Dupont v. Town of Wales, No. 2379CV00440 (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Hampden County Michael D. DUPONT v. TOWN OF WALES by and through its Zoning Board of Appeals
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts (MA)
Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Dupont v. Town of Wales, 2025 WL 1593187 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 1593187 (Mass.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of Massachusetts.Hampden CountyMichael D. DUPONT,v.TOWN OF WALES by and through its Zoning Board of Appeals, and Joel Jette, Adam Brassard,and Nate Collins, in their official capacity as members of the Zoning Board of Appeals.No. 2379CV00440.May 27, 2025.Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary JudgmentDeepika B. Shukla, Judge.*1 Plaintiff Michael D. Dupont brought this action, pursuant to G.L. c. 40A, § 17, challenging the August 15, 2023 decisionof Defendant Town of Wales (the “Town”) Zoning Board of Appeals (the “Board”) affirming the Building Inspector's decisiondenying him the use of his property as a campground. Both parties now move for summary judgment, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ.P. 56, arguing that there are no material facts in controversy. After a hearing and consideration of the parties' submissions, theCourt DENIES both Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions.FACTUAL BACKGROUNDThe Town issued a special permit on October 13, 2016, allowing property located at 38 Walker Road in Wales, Massachusetts(the “property”) to be used as a camp. At that time, Dupont did not own the property. After a bank foreclosure on the property,Dupont purchased the property, and on April 27, 2023, he sought approval from the Town's Building Inspector to continue useof the property as a camp. The Building Inspector denied the request on May 2, 2023, and Dupont requested that the BuildingInspector reconsider the denial. The Building Inspector subsequently issued a second determination that the property could notbe used as a camp. Dupont appealed the decision to the Board, and the Board held hearings on the matter on July 10, and August14, 2023. On August 14, 2023, the Board issued a written decision affirming the Building Inspector's decision, citing to sections4.2.3 and 8.4.8 of the Town's Zoning Bylaws (the “Bylaws”). Section 4.2.3 of the Bylaws is titled, “Abandonment,” and states:“A non-conforming use which has been abandoned or not used for two years or more shall not be reestablished, and any otherfuture use shall conform with this Bylaw.” Section 8.4.8 is titled, “Special Permit Expiration,” and states in pertinent part: “Allspecial permits shall lapse two (2) years from the date of issuance, unless substantial use or construction has commenced.”DISCUSSIONOn a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to thenonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”Augat v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). The moving party bears “the burden of affirmatively demonstrating
Dupont v. Town of Wales, 2025 WL 1593187 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2that there is no genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue ....” Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 371 (1982),quoting Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977). “[A] party moving for summary judgment in acase in which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial is entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrates ...that the [opposing party] has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of that party's case.” Korouvacilis v.General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991).On an appeal of a denial of a special permit, the Court must review the evidence “de novo and determine the legal validity ofthe decision of the board upon the facts found by him [or her].” Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295(1972); G. L. c. 40A, § 21. The judge gives no evidentiary weight to the findings or decisions of the Board. Josephs, 362 Mass.at 295. “After determining the board used the correct criteria and standards, the second inquiry considers whether the boardapplied those standards in an ‘unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary manner.”’ LaCourt Family, LLC v. PlanningBoard of the City of Cambridge, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1110, at *1 (2015) (Rule 1:28), citing Britton, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 73.“The decision of the board cannot be disturbed unless it is based on a legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical,capricious or arbitrary.” MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board ofAppeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1968).*2 Dupont argues that because there is evidence of websites and Facebook posts that the property was used as a camp withintwo years of the October 13, 2016 special permit issuance, and because the Board erroneously relied on section 4.2.3 of theBylaws because it was not enacted until 2019,1 judgment must enter in his favor. The Board similarly urges the Court to enterjudgment in its favor because there is no evidence that the property was substantially used as a camp within two years of theissuance of the special permit.It is clear that there is a crucial issue of fact that is controversy - whether the property was used as a camp within two years ofthe issuance of the October 13, 2016 special permit. Dupont has presented evidence that the previous owner used the propertyas a campground between May 2017 and October 2018, and the Board contends that that evidence does not meet the standard ofsubstantial use and that a certificate of occupancy was not issued until February 2019. Because there exists an issue of materialfact, summary judgment cannot issue for any party.ORDERFor the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED.<<signature>>Deepika B. Shukla Justice of the Superior CourtDATE: May 23, 2025Footnotes1While Plaintiff cites to Capone v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Marlborough, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 563 (1992), to support its assertionthat the Board could not rely on a bylaw that was not in effect at the time the special permit was awarded, the Court was unable tofind this case. The citation is incorrect, or the case does not exist. Nevertheless, this issue does not change the Court's ruling on thecross-motions for summary judgment.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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