In re Kenney (2025)

Case details
Full caption
In re: Sanctions Order of Kenney
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Louisiana (LA)
Court
Louisiana Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Timothy S. Marcel (J.) (unanimous Court)
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRYCourt of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit. | October 23, 2025 | Not Reported in So. Rptr. | 2025 WL2986582Document Detailsstandard Citation:IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, 25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25)All Citations:Not Reported in So. Rptr., 2025 WL 2986582, 25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir.10/23/25)Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:LouisianaDelivery DetailsDate:October 24, 2025 at 4:25 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineAttorneys and LawFirms (p.1)Opinion (p.1)All Citations (p.14)
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2986582UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURTRULES BEFORE CITING.Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDEROF KENNEY, KERRYNO. 25-C-389|October 23, 2025ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEWFROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIALDISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON,STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 860-037, DIVISION“I” HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER, JUDGEPRESIDINGWRIT GRANTED, RELIEF DENIED,JUDGMENT AFFIRMEDTSMMEJJJMAttorneys and Law FirmsCOUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR, KERRYKENNEY Connie P. TrieuCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,WEST JEFFERSON HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL AnnM. LeBlanc Mary Margaret H. Moore Kathryn M.CarawayPanel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson, John J.Molaison, Jr., and Timothy S. MarcelOpinionTIMOTHY S. MARCEL JUDGEThis writ presents a res nova issue for this Court:the imposition of sanctions on counsel for filingpleadings containing erroneous, false case citationscreated by generative artificial intelligence (“AI”)software. Connie P. Trieu, counsel for plaintiff, KerryM. Kenney, seeks supervisory review of the trial court'sAugust 11, 2025 judgment rendered against her on aMotion for Sanctions Pursuant to Louisiana Code ofCivil Procedure Article 863 filed by defendants, WestJefferson Holdings, LLC, d/b/a West Jefferson MedicalCenter and Louisiana Children's Medical Center d/b/a LCMC Health. For the following reasons, weaffirm the judgment of the trial court, tax relator withcosts of these proceedings, order relator to attend 3hours of CLE training, and refer relator to the Officeof Disciplinary Counsel for the Louisiana AttorneyDisciplinary Board.BACKGROUNDThis case arises from a Petition for Damages forinvasion of privacy and negligent supervision ofemployees brought on December 2, 2024 by plaintiff,Mr. Kenney, against defendants West JeffersonMedical Center, LCMC Health, and its employee,Amanda Dufrene. In the petition, Mr. Kenney allegesthat he was harmed when Ms. Dufrene accessed hiselectronic medical records without authorization andpublished his personal medical information on thesocial media platform Facebook.In response to plaintiff's petition, on May 23, 2025,defendants West Jefferson Medical Center and LCMCHealth1 filed a Peremptory Exception of No Causeof Action. In their exception, defendants argued thatplaintiff's petition failed to set forth facts necessaryto state causes of action for invasion of privacy ornegligent supervision of an employee under Louisianalaw and therefore the petition should be dismissed.Plaintiff replied on June 3, 2025 by filing anOpposition to Peremptory Exception of No Causeof Action as well as a Memorandum in Supportof Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants’ PeremptoryException of No Cause of Action. Plaintiff argued, withmultiple citations to legal authority, that the petition didinclude facts sufficient to state valid causes of actionfor invasion of privacy and negligent supervision underLouisiana law. These pleadings were signed and filedby plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Trieu.On June 19, defense counsel2 sent an email toplaintiff's counsel requesting clarification for twocitations to purported Louisiana appellate decisions
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2contained in plaintiff's opposition: “Burns v. State,813 So.2d 574 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2001)” and “Smith v.Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 20-306 (La. App. 3 Cir.11/3/20), 308 So.3d 1216.” In her email to plaintiff'scounsel, defense counsel requested courtesy copies ofthe cited cases because she was unable to find eithercase on Westlaw or on the appeals courts’ websites.In response to this email, a paralegal for plaintiff'scounsel replied with summaries of the Burns and Smithcases. Defense counsel then made phone calls to theFirst and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals: those courtsindicated they had no records of the Burns or Smithcases cited.3The next day, on June 20, defense counsel requestedfurther clarification and explanation from plaintiff'scounsel concerning the erroneous citations andreiterated her request for courtesy copies of thecases in PDF format. Plaintiff's counsel personallyreplied that she would have her paralegal amend andstrike those cases and stated “we checked w [sic]two different sources and don't understand how itgave us these incorrect case [sic] so I'll ask herto amend and strike these cases immediately”. Theparalegal then followed up with an email stating thatthe original citations were “compiled in good faithbased on internal notes and references provided toour office.” The paralegal further acknowledged theirresponsibility to ensure the accuracy of the authoritiescited, and stated they had reviewed and amended thememorandum accordingly to reflect proper controllingand persuasive jurisprudence.On the afternoon of June 20, Ms. Trieu signed andfiled a Supplemental Memorandum in Oppositionto Defendants’ Peremptory Exception of No Causeof Action and Errata to Plaintiff's Memorandum.Purportedly, this filing clarified and corrected theincorrect case citations stated in her previous filingsand provided additional legal authority in support ofthe legal arguments made in opposition to defendants’exception. However, no mention is made of theBurns or Smith cases, nor are the erroneous citationsidentified. Printed copies of two Louisiana reportedcases, Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So.2d1386 (La. 1979) and Thomas v. Reg'l Health Sys.of Acadiana, LLC, 19-507 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So.3d595 were attached as exhibits to this filing.4 TheJaubert case had been previously cited in plaintiff'spleadings and the Thomas case was provided as newsupplemental legal authority.On July 14, defendants filed a Memorandum in Replyto Plaintiff's Opposition to Peremptory Exception,Memorandum in Support, and SupplementalMemorandum and Errata. Defendants also filed aMotion for Sanctions Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863with an accompanying memorandum in support. Inthese filings, numerous problems were raised withplaintiff's filings. Defendants pointed to the Burns andSmith cases as entirely fabricated and identified a thirdfabricated case, “Doe v. Southwest Louisiana Hosp.Ass'n, 02-180 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/10/02), 833 So.2d1136,” cited as authority in plaintiff's Memorandumin Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants’Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action. Inaddition to the three fabricated authorities, defendantsalso argued that plaintiff's counsel misrepresented theholdings of Jaubert and another cited case, Acara v.Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006). Defendants notedthat, in addition to misrepresenting the Court's holdingin Thomas, plaintiff's counsel provided an incorrectcitation and false quotation from that case. Defendantsprayed that the court sanction plaintiff pursuant to La.C.C.P. art. 863 in the form of attorney's fees and costs.In support of the motion for sanctions, defendantsincluded a copy of the June 19-20 email exchangewhere the concerns about the case citations were firstraised and also an itemized bill detailing the time spentresearching and drafting responses to the fabricatedcitations.Ms. Trieu filed a Memorandum in Opposition toDefendants’ Motion for Sanctions in which she statedthat the erroneous citations were compiled in goodfaith based on internal notes and that she had filedthe supplemental memorandum and errata to correctthe record and remove the disputed citations. Theerroneous citations are not identified in this filing,nor is any reference made to the additional Doeand Thomas citation errors raised by defendants.Defendants filed a reply to this memorandum, pointingout that the statements of law made by Ms. Trieutherein, (e.g., “[t]he Louisiana Supreme Court hasemphasized that sanctions should not be imposedfor honest mistakes or inadvertent errors,”) are notsupported by citation to any legal authority.
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3On July 30, 2025, one day before the hearing on themotion for sanctions, Ms. Trieu filed an untimely sur-reply to defendants’ memorandum. In the sur-reply,Ms. Trieu disputed defendants’ arguments and againmade statements of law unsupported by any legalauthority. She attached two exhibits as “demonstrativerecords of the research conducted and the sourcematerials consulted to support the legal citations inquestion, including printouts of research verifyingthe good faith basis of the authorities cited.” Theseexhibits appear to be printed copies of summaries forthe Burns and Smith cases produced by generativeAI programs.5 These exhibits are also the first directindication in the record that Ms. Trieu had utilizedgenerative AI programs to conduct legal research.6A contradictory hearing on the motion for sanctionswas held on July 31, 2025.7 At that time, allparties acknowledged that the erroneous case citationswere “AI hallucinations.”8 Ms. Trieu stated that herparalegals and law clerks cross-checked the citationswith three different sources, Google, ChatGPT, andMicrosoft Copilot, and printed out cases from thesesources that she read. She argued that the inclusion ofthe erroneous citations was an “honest mistake” andthat she took active steps to correct the inadvertenterrors, including the filing of the supplementalmemorandum and errata. Ms. Trieu stated that she readevery single pleading she submitted to the court. Sheargued as well that the time defendants claimed tohave spent researching and responding to the erroneouscitations, 7.6 hours total, was excessive. She stated thatit only takes 7.6 seconds, not hours, to type citationsinto LexisNexis or Westlaw.Defense counsel argued that the “errata” filed by Ms.Trieu did not in fact identify the erroneous citations asbeing fabricated by generative AI. She also argued thatMs. Trieu's investigation into the erroneous citationswas not objectively reasonable based on the sourcescited or the evidence presented, and the investigation,including phone calls to the First and Third Circuits,was not conducted by Ms. Trieu, but by defensecounsel.Evidence introduced by defendants at the hearingincluded the email exchange between counsel, anitemized billing statement from defense counsel, andthe exhibits attached to plaintiff's untimely filed sur-reply brief consisting of printed copies of summariesof the AI-generated Burns and Smith cases. Ms. Trieuoffered no evidence.At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court grantedthe motion for sanctions and ordered plaintiff's counselto pay attorney's fees in the amount of $1,368 todefendants as well as court costs incurred by themas a result of their filing the motion for sanctionswithin thirty days of the date of the signing of thewritten judgment. The court also filed written reasonsfor judgment wherein the judge articulated the basis forthe sanction imposed as required under La. C.C.P. art.863(G):Plaintiff's counsel submitted legal authority andcitations generated by “A.I.” software withoutverifying their authenticity. Specifically, in supportof her Opposition to Peremptory Exception of NoCause of Action, plaintiff's counsel: (1) cited tothree cases which were entirely fabricated, includingone which was central to the plaintiff's argument;(2) provided a quote from one authentic casewhich contained addition [sic] language changingthe quote's substance; and (3) misrepresented theholdings of two other authentic cases.In response to defense counsel's inquiries,plaintiff's counsel submitted a supplemental “errata”memorandum. That memorandum cited only twocases: one previously cited in the defendants’memorandum, and one which repeated themisrepresented holding from her initial opposition.For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's counsel wasfound to have violated La. C.C.P. art. 863(B)(2). Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863(D), the Courtimposed sanctions in the amount of the defendants’reasonable attorney's fees for researching theerroneous citations and preparing the motion forsanctions.Ms. Trieu filed a writ application seeking supervisoryreview of the trial court's judgment. In her writapplication, she argues: (1) that the trial court abusedits discretion in issuing sanctions without a findingthat counsel acted in bad faith, with intent to deceive,or without reasonable inquiry as required under La.C.C.P. art. 863(D); (2) that the trial court failed to
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4articulate factual findings supporting the sanctionsimposed; and (3) that the sanctions imposed wereexcessive, punitive, and unsupported by the record.Counsel reiterates her arguments made before thetrial court that the citations originated from internalresearch notes and secondary online AI sources,including Microsoft Copilot, ChatGPT, and Google AIreferences, which were mistakenly relied upon duringdrafting. We consider the merits of her arguments inour discussion below.DISCUSSIONWe begin by observing that the August 11, 2025judgment is a partial final judgment subject toimmediate appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 1915 (A)(6) statesthat a final judgment may be rendered, even thoughit may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case,when the court imposes sanctions or disciplinaryaction pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863. We furtherobserve that, as of August 1, 2025, the newly enactedlegislative amendments to La. C.C.P. art. 1915 nolonger require the trial court to designate certain partialjudgments as final prior to taking an appeal fromthe judgment rendered.9 Nevertheless, because relatorhas filed a timely writ application, and because thesupplemented writ application10 and the defendants’opposition provide an otherwise complete record, weconsider this case under our supervisory jurisdiction.Our discussion proceeds with a statement of theapplicable standard of review and an examinationof the applicable law, Article 863, followed by areview of the trial court's findings of fact and thesanctions imposed. We conclude with the impositionof additional sanctions.Standard of ReviewThe standard of review of sanctions imposed underLa. C.C.P. art. 863 is twofold: the trial court'sdetermination that conduct is sanctionable is reviewedunder the manifest error standard to determine whethersuch a finding is supported by the facts of the case,while review of the nature or amount of such sanctionsis reviewed to determine whether the trial judge abusedher discretion when setting the sanctions. Marks v.Marks, 21-741, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/28/22), 349So.3d 1071, 1075; Richardson v. Whitney Nat. Bank,06-803, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/07), 953 So.2d 836,839; Alombro v. Alfortish, 02-1081, p. 8 (La. App. 5Cir. 4/29/03), 845 So.2d 1162, 1168; Durkin v. Quest,Inc., 98-939, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/98), 724 So.2d868, 872; Sternberg v. Sternberg, 97-101, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/28/97), 695 So.2d 1068, 1071.Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 863The matter presented, the imposition of sanctionsunder La. C.C.P. art. 863 for the inclusion of AI-generated fake citations in pleadings, is res novafor this Court and, to our knowledge, has notbeen considered by any other Louisiana appellatecourt. While novel to us, the widespread adoptionof generative AI software by legal practitioners inrecent years has resulted in many courts consideringthe same problem. See, e.g., Mata v. Avianca, Inc.,678 F.Supp.3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023); Park v. Kim, 91F.4th 610 (2d Cir. 2024); Iovino v. Michael StapletonAssociates, Ltd., 5:21-CV-00064, 2024 WL 3520170(W.D. Va. July 24, 2024); Gauthier v. GoodyearTire & Rubber Co., 1:23-CV-281, 2024 WL 4882651(E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2024); Wadsworth v. WalmartInc., 348 F.R.D. 489 (D. Wyo. 2025); Benjamin v.Costco Wholesale Corp., 779 F.Supp.3d 341 (E.D.N.Y.2025); Versant Funding LLC v. Teras Breakbulk OceanNavigation Enterprises, LLC, 17-CV-81140, 2025WL 1440351 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2025); Johnson v.Dunn, 2:21-CV-1701-AMM, 2025 WL 2086116, ---F.Supp.3d --- (N.D. Ala. July 23, 2025); Nora v. M &A Transp., Inc., CV 25-1015, 2025 WL 2337132 (E.D.La. Aug. 13, 2025); Lee v. R&R Home Care, Inc., CV24-836, 2025 WL 2481375 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2025);Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P., 114 Cal. App. 5th 426(2025).11 Many of these cases involve the impositionof sanctions on attorneys pursuant to Rule 11 of theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the signingof pleadings and representations made to the court. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 11.Louisiana appellate courts have previously observedthat our Article 863 was amended in 1988 andmodelled after Rule 11, and that both require theattorney or litigant who signs a pleading to makean objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5law. Butler v. Reeder, 98-484, p. 13 (La. App. 5 Cir.12/29/98), 728 So.2d 888, 894; Diesel Driving Acad.,Inc. v. Ferrier, 563 So.2d 898, 902 (La. App. 2 Cir.4/4/90); Fairchild v. Fairchild, 580 So.2d 513, 516 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/16/91). While the language of Article863 does not exactly mirror the current text of Rule1112, the requirements of the statutes are substantiallysimilar such that the decisions of the federal courtsconsidering sanctions under Rule 11 on attorneys forerroneous or fake citations fabricated by generative AIprograms are instructive and may provide guidance toLouisiana courts applying Article 863 under similarcircumstances.In Louisiana, as in other civil law jurisdictions,legislation is superior to any other source of law. La.C.C. art. 1; Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 00-0947, p.13 (La. 12/19/00), 774 So.2d 119, 128. Therefore,our analysis begins with the text of the statute itself.Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 863 statesin pertinent parts:...B. ... [T]he signature of an attorney or party shallconstitute a certification by him that he has readthe pleading, and that to the best of his knowledge,information, and belief formed after reasonableinquiry, he certifies all of the following:... (2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertionin the pleading is warranted by existing law orby a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,modification, or reversal of existing law....D. If, upon the motion of any party or upon itsown motion, the court determines that a certificationhas been made in violation of the provisions of thisArticle, the court shall impose upon the person whomade the certification or represented the party, orboth, an appropriate sanction which may includean order to pay the other party the amount of thereasonable expenses incurred because of the filingof the pleading, including reasonable attorney fees....G. If the court imposes a sanction, it shall describethe conduct determined to constitute a violation ofthe provisions of this Article and explain the basisfor the sanction imposed.Pursuant to Section B of this text, we examine the trialcourt's findings of fact to determine whether plaintiff'scounsel made a reasonable inquiry that her legal claimsand assertions in the pleadings were warranted byexisting law or by nonfrivolous argument for theextension, modification, or reversal of existing law.The Trial Court's Findings of FactTo impose sanctions under La. C.C.P. art. 863, thetrial court must factually find that the signed pleadingsdid not comply with the article's requirements. Teal v.Zeagler, 21-586, p. 14 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/6/22), 345So.3d 1092, 1102. This statute imposes an obligationon litigants and their counsel who sign a pleading tomake an objectively reasonable inquiry into the factsand the law; subjective good faith will not satisfythe duty of reasonable inquiry.13 Voitier v. Guidry,14-276, p. 8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14), 166 So.3d 262,268, writ denied, 2015-0118 (La. 4/10/15), 176 So.3d1032; Banks v. Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 22-151,p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/30/22), 350 So.3d 952, 958;Plaquemines Par. Gov't v. Williams, 19-803, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/24/20), 302 So.3d 123, 128, writ denied,20-943 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 315. This obligationis an affirmative duty. Div. of Admin., Office of Cmty.Dev. - Disaster Recovery Unit v. Joseph, 22-65, p. 6(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/21/22), 355 So.3d 144, 149. Theaffirmative duty is personal and non-delegable. Bornev. New Orleans Health Care, Inc., 616 So.2d 236, 238(La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/93). Article 863 is intended forexceptional circumstances; it is not violated simplybecause a party's argument or ground for relief issubsequently found unjustified. Id.Fabricated CasesFirst, we examine the pleadings filed by Ms. Trieu,including the Opposition to Peremptory Exception ofNo Cause of Action and the Memorandum in Supportof Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants’ PeremptoryException of No Cause of Action to identify the false
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6citations mentioned by the trial court in the writtenreasons for judgment.14 In these pleadings, we canidentify at least three types of erroneous or falsecitations: (1) fabricated case citations where the casename or the case/reporter/volume/page number areentirely fabricated; (2) true case citations followingstatements that misrepresent the holding of the case;and (3) false or altered quotations that are not found inthe text of the cited case.The Opposition to Peremptory Exception of No Causeof Action contains the following two false citations:15These allegations are sufficient to plead the tort ofinvasion of privacy, particularly under the theory ofintrusion upon seclusion. See Burns v. State, 813So.2d 574 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2001) (affirming invasionof privacy claim where improper access to driver'slicense information occurred.)Defendants’ assertion that HIPAA provides noprivate cause of action does not preclude Plaintiff'sclaims under state tort law, where the violation ofHIPAA standards may be evidence of breach ofduty. See Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir.2006); Smith v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 20-306(La. App. 3 Cir. 11/4/20), 308 So.3d 1216.The Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Oppositionto Defendants’ Peremptory Exception of No Cause ofAction repeats these two false citations with differentlanguage and adds another:16This case involves the second form - intrusionupon seclusion - which occurs when “the defendantintentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, uponthe solitude or seclusion of another or his privateaffairs or concerns, and the intrusion would behighly offensive to a reasonable person.” See Burnsv. State, 00-908 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 813So.2d 574, 578.[17]While the Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act (HIPAA) does not itself providea private cause of action, courts have held thatviolations of HIPPA may serve as evidence of thestandard of care in tort claims. See Acara v. Banks,470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Christus St.Patrick Hosp., 20-306 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/4/20), 308So.3d 1216.Louisiana recognizes a cause of action fornegligent supervision, hiring, or retention wherean employer knew or should have known of anemployee's unfitness. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605So.2d 1032 (La. 1991); Doe v. Southwest LouisianaHosp. Ass'n, 02-180 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/10/02), 833So.2d 1136, 1146.[18]The Burns, Smith, and Doe case citations are all falseor fabricated.For Burns, the reporter and volume number, 813Southern Second (So.2d), are genuine, but the pagenumber provided, 574, leads to another reported case,Bowie v. Young, 2001-0715 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/20/02),813 So.2d 562, concerning an appeal from a judgmentnotwithstanding the verdict and the award of damagesfollowing an automobile accident. The Bowie casedoes not involve a claim for invasion of privacy anddoes not contain the language quoted in plaintiff'spleadings. The page number for the quoted language,(813 So.2d at) 578, refers to a different case, Interestof C.C. v. E.C.C., 2001-1364 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/20/02),813 So.2d 576, concerning a child custody dispute thatalso makes no mention of invasion of privacy. Thequoted text appears to come from the AI-generatedcase summary rather than an actual reported Louisianaappellate decision.For Smith, again, the reporter and volume number,308 Southern Third (So.3d), are genuine, but the pagenumber provided, 1216, leads to another reported case,AOK Prop. Investments, LLC v. Boudreaux, 20-237(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/9/20), 308 So.3d 1214, 1216,writ denied, 2021-00002 (La. 3/2/21), 311 So.3d 1051.This case involves the transfer of a limited liabilitycompany's membership interest and has nothing todo with HIPAA or a cause of action for invasion ofprivacy.The error is repeated again for the Doe citation. Thereporter and volume number, 833 So.2d, are genuine,but the page numbers provided, 1136 and 1146, refer toentirely different cases: Robert v. Nelson, 36,541 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1136 (concerning adisputed finding of fault in an automobile accident)and Evans v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 36,539 (La.
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1143 (concerningdisputed fire insurance proceeds from arson). Neitherof these cases have anything to do with a cause ofaction for negligent supervision, hiring, or retentionunder Louisiana law as stated by Ms. Trieu in thepleading.In addition to these false citations, plaintiff also citesin both pleadings a genuine case, Acara v. Banks fromthe U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. While this caseis genuine, it does not support the legal propositionstated by Ms. Trieu. She states that in Acara the U.S.Fifth Circuit held that “violations of HIPAA may serveas evidence of the standard of care in tort claims.”This statement misrepresents the holding of Acara. Inthat case, the Fifth Circuit held that HIPAA does notgive rise to a private cause of action under federal law.However, this case makes no mention of state law tortclaims or evidence of breach of duty. Simply stated,the legal authority cited here does not support counsel'sargument that plaintiff's claims as stated in the petitionare sufficient to state a cause of action under Louisianalaw.This review of the pleadings shows that the trial court'sfactual findings that Ms. Trieu cited fabricated casesand misrepresented the holdings of authentic casesare supported by the record and are not manifestlyerroneous. Counsel's citation to fake or non-existentcases in her sworn, filed pleadings is prima facieevidence that counsel failed in her affirmative dutyto make an objectively reasonable inquiry into thelaw. As the court in Mata observed, “[a] fakeopinion is not ‘existing law’ and citation to a fakeopinion does not provide a non-frivolous ground forextending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or forestablishing new law.” 678 F.Supp.3d at 461.19Other Evidence of Counsel's Objectively ReasonableInquiryWe next review additional evidence in the recordspecifically to determine whether it supports thefinding that plaintiff's counsel failed to make anobjectively reasonable inquiry into the law cited inher pleading filed with the court as required under La.C.C.P. art. 863(B)(2).Before the trial court and before this Court, Ms.Trieu has consistently argued that the inclusion oferroneous citations in her pleadings was an inadvertent“honest mistake”. As stated above, the inclusion offake or false citations alone is prima facie evidencesufficient to support a finding that counsel did notmeet her affirmative duty of objective, reasonableinquiry into the law as required by Article 863. Theevidence provided at the hearing, the AI-generatedcase summaries, the June 19-20 email exchange, andthe supplemental memorandum and errata, all of whichplaintiff's counsel claims show that she acted in goodfaith, instead also show that she did not conduct anobjectively reasonable inquiry.The Supplemental Memorandum and ErrataMs. Trieu states that the Supplemental Memorandumin Opposition to Defendants’ Peremptory Exceptionof No Cause of Action and Errata to Plaintiff'sMemorandum she filed on June 20, 2025 corrected therecord, removed the disputed citations, and reaffirmedthe legal basis for plaintiff's claims using properand verifiable jurisprudence. We disagree. Instead ofcorrecting the record, with this filing Ms. Trieu insteadappears to have doubled down on and compounded herprevious errors.Our review of this filing begins with two observationsas to the caption of the pleading. First, we observethe distinction between ‘amending’ pleadings forthe purposes of correcting mistakes or restatingclaims and ‘supplementing’ pleadings to providenew or previously omitted information.20 While sucha distinction is not directly material to this casebecause plaintiff did not require leave of courtto file an amended or supplemental peremptoryexception (because such exceptions may be filed atany time under La. C.C.P. art. 928), it is neverthelessan important distinction unobserved by plaintiff'scounsel.Next, we observe that an “errata” is a list oferrors in a printed work discovered after printingand shown with corrections.21 The filing captioned“errata” by plaintiff's counsel does not in fact includea list of the erroneous citations from plaintiff's prior
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8pleadings.22 A party not privy to the June 19-20 emailexchange would have no knowledge of what errorswere being corrected. The caption of “supplemental”memorandum and “errata” is inaccurate and arguablymisleading.23We now turn to the substantive text of the filing whichstates in pertinent part:24I. PURPOSE OF SUPPLEMENTALMEMORANDUM AND ERRATADefendant's counsel raised concerns regarding theaccuracy of legal citations contained in Plaintiff'soriginal Opposition. In the interest of professionalcandor and judicial efficiency, the followingcorrected authorities are submitted to cure anyinadvertent citation errors and to reaffirm thevalidity of Plaintiff's substantive arguments inopposition to the Exception of No Cause of Action.II. CORRECTED CASE CITATIONS1. Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So.2d1186 (La. 1979) (See Exhibit A)• This seminal Louisiana Supreme Court case setsforth the four actionable forms of invasionof privacy under Louisiana law, includingintrusion upon seclusion and unreasonabledisclosure of private facts, both which arerelevant to Plaintiff's claims.2. Thomas v. Regional Health System of Acadiana,LLC, 2019-00507 (La. 1/29/20), 289 So.3d 99(See Exhibit B)• The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized avalid cause of action for invasion of privacybased on unauthorized access to a patient'smedical records by a hospital employee.“...plaintiff stated a cause of action for invasionof privacy under Louisiana law, independent ofHIPAA, based on unauthorized access to medicalrecords by hospital personnel.” Id. at 103.This citation to Thomas v. Reg'l Health Sys. ofAcadiana, LLC, contains another apparently AI-generated fabrication: the reporter and volume numberstated, “289 So.3d 99”, does not match the reporter andvolume number for the genuine case, 347 So.3d 595.The citation here also misrepresents the holding of theThomas case as recognizing a valid cause of action forinvasion of privacy based on unauthorized access to apatient's medical records by a hospital employee, whilein fact the Thomas case addresses a hospital's negligentre-credentialing. The words “invasion” and “privacy”do not appear at all in the Thomas case. Finally, thisfiling also includes a false quotation not found in thetext of the actual case: “ ‘...plaintiff states a cause ofaction for invasion of privacy under Louisiana law,independent of HIPAA, based on unauthorized accessto medical records by hospital personnel.’ Id. at 103.”Instead of correcting the citation errors from theprevious filing, with this supplemental pleadingplaintiff's counsel doubled down and providedadditional false citations. This is objectivelyunreasonable. Furthermore, these errors should havebeen immediately apparent to Ms. Trieu because sheprovided a printed hard copy of the Thomas casewith the correct citation number and complete text ofthe case as an exhibit attached to the supplementalmemorandum. Instead of evidencing a “good faith”effort to correct the record, this filing shows that Ms.Trieu, contrary to her assertions to the trial court atthe hearing on the motion, did not read the pleadingor its attached exhibits prior to signing and filing. Thispleading, on its face, shows that Ms. Trieu violatedher affirmative duty to investigate the law as requiredunder Article 863.The June 19-20 Email ExchangeIn the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant'sMotion for Sanctions, Ms. Trieu states that theemail exchange between the parties demonstratesher transparency, professionalism, and commitmentto accuracy. We acknowledge that plaintiff's counselpromptly replied to defense counsel's emails.However, we also observe: (1) that the investigationinto the erroneous citations was initiated only afterdefense counsel raised questions concerning citationsin the filed pleadings; (2) in response to defensecounsel's request for courtesy copies of the cases,Ms. Trieu's paralegal provided AI-generated casesummaries instead of the texts of actual cases; and (3)Ms. Trieu did not clearly acknowledge generative AIprograms as the source of the erroneous citations until
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9the hearing on the motion for sanctions. These actionsare not indicative of a commitment to transparency,professionalism, or accuracy.25Defense counsel's email inquiries do not appear tohave prompted plaintiff's counsel to comprehensivelyinvestigate all of the case citations contained inher pleadings; such an internal investigation wouldhave revealed the third false citation contained inthe Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Oppositionto Defendants’ Peremptory Exception of No Causeof Action, the fabricated Doe case.26 To date, thiserroneous citation and those in the supplementalmemorandum and errata have still not been addressed,explained, or corrected by Ms. Trieu.The affirmative duty of objective, reasonable inquiryinto the law is not met by investigating only thoseerrors pointed out by opposing counsel. Notice that onecitation is fabricated or erroneous should necessitatea review of all of the citations in a documentfor accuracy and validity. The affirmative duty tomake an objectively reasonable inquiry into thefacts and law under La. C.C.P. art. 863 is ongoingand must be met with every pleading filed. Thisrequires not only addressing errors raised by opposingcounsel, but also those identified in the course ofone's own investigation. These should be promptlyacknowledged, addressed, and corrected.AI-generated Case SummariesIntroduced at the hearing on the motion are printoutsof AI-generated summaries of the Burns and Smithcases. We reiterate here: the Burns and Smith cases donot exist. They were entirely fabricated by generativeAI programs in response to plaintiff's counsel's searchquery or prompt. These summaries contain fabricatedcase titles, fabricated case and reporter numbers,fabricated statements of fact, fabricated proceduralhistory, fabricated statements of law, fabricated rulingsand holdings, and fabricated legal analysis thatpurports to contextualize these cases in the broaderbody of Louisiana law. Plaintiff's counsel offered theseas “demonstrative records of the research conductedand the source materials consulted to support the legalcitations in question, including printouts of researchverifying the good faith basis of the authorities cited.”At the hearing on the motion, plaintiff's counsel statedthat she read these summaries as cases.27 It is unclearwhy plaintiff's counsel, or her paralegals or associates,attempted to validate the erroneous citations fabricatedby generative AI software using that same softwarerather than a recognized, legitimate source. We knowMs. Trieu had access to such a source, vLex Fastcase,because she printed out hard copies of the Jaubert andThomas cases and included them in her supplementalmemorandum filing.It is immediately apparent that the AI-generatedcase summaries are not genuine, full and completetexts of reported cases like one might find onWestlaw, LexisNexis, vLex Fastcase, or our courts’own websites.28 The summaries, besides containinglists and bullet points which rarely appear in theformatting of reported cases, omit the names of thewriter judge and the other judges on the panel, andrefer to “the court” in the third-person. Additionally,the summaries contain the following disclaimer atthe bottom of the page: “AI responses may includemistakes. For legal advice, consult a professional.”For our analysis, the most important aspect of sucha disclaimer is not its veracity,29 but rather that sucha disclaimer is an additional obvious sign that thetext being read is not an actual, real legal case. Fora reasonable reader, such a disclaimer would indicatethat additional inquiry is necessary in order to verifythe accuracy or sources of the generated text summary.It was objectively unreasonable for plaintiff's counselto rely solely on AI-generated case summaries whenconducting legal research or verifying AI-generatedlegal citations, especially in light of the evidenceshowing that she had access to a traditional legalresearch database that contains the full texts ofgenuine reported cases. Reviewing AI-generated casesummaries is not the same as reading legal cases.The manifest error standard of review precludes thesetting aside of a trial court's finding of fact unless thatfinding is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewedin its entirety. Mann v. Louisiana-1 Gaming, 21-83,p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/15/21), 334 So.3d 894, 898.Upon review of the record and evidence before us,we find no error in the trial court's findings of fact.The evidence shows that plaintiff's counsel, even afterbeing placed on notice of erroneous citations, failed
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10to clearly identify and correct those fake citations,conducted an incomplete and haphazard inquiry intothe law fabricated by the generative AI programs,and doubled down on her previous mistakes by filingpleadings with additional, avoidable errors. We agreewith the trial court that Ms. Trieu signed the pleadingswithout first making an objectively reasonable inquiryinto the law as required under La. C.C.P. art. 863(B)(2).Reasonableness of the Sanctions ImposedIn the August 11, 2025 judgment, the trial courtordered Ms. Trieu to pay attorney's fees in the amountof $1,368 to West Jefferson Medical Center and LCMCHealth in addition to court costs incurred by thosedefendants as a result of their filing of their Motionfor Sanctions Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863 andassociated memoranda. In her writ application, Ms.Trieu argues that “[t]he sanctions were excessive,punitive, and unsupported by the record.”30 Relatorprovides no other argument or briefing concerningthis purported error of the trial court. Under UniformRules-Courts of Appeal Rule 2-12.4(B)(4), “[a]llassignments of error and issues for review shallbe briefed. The court may deem as abandoned anyassignment of error or issue for review which has notbeen briefed.” Rule 4-5(C)(5) also requires that theoriginal application for writs contain “the assignmentsor specifications of errors and a brief in support of theapplication...”. Nevertheless, in the interests of justiceand because the issue was argued before the trial court,we consider relator's arguments here.31In our consideration of whether the sanction imposedhere is appropriate, we look to the Louisiana law bywhich we are bound as well as the aforementionedinstructive examples from other courts who haveencountered similar instances of AI-fabricated casesand citations.We restate here that section of Article 863 authorizingthe award of sanctions:D. If, upon the motion of any party or upon itsown motion, the court determines that a certificationhas been made in violation of the provisions of thisArticle, the court shall impose upon the person whomade the certification or represented the party, orboth, an appropriate sanction which may includean order to pay the other party the amount of thereasonable expenses incurred because of the filing ofthe pleading, including reasonable attorney fees.32Under this section, Article 863 requires the trial courtto sanction attorneys who violate their obligations tomake reasonable inquiry into the law and facts prior tosigning the pleadings. The statute does not expresslyidentify what is an “appropriate sanction”, but usesthe permissive language “may” to indicate that amonetary penalty of reasonable expenses incurred canbe appropriate. See Carrollton Presbyterian Churchv. Presbytery of S. Louisiana of Presbyterian Church(U.S.A.), 14-1214, p. 18 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/9/15),172 So.3d 1, writ denied, 15-682 (La. 5/22/15), 171So.3d 257. Other sanctions, including non-monetarysanctions in addition or as an alternative to an awardof reasonable attorney's fees, may also be appropriatedepending on the facts and circumstances of thecase and within the bounds of the rule that statutesauthorizing the imposition of a penalty are to be strictlyconstrued. See Agenor v. Suarez, 23-488, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/24/24), 386 So.3d 1216, 1219. The trialcourt has considerable discretion as to the type andseverity of the sanctions imposed once it determinesthat sanctions are appropriate. Alombro, 845 So.2d at1170. Four factors to be considered when arriving atan appropriate sanction include: (1) the conduct beingpunished or sought to be deterred by the sanction; (2)the expenses or costs caused by the violation of therule; (3) whether costs or expenses are reasonable, asopposed to self-imposed, mitigable, or the result ofdelay in seeking court intervention; and (4) whetherthe sanction is the least severe sanction adequate toachieve the purpose of the rule under which it wasimposed. Id.; Butler, 728 So.2d at 895. We considerthese factors here.Conduct to be Punished and DeterredWe are concerned not only with plaintiff's counsel'sinclusion of false and erroneous case citations inher pleadings, conduct sanctionable in and of itself,but also the exacerbation and multiplication of theseerrors in subsequent pleadings that purport to identifyand correct them. Counsel's actions are indicative ofmultiple violations of the duty to conduct a reasonable
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11inquiry into the law as required under Article 863.We are also concerned that counsel has never clearlyaddressed the erroneous citations identified in thesupplemental memorandum and errata.As has been observed, it is not necessarily the useof generative AI in and of itself that causes offenseand concern, but rather counsel's failure to reviewthe citations and cases produced by the generative AIprograms without proper examination and scrutiny.Will of Samuel, 82 Misc.3d 616; 206 N.Y.S.3d 888,891 (N.Y. Sur. 2024). A basic prerequisite to the filingof any pleading, motion, response, reply, or paper incourt is for the drafting and filing attorney to carefullycheck every case citation, fact, and argument to makesure they are correct and proper. Versant, 2025 WL1440351 at *4. Attorneys cannot delegate that role toAI, computers, robots, or any other form of technology.Id. Just as a competent attorney would very carefullycheck the veracity and accuracy of all case citations inany pleading, motion, response, reply, or other paperprepared by a law clerk, intern, or other attorney beforeit is filed, the same holds true when attorneys utilizeAI or any other form of technology. Id.While in this case we are concerned with the violationof Article 863, we also observe that the use ofgenerative AI by any legal professional has multipleimplications of ethical concern. Attorneys are boundby rules of professional conduct that include dutiesof competence, confidentiality33, supervision, candor,and more.34 For example, the Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 3.3. Candor Toward theTribunal states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly...make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunalor fail to correct a false statement of material fact orlaw previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer...”.Whether Ms. Trieu has violated these professionalrules is a question not before us at this time.Nevertheless, the facts of this case warrant furtherinquiry into whether such a violation has occurred,and therefore we refer this matter to the Officeof Disciplinary Counsel for the Louisiana AttorneyDisciplinary Board.Expenses and Costs from Violation of Article 863The harms caused by the inclusion of fake anderroneous citations in pleadings are many. See Mata,678 F.Supp.3d at 464. The most concrete, ascertainableharm is the time wasted by readers of the documentscontaining the erroneous citations seeking to verifythe authority on which the legal arguments are based.Such attempts are fruitless and frustrating, and thosecosts are born not just by opposing counsel but alsoother readers, including judges and law clerks.35 Sucha harm is not isolated and singular, but grows andmultiplies as the number of fake citations included inthe pleadings increases. More fake citations result inmore time wasted by the reader trying to verify theunverifiable.Other harms are less discrete, but no less real. Thefiling of pleadings that cite fake legal authorityundermines the rule of law and a judicial system basedon reason. Such fakery also erodes public trust inthe legal profession. In response to these less discreteharms, and in their effort to deter baseless filings andcurb abuses of the judicial system, courts have adopteda variety of non-monetary sanctions for attorneyswho have included fake citations in their pleadings,such as requiring the attorney to attend CLE trainingsregarding the use of AI,36 requiring counsel to providea copy of the opinion imposing the sanctions to theirclient37 or to the state bar,38 referring counsel fordisciplinary proceedings,39 and disqualifying counselfrom the proceedings.40 The permissive language ofSection D of Article 863 allows for a Louisiana trialcourt to impose similar non-monetary sanctions incases where the facts and evidence presented warrantsuch measures.Reasonableness of Costs and ExpensesThe amount of the sanction awarded, $1,368, issupported by evidence in the record, particularlythe itemized bill provided by defense counsel.This itemized bill documents the time spentresearching the cases stated in plaintiff's pleadings,communications with the First and Third CircuitCourts to investigate the fabricated cases, the June19-20 email communications with plaintiff's counsel,and drafting and revising the motion for sanctionsand supporting memorandum. In total, the bill shows
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12eleven time entries totaling 7.6 hours of workbetween June 19 and July 14 spent responding to theerroneous citations. We find the measures undertakenby defense counsel in this case—notifying counsel ofthe errors, verifying the cases with the appropriatecourts, requesting courtesy copies, filing a motion forsanctions after plaintiff's counsel's subsequent filingscompounded rather than corrected the errors—to bereasonable, professional, and commendable.At the hearing on the motion for sanctions, Ms. Trieu,citing her own years of experience practicing law,argued that 7.6 hours of work was too much for tasks assimple as conducting legal research or making phonecalls. The work of verifying the citations could be donein 7.6 seconds, she stated. Such statements display anastounding lack of awareness of counsel's obligationsunder Article 863. The responsibility for correctingerroneous and fake citations never shifts to opposingcounsel or the court, even if they are the first to noticethe errors. The duty to mitigate the harms caused bysuch errors remains with the signor. The sooner sucherrors are properly corrected, either by withdrawing oramending and supplementing the offending pleadings,the less time is wasted by everyone involved, and fewercosts are incurred.Least Severe Sanction to Achieve Purpose of the RuleThe goal to be served by imposing sanctions is notwholesale fee shifting, but correction of litigationabuse. Carrollton, supra. The reading requirementembodied in Article 863 is designed to precludethe defense of personal ignorance of mistakes ordefects and to eliminate the defense that the pleadingswere prepared by another person.41 While plaintiff'scounsel has argued that the monetary sanction imposedis “excessive”, in fact, it falls on the low end ofsanctions imposed by other Louisiana courts forother violations of Article 863, which have rangedfrom $500 to $390,000.00. See, e.g., Borne, 616So.2d 236, ($82,047.84 sanctions); Sternberg, 695So.2d 1068, ($2,500.00 sanctions); John W. Fisk Co.,Div. of Fisk Corp. v. Michel, 97-2105 (La. App. 4Cir. 3/25/98), 709 So.2d 1061, ($5000.00 sanctions);Butler, 728 So.2d 888, ($8,491.39, $13,802.20,$2500.00 and $26,875.80 sanctions); Brooks v.Maggio, 33,734 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/00), 766 So.2d698, ($500.00 sanctions); Graves v. Fields, 35,411(La. App. 2 Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 392, ($1500.00sanctions); Alombro, 845 So.2d 1162, ($3,102.15sanctions); Carrollton Presbyterian Church, 172 So.3d1, ($390,000.00 sanctions); Plaquemines Par. Gov't,302 So.3d 123, ($31,037.56 sanctions); Marks, 349So.3d 1071, ($7,924.50 sanctions); Pierce v. BuckKreihs Co., Inc., 22-848 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/23), 371So.3d 534, ($11,174.81 sanctions).The trial court's $1,368 award is also on the low end ofsanctions awarded by federal courts for the inclusionof fake citations in violation of Rule 11. In nearly allcases reported so far, courts have imposed monetarysanctions ranging from $1,500 to $15,000. Benjaminv. Costco Wholesale Corp., 779 F.Supp.3d 341, 349(E.D.N.Y. 2025) (and cases cited therein). The sanctionimposed by the trial court is the least severe that couldhave been imposed under the facts presented.Upon review, we find no abuse of the trial court'sbroad discretion in imposing sanctions of $1,368 onplaintiff's counsel. The amount of this award is clearlyauthorized by the language of Article 863 and is wellsupported by the evidence presented at the hearing onthe motion.Additional Sanctions Pursuant to La. C.C.P. Article2164The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2164authorizes courts to impose additional penalties for thefiling of frivolous appeals. It states:The appellate court shall render any judgment whichis just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.The court may award damages, including attorneyfees, for frivolous appeal or application for writs,and may tax the costs of the lower or appellate court,or any part thereof, against any party to the suit, asin its judgment may be considered equitable.We have previously held that an appellate court mayaward damages for a frivolous appeal or writ whenthere is no serious legal question, when it is takensolely for the purpose of delay, or when it is evidentthat counsel does not seriously believe in the positionshe advocates. Alombro, 845 So.2d at 1170. A writ will
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13not automatically be deemed frivolous simply becauseit lacks merit. Id. In this single instance, we find thatthis matter, which presents a res nova legal question,does not meet the requirements of a frivolous writ,and therefore we decline to award additional monetarypenalties pursuant to our authority under Article 2164.Future appeals or writs that arise from similar casesinvolving AI-generated fake citations may be deemedfrivolous and subject to additional penalties dependingon the facts and circumstances presented. While wedecline to exercise our authority to award additionalmonetary penalties, we find that it is just, legal, andproper to order plaintiff's counsel to attend 3 hoursof CLE training on the ethical and responsible use ofgenerative AI programs.Defense counsel has requested that this court awardadditional attorney's fees for the time spent preparingand responding to relator's writ application. Such anadditional award is generally not permitted in theabsence of a finding that the appeal or writ is frivolous.Diesel Driving Acad., Inc., 563 So.2d at 908 (onrehearing) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359(1990)). Accordingly, we do not impose additionalattorney's fees pursuant to respondent's request.CONCLUSIONWhile the technology utilized by lawyers has changed,our obligations as officers of the court to the bench,the bar, clients, and the public remain the same. In aletter regarding the emergence of generative artificialintelligence to the Louisiana State Bar Association, thejustices of the Louisiana Supreme Court have stated:As with any developing technology, AI appears topresent both opportunities and concerns, and the useof such technology raises a host of possible issuesfrom an ethics and professionalism standpoint.Although many applications of AI technology in thelegal profession are new, the rules governing thebench and the Bar are not new and have been in placefor decades. At the present time, the ethical andprofessional rules governing the bench and the Barare robust and broad enough to cover the landscapeof issues presented by AI in its current forms.Regardless of the use of AI, attorneys practicing inLouisiana have always been ultimately responsiblefor their work-product and the pleadings they filein court, maintaining competence in technology, andprotecting confidential client information and havea duty to avoid making misrepresentations of factor law. See, e.g., Rules of Professional Conduct1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.6, 1.15, 3.1, 3.3, and 5.3; LouisianaCode of Civil Procedure articles 371 and 863. Theseobligations remain unchanged or unaffected by theavailability of AI.[42]The lawyer's obligation under Article 863 is crystalclear: read the law you cite. Read the Code. Readthe statutes. Read the cases. Citation to fake orfabricated cases in pleadings is prima facie evidencethat the attorney who signs the pleadings has failedher duty under Article 863. This is a responsibility thatcannot be outsourced. Those who utilize generativeAI programs, such as ChatGPT, for legal researchand drafting legal documents should be aware of theproblem of fake cases.43 There is no reason fakecitations, be they generated by AI programs or byhumans, should appear in any pleading filed in aLouisiana court. This is an easily preventable problem,and all attorneys practicing in Louisiana have accessto resources to easily verify the law they employ tosupport their arguments.ORDER AND DECREEUpon review of the writ before us, we affirm theAugust 11, 2025 judgment of the trial court imposingsanctions on Ms. Trieu for violation of her obligationsunder La. C.C.P. art. 863. We order Ms. Trieu toattend 3 hours of CLE training on the ethical use ofgenerative AI programs and to provide a certificate ofcompletion of such education to the trial court on orbefore December 31, 2025. We also report Ms. Trieu'sconduct to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for theLouisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board to evaluatethe evidence of potential violations of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct presented in this matter. We taxplaintiff's counsel with the costs of these proceedings.WRIT GRANTED, RELIEF DENIED,JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.14FIFTH CIRCUIT101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)POST OFFICE BOX 489GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054www.fifthcircuit.orgSUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGEFREDERICKA H. WICKERJUDE G. GRAVOISMARC E. JOHNSONSTEPHEN J. WINDHORSTJOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.SCOTT U. SCHLEGELTIMOTHY S. MARCELJUDGESCURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURTSUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERKLINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERKMELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRALSTAFF(504) 376-1400(504) 376-1498 FAXNOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATEOF DELIVERYI CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINIONIN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HASBEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITHUNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY OCTOBER 23,2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT,COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIESNOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTEDBELOW:CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT25-C-389E-NOTIFIED24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER (DISTRICTJUDGE)CONNIE P. TRIEU (RELATOR)ANN M. LEBLANC (RESPONDENT)KATHRYN M. CARAWAY (RESPONDENT)MAILEDMARY MARGARET H. MOORE(RESPONDENT)ATTORNEY AT LAW3936 BIENVILLE STREETNEW ORLEANS, LA 70119All CitationsNot Reported in So. Rptr., 2025 WL 2986582, 25-389(La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25)Footnotes
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.151Hereinafter, “defendants” shall indicate West Jefferson Medical Center and LCMC Health but not Ms.Dufrene who did not join in the peremptory exception or motions discussed herein.2Ms. Mary Margaret H. Moore with the firm Caraway LeBlanc, L.L.C.3Records custodians at the First Circuit Court of Appeals also indicated that the Burns case number, “00-908”,was not a case number that would exist under their numbering system: a fact also relayed by defensecounsel to plaintiff's counsel.4These copies of the cases appear to have been sourced from the vLex Fastcase legal database.5“Generative AI programs” such as OpenAI ChatGPT, Google Gemini, and Microsoft Copilot, are computerprograms (a.k.a. “chatbots”) that utilize human feedback and algorithms trained on large language modelsto produce statistically probable, fluent, and grammatical responses to the program user's input prompt orquery. Such programs often produce texts that include false statements of fact. In the case of generativeAI programs producing texts in relation to prompts on legal subjects, those false statements of fact typicallyconsist of inaccurate statements of law, incorrect summaries of judicial opinions, or fabricated citations. SeeMegan E. Boyd & Brian L. Frye, The Duty of Efficiency & Generative Ai Pedagogy, 77 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol'y96, 117 (2025).6The formatting of plaintiff's pleadings, including the multiple and repeated use of bullet points, lists, and boldtext, suggests that generative AI software was used not only for legal research, but also in the drafting ofthe pleading documents. This has not been acknowledged by plaintiff's counsel.7The defendants’ peremptory exception was also heard at that time. The trial court granted the exception,but allowed plaintiff the opportunity to amend the petition pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 934. No review hasbeen sought of the judgment granting the exception.8While “hallucinations” is becoming a common term to refer to these computer-generated errors, legalscholars have noted that “[c]alling false statements of fact produced by a [generative AI program]‘hallucinations’ wrongly encourages people to conceptualize what a text generator is doing as thinking, ratherthan merely producing statistically probable words in a sequence.” Boyd & Frye, supra. We decline to adoptthat terminology here.9See Act. No. 250, H.B. 178, 2025 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2025).10The writ application was supplemented pursuant to this Court's September 16, 2025 order with items requiredunder Rule 4-5(C) of the Uniform Rules – Courts of Appeal but missing from the original writ application.11See also Damien Charlotin, AI Hallucination Cases, (Sept. 9, 2025) https://www.damiencharlotin.com/hallucinations/ (database tracking legal decisions “in cases where generative AI produced hallucinatedcontent,” evidencing 406 cases to date in jurisdictions around the world); AI Law Librarians, InteractiveGenAI Legal Hallucination Tracker, (Oct. 10, 2025) https://www.ailawlibrarians.com/full-screen-interactive-table/ (searchable database of over 500 reported cases involving generative AI hallucinations).12Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 states in pertinent part:(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper –whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it – an attorney or unrepresented party certifiesthat to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonableunder the circumstances:... (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolousargument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law...
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1613Emphasis supplied.14Errors contained in the Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Peremptory Exception ofNo Cause of Action and Errata to Plaintiff's Memorandum are addressed infra.15All emphasis in the following block quotation is original.16All emphasis in the following block quotation is original.17In addition to this case being entirely fabricated, we observe that the use of the introductory signal “see” inthis citation is incorrect. “’See’ is used instead of ‘[no signal]’ when the proposition is not directly stated bythe cited authority but obviously follows from it; there is an inferential step between the authority cited andthe proposition it supports.” The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation Rule 1.2 (22nd ed. 2025).18Roberts is a genuine case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the tort of negligent hiring ina matter involving the accidental discharge of a gun owned by a deputy sheriff.19See also Park, 91 F.4th at 615 (“At the very least, the duties imposed by [the rule on signing pleadings]requires that the attorneys read, and thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities onwhich they rely. Indeed, we can think of no other way to ensure that the arguments made based on thoseauthorities are ‘warranted by existing law...’ ”).20See Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Civil Procedure § 6:10 (2d ed.) (“Courts and counsel frequently treatthe terms supplemental pleading and amended pleading as synonymous. However, they are separateconcepts.”)21“Errata.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/errata. Accessed 18 Sep. 2025.22A proper method of addressing the errors like the ones identified here would be to file an ‘amended andsupplemental’ pleading and an ‘errata’ that clearly identifies previously published mistakes; or, alternatively,withdrawing the offending pleadings.23See United States v. Hayes, 763 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (where the court found an “errata”filed by counsel purporting to address generative AI fabrication errors to be inadequate and misleading.)24All emphasis in the following block quotation is original.25See, generally, Code of Professional Conduct (Louisiana State Bar Association, 2018)(“My word is mybond...I will not knowingly make statements of fact or law that are untrue or misleading ... I will usetechnology...responsibly... I will stay informed about changes in the law, communication, and technologywhich affect the practice of law.”) We observe that, unlike the Rules of Professional Conduct, the standardsstated in the Code of Professional Conduct are not a basis for sanctions or penalties.26See Mata, 678 F.Supp.3d at 464 (“Poor and sloppy research would merely have been objectivelyunreasonable. But [counsel] was aware of facts that alerted him to the high probability that the [AI-generatedcases] did not exist and consciously avoided confirming that fact.”)27Ms. Trieu stated, “I had my paralegal print out from Google, from Copilot, from ChatGPT these cases ... andI looked at these cases and said, Okay, looks good.”28While Westlaw and LexisNexis are legal research databases that require a subscription, members of theLouisiana State Bar Association, including Ms. Trieu, have free access to vLex FastCase.29Some legal scholars have pointed out the contradiction of such disclaimers from companies that market AIgenerative programs as trustworthy. See Eugene Volokh, Large Libel Models? Liability for Ai Output, 3 J.
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.17Free Speech L. 489, 499 (2023); Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Michal Lavi, AI in the Courtroom: The Boundaries ofRobolawyers and Robojudges, 35 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 286, 320 (2025); Sandra Wachter,Brent Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell, Do Large Language Models Have a Legal Duty to Tell the Truth?, RoyalSociety Open Science, Vol. 11, Iss. 8 (Aug. 2024) (https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.240197)30Emphasis original.31Ms. Trieu's claim that the sanctions imposed are “punitive” is a tautology. We make no further observationsabout this self-evident claim except to note that the trial court properly provided Ms. Trieu with notice and helda contradictory hearing prior to imposing the sanction. See La. C.C.P. art. 863(E) (“A sanction authorizedin Paragraph D shall be imposed only after a hearing at which any party or his counsel may present anyevidence or argument relevant to the issue of the imposition of the sanction.”), and Joseph, 355 So.3d at 150.32Emphasis supplied.33We specifically note the relevance of an attorney's duty of confidentiality in this case which involves theplaintiff's alleged injury from an invasion of privacy and sharing of private medical information on socialmedia.34See generally, Roy D. Simon, Artificial Intelligence, Real Ethics, 90 N.Y. St. B.J. 34 (March/April 2018); Hon.John G. Browning, Robot Lawyers Don't Have Disciplinary Hearings-Real Lawyers Do: The Ethical Risksand Responses in Using Generative Artificial Intelligence, 40 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 917 (2024); and Abdi Aidid,Toward an Ethical Human-Computer Division of Labor in Law Practice, 92 Fordham L. Rev. 1797 (2024).35For this reason, some courts have required the monetary penalty imposed to be paid to the registry ofthe court. See Mata, 678 F.Supp.3d 443; Gauthier, 2024 WL 4882651; Versant Funding LLC, 2025 WL1440351 (in addition to sanctions paid to opposing counsel); and Noland, 114 Cal.App.5th 426 (noting thatthe fabricated citations were first identified and raised by the Court, not opposing counsel).36See, e.g., Nora, 2025 WL 2337132; Gauthier, 2024 WL 4882651; and Versant Funding LLC, 2025 WL1440351.37See, e.g., Mata, 678 F.Supp.3d 443; Gauthier, 2024 WL 4882651; Park, 91 F.4th 610; and Noland, 114Cal.App.5th 426.38See, e.g., Noland, supra.39See, e.g., Park, 91 F.4th 610; Nora, 2025 WL 2337132; Johnson, 2025 WL 2086116, at *20, (N.D. Ala.July 23, 2025) (stating “[i]f fines and public embarrassment were effective deterrents, there would not be somany cases to cite. ... [F]ines do not account for the extreme dereliction of professional responsibility thatfabricating citations reflects, nor the many harms it causes.”)40See, e.g., Johnson, supra.41See, generally, Art. 863. Signing of pleadings, effect., 2 La. Prac. Civ. Proc. Article 863 (2025 ed.)42January 22, 2024 letter, “The Emergence of Artificial Intelligence,” by David Becker, General Counsel for theLouisiana Supreme Court, on behalf of the justices to the President of the Louisiana State Bar Association.(https://www.lsba.org/documents/News/LSBANews/LASCLetterAI.pdf)43At this point in time, such problems have been widely reported. See, e.g., BenjaminWeiser, Here's What Happens When Your Lawyer Uses ChatGPT, N.Y. TIMES (May 27,2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/27/nyregion/avianca-airline-lawsuit-chatgpt.html; Erin Mulvaney,Judge Sanctions Lawyers Who Filed Fake ChatGPT Legal Research, WALL. ST.J. (June 22, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-sanctions-lawyers-who-filed-fake-chatgptlegal-research-9ebad8f9; Pranshu Verma and Will Oremus, These lawyers used ChatGPT to save time. They got
IN RE: SANCTIONS ORDER OF KENNEY, KERRY, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2025)25-389 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/23/25) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.18fired and fined., WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/11/16/chatgpt-lawyer-fired-ai/.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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