In re Marrett, No. 25-30440-EDK (Feb. 19, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
In re: Marrett
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts (MA)
Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Decided
Feb. 19, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 479029Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts.In re: DAVID T. MARRETT,SANDY J. MARRETT, DebtorsDAVID T. MARRETT, SANDYJ. MARRETT, Plaintiffsv.AROOSTOOK COUNTY FEDERALSAVINGS & LOAN, ZURICH NORTHAMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,SOLMAN & HUNTER, P.A., MARDENDUBORD, BERNIER & STEVENS,P.A., O'DONNELL, LEE, MARDEN,DUBORD MONAGHAN LEAHY, LLP,WILLIAM DRUARY, JR., LAUREN K.SOUZA, DIANE GLIDDEN, DIANADURGIN, CHRISTINE KENNEDY-JENSEN, JOHN AND JANE DOE, DefendantsCase No. 25-30440-EDK|Adversary Proceeding No. 25-03006|Filed 02/19/2026Chapter 13MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONElizabeth D. Katz United States Bankruptcy Judge*1 Before the Court are motions to dismiss filed byseveral defendants in this adversary proceeding seekingdismissal of the complaint (the “Complaint”) brought byDavid T. Marrett and Sandy J. Marrett, the plaintiffs in thisadversary proceeding and debtors in the underlying Chapter13 bankruptcy case (the “Debtors”).This decision addresses the motions to dismiss filedby (1) Aroostook County Federal Savings and Loan(“Aroostook”); (2) Solman & Hunter, P.A. (“Solman &Hunter”), Monaghan Leahy, LLP (“Leahy”), ChristineKennedy-Jensen (“Kennedy-Jensen”), Lauren K. Souza(“Souza”), Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, P.A.(“Marden”), William Druary, Jr. (“Druary”), and RichardSolman (“Solman”); and (3) Fidelity and Deposit Companyof Maryland (“Zurich”)1 (collectively, the “Motions toDismiss”).I. FACTS AND TRAVEL OF THE CASE2This adversary proceeding is but the most recent installmentin a series of lawsuits across various state and federal courtsinvolving the Debtors, all of which relate to real propertylocated at 35 York Street, Caribou, Maine (the “Property”).In September 2004, the Debtors borrowed funds fromAroostook to finance the purchase of the Property and grantedAroostook a mortgage on the Property to secure the loan.3In November 2009, the Debtors refinanced their existingmortgage obligation, obtaining a new loan from Aroostooksecured by a mortgage on the Property (the “Mortgage”).4The Debtors have not resided at the Property since 2017.5They fell into default on the Mortgage in July 2021.6 OnSeptember 14, 2021, Aroostook sent the Debtors a “35-DayNotice of Right to Cure Default” letter (the “September 2021Letter”), providing the Debtors 35 days to pay a $5,979.45default balance, and further providing that if the Debtorsfailed to timely cure the default, Aroostook would forecloseon the mortgage.7*2 The Debtors listed the Property for sale on October 25,2021 to avoid foreclosure litigation, informing Aroostook byemail. Aroostook later proposed a deed in lieu of foreclosure.In an email dated November 18, 2021, in which Aroostookrequested a response to its proposal, Aroostook indicated thata representative had visited the Property, that the furnace wasnot working, and that there was no oil in the tank. As a result,a technician was called to fix the furnace and to put fuel intothe tank to protect the Property from frozen pipes and frostdamage. The Debtors then responded on November 23, 2021,demanding that Aroostook cease communications with therealtor and return any keys in their possession.In January 2022, Aroostook filed a complaint against theDebtors in Aroostook County Superior Court for foreclosureof the Property (the “Foreclosure Case”). In response, theDebtors filed an answer and asserted several counterclaims.8
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2At some point between late April and late May 2022, SandyMarrett returned to Maine and discovered that the Propertyhad been damaged by water, which the Debtors assert isAroostook's fault.Sandy Marrett filed an insurance claim through Zurich'sonline portal on May 25, 2022 after obtaining informationon force-placed insurance from Aroostook. Zurich denied theclaim on May 31, 2022, stating that “[t]he policy is a contractwith [Aroostook] and they are the insured.... [T]he insured hasconfirmed they are not pursuing a claim ....”9On August 16, 2022, Maine Superior Court Justice StephenNelson, sitting in Aroostook County, issued an order recusinghimself from the Foreclosure Case and transferring theForeclosure Case to the Penobscot County Superior Court(the “Recusal Order”).10 Approximately two weeks later,on August 31, 2022, Chief Justice Robert E. Mullen of theMaine Superior Court issued an order acknowledging thatthe Foreclosure Case was to be transferred to PenobscotCounty and specifically assigning all matters related to theForeclosure Case to Justice Bruce Mallonee (sitting in thePenobscot County Superior Court) (the “Special AssignmentOrder”).11In January 2023, the Debtors removed the Foreclosure Caseto the United States District Court for the District of Maine.12Souza appeared as counsel for Aroostook in federal court.Ultimately, on April 10, 2023, the District Court grantedAroostook's motion to remand, holding that the removalwas untimely.13 Meanwhile, in an order dated March 3,2023, the state court denied the Debtors’ motion for leaveto amend their counterclaims.14 The court articulated tworeasons for denial: first, permitting amendment would causeundue prejudice, and second, the proposed amendmentswere futile because they failed to state claims upon whichrelief could be granted.15 In the order, the court notedthat some of the proposed amended counterclaims werebrought under the implementing regulations of the Real EstateSettlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), known as RegulationX, specifically 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.39(a)–(b) and 1024.41(f),and concluded that such claims would be futile.16 Before thecase was remanded to state court, Druary filed on the federaldocket a copy of the state court's March 3, 2023 order denyingleave to amend.*3 In January 2024, the Penobscot County Superior Courtgranted Aroostook's Motion for Summary Judgment on CountI for foreclosure.17 And, in an order dated October 21, 2024,that court granted a motion for sanctions against the Debtorsand dismissed the Debtors’ counterclaims with prejudice.18Aroostook then filed a motion for final judgment in theForeclosure Case.In November 2024, before final judgment entered, theDebtors filed a notice of appeal in the Supreme JudicialCourt, Sitting as the Law Court (the “Law Court”).19While the appeal was pending, however, the Law Courtsuspended Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) to permitthe Penobscot County Superior Court to take any actionnecessary to dispose of all motions then pending in theForeclosure Case.20 The Penobscot County Superior Courtthen entered a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale in December2024 (the “Foreclosure Judgment”).21The Debtors filed various emergency motions with the LawCourt attempting to stay or otherwise stop the entry of finaljudgment, but each emergency motion was denied.22 In anorder dated December 30, 2024, Associate Justice Andrew M.Horton, writing for the court, noted that “[s]ince the docketingof their appeal a mere month ago, the Marretts have inundatedthe Court with repeated filings making similar claims andasking for similar ‘emergency’ relief. The requests for reliefhave been meritless, and many are outside of the authority ofthe Court.”23 The Law Court then warned that further filingsnot related to the appeal process, or correspondence directedto other entities, may result in monetary sanctions, dismissalof the appeal, or both.24On April 4, 2025, the Debtors filed in Aroostook County amotion related to amended counterclaims.25 Sandy Marrettagain filed in Aroostook County another related motion onApril 25, 2025.26 Meanwhile, on April 7, 2025, the Debtorsmoved to voluntarily withdraw their appeal pending beforethe Law Court, and the Law Court dismissed the appeal onApril 15, 2025.27 All pending requests for relief filed in theAroostook County Superior Court were addressed and deniedby the Penobscot County Superior Court on May 2, 2025.28On July 22, 2025, the Debtors filed a voluntary petitionunder Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code29in the District of Massachusetts. The Debtors commenced
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3this adversary proceeding by filing the Complaint on July 29,2025, which contains the following Counts:*4 • Count I: “Fraud on the Court,” brought under FederalRule of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rule”) 60(d)(3).• Count II: “Civil Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice,” inviolation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and (3).• Count III: “RESPA Violations and WrongfulForeclosure,” in violation of 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.41(f)(1)(i), 1024.35(b)(6), 1024.30(c)(2), and 1024.41.• Count IV: “Violations of the Fair Debt CollectionPractices Act” (the “FDCPA”), in violation of 15 U.S.C.§§ 1692e and 1692f.• Count V: “Bad Faith Insurance Handling/Breach ofImplied Covenant,” in violation of the Maine UnfairClaims Settlement Practices Act (the “Maine UCSPA”or “UCSPA”), Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A.• Count VI: “Tortious Interference with a CivilProceeding.”30The Complaint seeks the following relief: (1) disallowanceor reclassification of certain insurance claims submitted byAroostook, Zurich, and their agents; (2) declaratory andinjunctive relief relating to the foreclosure and insuranceclaims, including, inter alia, that the Court declare theforeclosure void; (3) compensatory damages related to theProperty and subsequent litigation in state and federal court;(4) statutory damages under state and federal law; (5)punitive damages against various parties; (6) equitable relief,including, inter alia, recission of any improperly obtainedforeclosure judgment and a declaration that state court rulingsare void; (7) fees and costs of litigation under federal law;(8) referral to federal authorities and state bar associations forcriminal and regulatory review; and (9) any other relief theCourt deems just and proper.The moving parties all contend that the counts assertedagainst them should be dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can begranted. The Debtors, in their myriad oppositions, responses,supplements, and other filings, contend that the Complaintalleges facts sufficient to state claims upon which relief can begranted. In their filings, the Debtors address some, but not all,of the arguments presented by the moving parties, essentiallyrepeating, in conclusory fashion, that the facts support theclaims asserted.The Debtors argue repeatedly and at length that theunderlying Foreclosure Judgment is void because of, as theDebtors assert, procedural irregularities with respect to theRecusal Order. They maintain that the Recusal Order wasjurisdictionally infirm because the recusing judge lost theauthority to transfer the case in light of the recusal. TheDebtors also assert that their amended counterclaims weretherefore not actually adjudicated and the state court litigationis not final.The parties’ specific arguments will be addressed in turnbelow.II. DISCUSSIONA. Legal StandardIn evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), made applicable to this adversary proceeding by FederalRule of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rule”) 7012(b),the Court must determine whether the Complaint contains “ashort and plain statement,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), allegingsufficient “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on itsface,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).*5 While the Court must “accept as true all well-pleadedfacts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonableinferences therefrom in the [plaintiff]’s favor,” Back BeachNeighbors Comm. v. Town of Rockport, 63 F.4th 126, 130 (1stCir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Legal Sea Foods,LLC v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 36 F.4th 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2022)),the Court “credit[s] neither conclusory legal allegations norfactual allegations that are too meager, vague, or conclusoryto remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mereconjecture,” id. (quoting Legal Sea Foods, 36 F.4th at 33).In addition to considering the facts alleged in thecomplaint and exhibits attached thereto, Thorton v. IpsenBiopharmaceuticals, Inc., 126 F.4th 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2025)(citing Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 35–36(1st Cir. 2012)), courts may consider documents “ ‘fairlyincorporated into the complaint,’ ‘facts susceptible to judicialnotice,’ and ‘concessions in plaintiff[s’] response to themotion to dismiss,’ ” Cheng, 51 F.4th at 441 (alteration inoriginal) (quoting Lemelson v. Bloomberg L.P., 903 F.3d 19,21 (1st Cir. 2018)); see also Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3 (notingthat courts can also consider documents the authenticity ofwhich are not disputed; official public records; documentscentral to the claims; and documents sufficiently referred
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4to in the complaint). “When such documents contradictan allegation in the complaint, the document trumps theallegation.” Lowenstern v. Residential Credit Sols., C.A. No.11-11760-MLW, 2013 WL 697108, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 25,2013) (citing Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Com. Co.,228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2000)).Where, as here, the Debtors are proceeding pro se, the Courtconstrues the Complaint liberally. See Vieira v. De Souza, 22F.4th 304, 311 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “However, pro se status does not insulatea party from complying with procedural and substantivelaw.” Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997)(citation omitted).B. Count I: “Fraud on the Court”In Count I, the Complaint alleges that Kennedy-Jensen,Souza, and Druary (the “Count I Defendants”)31 committedfraud on the court by “submitting fabricated orders,false employer affiliations, and unserved pleadings; bymisrepresenting docket entries; and by working with clerksto suppress filings and reroute the case without properauthority.”32 The Debtors argue that events in the UnitedStates District Court for the District of Maine, including thefiling of the state court order denying leave to amend thecounterclaim on the federal docket, sufficiently demonstratesfraud on the court and therefore this Court should setaside the state court Foreclosure Judgment. The Count IDefendants argue that the claim should be dismissed becausethe Complaint fails to assert any legal basis for this claim.Federal Rule 60(d)(3) permits a federal court to “set asidea judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). However, the First Circuit does not recognize fraudon the court as an independent cause of action except inrare circumstances. See, e.g., Bogosian v. R.I. Airport Corp.(T.F. Green Airport), C.A. No. 17-16S, 2017 WL 9324764,at *8 (D.R.I. May 3, 2017); Shirokov v. Dunlap, Grubb &Weaver, PLLC, Civil Action No. 10-12043-GAO, 2012 WL1065578, at *30 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2012). “[A] claim offraud o[n] the court may be sustained as an independentaction only if the issue raised is ‘egregious’ and involves‘an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with thejudicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matterinvolving an officer of the court.’ ” Bogosian, 2017 WL9324764, at *8 (quoting Roger Edwards LLC v. Fiddles &Sons Ltd., 427 F.3d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 2005)). Setting aside ajudgment under Federal Rule 60(d)(3) is a “drastic remedy ...hedged with restrictions,” Torres v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc.,914 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2019), and “is limited to fraudthat ‘seriously affects the integrity of the normal processof adjudication’ ... for example, bribery of a judge or jurytampering,” id. at 19 (quoting 12 Moore's Federal Practice §60.21[4][a] (2018)).*6 Most importantly, “[f]raud on the court cannot be usedto challenge conduct before a different court.” King v. Fields,790 F. Supp. 3d 32, 35 n.1 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing Davidson v.Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 276–77 (D. Mass. 2002)); Beaulieuv. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:14-cv-00023-GZS, 2014 WL4843809, at *10 n.5 (D. Me. Sept. 29, 2014) (noting that“fraud on the court is not available as an independent causeof action based on conduct that occurred before a differentcourt” (citation omitted)).Here, Count I fails to state a claim upon which relief canbe granted because none of the alleged conduct occurredbefore this Court. See King, 790 F. Supp. 3d at 35 n.1;Beaulieu, 2014 WL 4843809, at *10 n.5. Additionally, noneof the allegations relating to conduct that occurred in federalcourt in the District of Maine — namely that the case wasremoved to federal court; that Souza appeared as counselin federal court; that Druary electronically filed on thedocket a copy of the state court's order denying leave toamend; and that the case was remanded to state court — are“egregious,” Bogosian, 2017 WL 9324764, at *8, describe“an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with thejudicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matterinvolving an officer of the court,” id., or constitute actionsthat would “seriously affect[ ] the integrity of the normalprocess of adjudication,” Torres, 914 F.3d at 19. Enteringan appearance or filing documents on a docket, even iffabricated, false, and unserved, as the Complaint asserts, isinsufficient to meet the applicable standard. The remainingconduct alleged in the Complaint occurred in state court, notfederal court. See Cline v. Burke, 682 F. Supp. 3d 125, 134(D. Mass. 2023), aff'd, No. 23-1680, 2024 WL 5412394 (1stCir. Oct. 16, 2024) (dismissing claim because, inter alia, “thealleged fraud appear[ed] to have been committed on [a statecourt], not a federal court”). Accordingly, Count I will beDISMISSED.C. Count II: “Civil Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice”In Count II, the Complaint alleges that Aroostook, Zurich,Solman & Hunter, Marden, Leahy, Kennedy-Jensen, Souza,and Druary (the “Count II Defendants”) engaged in a civilconspiracy to obstruct justice in violation in 42 U.S.C. §§
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.51985(2) and 1985(3). The Complaint alleges that the CountII Defendants “coordinated a series of fraudulent filings,fabricated records, and procedural manipulations within aMaine state and federal court,”33 “acted with animus towardthe [Debtors] as a pro se party [sic], and in retaliation forthe [Debtors’] efforts to expose fraud and corruption,”34and “suppress[ed] insurance claims, initiate[d] fraudulentforeclosure, manipulate[d] court venue, and fabricate[d]filings.”35 The Complaint does not allege or otherwiseidentify which defendant took which act.The Count II Defendants argue that the § 1985(2) claim failsbecause the Complaint does not allege that any of the CountII Defendants acted to intimidate the Debtors in any conductrelated to federal court and that the § 1985(3) claim failsbecause the Complaint does not allege that the Debtors aremembers of a constitutionally protected class. The Debtorsargue that the allegations are legally sufficient because thefirst clause of § 1985(2) does not require class-based animusfor conspiracies to obstruct justice in federal court and thatthe obstruction of state court counterclaims through allegedlyvoid orders and alleged venue manipulation is a “classic”offense under § 1985(2).36 Additionally, the Debtors arguethat “[t]he facts demonstrate that all defendants acted withthe intent to deprive [the Debtors] of due process,” therebysupporting the § 1985(3) claim.371. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)*7 “Section 1985(2) contains two clauses; the first appliesto federal court proceedings, and the second applies to statecourt proceedings.” Traudt v. Lebanon Police Dep't, 749 F.Supp. 3d 251, 261 (D.N.H. 2024). The first clause makes itunlawful for “two or more persons in any State or Territory[to] conspire to deter by force, intimidation, or threat, anyparty or witness in any court of the United States fromattending such court, or from testifying to any matter pendingtherein, freely, fully, and truthfully.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). Thesecond clause makes it unlawful for “two or more persons [to]conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing,or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in anyState or Territory, with intent to deny any citizen the equalprotection of the laws.” Id.“Courts must be careful to separate those parts of 42 U.S.C.§ 1985 that relate to issues of federal concern from thosethat relate to issues of state concern.” J.S.H. v. Newton,654 F. Supp. 3d 7, 23 (D. Mass. 2023). “Interference withwitnesses in a state court proceeding is modified by equalprotection language and, as such, requires a discriminatory,class-based animus.” Id. (citing Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S.719, 725 (1983)). “By contrast, a plaintiff need not allegediscriminatory animus to state a claim for the allegedobstruction of a federal court proceeding.” Traudt, 749 F.Supp. 3d at 261 (citing Kush, 460 U.S. at 726).Here, the Complaint does not specify under which clause the§ 1985(2) claim is brought, but nearly all the facts allegedrelate to state court proceedings. The few allegations relatingto federal court, described above, do not set forth any factsto support that any of the defendants forced, intimidated, orthreatened any party or witness from attending or testifyingin federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). Therefore, theComplaint fails to state a claim for relief under the clause of§ 1985(2) addressed to federal court proceedings.With respect to the state court proceedings, the Complaintalleges that the defendants acted with a discriminatory animustoward the Debtors as pro se litigants but offers no factsto support this assertion. Additionally, the Debtors have notprovided, nor has the Court found, any authority supportingthe proposition that a litigant's pro se status can serve as thebasis for a finding of a discriminatory, class-based animusunder § 1985. Therefore, because there is no allegation of asufficient discriminatory, class-based animus, the Complaintfails to state a claim under the clause of § 1985(2) addressedto state court proceedings. See Kush, 460 U.S. at 726; J.S.H.,654 F. Supp. 3d at 23. Accordingly, Count II fails to state aclaim upon which relief can be granted under § 1985(2).2. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), aplaintiff must allege the existence of a conspiracy, “that thepurpose of the conspiracy is ‘to deprive the plaintiff of theequal protection of the laws,’ describe at least one overtact in furtherance of the conspiracy, and ‘show either injuryto person or property, or a deprivation of a constitutionallyprotected right.’ ” Alston v. Spiegel, 988 F.3d 564, 577 (1stCir. 2021) (quoting Pérez-Sánchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 531F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 2008)). “Pleading a section 1985(3)conspiracy ‘requires at least minimum factual support ofthe existence of a conspiracy.’ ” Parker v. Landry, 935F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Francis-Sobel v. Univ.of Me., 597 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1979)). “Vague and
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6conclusory allegations about persons working together, withscant specifics as to the nature of their joint effort or theformation of their agreement, will not suffice to defeat amotion to dismiss.” Alston, 988 F.3d at 578 (citing Parker,935 F.3d at 18). “It has long been established that a claimunder § 1985(3) requires ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwiseclass-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind theconspirators’ action.’ ” Pérez-Sánchez, 531 F.3d at 107(quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)).*8 As stated above, the Complaint does not allege asufficient discriminatory, class-based animus, and thus cannotsupport a § 1985(3) claim. The assertion that the Debtorswere discriminated against because of their status as pro selitigants, although not specifically alleged in their § 1985(3)claim, again fails, as the Debtors have not provided, nor hasthe Court found, any authority supporting the propositionthat a litigant's pro se status can serve as the basis of adiscriminatory, class-based animus finding under § 1985.Further, the Complaint asserts only “[v]ague and conclusoryallegations about persons working together,” bereft of anyspecific facts about the defendants as to the “nature of theirjoint effort or the formation of their agreement.” Alston, 988F.3d at 578. Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a claimunder § 1985(3).Because the Complaint does not set forth facts to state a claimupon which relief can be granted under either 42 U.S.C. §§1985(2) or 1985(3), Count II will be DISMISSED.D. Count III: “RESPA Violations and WrongfulForeclosure”In Count III, the Debtors assert claims against Aroostook,Solman & Hunter, and Solman (the “Count III Defendants”)for violations of RESPA (specifically, its implementingregulation known as Regulation X) in connection withthe servicing and foreclosure of the Debtors’ Mortgage.The Complaint alleges that the Count III Defendants (1)prematurely issued a notice to cure and initiated foreclosureproceedings before the loan was delinquent for 120 days,in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1)(i); (2) includedinaccurate or duplicative amounts in payoff or reinstatementdemands, such as fees and premiums that had been capitalizedinto the loan balance, in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(b)(6); and (3) falsely asserted that the Property was notowner-occupied (despite the Debtors’ intention to return tothe Property and occupy it), in violation of 12 C.F.R. §§1024.30(c)(2) and 1024.41.“The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)promulgated ‘Regulation X’ pursuant to RESPA.” Jacksonv. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs. (In re Jackson), 622B.R. 321, 328 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2020) (citing 12 C.F.R.§§ 1024.1–1024.41). “Regulation X is the implementingregulation of RESPA, and creates an error resolution processthat defines [mortgage loan] servicers’ obligations under thestatute.” McGahey v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 266 F. Supp. 3d421, 438 (D. Me. 2017) (citations omitted). “Section 2605(f)of [RESPA] provides a private right of action for violations of[Regulation X].” DeCotis v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC,642 F. Supp. 3d 181, 185 (D. Mass. 2022).The Count III Defendants argue that Count III must bedismissed because the claims are barred by the doctrine ofres judicata, because the claims are time-barred, and becausethe facts alleged fail to state a claim upon which relief canbe granted. Aroostook also specifically notes that the Debtorsask this Court to void the Foreclosure Judgment, an action notpermitted under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.38 The Debtorsmaintain that Rooker-Feldman and res judicata do not applybecause the Recusal Order deprived the trial court of subjectmatter jurisdiction. At the same time, the Debtors assert thattheir amended counterclaim, which included RESPA claims,was not adjudicated. Ultimately, the Debtors appear to arguethat the state court action is not final.1. Rooker-FeldmanThe Court is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine39 fromconsidering the claims in Count III. “Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine directly affects a court's subject-matterjurisdiction, it is appropriate to begin by discussing whetherand to what claims the doctrine applies here.” Goldsmith v.Massad (In re Fiorillo), 494 B.R. 119, 140 (Bankr. D. Mass.2013).*9 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine preserves the SupremeCourt's exclusive jurisdiction over “appeals from finalstate-court judgments,” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,463, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1059 (2006) (percuriam), by divesting lower federal courts of jurisdiction tohear certain cases brought by parties who have lost in statecourt, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,544 U.S. 280, 291–93, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454(2005); Coggeshall v. Mass. Bd. of Regist. of Psychologists,604 F.3d 658, 663 (1st Cir. 2010). Specifically, the doctrineapplies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7of injuries caused by state-court judgments [that were]rendered before the district court proceedings commencedand invit[e] district court review and rejection of thosejudgments.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 907 F.3d 61, 64–65 (1st Cir. 2018) (alterations in original).The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “(1) a party who lostin a state-court judgment that (2) was rendered before thefederal action commenced, where (3) the party complains ofinjuries caused by the state-court judgment and (4) invites[federal] court review and rejection of those judgments.”DuLaurence v. Telegen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 73, 79 (D. Mass.2015), aff'd, No. 15-1537, 2016 WL 10454553 (1st Cir.Nov. 30, 2016) (citing Silva v. Massachusetts, 351 F. App'x450, 454 (1st Cir. 2009)). Furthermore, “application of theRooker-Feldman doctrine is not contingent upon an identitybetween the issues actually litigated in the prior state-court proceedings and the issues proffered in the federalsuit.” Klimowicz, 907 F.3d at 66 (citing Maymó-Meléndez v.Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2004)).All four elements are satisfied here. First, the Debtorslost in the state court Foreclosure Judgment. Second,the Foreclosure Judgment entered before this adversaryproceeding commenced. Third, Count III “seeks to challengethe validity of ... the foreclosure,” Klimowicz, 907 F.3d at 65,and thus it complains of injuries caused by the ForeclosureJudgment in favor of Aroostook, see id. Fourth, Count IIIinvites this Court to review the Foreclosure Judgment anddeclare it void.While the Debtors attempt to “evade the reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by artful pleading,” id., and by arguing thatthey do not seek to relitigate the foreclosure or invite thisCourt to review or reject the judgment,40 that is preciselywhat Count III seeks and what Rooker-Feldman prohibits.In the prayer for relief, the Debtors ask this Court to, interalia, rescind any improperly obtained foreclosure judgmentand to declare state court rulings void. In other words,granting the requested relief “would effectively reverse thestate court decision or void its holding.” Schwartz v. Schwartz(In re Schwartz), 409 B.R. 240, 247 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008)(quoting Halvorsen v. Mendez (In re Mendez), 246 B.R.141, 145 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2000)); see also Klimowicz, 907F.3d at 66 (finding that plaintiff's requested “remediationwould necessarily invite the district court to review, reject,and reverse the state court[’s] rulings”). Therefore, Rooker-Feldman applies here and the Court lacks subject matterjurisdiction to consider the claims raised under Count III.2. Aroostook*10 Even if Rooker-Feldman did not apply, and the Courthad jurisdiction over Count III, the claims against Aroostookwould be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “[A] judgmentrendered in a state court is entitled to the same preclusiveeffect in federal court as it would be given within the statein which it was rendered.” Kittery Point Partners, LLC v.Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Kittery Point Partners,LLC), 623 B.R. 825, 838 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2021), aff'd, 858F. App'x 386 (1st Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quotingPinsoy v. Ahmed (In re Sonus Networks, Inc.), 499 F.3d47, 56 (1st Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, “the preclusive effectof the [judgment from the state court] is determined underMaine law.” Id. Under Maine law, a party “cannot again comeforward in the same legal mission against the same partiesto secure a remedy ... previously denied.” Portland WaterDist. v. Town of Standish, 940 A.2d 1097, 1099 (Me. 2008)(quoting Harriman v. Border Tr. Co., 842 A.2d 1266, 1267(Me. 2004)).Res judicata “has two components: collateral estoppel, alsoknown as issue preclusion, and claim preclusion.” WilmingtonTr. Co. v. Sullivan-Thorne, 81 A.3d 371, 374 (Me. 2013)(quoting Kurtz & Perry, P.A. v. Emerson, 8 A.3d 677, 681(Me. 2010)). Claim preclusion would apply here. “Claimpreclusion bars relitigation if: (1) the same parties or theirprivies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final judgmentwas entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters presentedfor decision in the second action were, or might have been[,]litigated in the first action.” Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 307A.3d 1049, 1058 (Me. 2024) (alteration in original) (quotingMachias Sav. Bank v. Ramsdell, 689 A.2d 595, 599 (Me.1997)). “To determine whether the matter[ ] presented fordecision in the instant action [was] or might have beenlitigated in the prior action, [Maine courts] examine whetherthe same cause of action was before the court in the priorcase.” Wilmington, 81 A.3d at 375 (quoting In re Kaleb D.,769 A.2d 179, 184 (Me. 2001)). To define a cause of action,Maine courts apply a transactional test to determine if theclaims “were founded upon the same transaction, arose outof the same nucleus of operative facts, and sought redressfor essentially the same basic wrong.” Id. (quoting Sebra v.Wentworth, 990 A.2d 538, 543 (Me. 2010)).
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Here, claim preclusion would apply to Aroostook because (1)the prior action involved the same parties; (2) a final judgmententered in the prior action and the Debtors voluntarilywithdrew their appeal; and (3) the claims in Count III —namely those related to RESPA violations and wrongfulforeclosure — presented in this “action were, or might havebeen[,] litigated in the first action.” Finch, 307 A.3d at 1058.The state court denied the Debtors’ motion for leave toamend their counterclaims, which included, inter alia, a claimbrought under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f).41 In Maine, a “SuperiorCourt's refusal to grant leave to amend has a preclusiveeffect on [a plaintiff's] attempt to raise the identical claimsin subsequent litigation.” Dall v. Goulet, 871 F. Supp. 518,521 (D. Me. 1994); see also Hatch v. Trail King Indus., Inc.,699 F.3d 38, 46 n.6 (1st Cir. 2012). Therefore, the Debtorswould be barred from asserting the claim under 12 C.F.R. §1024.41(f)(1)(i). Additionally, the claim under 12 C.F.R. §1024.35(b)(6) would be barred because the claim “arose outof the same nucleus of operative facts,” Wilmington Tr. Co.,81 A.3d at 375, as the prior action, namely the September2021 Letter. Accordingly, claim preclusion would apply to theclaims under 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.41(f)(1)(i) and 1024.35(b)(6).*11 The other claims, asserting violations of 12 C.F.R. §§1024.30(c) and 1041, arise out of statements made in judicialproceedings that the Property was not owner-occupied. Whilethose claims do not arise out of the same nucleus of operativefacts as the other claims, Aroostook is entitled to absoluteprivilege under state law. “Maine law accords an absoluteprivilege against liability in later lawsuits ‘for statementsmade in the course of judicial proceedings.’ ” Bradbury v.GMAC Mortg., LLC, 780 F. Supp. 2d 108, 111 (D. Me.2011) (quoting Creamer v. Danks, 863 F.2d 1037, 1037(1st Cir. 1988)). This absolute privilege equally applies topleadings. See OfficeMax Inc. v. Sousa, 773 F. Supp. 2d190, 237 (D. Me. 2011) (noting that “it is settled law inMaine that allegations made in pleadings are absolutelyprivileged” (internal quotation omitted)). Therefore, theremaining claims under 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.30(c) and 1024.41based on the classification of the Property as not owner-occupied would both fail.3. Solman & Hunter and SolmanSimilarly, even if Rooker-Feldman did not apply, and theCourt had jurisdiction over Count III, the claims againstSolman & Hunter and Solman would still fail because theallegations in Count III do not state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted as to either Solman & Hunter or Solman.First, there are no specific factual allegations regardingSolman & Hunter or Solman related to the September 2021Letter, which forms the basis of the asserted claims broughtunder 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.41(f)(1)(i) and 1024.35(b)(6). Thoseregulations simply would not apply. Second, for the samereasons discussed above, to the extent that Count III seeksto hold Solman & Hunter and Solman liable for statementsmade in judicial proceedings that the Property was not owner-occupied, they are entitled to absolute privilege because suchstatements were submitted in state court pleadings on behalfof their client, Aroostook. See Bradbury, 780 F. Supp. 2dat 111; OfficeMax, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 237. Therefore, theremaining claims under 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.30(c) and 1024.41based on the classification of the Property as not owner-occupied would both fail. Accordingly, Count III fails tostate any claim upon which relief can be granted as to eitherSolman & Hunter or Solman.4. Statute of LimitationsFinally, even if Rooker-Feldman and res judicata did notapply, the claims in Count III would be barred by RegulationX's three-year statute of limitations. “A claim under RESPA§ 2605 must be filed within three years of a violation.” Saadev. Sec. Connection Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 414, 419 (D. Mass.2017) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2614); DeCotis, 642 F. Supp. 3dat 185; see also Dail v. Bank of Am., N.A., Civil ActionNo. 2:18-cv-640, 2019 WL 921452, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 21,2019) (noting that “Regulation X has a three-year statute oflimitations” (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605, 2614)).Here, all facts relating to the Regulation X claims are rootedin the September 2021 Letter and court filings from Februaryand March 2022. The Complaint was filed on July 29, 2025,more than three years after the alleged violations. Therefore,the claims in Count III would be time-barred. See 12 U.S.C.§ 2614. Count III will be DISMISSED.E. Count IV: “Violations of the Fair Debt CollectionPractices Act”Count IV alleges that Aroostook, Solman & Hunter, andSolman (the “Count IV Defendants”) violated the FDCPA,specifically 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f, by usingdeceptive, unfair, and abusive practices in connection with the
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9foreclosure of the Property through misrepresentation, falsestatements, and misclassification of the Property. The CountIV Defendants argue that the FDCPA does not apply to any ofthem because there are no allegations or facts to support thatany of them was attempting to collect a debt “owed or dueanother,” as required under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), and that theclaims are barred by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k’s one-year limitationperiod. The Debtors did not address Count IV in their filingsor at the October 23, 2025 Hearing.*12 “In order to prevail on an FDCPA claim, [a] plaintiffmust prove that (1) she was the object of collection activityarising from consumer debt, (2) defendants are debt collectorsas defined by the FDCPA, and (3) defendants have engagedin an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” Murray v.Revenue Mgmt. Corp. (In re Murray), 552 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr.D. Mass. 2016) (quoting Claudio v. LVNV Funding, LLC (Inre Claudio), 463 B.R. 190, 193 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012)).The restrictions of the FDCPA only apply to thosedefendants who meet the definition of “debt collector.”Under the statute, a debt collector is “any person whouses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or themails in any business the principal purpose of which is thecollection of debts, or who regularly collects or attempts tocollect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or assertedto be owed or due another.”O'Connor v. Nantucket Bank, 992 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D. Mass.2014) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)).1. AroostookHere, the Complaint does not allege that Aroostook is a“debt collector,” that Aroostook was attempting to collecta debt “owed or due another,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), orthat Aroostook's principal purpose is the collection of debts.Rather, the allegations in the Complaint, as well as the contentof the September 2021 Letter, all indicate that Aroostook wasattempting to collect mortgage payments owed to itself by theDebtors. See O'Connor, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 31–32 (findingthat bank was not a debt collector because it sought paymentof “fees asserted to be due to itself”). Therefore, Aroostookis not a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA. Becausethe Complaint does not sufficiently allege that Aroostook isa “debt collector” under the FDCPA, Count IV fails to state aclaim upon which relief can be granted as to Aroostook.2. Solman & Hunter and SolmanAs to Solman & Hunter and Solman, the Complaint allegesonly that Solman is a partner at Solman & Hunter, andthat the firm, through Solman, “actively concealed Zurich'sliability, misrepresented the insurance status, and enabled afraudulent foreclosure process.”42 First, these allegations areconclusory because there are no additional facts alleged tosupport how Solman & Hunter or Solman concealed anyliability, misrepresented any insurance status, or enabled anyfraudulent foreclosure process. Second, even if there werefacts to support these conclusory allegations, and even ifSolman & Hunter and Solman could be considered “debtcollectors” under the FDCPA for their conduct related to theForeclosure Case, the statute of limitations would apply andthe FDCPA claims would be time-barred.Claims based on violations of the FDCPA must be brought“within one year of the date on which the violation occurs.”15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Here, the alleged FDCPA violationsrelate to conduct that occurred prior to, or in the early stagesof, the Foreclosure Case, more than one year prior to thecommencement of this adversary proceeding. Therefore, theclaims asserted in Count IV are time-barred under § 1692k(d).See Saade, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 418 (dismissing FDCPA claimbecause complaint was filed more than one year after thealleged violation and was therefore barred by the statute oflimitations).*13 Because the Complaint does not set forth sufficientfactual allegations against Solman & Hunter and Solmon, andbecause the claims are time-barred, Count IV fails to state aclaim upon which relief can be granted as to Solman & Hunterand Solmon. Accordingly, Count IV will be DISMISSED.F. Count V: “Bad Faith Insurance Handling/Breach ofImplied Covenant”Count V alleges that Zurich, as provider and administratorof a force-placed insurance policy on the Property, breachedthe implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and thatZurich violated Maine's UCSPA, see Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A, by “re-opening [an insurance] claim in 2025,then closing it without action.”43 Zurich argues that theDebtors cannot bring a claim under Maine's UCSPA becausethere is no allegation that Zurich issued any policy to theDebtors and because the Debtors are not named insuredsunder the force-placed insurance policy and do not hold any
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10rights against Zurich. The Debtors argue that they can assertthese claims because of Zurich's purportedly “central role in[the] litigation” and because Zurich “open[ed] and manag[ed]claims in [the Debtors’] names.”44 In reply, Zurich reiteratesthat the Debtors failed to allege that they are named insuredsunder any Zurich policy, a requirement under the statute.“Maine's Unfair Claims Settlements Practices Act generallyprohibits insurers from offering threats or knowingmisrepresentations, failing to act within a reasonable amountof time, or contesting the basis or amount of liability withouta reasonable basis.” Maine Woods Pellet Co., LLC v. WesternWorld Ins. Co., 401 F. Supp. 3d 194, 206 (D. Me. 2019)(citations omitted). By its plain language, the UCSPA appliesto “[a] person injured by ... [certain] actions taken by thatperson's own insurer ....” Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A(1). Put another way, a party must be named as an “insured”to assert such a claim. See, e.g., Anderson v. Virginia Sur. Co.,Inc., 985 F. Supp. 182, 192 (D. Me. 1998) (explaining that theUCSPA “statute permits insureds to bring civil actions againsttheir insurers for certain conduct”); Curtis v. Allstate Ins.Co., 787 A.2d 760, 767 (Me. 2002) (noting that the UCSPAcreates liability for an insurer to its insured for knowingmisrepresentations of pertinent facts or policy provisionsrelated to coverage).Here, the Debtors do not allege that they are named onany Zurich insurance policy. In fact, the Debtors admit thatAroostook is the “named insured” on the relevant policy.45Although the Debtors attempt to argue that opening aninsurance claim related to the policy, at the Debtors’ request,permits them to bring this action, that argument is notpersuasive because the Debtors are not the insured partiesunder the policy.46 Therefore, because the Debtors are not thenamed insureds under the policy, they cannot bring a claimunder Maine's UCSPA.To the extent that Count V asserts an independent tort claimrelated to bad faith, such an action is not recognized in Maine.See Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644,652 (Me. 1993). And to the extent that Count V assertsa claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fairdealing, “[t]he Maine Law Court has refused to recognizea separate tort action for an insurer's breach of its duty ofgood faith and fair dealing in its interactions with its insured.”Anderson, 985 F. Supp. at 185 (citing Marquis, 628 A.2d at652). Therefore, even if the Debtors were the named insuredsunder the relevant policy, a separate tort claim based on abreach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing would fail.Accordingly, Count V will be DISMISSED.G. Count VI: “Tortious Interference with a CivilProceeding”*14 Count VI asserts a claim for “tortious interference with acivil proceeding” against Zurich, Solman & Hunter, Marden,Leahy, Souza, and Druary (the “Count VI Defendants”). TheComplaint alleges that the Count VI Defendants, “actingunder the direction of Zurich,” interfered with the Debtors’legal proceedings by “[i]ssuing informal discovery threats ...[f]abricating or altering docket entries ... [s]ubmitt[ing]ghost pleadings without service or judicial review ... [and][e]ngag[ing] in misconduct meant to delay, intimidate, orsabotage the [Debtors’] access to justice.”47The Count VI Defendants argue that the claim fails because(1) “tortious interference with a civil proceeding” is not acognizable cause of action in Maine; (2) the authorities citedin Count VI either do not exist or do not support such a causeof action; and (3) other tort remedies are not supported bythe factual allegations. The Debtors respond by asserting thatthe Count VI Defendants’ argument that Maine law does notrecognize “tortious interference with a civil proceeding” as acause of action is misplaced because the allegations of venuemanipulation and filing of void orders support other causes ofaction regardless of how the claims are labeled.1. Tortious Interference with a Civil ProceedingThe claim of “tortious interference of a civil proceeding”is not recognized as a cause of action in Maine. Twoof the three authorities on which the Debtors rely in theComplaint do not support, let alone relate to, a cause ofaction for “tortious interference with a civil proceeding.”The first authority, Bell v. Mazza, is a Massachusetts opinioninvolving a property dispute and alleged violations under42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11lfor alleged interference with rights secured by the UnitedStates and Massachusetts constitutions. See 474 N.E.2d 1111,1112 (Mass. 1985). While the case mentions “interference,”it does so in the context of federal and state constitutionallaw. See id. The second authority cited by the Debtors, theRestatement (Second) of Torts, § 766, discusses intentionalinterference with performance of a contract by a third person,not “tortious interference with a civil proceeding.” SeeRestatement (Second) of Torts, § 766 (A.L.I. 1979).
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11The third authority cited by the Debtors appears to be anonexistent case. The Debtors cite to “Goguen v. Nason, 419A.2d 1032 (Me. 1980)” for the proposition that “Maine Courtshave held that interference with legal relations, includingthrough procedural sabotage, gives rise to tort liability.”48Westlaw and Lexis searches for the citation “419 A.2d 1032”yield a page from a different opinion: Ridgway v. PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., 419 A.2d 1030 (Me. 1980). That opiniondiscusses constructive trusts and insurance proceeds, not“tortious interference with a civil proceeding.”49 In short,the Debtors have not provided, nor has the Court found, anyauthority to support a cause of action under Maine law for“tortious interference with a civil proceeding.”2. Abuse of ProcessAlthough not well developed in the Complaint, to the extentthat Count VI asserts a claim for abuse of process,50 the factsalleged do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.“Maine law has identified two elements necessary to sustainan abuse of process claim: ‘1) a use of the process in a mannernot proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings and, 2)the existence of an ulterior motive.’ ” OfficeMax Inc., 773 F.Supp. 2d at 240 (quoting Grace v. Yarnall, 346 F. Supp. 2d222, 224 (D. Me. 2004)).*15 “The term ‘process’ does not refer to ‘the legal processgenerally’ but rather to ‘the instruments by which courtsassert their jurisdiction and command others to appear, act, ordesist.’ ” Leighton v. Lowenberg, 290 A.3d 68, 73–74 (Me.2023) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. For Econ.Harm § 26 cmt. b (A.L.I. 2020)). “Abuse of process may bedemonstrated ‘if a [p]laintiff can show an improper use ofprocess for an immediate purpose other than that for whichit was designed and intended.’ ” OfficeMax, 773 F. Supp.2d at 240 (quoting Grace, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 224). “Typicalabuse of process cases involve misuse of such procedures asdiscovery, subpoenas, and attachment.” Id. (quoting Grace,346 F. Supp. 2d at 224).The Complaint's conclusory allegations relating to allegedvenue and docket manipulation simply do not constitute“process” for purposes of an abuse of process claim. SeeLeighton, 290 A.3d at 73–74; OfficeMax, 773 F. Supp. 2dat 240. Here, the only relevant allegations are those relatingto discovery. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Mardenengaged in “a campaign of informal ‘ghost filings’ withoutentering an appearance,”51 and issued threats, interrogatories,and deposition notices “outside the rules of procedure.”52The Complaint provides no facts to support these allegations,particularly those relating to threats. The Complaint alsoalleges that “[f]rom Spring 2023 through Fall of 2024 ...attorneys ... [p]ressed for depositions just five days after thedeath of [Sandy] Marrett's mother.”53 Even assuming thatis true, in the absence of additional facts, the Court cannotreasonably infer that any of the defendants used discovery forany improper purpose in the state court action. See OfficeMax,773 F. Supp. 2d at 240. Accordingly, the Complaint does notallege facts sufficient to state a claim for abuse of process.3. Wrongful Use of Civil ProceedingsWhile Maine does not recognize a cause of action for “tortiousinterference with a civil proceeding,” wrongful use of civilproceedings is recognized under Maine law.The tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings exists where(1) one initiates, continues, or procures civil proceedingswithout probable cause, (2) with a primary purpose otherthan that of securing the proper adjudication of theclaim upon which the proceedings are based, and (3) theproceedings have terminated in favor of the person againstwhom they are brought.Leighton, 290 A.3d at 74–75 (quoting Pepperell Tr. Co. v.Mountain Heir Fin. Corp., 708 A.2d 651, 656 (Me. 1998)).Here, the Complaint does not allege that the Foreclosure Casewas initiated, continued, or procured without probable cause,nor does the Complaint allege facts that demonstrate theprimary purpose of the Foreclosure Case was not to secure theproper adjudication of the claims related to the foreclosure.See id. at 74. While the Complaint asserts conclusorystatements that, for example, “[e]very legal pathway wasintentionally blocked,”54 or that defendants engaged in “amulti-year cover up,”55 such statements are not supported byany well-pleaded facts. And notably, the Foreclosure Case didnot terminate in favor of the Debtors, the parties against whomthe proceedings were brought. See Leighton, 290 A.3d at 74–75. Therefore, the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factsto state a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings.Accordingly, because the Complaint fails to state a claimfor “tortious interference with a civil proceeding,” abuse of
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12process, or wrongful use of civil proceedings, Count VI willbe DISMISSED.III. CONCLUSION*16 For all the foregoing reasons, the Motions to Dismisswill be GRANTED. Counts I–VI asserted against AroostookCounty Federal Savings and Loan; Solman & Hunter, P.A.;Monaghan Leahy, LLP; Christine Kennedy-Jensen; LaurenK. Souza; Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, P.A.; WilliamDruary, Jr.; Richard Solman; and Fidelity and DepositCompany of Maryland, incorrectly sued as “Zurich NorthAmerica Insurance Company,” will be DISMISSED. Separateorders in conformity with this Memorandum will issueforthwith.By the Court,All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 479029Footnotes1Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (“F&D”) was incorrectly sued as Zurich. See Zurich's Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No57. However, for ease of reference, this memorandum of decision will continue to refer to F&D as Zurich.2The facts are drawn from the Complaint, the attachments thereto, documents central to the claims, documents fairlyincorporated into the complaint, facts susceptible to judicial notice, concessions in response to the motions to dismiss,and documents the authenticity of which are not disputed. See Cheng v. Neumann, 51 F.4th 438, 441 (1st Cir. 2022);Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).3See Warranty Deed, Notice of Suppl. Authority and Procedural Development (“Notice of Suppl. Authority”), Ex. B, Dkt. No.77; Letters Approving Mortgage Loan Request and Settlement Statement, Notice of Suppl. Authority, Ex. A-1, Dkt. No. 77.4December 1, 2009 Mortgage and Settlement Statement, Ex. A2, Notice of Suppl. Authority, Dkt. No. 77.5See Nov. 20, 2025 Hr'g Tr. 21:4–6, Case No. 25-30440-EDK, Dkt. 214.6See September 14, 2021 35-Day Notice of Right to Cure Default, Compl., Ex. A-2, Dkt. No. 1.7Id.8The Debtors asserted five counterclaims: (1) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (2) economic duress;(3) tortious interference with contract; (4) breach of contract; and (5) unfair trade practices. See Answer, AffirmativeDefenses, and Countercl., Ex. B-1, Compl.9Email dated May 31, 2022, 3:34 p.m., Compl., Ex. K.10Recusal Order, Compl., Ex. M.11Special Assignment Order, Compl., Ex. O.12Order on Mot. to Remand, Aroostook Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 33.13Id.14Order on Defs.-Counterclaimants’ Mot. for Leave to Amend and Suppl. Countercl. and Mot. to Strike, Compl., Ex. Q-2.15See id.16See id.17J. of Foreclosure and Sale, Aroostook Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 33.
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1318Order Granting Countercl. Def.’s Mot. for Sanctions Against Countercl. Pls. David and Sandy Marrett, Compl. Ex. T-2.19See Dkt. R., Supreme Judicial Ct. Sitting as the Law Ct., Aroostook Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 8, Dkt. No. 33.20Order Permitting Trial Ct. Action, Compl., Ex. U-1.21J. of Foreclosure and Sale, Aroostook Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 33.22See Order Dismissing Emergency Mot. to Stay, Compl., Ex. U-2; Order on Mot. for Emergency Relief, Compl., Ex. U-3;Order on Mot. to Reconsider and Mot. for Various Relief, Compl., Ex. U-4.23Order on Mot. to Reconsider and Mot. for Various Relief, Compl., Ex. U-4.24Id.25Mot. to Proceed with Adjudication of Am. Countercl. Or, in the Alternative, Enter Default J., Compl., Ex. V-1.26Mot. to Schedule Hr'g on Mot. to Adjudicate and Related Matters, Compl., Ex. W.27See Order Regarding Future Filings, Aroostook Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 7, Dkt. No. 33.28See id.29See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.30The Complaint contains a seventh count that is not the subject of any of the Motions to Dismiss discussed in thisMemorandum.31In the Debtors’ oppositions to the motions to dismiss filed by Zurich and to Aroostook, they assert that Zurich andAroostook engaged in fraud on the court. However, Count I is not directed against either of those parties.32Compl. 51.33Compl. 55.34Id. at 57.35Id. at 58.36Pls.’ Opp'n to Def. Zurich North America's Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 63 at 6.37Id.38See Aroostook Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 33 at 2.39See generally Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).40See, e.g., Pls.’ Opp'n to Def. Zurich North America's Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 63 at 1.41See Order on Defs.-Counterclaimants’ Mot. for Leave to Amend and Suppl. Countercl. and Mot. to Strike, Compl., Ex. Q-2.42Compl. 7.43Compl. 72-D. The Complaint contains no factual allegations as to any insurance claim or related conduct that occurredin 2025.44Pls.’ Opp'n to Def. Zurich North America's Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 63 at 4–5.
In re: DAVID T. MARRETT, SANDY J. MARRETT, Debtors..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1445See Compl. 72-C.46See id.; Email dated May 31, 2022, 3:34 p.m., Compl., Ex. K (stating that Aroostook is the insured party on the policy).47Compl. 77.48Compl. 79.49Citations to nonexistent cases, mis-quotes, and misleading characterizations of existing cases have been a recurringissue in both this adversary proceeding and the main case. The Court has previously sanctioned the Debtors for violationsof Bankruptcy Rule 9011 in both this adversary proceeding and the main case. See Order, Nov. 20, 2025, Dkt. No. 143.50See Compl. 78.51Compl. 30.52Id.53Id. at 39.54Compl. 47.55Id. at 48.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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