Blair v. Sanctuary Bluff Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Pamela Blair v. Sanctuary Bluff Homeowners Association, Inc., et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Kentucky (KY)
Court
Kentucky Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Vacated and Remanded
Majority
Cetrulo (J.) (unanimous Court)
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 784501Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.Unpublished opinion. See KYST RAP Rule 41 before citing.NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDCourt of Appeals of Kentucky.PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANTv.SANCTUARY BLUFF HOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION, INC.; DAVID WEINSTEIN;DWIGHT HICKERSON; EXP REALTY LLC;GILEZAN REALTY LLC; JAMIE SHEARER;JAN WADE; LEN CHOPOVSKY (a/k/aLEONID CHOPOVSKY); LISA PAYNE (a/k/a LISA EVERETT); PAMELA ZANNI;RANDALL CAMPBELL; RENU KAKAR;SHAM KAKAR; STEPHANIE GILEZAN;SUNRISE CUSTOM HOMES; T.J. FEDERER(a/k/a THOMAS JOSEPH FEDERER);AND TOM BERWAGER APPELLEESANDPAMELA BLAIR APPELLANTv.MOHANA ARLA; EXP REALTY, LLC;GILEZAN REALTY, LLC; RAMAARLA; RANDALL CAMPBELL; RAPPROPERTIES, LLC; REGINA BIDDLE;RENU KAKAR; RON BIDDLE; SHAMKAKAR; STEPHANIE GILEZAN; ANDSUNRISE CUSTOM HOMES APPELLEESANDPAMELA BLAIR APPELLANTv.SANCTUARY BLUFF HOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION, INC.; EXP REALTY,LLC; GILEZAN REALTY; RANDALLCAMPBELL; RENU KAKAR; SHAMKAKAR; STEPHANIE GILEZAN; ANDSUNRISE CUSTOM HOMES APPELLEESANDPAMELA BLAIR APPELLANTv.GARY SHEARER; EXP REALTY, LLC;GDS BUILDER AND REMODELER;GILEZAN REALTY, LLC; JAMIESHEARER; MOHANA ARLA; RAMAARLA; RANDALL CAMPBELL; RAPPROPERTIES, LLC; REGINA BIDDLE;RENU KAKAR; RON BIDDLE; SHAMKAKAR; STEPHANIE GILEZAN; ANDSUNRISE CUSTOM HOMES APPELLEESANDPAMELA D. BLAIR APPELLANTv.SANCTUARY BLUFF HOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION, INC.; DAVID WEINSTEIN;DWIGHT HICKERSON; EXP REALTY,LLC; GARY SHEARER; GDS BUILDERAND REMODELER; GILEZAN REALTY,LLC; JAMIE SHEARER; JAN WADE;LEN CHOPOVSKY (a/k/a LEONIDCHOPOVSKY); LISA PAYNE (a/k/a LISAEVERETT); MOHANA ARLA; PAMELAZANNI; RAMA ARLA; RANDALLCAMPBELL; RAP PROPERTIES, LLC;REGINA BIDDLE; RENU KAKAR;RON BIDDLE; SHAM KAKAR;STEPHANIE GILEZAN; SUNRISECUSTOM HOMES; T.J. FEDERER (a/k/a THOMAS JOSEPH FEDERER);AND TOM BERWAGER APPELLEESANDPAMELA BLAIR APPELLANTv.SANCTUARY BLUFF HOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION, INC.; DAVID WEINSTEIN;DWIGHT HICKERSON; EXP REALTYLLC; GARY SHEARER; GDS BUILDERAND REMODELER; GILEZAN REALTY,LLC; JAMIE SHEARER; JAN WADE;LEN CHOPOVSKY (a/k/a LEONIDCHOPOVSKY); LISA PAYNE (a/k/a LISA EVERETT); MOHANARAMA; PAMELA ZANNI; RAMAARLA; RANDALL CAMPBELL; RAPPROPERTIES, LLC; REGINA BIDDLE;RENU KAKAR; RON BIDDLE; SHAMKAKAR; STEPHANIE GILEZAN; SUNRISECUSTOM HOMES; T.J. FEDERER (a/k/a THOMAS JOSEPH FEDERER);AND TOM BERWAGER APPELLEESNO. 2024-CA-0650-MR, NO. 2024-CA-0933-MR,NO. 2024-CA-1065-MR, NO. 2024-CA-1119-MR,NO. 2025-CA-0003-MR, NO. 2025-CA-0627-MR
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2|MARCH 20, 2026; 10:00 A.MAPPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTHONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE ACTION NOS.19-CI-005241, 19-CI-005335, AND 20-CI-006226APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTHONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE ACTION NOS.19-CI-005241, 19-CI-005335, AND 20-CI-006226APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTHONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE ACTION NOS.19-CI-005241, 19-CI-005335, AND 20-CI-006226APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTHONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE ACTION NOS.19-CI-005241, 19-CI-005335, AND 20-CI-006226APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTHONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CI-005241, 19-CI-005335, & 20-CI-006226APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTHONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CI-005241 & 19-CI-005335, & 20-CI-006226Attorneys and Law FirmsBRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Pamela Blair, pro se Louisville,KentuckyBRIEF FOR APPELLEES RONALD AND REGINABIDDLE: Paul R. Schurman, Jr. Louisville, KentuckyBRIEF FOR APPELLEE RANDALL CAMPBELL: R. DaleWarren Louisville, KentuckyBRIEF FOR APPELLEES HOA AND ITS BOARD OFDIRECTORS: Derek Miles Kenneth C. Whitlock Louisville,KentuckyBRIEF FOR APPELLEES RAP PROPERTIES ANDMEMBERS: David K. Barnes Matthew R. LonderganLouisville, KentuckyBRIEF FOR APPELLEES GARY SHEARER AND GDSBUILDER: Denis C. Wiggins Hunter E. RommelmanLouisville, KentuckyBEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,AND REMANDINGCETRULO, JUDGE:*1 In this consolidated appeal, Pamela Blair (“Blair”)appeals seven orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court: (a)six orders cumulatively dismissing all her claims (againsther neighbors, homeowners’ association, related real estatecompanies, and various builders) and (b) one orderforeclosing on her property. After review of the more than6,000-page record, numerous briefs, applicable law, multipleorders by this Court, and those by the circuit court, weaffirm the orders dismissing, and affirm, in part, the summaryjudgment foreclosure order, but vacate and remand foradditional proceedings as to the attorneys’ fees only.BACKGROUNDA. Brief OverviewIn December 2017, Blair purchased the home and propertydesignated as Lot 9 in Sanctuary Bluff (“Sanctuary Bluff”or “Subdivision”), a residential subdivision in easternJefferson County, Kentucky. As a deed-restricted community,Sanctuary Bluff is governed by recorded Declarations andCovenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“CCRs”). By virtueof home ownership in the subdivision, the residents aremembers of the Sanctuary Bluff Homeowners’ Association(“HOA”) and subject to the CCRs and the HOA's Bylaws.After moving into Sanctuary Bluff, Blair began to haveconcerns about both the new construction of a residenceon the adjacent lot (“Lot 8”) and various retaining wallsthroughout the Subdivision, including a retaining wall locatedon or near the rear of her property. Blair sought to have theLot 8 new construction torn down, the Subdivision's retainingwalls to be stabilized and maintained, and for variousneighbors, builders, developers, and others to pay damages.She also challenged the validity of the HOA (as an entitycapable of enforcing the CCRs and Bylaws) and withheldher HOA fees for a time. Blair pursued the matter beforethe HOA, the Louisville Metro Board of Zoning Adjustment(“Zoning Board”), and eventually the court system. Whatensued was a largely unproductive legal cacophony.
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3This litigation – the “HOA Action” and the “ForeclosureAction” – is the result of 19 counts brought by Blair,against more than 20 parties, in six complaints, within atleast three consolidated circuit court cases, that resultedin 10 Court of Appeals cases, six of which make up thisconsolidated appeal, with more than 20 pertinent briefs.1 Ouranalysis does not require a recitation of the entire record orprocedural background, and we have limited our review tothose facts, arguments, and parties necessary for a full and fairdisposition.B. Retaining WallsSanctuary Bluff's original developers built most of itshomes between 2007 and 2009. In 2012, a second owneracquired Sanctuary Bluff in a foreclosure action. Afteracquiring Sanctuary Bluff, the second owner commissionedGEM Engineering, Inc. (“GEM Engineering”) to provide anevaluation of the retaining walls throughout the Subdivision.GEM Engineering determined the retaining walls did notcomport with standard guidelines, were “not stable in thelong term,” and without stabilization they were likely tofail. Sanctuary Bluff's second owners then sent the “GEMEngineering Report” to all the members of the HOA,(apparently) did not perform any stabilization work, andsold the Subdivision to Appellee RAP Properties, LLC(“RAP Properties”). RAP Properties bought the Subdivision“as is” presumably with knowledge of the GEM EngineeringReport.2*2 In May 2013, RAP Properties sold Lot 9 – Blair'seventual property – to a builder, an entity not a party to thisaction (“Blair's home builder”). The record does not show thatRAP Properties did any work to stabilize the retaining wallon or near the rear of Lot 9 prior to its sale.Blair's home builder constructed a residence on the lot, andin September 2013, sold the property to a doctor. The recorddoes not show that Blair's home builder did any work tostabilize the rear retaining wall prior to selling Lot 9. Thedoctor later testified that before or during her purchase shewas not told of any problems or concerns about the retainingwall along her property line, and in fact, she was told the wallwas “fine.”In January 2016, the doctor learned about the GEMEngineering Report from the realtor she contracted with tosell her home, and a few days later she received a copyof that report. Mid-2016, one of the parties involved inthe sale to the doctor commissioned a structural engineerto evaluate the retaining wall at the rear of the doctor'sproperty, Lot 9. This “Second Engineering Report” statedthat the wall was stable, but emphasized the evaluationwas not comprehensive or technically exhaustive. In January2017, the doctor retained another engineering company toevaluate the retaining wall. This “Third Engineering Report”concurred with the GEM Engineering Report and, uponindependent inspection, determined the wall was not stable inthe long term and presented “a significant hazard for personsin the immediate vicinity.”In December 2017, Blair purchased Lot 9 from the doctor.The doctor fully disclosed the retaining wall concerns withBlair. Blair later testified that prior to purchasing herhome, she read all three engineering reports and initialed anacknowledgement that she read each report. Blair admittedthat her purchase price was significantly reduced due to thoseengineering reports and the rear retaining wall's structuralconcerns.3C. Lot 8, the Adjacent PropertyIn October 2018, Appellee Sunrise Custom Homes LLC(“Sunrise”) purchased Lot 8, a vacant lot immediatelyadjacent to Blair's property. In January 2019, Sunrise obtaineda new construction building permit (“First Permit”) to build ahome on Lot 8. This First Permit conformed with SanctuaryBluff's CCRs. After the home had been partially constructed,it was determined that the home did not conform to theFirst Permit nor the 30-foot setback required by the CCRs.The parties disagree as to whether this error was due tooversight/mistake or done as an intentional cost-savingstactic. Blair asserts the plans for the Lot 8 construction werenever submitted to the Sanctuary Bluff's Architectural ReviewCommittee (“Architectural Review Committee”) within theHOA as required by the CCRs.In January 2019, Sunrise sought a variance for the buildingpermi violation from the Zoning Board. Blair opposed thevariance as did Appellee Ronald Biddle, the then head of theArchitectural Review Committee. The Zoning Board deniedSunrise's request for a variance and withdrew the First Permit.*3 In late June or early July 2019, Sunrise then soldLot 8 to Ronald Biddle and his wife, Appellee ReginaBiddle. Ronald Biddle, a realtor and developer, hired generalcontractor Appellee Gary Shearer (“Shearer”) and hiscompany, Appellee GDS Builder and Remodeler (“GDS
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Builder”), with the intention of finishing the Lot 8 structureand bringing it into compliance. In July 2019, the Biddles,through Shearer and GDS Builder, obtained a renovationbuilding permit, more specifically a “residential addition”permit (“Second Permit”). In the months that followed, GDSBuilder redesigned the home, removed portions closest tothe street, and completed the home. Despite their renovationefforts, the newly completed Lot 8 residence still violated thesetback by approximately two feet, and a front yard retainingwall still violated the setback by approximately 15 feet. InApril 2020, the Biddles applied for another variance, and thematter was heard at the Zoning Board's June 2020 publicmeeting. This time, the Zoning Board granted the varianceover Blair's opposition. Subsequently, in May 2022, the HOAvoted to approve the Zoning Board's variance.D. Zoning Board Action – NOT on AppealThe Zoning Board Action is not part of this appeal, but wemust nonetheless give a brief overview of that action forfoundational purposes.Initiating the Zoning Board Action, Blair appealed the ZoningBoard's grant of a variance to the Jefferson Circuit Court(No. 20-CI-004093). In the Zoning Board Action, the circuitcourt affirmed the Zoning Board's grant of a variance, butthis Court later determined that the Zoning Board did notmake all of the factual findings required by Kentucky RevisedStatute (“KRS”) 100.243. Thus, we vacated the varianceand remanded the matter for further proceedings. Blairv. Louisville Metro Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. 2023-CA-0217-MR, 2023 WL 8656414, at *4 (Ky. App. Dec. 15,2023).On remand, the Zoning Board entered additional findingsconsistent with this Court's instructions and again approvedthe variance in May 2024. It is unclear to this Court if/whenthe HOA again approved the variance. However, Blair againchallenged the Zoning Board's decision before the circuitcourt and this Court, but as of February 2026, Blair had beenunsuccessful in her attempts to get the Zoning Board's grantof a variance vacated or reversed. See Blair v. Louisville Bd.of Zoning Adjustments, No. 2024-CA-0992-MR (Ky. App.Jul. 22, 2025) (dismissing Blair's Zoning Board Action appealon procedural grounds as the order lacks finality pursuant toKentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 54.02).E. The HOA Action – THIS AppealWhile the Zoning Board Action was proceeding, three otheractions were instituted before the Jefferson Circuit Court thatwere rooted in the same core facts but contained tangentiallegal claims to the Zoning Board Action. Ronald Biddle,Shearer, and GDS Builder initiated one action, and Blair filedthe other two. These three consolidated circuit actions are theroot of this appeal.In August 2019, Ronald Biddle, Shearer, and GDS Builderfiled suit against Blair in Jefferson Circuit Court (No. 19-CI-005241), alleging defamation, intentional interferencewith commercial relations, and negligent interference withcommercial relations. They asserted Blair had accosted theirworkers, made slanderous statements to their contractors,called the police on their workers for “interfering” with herswimming pool, and sent a libelous letter to other SanctuaryBluff residents.Also in August 2019, Blair filed suit in Jefferson CircuitCourt (No. 19-CI-005335) against the Biddles, Shearer,GDS Builder, the HOA and its directors (in their officialand personal capacities), developer RAP Properties (andits members), real estate companies (and their realtors)involved with Sanctuary Bluff sales, a code enforcementofficer, several of her neighbors, and the original Lot 8builder, Sunrise.4 Through the course of this HOA Action,Blair filed six complaints, her original complaint plus fiveamended complaints, (at least two of which were pro se)between August 2019 and June 2022.5 Ultimately, Blairalleged a “massive amount of violations of State and locallaws” totaling 19 counts including, but not limited to,nuisance, breach of duties, breach of contract, fraudulentrepresentation, trespass by water intrusion, and negligence.6Blair sought, among other requests, strict enforcement of theCCRs (although she later claimed the HOA was unable toenforce the CCRs), injunctions against the HOA and builders,recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress, andattorneys’ fees. Litigation ensued for the next five years.*4 At the core of Blair's evolving arguments were thefollowing claims: (1) developer RAP Properties breachedits duties to maintain the retaining walls, to timely and/orproperly transition the Board of Directors (“HOA Board”),and failed to enforce the CCRs and HOA Bylaws when ithad control of the HOA; (2) the HOA was not properlyformed, and hence, its HOA Board acted negligently and/or fraudulently by engaging in HOA matters without properorganizational formation; (3) the HOA and its past andpresent HOA Board failed to carry out their duties by
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5allowing, adopting, approving, and/or not stopping the Lot 8construction, and personally and financially benefited fromthat failure; (4) Sunrise, the original builder of the Lot 8residence, intentionally violated the CCRs and failed to laya foundation consistent with its First Permit, and thereby,caused damage to Blair's property, reduced the value of herhome, and intentionally caused her emotional distress; (5)Ronald Biddle, the subsequent owner of the Lot 8 residence,prior HOA Board Member and former Architectural ReviewCommittee director, fraudulently manipulated the purchaseof the Lot 8 property, breached his duties by failing toenforce the CCRs and HOA Bylaws, intentionally causedBlair emotional distress, and negligently caused damage toher property; (6) the Biddles’ general contractor, Shearer,and his company, GDS Builders, willfully failed to adhereto the Second Permit, intentionally misled the ZoningBoard by requesting a “renovation” permit instead of anadditional “new construction” permit, caused damages toBlair's property through its poor/improper construction, andcaused her emotional distress; and (7) Appellee RandallCampbell, the current owner of Lot 8, by virtue of hisownership, continues to cause damage to her property.The beginning of the end for Blair's litigation coincided withJefferson Circuit Court Judge Charlie Cunningham's swansong order prior to his retirement in December 2022.7 This“Omnibus Order” is not on appeal, but it lays the foundationfor what is to come. Relevantly, the Omnibus Order clarified(1) that the members of the HOA Board, in their officialcapacities, were previously dismissed, while the HOA, asan organization, remained in the suit; (2) the members ofthe HOA Board who voted to approve the variance weredismissed (and/or not permitted to be re-joined by Blair);and (3) that it was premature to dismiss Blair's motion forjudgment on defamation, tortious interference, and her claimsagainst the HOA for approving the variance.Finally, between April 2024 and September 2024, theJefferson Circuit Court entered six orders – now on appeal– essentially dismissing all of Blair's claims. Collectively,those orders – although in large part, the April 2024 andMay 2024 orders – dismissed Blair's claims against theHOA and its former and current Board.8 Blair repeatedlyargued the HOA and its former and current Board shouldbe personally and officially liable for voting to accept theZoning Board's grant of a variance. However, the circuit courtheld that Blair's numerous complaints were “ambiguous”and did “nothing to distinguish” the actions taken by HOAdirectors in their official and individual capacities. As Blairfailed to differentiate between their capacities, conflated herarguments, and “provided nothing to support her claims”against the HOA and its Board, despite years of litigation, thecourt determined dismissal of those HOA parties was proper.The court determined Blair did not show how the HOA'sapproval of the Zoning Board's grant of a variance createdliability for its voting members. Also, repeating findings fromthe prior Omnibus Order, the court stated it agreed “there[was] no reason to think [the HOA Board] bear[ed] anypersonal liability for their votes.”*5 The circuit court's June 2024 Order granted the HOA'sand GDS Builder's motions to dismiss for lack of prosecutionand dismissed all of Blair's claims against all of thedefendants.9 In this order, the circuit court stated that althoughthe trial date was merely three months away, Blair had neithersent discovery nor fully responded to discovery requestsby various defendants. Further, the circuit court stated thefollowing:[Blair] failed to take the requisite actions to prosecute allthe remaining viable causes of action she brings against thecodefendants in this lawsuit, including complying with thecourt's orders designed to move this case along.A cursory review of the record indicates that over thelast 12 months, Ms. Blair has not served any discoveryrequests on the parties, has not taken a single deposition,has not retained any experts to support her claims, andhas not filed any motions to advance her claims. Mostrecently, she's refused to comply with the Court's orderswhich compelled her to provide supplemental discoveryresponses and sit for a deposition. Instead of doing anythingto advance her claims since May 2023, she's filed severalseparate motions to alter, amend, or vacate this court'sorders, without actually complying with them.To be clear, both sides have filed extraneous motions in thiscase, but only Ms. Blair has the duty and power to movethe case forward to judgment if she truly wishes to do so,and she has failed in this regard despite multiple delays andstays, one designed to allow her to procure counsel if shewished to do so.[10]Moreover, the circuit court walked through the factors toconsider before granting a motion for dismissal for lack ofprosecution as described by Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W.2d717, 719 (Ky. App. 1991) (citing Scarborough v. Eubanks,747 F.2d 871, 875-78 (3d Cir. 1984)), and considered thetotality of the circumstances as required by CR 41.02. The
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6court noted Blair's inaction, including but not limited to, herfailure to take any depositions, to tender or fully respondto discovery, to retain experts, or to file any substantivemotions relative to any expert witnesses. She did not respondto opposing counsel's attempts to schedule an inspection ofher lot nor conduct any written discovery. The court notedBlair's history of dilatory conduct, her demonstration ofwillful inaction, the resulting prejudice of such inaction tothe defendants, and the court's belief that there is nothingfurther that it could do to prompt Blair to advance herclaims. These considerations, actions, and inactions, the courtdetermined, were likely due to the fact her claims lackedmerit. The court noted that Blair was “now refusing outright tocomply with the Court's orders” as she had failed until then toprovide supplemental discovery responses to the HOA and toschedule the completion of her deposition. The court observedthat “there seems to be no reason to believe that there is anyalternative sanction that would effectively guide [Blair] intoaction.” Ultimately, the circuit court held that Blair failed tomake a good faith effort to prosecute the action, her inactionwas fatal to her claims, and despite years to do so, she failedto meet her burden of advancing the causes of action andallegations within her numerous complaints.*6 Despite this strongly worded June 2024 Order, Blaircontinued rearguing previously adjudicated matters and filingmotions that lacked substance. Hence, in the subsequentorders, the circuit court incorporated its June 2024 Order andgranted motions to dismiss for lack of prosecution filed byRAP Properties (July 2, 2024 Order), Campbell, the currentowner of Lot 8 (July 30, 2024), and, again, the HOA and GDSBuilder (September 2024).F. Foreclosure Action – on AppealLastly, in a December 2024 Order, the circuit court grantedthe HOA's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaimregarding foreclosure.In November 2022, the circuit court permitted the HOAto amend its complaint. In this new amended complaint,the HOA argued Blair failed to pay more than $18,000 inassessments and fees to the HOA, rented her property inviolation of the CCRs, and failed to register her property as ashort-term rental with the Louisville Metro Government. Assuch, the HOA argued it had a valid and continuing lien ofmore than $70,000 against Blair warranting a judicial sale.Conversely, Blair argued the HOA was not a valid entity andthus, it was unable to enforce the CCRs, and she asserted thelien in question had been paid.In its December 2024 “Summary Judgment” Order, the circuitcourt held the HOA was a valid entity; the CCRs and HOABylaws applied to Blair; she violated the CCRs by engagingin a short-term rental property business; and Blair had notsatisfied her debt. The court ordered Blair to pay all overdueHOA fees (with interest) plus all fees (also with interest)associated with the impermissible renting of her home. Thecourt stated foreclosure was permissible and referred thematter to the Master Commissioner for judicial sale.Blair appealed the six April to September 2024 Ordersdismissing her claims in the HOA Action, and the SummaryJudgment in the foreclosure action.ANALYSISWe are a court of review, not factfinders, and as such our scopeis limited to those orders properly on appeal, and the findingsand conclusions in those orders.11 Yet, before we review theorders dismissing for lack of prosecution and the SummaryJudgment, we must first address our Rules of Civil Procedure,rules Blair does not feel compelled to follow.A. Civil ProcedureOur Commonwealth has adopted some rules of civilprocedure that a pro se litigant is unlikely to fullyappreciate nor successfully maneuver. The rules pertainingto interlocutory orders, finality, and jurisdiction likely fitinto that category. By way of example, Blair argues someof the circuit court orders on appeal are improper (andunenforceable) because they vary from prior interlocutoryorders. However, interlocutory orders (without specificfinality language) are “subject to revision at any time beforethe entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rightsand liabilities of all the parties.” CR 54.02. Hence, the circuitcourt did not err even if it altered prior, non-final interlocutoryorders. In this legal cacophony, that issue is but a piddlingpeep.*7 However, on other civil procedure misconceptions,Blair's unwillingness to listen, learn, and pivot can no longerbe overlooked. In almost every brief and every motion shefiled within the last two years, both before the circuit courtand this Court, Blair challenged the circuit court's jurisdictionand its ability to continue litigation after she appealed onespecific issue. She argued the circuit court was divested of
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7all jurisdiction after she filed a notice of appeal, and hence,various other orders subsequently entered by the circuit courtmust be vacated. (Blair even moved this Court to holdopposing counsel and the circuit court judge, by name, in civilcontempt and impose sanctions for continuing litigation aftera limited interlocutory order with proper finality languagewas appealed. We declined to do so.) However, as wehave previously held, interlocutory orders made final andappealable pursuant to CR 54.02, do not divest the circuitcourt of jurisdiction on the other remaining matters againstother parties and/or different claims. See Commonwealth Fin.& Admin. Cabinet v. Wingate, 460 S.W.3d 843, 847-48 (Ky.2015). In fact, this Court entered orders specific to Blair'slitigation efforts in October 2024 (No. 2024-CA-0650-MR)and again in April 2025 (No. 2024-CA-0857-MR), detailingfinality rules as they relate to interlocutory orders. Despitethis Court's clear guidance, she nonetheless disregarded ourconclusions and has continued to present a version of hererroneous jurisdictional argument at least 15 additional timesto this Court.Similarly, in appeal No. 2025-CA-0003-MR, Appellee HOAmoved to strike Blair's appellant brief and dismiss theappeal due to her nine hallucinated citations and persistentmisquoting/misinterpretation of precedent. In her response,Blair admitted to using artificial intelligence (“AI”) and statedshe had caught the mistakes prior to submission, but in herhaste, she submitted the wrong draft. This Court then deniedthe HOA's motion to dismiss the appeal but granted its motionto strike Blair's brief and allowed her to refile a compliantbrief with a certification that her brief was prepared withoutAI. Ten days later, Blair submitted a brief with a certificationthat while she used AI for editing purposes, she did not utilizeit for drafting or research. The HOA renewed its motionto dismiss the appeal as Blair's latest brief again containedhallucinated precedent. Blair responded by admitting herbrief contained one hallucinated case that was “erroneouslyrepeated.” In an abundance of grace, this Court denied theHOA's motion to dismiss. Even so, Blair closed the appellatebriefing window by submitting a reply brief with yet anotherhallucinated case12 and absent an AI certification. Thisdeliberate disregard for a Court's ruling, and her recalcitrantapproach to litigation has become a pattern and such actionshave likely sabotaged her own litigation.Nonetheless, we shall address the merits of the matter in orderto bring some much-needed finality.B. HOA ActionIn challenging the circuit court's dismissals, Blair reargues themerits of her case, making the same unsupported argumentsshe presented to the circuit court. For instance, Blair assertsa prima facie case for nuisance based on Lot 8 residence'snoncompliance with the CCRs and the building permits.She contends that because the HOA did not follow theirown organizational procedures for elections and/or publicmeetings, all the actions taken by the HOA Board wereimproper. She appears to argue that photographs she tookof her backyard are sufficient – without additional experttestimony or further foundation – to establish her rightto recover damages. Again, she argues without proof orclarity, that the Lot 8 residence was “unauthorized” and“substandard.” However, due to the scope of our review, wecannot address these arguments as presented.*8 Instead, the question on review first – for the ordersdismissing Blair's claims in the HOA Action – is whether thecircuit court erred in its application of the Ward factors, 809S.W.2d at 719, and/or abused its discretion in applying CR41.02. Rule 41.02 allows the court to involuntarily dismiss anaction for a plaintiff's failure “to prosecute or to comply withthe [civil rules] or any order of the court.” CR 41.02(1); seeStapleton v. Shower, 251 S.W.3d 341, 343 (Ky. App. 2008).Our standard for review is set out in Jones v. Pinter, 642S.W.3d 698, 701 (Ky. 2022):We review dismissals under CR 41.02 for abuse ofdiscretion. [Jaroszewski v. Flege, 297 S.W.3d 24, 32(Ky. 2009).] Under this standard of review, we willreverse the trial court's dismissal only if it was arbitrary,unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legalprinciples. [Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).]...Consideration of a motion to dismiss under CR 41.02(1)requires fact-specific determinations that are left to thesound discretion of the trial court. [Jaroszewski, 297S.W.3d at 32.] The trial court must base its assessment onthe totality of the circumstances. [See id. at 36.]Still, a trial court's discretion is not unfettered and is subjectto an important limitation. Our courts have long recognizedthat CR 41.02(1) dismissal with prejudice is an “extremeremedy.” [Manning v. Wilkinson, 264 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Ky.App. 2007); Toler v. Rapid Am., 190 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Ky.App. 2006); Polk v. Wimsatt, 689 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Ky.
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8App. 1985).] As a result, we must “carefully scrutinizethe trial court's exercise of discretion” when reviewingdismissal with prejudice under CR 41.02(1). [Manning,264 S.W.3d at 624.]In considering the totality of the circumstances, trialcourts may consider the factors espoused in Ward v.Housman. [See 809 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky. App. 1991)(citing Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 875-78(3d Cir. 1984)).] Ward provides a nonexclusive list offactors for consideration when analyzing the totality of thecircumstances relevant to a motion to dismiss for lack ofprosecution under CR 41.02. [Id.] The Ward factors are:“1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; 2) thehistory of dilatoriness; 3) whether the attorney's conductwas willful and in bad faith; 4) meritoriousness of theclaim; 5) prejudice to the other party, and 6) alternativesanctions.” [Id.]In its June 2024 Order, the circuit court made specific findingsas to all six factors supplied by Ward v. Housman andexplicitly assessed the totality of the circumstances. Blairappears to argue the circuit court erred by addressing allsix Ward factors and should be reversed with instructions toconsider alternative sanctions, but we do not agree. True, thecircuit court need not have discussed all six factors as thatlist is not exclusive nor exhaustive, but we shall not hold thecircuit court's thoroughness against it.The circuit court determined Blair bore the responsibility forfailing to advance, “or to even explore,” her claims. Whileother parties attempted to engage in discovery and movethe case along, Blair (while both pro se and represented by“capable counsel,”) did not engage in “meaningful actionsabout the allegations she made in her Complaint.” (Emphasisadded.) On appeal, Blair argues she filed a flurry of motions,thereby demonstrating active engagement in her case, but asthe circuit court repeatedly noted, filing motions does notalways correlate to advancing the case. See Jaroszewski, 297S.W.3d at 38 (emphasis added) (“Generally, it is entirelyproper for a trial court to consider that a plaintiff has onlybeen acting reactively and has shown no inclination to takeaffirmative steps to advance resolution of the case for anunreasonable period of time as a relevant factor indicating thatthe plaintiff has not been actively prosecuting the case.”).*9 The circuit court found ample examples of her dilatoryconduct. Despite years of litigation, Blair had not retainedor identified any experts to support her claims nor filedany timely substantive motions related to the defense expertwitnesses. Blair had not taken any depositions, completed herown deposition, nor fully responded to others’ requests foradditional discovery.13 The court stated that it had attemptedto progress the case and lead Blair toward trial, but Blairfailed to comply with the “overwhelming majority” of thecourt's orders, further demonstrating her willful failure toprosecute her causes of action. In fact, after almost fiveyears of litigation, the circuit court determined “there is noevidence” to support her claims proceeding to trial, and such afailure demonstrates her claims lacked merit and she failed tomeet her burden. See Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc.,330 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Ky. 1959) (“[T]he burden of proof ison a plaintiff to establish by sufficient evidence the materialfacts which constitute his alleged cause of action.”).Moreover, the circuit court noted the prejudice Blair's failureshave had on the defendants/appellees: multiple potentialwitnesses have moved or become otherwise unavailable,memories have faded, and significant time and resources havebeen spent in defense of the claims. The defense had identifiedexperts pursuant to the scheduling order, but plaintiff did notdo so until after the defense experts were identified and afterthe motions to dismiss were filed. Even then, she submittedold reports and asserted a need for additional time. The courtnoted the September 2024 trial date, but Blair's much delayeddeposition was unable to be scheduled until July 2024. Dueto her unproductive actions – including the filing of frivolousmotions, delays, failures to respond for years to schedulingrequests and discovery, etc. – the circuit court determinedthe defendants/appellees had been “wholly unable to gatherdiscovery as needed” for trial and Blair bore that burden ofthe resulting prejudice.Blair argues the circuit court erred by not consideringalternative sanctions, but as the court aptly points out,alternative sanctions would likely be ineffective as Blair “isnow refusing to comply with the Court's orders.” The court'sorder stated that within the prior six weeks, Blair had failed tocomply with an order compelling her to provide supplementaldiscovery responses to the HOA and with an order directingher to complete her deposition. In fact, the court perceivedher delay to be intentional. While she ultimately “somewhat”complied, it was too little and too late. She continued toassert that she was not yet in a position to state her damages,that it was a “pre-discovery stage,” and claimed she wouldsupplement. At that point, trial was four months away, and thediscovery was two to three years overdue. The circuit courtfound that while Blair filed motions in the prior year, those
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9motions did not advance the case but instead kept the court“bogged down in revisiting prior rulings.”Clearly, the circuit court assessed the totality of thecircumstances, and we detect no abuse of the court'sdiscretion in its decision to dismiss this action with prejudice.No aspect of its application of the Ward factors wasarbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by soundlegal principles. The court acted within the bounds of itsbroad discretion in granting defendants’/appellees’ motionsto dismiss for lack of prosecution, and, accordingly, we mustaffirm its orders dismissing the HOA action for lack ofprosecution.C. Foreclosure ActionThe standard of review upon appeal of an order grantingsummary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly foundthat there were no genuine issues as to any material fact andthat the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996)(citing CR 56.03). Upon a motion for summary judgment,all facts and inferences in the record are viewed in a lightmost favorable to the non-moving party and “all doubts areto be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv.Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). The trial court“must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact,but to discover if a real issue exists.” Id. Thus, a summaryjudgment looks only to questions of law, and we review denovo. Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. App. 2016)(citing Coomer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 319 S.W.3d 366, 370-71(Ky. 2010)). Even viewing the facts and inferences in a lightmost favorable to Blair and resolving all doubts in her favor,we cannot agree that Blair presented any genuine issue of factas to the HOA's right to collect HOA fees and assessmentsthat she admittedly had not paid in five years.*10 Sanctuary Bluff's CCRs allow the HOA to levyassessments, and the CCRS and Bylaws further allow theHOA to recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees forunpaid assessments. Yet, Blair believed the HOA was nota valid entity and the organization failed to satisfy itsmaintenance duties, and thus, beginning in October 2019 shestopped paying her monthly fees and assessments to the HOA.The HOA did not withhold benefits and services to Blairdespite her non-payment.In February 2020, the HOA recorded a “First Lien” againstBlair's property totaling $1,709 for unpaid fees, assessments,late charges, and legal fees.In May 2020, after seven months of non-payment, the HOAfiled suit against Blair for unpaid HOA fees, assessments,and late charges in Jefferson District Court (No. 20-C-23459).That district court record is not part of the record on appeal,but apparently the action was transferred to circuit court,consolidated with the present action, and converted into theHOA's counterclaim.In November 2022, the HOA amended its counterclaimand provided an updated accounting to the circuit courtshowing Blair's debt had grown to $18,098 ($13,197 inassessments, interest, and late fees; $22 in miscellaneouscharges; and $4,879 in legal fees). The record does not includean accounting for the legal fees. A year later, the HOAagain amended its counterclaim, asserting Blair now owed$30,340.60 ($20,403.35 in assessments, interest, and late fees,$9,937.25 in legal fees). The HOA also added a foreclosureaction based on its continuing lien for unpaid assessments.Almost four years later, on March 7, 2024, Blairacknowledged the HOA's lien and right to recover fees bypaying $2,823 to the HOA. We could not locate a copy ofthis payment within the record, and it is unclear if Blairever provided proof of payment to the circuit court. Asthe recorded First Lien was for $1,709, it is unclear howBlair arrived at her payment amount or why she believedthat amount satisfied her HOA debt. Shortly thereafter, shedemanded a lien release from the HOA, which it denied,although the payment was credited to her account.In May 2024, the HOA moved for partial summary judgment.In its supporting memorandum, the HOA asserted Blair nowowed $29,927 ($18,309 in assessments, interest, and late fees;$42 in miscellaneous charges; and $11,576 in legal fees). Thatmotion was not immediately ruled upon. Two months later,in July 2024, the HOA again moved for summary judgment,this time arguing: (1) Blair had not paid her HOA dues in fiveyears in violation of the CCRs; (2) she utilized her residenceas rental property in violation of the CCRs; and (3) as a result,the HOA sought foreclosure of Blair's residence to satisfy the“continuing” lien. With its motion, the HOA argued Blair'sdebt now amounted to $70,991 ($19,220 in assessments,interest, and late fees; $62 in miscellaneous charges; and$51,709 in legal fees). From two months prior, the HOA's newtotal indebtedness for Blair increased by $40,133 in legal feesalone, without explanation and/or accounting. There was noresponse to this motion filed by Blair in the circuit court.
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10In its December 3, 2024 Summary Judgment Order, the circuitcourt held that the HOA was a valid entity with the abilityto enforce the CCRs and Bylaws; that the CCRs and HOABylaws applied to Blair; that Blair violated those CCRsand Bylaws; and that the HOA had a valid and enforceablecontinuing lien. The Order also referred the matter to theMaster Commissioner for judicial sale to satisfy Blair'sindebtedness. Specifically, the court ordered Blair to pay$70,991 for:*11 annual assessments, interest, costs and reasonableattorney's fees due and owning to Sanctuary Bluff [HOA]from October 1, 2019 through July 1, 2024, plus continuinginterest, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees on futureassessments not paid when due and incurred herein untilthe obligations are paid in full or the property is sold.The Order, which was tendered by counsel for the HOA, didnot elaborate further about the $70,991 total, nor did the courtdetermine if the more than $50,000 in attorneys’ fees werereasonable for approximately $20,000 in unpaid HOA fees.The next day, on December 4, 2024, the HOA recorded a“Second Lien” totaling $70,991.14On appeal, Blair continues to argue, as she did below, thatthe circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the December 3,2024 Order because of the pending appeals. This Court hasaddressed these claims repeatedly, and we decline to do sofurther. She asserts that she did raise disputes regarding theHOA's authority and validity of the assessments below, buther citations to the record for where these arguments weremade do not support her assertions. Rather, her own filings,her payment of some portion of the lien, as well as statementsby her prior counsel, all demonstrate that she knew she owedthe fees but simply continued to argue that the HOA was notlegally entitled to assess fees. She has lost that argument.On appeal, Blair raises a few compelling questions, but again,it is her own conduct that forecloses our review of thosequestions. She does not refer us to where these issues werepreserved below. She did not file a response to the summaryjudgment motion below nor appear for the hearing on thesame. As she continued to argue that the circuit court couldnot proceed in light of the appeals, we must presume that wasintentional on her part. Our independent review of the recorddoes not demonstrate where those issues were raised beforethe circuit court and as such we will not address them here. SeePhelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. 2003)(citations omitted) (stating where preservation is lacking, itis not an appellate court's duty to “search the vast record onappeal to make that determination”).Alternatively, apparently recognizing her lack ofpreservation, Blair then argues that this Court can entertain anargument not presented to the circuit court in order to averta manifest injustice. See CR 61.02 (permitting unpreservedreview if a manifest injustice has resulted from a palpableerror). On the issue of attorneys’ fees only, we conclude thatBlair has presented such an issue. There is no indication in thecircuit court's order that it considered the significant increasein legal fees for pursuing the unpaid HOA debt. Our courtshave long held that in an action where attorneys’ fees aresought, a circuit court must determine whether attorneys’ feeswere warranted in light of a statute, contractual provision, orequitable consideration, and, if so, what amount is reasonable.Key v. Mariner Fin., LLC, 617 S.W.3d 819 (Ky. App. 2020).While the circuit court has discretion in determining thefees, generally, this requires some detailed accounting, or atleast a review of the reasonableness of the legal fees by thecircuit court. See, by example, Superior Steel, Inc. v. Ascent atRoebling's Bridge, LLC, 540 S.W.3d 770, 787-88 (Ky. 2017);see also Flag Drilling Co., Inc. v. Erco, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 762,766-67 (Ky. App. 2005). Here, the circuit court conducted nosuch review.*12 Accordingly, we remand for a review of thereasonableness of the attorneys’ fees. To be clear, legal feesfor pursuing the unpaid HOA debt should be legal fees forpursuing the unpaid HOA debt, not an attempt to recouplitigation fees from other claims.CONCLUSIONTherefore, we AFFIRM the Jefferson Circuit Court ordersdismissing all of Blair's appeals. However, in the December 3,2024 Summary Judgment Order, we VACATE only the awardand REMAND for further proceedings, including a circuitcourt review of reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees.ALL CONCUR.All CitationsNot Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2026 WL 784501
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11Footnotes1Four of Blair's appeals to this Court are not included in this case: No. 2023-CA-0724-I (this Court dissolved a temporaryinjunction); No. 2024-CA-0645-MR (this Court dismissed as duplicative); No. 2024-CA-0857-MR (this Court dismissedon procedural grounds); and No. 2024-CA-0992-MR (Blair's appeal in a different action).2This statement is contested. A later arbitration determined RAP Properties had “ample opportunity to inspect [SanctuaryBluff]” including “all materials delivered to members of the [HOA]....” However, RAP Properties’ then managing membertestified he was unaware of the GEM Engineering Report at the time of the closing as he did not read the documents(including the GEM Engineering Report) provided by the seller.3The doctor was hoping to sell the property for around $800,000, but as she later received a $385,000 arbitration awardagainst her sellers, she agreed to a sale price of $500,000 with Blair. Blair later testified that prior to purchasing her home,she knew of the doctor's arbitration award and the reason for the sizeable reduction in the sale price.4Not all parties were named in Blair's original complaint. Through her five amended complaints and several circuit courtorders, parties were subsequently added, modified, and dismissed. For instance, Blair added a claim against the HOAin her first amended complaint; in February 2020, the circuit court dismissed the HOA; Blair brought the HOA back in theaction with her third amended complaint; the circuit court again dismissed the HOA in December 2021; Blair brought theHOA back into the action with her fifth amended complaint; the circuit court again dismissed.5Blair filed her original complaint in August 2018 and subsequent amended complaints in September 2019, March 2020,November 2020, February 2021, and June 2022.6We need not discuss all of the claims in Blair's complaints as not all her claims are relevant to this appeal and/or rootedin sound law. For instance, Blair claimed tortious interference and breach of contract with agreements to which she wasnot a signee, made accusations against entities not parties to the suit, failed to appreciate the distinction between aperson's personal capacity versus his/her professional capacity, included rambling factual recitations/accusations thatwere irrelevant to the present litigation, and requested relief beyond a court's reach.7Judge Cunningham wrote, “It will almost certainly be the undersigned's last act as the judge in Division 4 of JeffersonCircuit Court; and thus, this judge goes out with a whimper rather than with a bang! At the risk of acting injudiciously,the Court feels compelled to comment on the general path of this seven-volume, four-case piece of litigation. It has goneback and forth, with punches and counterpunches. Yet, what has anybody actually accomplished and what is the pathforward where any client will shake their attorney's hand when this is all said and done and say, ‘I'm glad I met ya!’? Yearsof discovery, trials, and appeals from now, it seems likely all the litigants will be disenchanted with each other (many ofwhom are neighbors), with the lawyers, and with the ‘system.’ The financial and emotional cost will be extraordinary. Yet,that is sometimes the unavoidable cost of seeking justice.”8It has been a challenge for this Court to unweave the procedural history of this litigation. It appears, instead of movingthe litigation forward after an adjudication, Blair was allowed to continue arguments as if no adjudication happened, andthe circuit court then readdressed matters anew in later orders. For instance, the May 2024 Order appears to adoptprior rulings dismissing various HOA Board members, grant the HOA's cross-motion for summary judgment filed inNovember 2022, and dismiss three specific counts. However, Blair continued to assert the same arguments underlyingthese May 2024 findings as if the circuit court had not adjudicated the issues. As such, the later orders dismissing forlack of prosecution readdress her arguments and again dismiss, albeit with new conclusions. Hence, the later ordersencapsulate the May 2024 Order, and our review will focus on the later orders dismissing for lack of prosecution.9This interlocutory order originally did not contain finality language, but in April 2025, it was reentered verbatim with finalitylanguage. For chronological clarity purposes, we shall refer to it as the “June 2024 Order.”10The circuit court noted Blair initiated the action pro se, “retained counsel for most of the last three years” from two differentlaw firms sequentially, and then again proceeded pro se. Prior to entering this order, the circuit court paused litigationwhile Blair sought new counsel, but she was unable to retain representation, and the litigation proceeded with Blair pro se.
PAMELA BLAIR APPELLANT v. SANCTUARY BLUFF..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1211Blair's appellant briefs appear to challenge the Omnibus Order and possibly other circuit court orders prior to April 2024,but we shall limit our review to those circuit court orders named in Blair's Notices of Appeal. See Kentucky Rule ofAppellate Procedure (“RAP”) 2(B)(1) (requiring the appellant to specify “the date of, the judgment, order, or part thereofappealed from”).12Blair cited “Pinnacle Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 502 S.W.3d 891 (Ky. App. 2016)” for theproposition that the HOA's recorded lien was unable to accrue additional charges in the absence of “continuing lienlanguage” in the recorded lien and CCRs. Yet, “502 S.W.3d 891” belongs to a Texas case about sexual assault. Also,Pinnacle Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2016-CA-000084-MR, 2018 WL 1357494 (Ky.App. Mar. 16, 2018), deals with lien priority, not continuing liens.13Blair did ultimately produce supplemental discovery responses in May 2024 identifying some “experts” but this was wellafter the deadlines imposed by the court's trial order entered in August 2023.14After a stay was denied by this Court, the Master Commissioner scheduled a sale of Blair's home for May 2025. Therecord includes a report that the sale was cancelled, but that report does not elaborate as to the reason. Blair argues that,on the day of the sale, the HOA demanded $131,328. Blair argues she requested an accounting, but the “HOA refusedto provide one” and informed her that $22,089 represented her missed HOA fees while $87,150 were legal fees. Therecord also includes a June 2, 2025 notice that both the First Lien and Second Lien had been released, but no furtherdetails were provided.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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