. Sec'y,Florida Dep't of Corr., 21-12686, 2022 WL 2388425, at *3(11th Cir. July 1, 2022) (‘[w]hile it is true pro se pleadingsare held to a less strict standard than counseled pleadingsand are liberally construed ... [pro se litigants] also owe thesame duty of candor to the court as imposed on any otherlitigant.’).
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6*7 “The imposition of sanctions against parties whosubmit fake citations is also not uncommon. See, e.g.,Thomas v. Pangburn, CV423-046, 2023 WL 9425765, at*4-5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2023) (‘Plaintiff did not explainwhat sources he relied on during his research or wherehe found the sham cases.’), report and recommendationadopted, 4:23-CV-46, 2024 WL 329947 (S.D. Ga. Jan.29, 2024). And pro se litigants are not immune from suchsanctions. See Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo.Ct. App. 2024), reh'g and/or transfer denied (Apr. 9, 2024)(sanctioning pro se litigant who submitted false citations byimposing a $10,000 fine); see also Morgan v. Cmty. AgainstViolence, No. 23 Civ. 353-WPJ/JMR, 2023 WL 6976510,at *7 (D.N.M. Oct. 23, 2023) (explaining that althoughcourts make ‘some allowances for [a] pro se Plaintiff'sfailure to cite to proper legal authority, courts do not makeallowances for a Plaintiff who cites to fake, nonexistent,misleading authorities.’ (cleaned up)).” O'Brien v. Flick,No. 24-61529-CIVDAMIAN, 2025 WL 242924, at *6(S.D. Fla. 2025), aff'd, No. 25-10143, 2025 WL 2731627(11th Cir. 2025).Again, we understand the difficulty pro se litigants havepresenting complex legal issues and distinguishing nuancedcaselaw. But self-represented litigants are not exemptfrom the requirement to follow procedural rules, includingpinpoints to the record to show they preserved the issuefor appeal, proper citations to real cases relied upon, andan accurate explanation of how the cited cases relate tothis case. The Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct statesthat accommodations for self-represented litigants must notrelieve them of the obligation to adhere to the same rules ofprocedure and evidence as litigants represented by attorneys.Kansas Supreme Court Rule 601B, Canon 2, Rule 2.2,comment 4 (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 483). This ensuresfairness and consistency in the application of legal standards,regardless of representation.In sum, Goldwyn not only failed to demonstrate whereshe preserved these arguments for appellate review throughpinpoint citations to the record, but she has waivedand abandoned them due to wholly inadequate briefing.Moreover, we would be justified in dismissing her claimsand imposing sanctions for the blatant errors contained in herbriefing. Instead, we simply find, as we must, that her claimof error fails.Affirmed.Warner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:I join fully in my colleagues’ analysis of whether the lawpermitted the trial court to enter a default judgment againstPaula Goldwyn and Leon Sanders when neither appeared forthe eviction trial in this case. As the majority opinion notes,all parties must participate in the court process and abide bythe procedures that govern that process. And K.S.A. 2024Supp. 61-3301(a)(2) specifically permits a court to enter adefault judgment against a party who does not attend a trialin an eviction case. I diverge, however, in my analysis of thesecond and primary issue in this appeal—whether Goldwynhas shown that the trial court erred when it denied her motionto set aside that default judgment eight days later.Just as a trial court has flexibility in deciding when a defaultjudgment is appropriate, it also has discretion to set asidethat default judgment when principles of fairness and equitywarrant that action. But that discretion is not absolute. K.S.A.2024 Supp. 60-255(b) states that a default judgment may beset aside for any of the grounds listed in K.S.A. 60-260(b).Goldwyn requested that the default judgment in this casebe set aside based on K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 60-260(b). K.S.A.2024 Supp. 60-260(b)(1) allows default judgments to be setaside based on “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise or excusableneglect,” and subsection (b)(6) likewise allows setting asidebased on “any other reason that justifies relief.” The trial courtdenied Goldwyn's motion in a two-sentence order two daysafter she submitted that request (and one day after Riverchasefiled a response).*8 The Kansas Supreme Court has routinely cautionedthat courts’ analysis of such motions should begin witha preference for resolving claims on their merits, ratherthan through a finding of default. Our governing caselawrecognizes that “[w]hile there is a need to achieve finalityin litigation, judicial discretion must not achieve that endin disregard of what is right and equitable under thecircumstances.” Bazine State Bank v. Pawnee Prod. Serv.,Inc., 245 Kan. 490, 495, 781 P.2d 1077 (1989). Practicallyspeaking, this means that when a court is “determiningwhether to set aside a default judgment, [it] should resolveany doubt in favor of the motion so that cases may be decidedon their merits.” Jenkins v. Arnold, 223 Kan. 298, 299, 573P.2d 1013 (1978).In my view, Goldwyn's arguments on appeal sufficiently callinto question whether the trial court's decision was renderedunder this governing framework. The majority opinion does
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7not address this issue, however, as it concludes that Goldwynhas not adequately briefed her challenge to the trial court'sdenial of her motion to set aside the default judgment. Idisagree with this conclusion.Goldwyn's BriefGoldwyn's briefing is far from an ideal appellate submission.But that does not mean that it fails to apprise us of error.The first reason the majority opinion provides for itsconclusion that Goldwyn has inaccurately briefed her requestfor relief is that Goldwyn's brief does not provide sufficientcitations to the record on appeal to support her factualassertions. Yet my review shows that Goldwyn's brief setsforth the facts giving rise to her claim. These facts are limited,but that is to be expected when a default judgment is entered,particularly in the abbreviated timeline in an eviction case:Goldwyn alleges that Riverchase filed an eviction petitionafter serving a 14-30 day notice, and the defendants answered.The defendants did not appear for trial until a week later, andthe court entered a default judgment against them. Goldwynmoved to set aside that judgment, and the court denied thatrequest.Again, Goldwyn's brief is not perfect. It cites the officialappellate record in a manner required by our Supreme CourtRules for some parts of its factual statement. See SupremeCourt Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36). Somefactual recitations—such as the fact that the trial court deniedGoldwyn's motion to set aside the default verdict—are notaccompanied by record cites. But no one disputes that thisis what happened. The entire trial court file in this case,excluding the transcript, is under 100 pages; Riverchase'sbrief concurs that this took place; and the majority opiniondiscusses—and quotes the body of—the trial court's ruling inits factual background. It seems unlikely that this absence ofa record cite on this fact prevented meaningful review of thisargument.Indeed, as my colleagues note, Goldwyn's brief succinctlystates what occurred in this case and provides the legalstandards that should have guided the trial court's decision,along with a brief explanation of why she believes that reliefis appropriate:“K.S.A. 60-260(b)(l) provides that a court may relieve aparty from a final judgment for reasons including mistake,inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and K.S.A.60-260(b)(6) for any other reason that justifies relief.Defendant contends that the Default Judgment should beset aside for the following reasons:“1. Mistake/Inadvertence/Surprise/ExcusableNeglect: The Defendant's failure to respond tothe complaint was due to the pro se Defendantmistakenly reading the date of the hearing wrong inthe Notice of Hearing. Courts have recognized thatsuch circumstances can constitute excusable neglectunder K.S.A. 60-260(b)(l).*9 “2. Meritorious Defense: Defendant has ameritorious defense to Plaintiffs claims. Specifically,Plaintiff did not notify Defendant of any allegedcomplaints against her pet, as required by thelease, and most importantly, Defendant's pet is notaggressive and there is no evidence anywhere inthe record that Defendant's pet has ever exhibitedaggressive behaviors.“3. No Prejudice to Appellee: Setting aside the DefaultJudgment will not result in undue prejudice toPlaintiff. Plaintiff will still have the opportunity topresent its case on the merits.”In short, while Goldwyn's brief provides little in the wayof analysis, I find this description sufficient to present herargument.The second, and likely predominant, reason why the majorityopinion declines to reach the merits is its response to thenext section of Goldwyn's brief. There, Goldwyn purports toprovide a list of “ten Kansas appellate cases where defaultjudgments were reversed based on mistake or inadvertenceunder K.S.A. 60-260(b).” The brief then appears to list 10case citations, followed by a sentence for each summarizingthe case's holding. As the majority explains, these casesare inaccurately described, either in the citation form or thesummary (using, for example, the docket number of a correctand relevant opinion but giving the wrong case name ordescription). This list appears to have been generated by aninaccurate artificial-intelligence model.There is no question that the citation to inaccurate ornonexistent cases is inappropriate. Lawyers who practice inKansas courts have, among other ethical duties, duties ofcompetence and candor to the court; citations to computer-hallucinated cases at least technically run afoul of bothresponsibilities and risks discipline or other sanction. See
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8KRPC 1.1 (Competence) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 320); KRPC3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at383). While Goldwyn is not a lawyer, she has a responsibilityto abide by these same standards when she is representingherself in court. See Joritz v. University of Kansas, 61 Kan.App. 2d 482, 498, 505 P.3d 775, rev. denied 315 Kan.968 (2022). Parties’ reliance on—or even inclusion of—hallucinated cases in briefing is a serious problem that courtsacross the country are grappling with.While the majority opinion here purports to reach its decisionbased on inadequate briefing, its lengthy discussion of thefaulty case citations in Goldwyn's brief makes the denial ofrelief feel more like a court-imposed sanction for includinginaccurate AIgenerated content in her argument. Riverchasedid not seek this sanction in its brief; in fact, Riverchase doesnot mention or address the faulty case citations at all. Thatsilence does not mean the court lacks the inherent authority totake action to safeguard the integrity of the appellate process.Nor do I disagree that some action is necessary. But myresponse is less extreme.Whenever appellate courts are faced with inaccurateinformation in a brief, we can address that information inseveral ways. When the information is limited and likelyinadvertent (such as a typo), we may ignore it entirely.When the information plays a more dominant role, we mayreprimand the party in our opinion and strike the informationfrom the brief, meaning it will play no role in our analysis.And when the information is so prevalent that it pervadesthe entire case, rendering reliance on any other statementsin that brief suspect, we may strike the brief or dismiss thecase entirely. In other words, the duty to provide accurateinformation to courts is a responsibility we take seriously. Butas in all things, the court's response should be proportionateto the violation at hand.*10 The information in Goldwyn’ brief falls into the middlecategory of cases. Goldwyn's brief includes several citationsto cases that are incorrect. But these cases were includedas essentially a bulleted string cite to bolster her earlierargument, not cases that set the standard that the court shouldapply. Thus, I would strike this information and decline toconsider these cases in our analysis. I would also informGoldwyn that including other case citations without verifyingthem in filings in this case, whether before the appellate courtsor before the trial court on a potential remand, would bedeemed intentional malfeasance and would result in the casebeing dismissed. I would not deny relief outright.This detour brings us back to the issue raised in Goldwyn'sbrief—whether the trial court erred in denying her requestto reopen the default judgment, a request filed about a weekafter Goldwyn did not appear for trial. Excising the computer-generated string cite, the fact remains that the brief sets forththe relevant facts and citations to the record on appeal thatare necessary to review the case, and it provides the correctfactors for assessing whether a default judgment should beset aside. In other words, it sufficiently frames the issues forour review. And it identifies error that—in my view—requiresreversal.The Trial Court's ErrorAs Riverchase notes in its response brief in this case, appellatecourts overturn a trial court's ruling on a motion to setaside a default judgment only when that ruling exceeds thebounds of the trial court's discretion in some way. Garcia v.Ball, 303 Kan. 560, 566, 363 P.3d 399 (2015); State ex rel.Stovall v. Alivio, 275 Kan. 169, 172-73, 61 P.3d 687 (2003).Appellate courts must be mindful not to overstep our roleand substitute our judgment for that of the trial court ondiscretionary calls. But neither is our review toothless; wemust consider the legal, factual, and equitable soundness ofthe trial court's decision based on the governing standards andall other information available when that decision was madeto determine whether the decision was reasonable. Garcia,303 Kan. at 566-67.The record shows that Goldwyn made a simple calendaringmistake. She moved to set aside the judgment quickly—abouta week later, even though her roommate (whom she had beencaring for) had passed away in the interim. She was up todate on rent at the time of the default and has continued topay rent throughout this appeal. She makes factual assertionsthat, if true, would undermine the allegations in the petition.And the only claims of prejudice made by the defendant areattendant considerations that arise when preparing for andattending a new trial—considerations that must be balancedagainst the weighty consequence of evicting someone from amobile home park without a trial on the merits.Goldwyn's brief highlights standards that should have guidedthe trial court's decision here—whether her failure to appearat trial was based on excusable neglect, whether she hada potentially meritorious defense, and whether Riverchasewould be prejudiced by reopening the case after judgment hadbeen entered. The record is silent as to whether the trial court
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9considered these questions when it denied Goldwyn's request;its ruling on her motion consisted of two sentences with noexplanation.The factors were first listed in Montez v. Tonkawa VillageApartments, 215 Kan. 59, 65, 523 P.2d 351 (1974), asreasons why a default judgment warranted reversal on appeal.The Kansas Supreme Court has since explained that thefactors “are not gleaned from the plain language of K.S.A.60-260(b)” but instead are borrowed from federal caselaw andare “based in equity.” Garcia, 303 Kan. at 570. Thus, while thefactors are “viable benchmarks for judicial discretion,” they“should not be rigidly adhered to” when assessing whetherit is appropriate to set aside a default judgment. 303 Kan.at 570. In other words, the factors are helpful, equitableconsiderations for a court when assessing a motion likeGoldwyn's, but they are not statutory elements or requiredproofs.*11 In analyzing these factors, given the stated preferencefor resolving claims on their merits, I view setting aside thedefault judgment as the only reasonable outcome.Reasons for the default. The parties do not seriously disputethat Goldwyn provided an honest and reasonable explanationfor her absence at the trial—she entered the wrong dateon her phone calendar, likely due in part to the fact thatshe was experiencing serious health issues while also caringfor Sanders. Nor is there any question that Sanders passedaway on the date of the trial (albeit hours after the trialwas scheduled). Even though she is not an attorney andwas representing herself, Goldwyn moved to set aside thedefault judgment within eight days—relatively quickly givenSanders’ death and everything else she was going through.Riverchase's response opposing Goldwyn's motion did notchallenge this explanation; it argued other factors (what itconstrued as the absence of a meritorious defense and theprejudice it would suffer by reopening the case) weighedagainst granting relief. This is not the sort of “ ‘recklessindifference’ ” Kansas courts have found to be “ ‘inexcusable’” and thus to warrant preserving a default judgment. Montez,215 Kan. at 65. Instead, it is understandable human errorthat warrants a second opportunity, especially given thepermanence of the stakes in an eviction case.Goldwyn's defenses. A person seeking to reopen a defaultjudgment does not have to prove their case in the motionto set aside the judgment; rather, they must demonstratethat they are raising a valid claim or defense that couldpotentially support a judgment in their favor. See LandmarkNat'l Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 534-35, 216 P.3d 158(2009) (quoting 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice& Procedure: Civil 3d § 2697 [1998]) (“ ‘The demonstrationof a meritorious defense is not expressly called for by thefederal rules and, therefore, the nature and extent of theshowing that will be necessary is a matter that lies within thecourt's discretion.... The underlying concern is to determinewhether there is some possibility that the outcome of thesuit after a full trial will be contrary to the result achievedby the default.’ ”). The answers filed in this case identifytwo potentially meritorious defenses to the eviction petition:that the allegations in the petition are factually false and thatthe dog is a service dog (which seems tenuous on its face,but if true would trigger other legal protections). I makeno prediction as to whether these defenses would ultimatelysucceed, but they are genuine factual issues Goldwyn cantestify about that warrant the evidentiary testing of a trial.Prejudice to Riverchase. In Garcia, the Kansas SupremeCourt explained that the type of prejudice that would warrantdenying a motion to set aside a default judgment mightinclude allegations “that evidence had been destroyed or that[the plaintiff] had undertaken any action in reliance of thedefault judgment.” 303 Kan. at 571. These circumstances aremarkedly different than the plaintiff's unavailing allegationsof prejudice in Montez, where the plaintiff “could show noprejudice from setting aside the judgment except that shewould be required to prove her case.” 215 Kan. at 65.*12 I discern little difference between the plaintiff in Montezwishing not to litigate that case and Riverchase's assertionthat setting aside the default judgment here would require itto recall witnesses and have its attorney appear for anothereviction trial. Riverchase's postulations about potential otherdetriments are either speculative (uncertainty if Riverchase'semployee witnesses would be available for another trial) orcould be addressed through a less extreme sanction thana default judgment (such as requiring Goldwyn to pay theattorney fees associated with the first trial).In the end, my review of the trial court's two-sentence ruling—rendered two days after Goldwyn filed her motion and oneday after Riverchase filed its response—does not give meconfidence that the court considered and correctly appliedthese governing standards. And neither am I convinced thatthe court's ruling was based on a reasonable balance ofthe equities at play in this case, especially considering theKansas Supreme Court's stated preference for hearing a case
Riverchase, LLC, Appellee, v. Paula Goldwyn, Appellant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10on the merits. In fact, the trial court spent considerablymore time analyzing whether it should stay its ruling andenter an appeal bond than it did on the question of whetherthe default judgment should be set aside. The trial courtultimately granted that stay and bond, meaning Goldwyn hasremained on Riverchase's property for more than a year afterany reopened eviction trial on the merits would have occurred.That delay seems a bizarre result from a court unwilling toconsider the merits of the case. In these circumstances, “theexercise of sound judicial discretion required the setting asideof the judgment.” 215 Kan. at 65.This case illustrates a tension between several principles thatunderpin our judicial process. The adversarial court systemrequires the active, ethical participation of litigants to resolvedisputes, and the decision not to participate in a trial—orto participate with less than a candid approach on appeal—can carry weighty consequences for the defaulting party.Once judgment has been rendered in a case, a presumptionof finality attaches, and the judgment should be reopenedonly in certain circumstances. And even amid these otherconsiderations, principles of law and equity strongly favorresolving claims on their merits.We do not know what evidence would have been presentedat trial if this case had been heard on the merits. Riverchase'sassertions may have been substantiated along the linesoutlined in the majority opinion, and Goldwyn may nothave been able to prove her defenses. Or the opposite couldhave occurred. But equity demands that Goldwyn shouldbe granted another opportunity to present evidence of herdefenses in court. I would find the decision to deny thatopportunity implicitly unreasonable and reverse the trialcourt's judgment. I thus respectfully dissent.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 123280 (Table)End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access