Mbow v. Mackert (Jan. 28, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
D. Maryland. ABYBATOU MBOW v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Maryland (MD)
Court
Supreme Court of Maryland
Decided
Jan. 28, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Brendan A. Hurson (J.) (unanimous Court)
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 221711Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Maryland.ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff,v.OFFICER MICHAELMACKERT ET AL., Defendants.Civil No. 24-3674-BAH|Filed 01/28/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsLatoya Andrea Francis-Williams, Law Office of Latoya A.Francis-Williams LLC, Randallstown, MD, Sheridan ToddYeary, The Yeary Firm, LLC, Columbia, MD, for Plaintiff.Aleksander James Stathakis, Office of Law, Towson, MD, forDefendants.MEMORANDUM OPINIONBrendan A. Hurson United States District Judge*1 Plaintiff Abybatou Mbow (“Plaintiff”) filed an amendedcomplaint against Officer Michael Mackert (“Mackert”),Officer Vincent G. Skinner (“Skinner”), Officer ThomasBroznowicz (“Broznowicz”), Corporal David A. Lehnert(“Lehnert”) (together, the “County Officers”), and BaltimoreCounty, Maryland (“Baltimore County”) (collectively,“Defendants”), alleging numerous claims in connection withan alleged stop and detention of Plaintiff conducted byMackert and Skinner in May of 2024. See ECF 11 (amendedcomplaint). Pending are Baltimore County's motion to vacatethe entry of an order of default, ECF 22, and the CountyOfficers’ motion to dismiss, ECF 25. Plaintiff filed responsesto both motions, ECF 24 (response to motion to vacate) andECF 26 (response to motion to dismiss), and the CountyOfficers filed a reply, ECF 27. The motion to dismiss, ECF 25,and Plaintiff's response, ECF 26, include memoranda of law,and the motion to vacate includes exhibits.1 See ECFs 22-1–22-4. The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and findsthat no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025).Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Baltimore County'smotion to vacate is GRANTED, and the County Officers’motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED INPART. Further, Plaintiff's counsel is ORDERED to addressaccusations that she provided what appear to be fake orinaccurate case citations.I. BACKGROUNDA. Procedural BackgroundOn December 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit against “OfficerRyan Mackert,” “Officer Vernon Skinner,” “Officer KyleBroznowicz,” “Corporal Adam Lehnert,” and BaltimoreCounty. ECF 1. The summons for Baltimore County alongwith the initial complaint was served via private processserver on January 3, 2025. ECF 7. On January 25, 2025,Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaintin order to correct the names of the County Officers andprovide their badge numbers, see ECF 8, which the Courtgranted, ECF 10, at 1. The amended complaint was docketedon February 12, 2025, see ECF 11, and corrected summonsesissued for the County Officers only, see ECF 12. The CountyOfficers waived service on March 24, 2025. See ECFs 17–20.The County Officers then filed a motion to dismiss. ECF 25.Plaintiff filed a response, ECF 26, and the County Officersfiled a reply, ECF 27.Baltimore County's response to the initial complaint was dueon January 23, 2025, see ECF 7, at 2, but it did not file a timelyanswer. On February 20, 2025, approximately one week afterher amended complaint was docketed, Plaintiff filed a motionfor entry of default against Baltimore County, ECF 13, whichthe Clerk of Court entered on March 13, 2025, see ECF 15.On April 14, 2025, Baltimore County filed a motion to vacatethe entry of default, ECF 22, which Plaintiff opposes, ECF 24.B. Factual BackgroundPlaintiff alleges in her amended complaint that on May 6,2024, she was unlawfully stopped by Skinner and Mackert,ECF 11, at 5 11, while the two officers were assistingBroznowicz “with a missing person investigation” regardinga missing juvenile, id. at 4 8. The “only descript[ion]”Skinner and Mackert had of the missing juvenile was “Black,”“female,” and wearing a “black top.” Id. at 5 10. Followingup on a tip, Mackert “responded to 7604 Old Harford Rd” toinvestigate a juvenile who “was possibly walking on HillcrestAvenue.” Id. 9. Skinner then “advised he had locateda person matching the general description of the missingjuvenile” and stopped Plaintiff. Id. 10. Plaintiff alleges thestop occurred “solely because she is a black woman.” Id.
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.211. Plaintiff “repeatedly informed” Skinner and Mackert “thatshe was not the missing juvenile and confirmed the namethey were looking for was not her name.” Id. 12. Plaintiff“further explained that she did not have identification withher” because “she had just stepped out to go to the store.” Id.She also alleges that she “complained that the officers’ actionswere racist.” Id.*2 Despite Plaintiff's “clear explanation and lack of anysuspicious behavior,” she alleges that Mackert and Skinner“continued to follow and harass her[,] frightening [her] andmaking her fear for her safety.” Id. 13. For example,when Plaintiff “tried to leave the officers’ presence,” Mackertand Skinner “jumped into their respective police vehiclesand cornered [Plaintiff] in an alley,” and “then used forceto physically restrain her” and “tak[e] photographs of herwithout her consent.” Id. 14. She alleges that she was“forced to the ground as she cried out for help” and“handcuffed by both Skinner and Mackert, despite herprotests.” Id. 15. Mackert “berated Plaintiff, telling herthat the situation was her own fault,” allegedly stating, “youdid this to yourself.” Id. at 6 17. Plaintiff alleges that theepisode caused her to “sustain[ ] physical injuries, includingto her knees, from being forced to the ground” and allegesthat she also suffered “severe emotional trauma[.]” Id. 18.Mackert and Skinner “ultimately confirmed [Plaintiff] wasnot the missing person and released her from custody aftersome time.” Id. 16.Later that same day, Plaintiff “went to the Parkville policeprecinct and reported the incident.” Id. 19. She claims that“Sergeant German ... dismissed her complaints, advising her’that the incident was her own fault for failing to provideidentification[.]” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the CountyOfficers “coordinated their statements” about the stop, “withthe goal of deterring and discouraging [Plaintiff] from filing aformal complaint.” Id. 20. Also, “as retaliation for [Plaintiff]reporting this incident and in furtherance of their cover up,”Plaintiff alleges that “Mackert swore out criminal chargesagainst [Plaintiff] for two counts of assault ... and obstructingand hindering at common law.” Id. at 7 24.On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff appeared for jury trial onher state criminal charges. Id. at 8 28. She alleges thatafter “Skinner entered the courtroom and sat immediately infront of [Plaintiff],” Plaintiff began to “shake with fear and[be]come overwhelmed with anxiety.” Id. ¶¶ 28–29. Plaintiff'scriminal charges were dismissed. Id. 30.Plaintiff claims she has suffered “physical injury, humiliation,damage to her reputation[,] inconvenience, anxiety and severeemotional distress” and has been “forced to seek medicaland mental health attention as a result of this incident,incurring substantial medical expenses and time lost fromwork, resulting in lost wages.” Id. at 7–8, ¶¶ 25–26. Shealleges she has also been harmed “reputation wise.” Id. at 8 31. Further, Plaintiff claims she was “forced to retain counseland prepare for a criminal trial, which caused substantialfinancial hardship,” id. 27, including “attorneys’ fees andrelated expert fees,” id. 32.Plaintiff brings thirteen claims related to this incident. AgainstMackert and Skinner only, Plaintiff brings claims of assault(Count I); battery (Count II); false arrest/false imprisonment(Count III); malicious prosecution (Count IV); abuse ofprocess (Count V); and violation of Articles 24 and 26 ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count VI). Id. at 8–15.Against all four County Officers, Plaintiff brings a claim ofintentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (CountVII). Id. at 15–17. Against Mackert, Skinner, Broznowicz,and Baltimore County, Plaintiff brings a claim under 42U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure, excessive force, and falsearrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count VIII)and a racial discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 andrelated Maryland state law (Count IX). Id. at 17–21. AgainstBaltimore County only, Plaintiff brings a Monell claim forfailure to train, supervise, and discipline pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (Count X); and claims alleging negligent hiring,retention, and supervision (Count XI); failure to investigatepolice misconduct (Count XII); and negligent failure toinvestigate police misconduct (Count XIII). Id. at 21–28. TheCourt now turns to the pending motions, which are ripe forreview.II. BALTIMORE COUNTY'S MOTION TO VACATE*3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a),“[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmativerelief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, andthat failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk mustenter the party's default.” Under Rule 55(c), the court “may setaside an entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has“repeatedly expressed a strong preference that, as a generalmatter, defaults be avoided and that claims and defenses bedisposed of on their merits.” Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc.v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2010);see also Saunders v. Metro. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 806 F. App'x165, 168 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he law disfavors disposition
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3by default and accords preference to resolving a case on itsmerits.”).Baltimore County was properly served with the initialcomplaint, see ECF 7 (summons returned executed onBaltimore County on January 2, 2025); ECF 22, at 1 n.1(confirming that Baltimore County “was served via privateprocess server on January 2, 2025”). It failed to file aresponsive pleading by January 23, 2025, which ordinarilywould warrant the entry of default. See Hodges v. WashingtonMetro. Area Transit Auth., Civ. No. CBD-14-0891, 2014WL 5797754, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2014) (“Entry ofdefault ... may only be entered after a defendant has beenproperly served.” (citing Maryland State Firemen's Ass'n v.Chavez, 166 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Md. 1996))). However, afterreceiving leave of the Court, ECF 10, Plaintiff subsequentlyfiled an amended complaint on February 12, 2024 against theCounty Officers and Baltimore County, see ECF 11.As a threshold matter, Plaintiff seeks default based onBaltimore County's failure to respond to Plaintiff's initialcomplaint, see ECF 13, despite the fact that Plaintiffsubsequently filed an amended complaint. The filing of “anamended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original andrenders it of no legal effect.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001). “Consistent with this principle,district courts in other circuits routinely have vacated or setaside’ ‘as moot’ a defendant's default on a prior, supersededcomplaint once the plaintiff's amended complaint is theoperative pleading in the case—even if the plaintiff simplyrepleaded her claims against that defendant.” Anselme v.Griffin, No. 3:20CV00005, 2021 WL 2152512, at *3 (W.D.Va. May 26, 2021) (collecting cases); see also Rice v. M-E-C Co., No. CV 2:17-1274-BHH, 2022 WL 20138734, at*2 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (“Likewise, this Court now findsmoot the Clerk's earlier entries of default against Reuben andM-E-C, as they were based on Plaintiff's prior, supersededcomplaint.”); Altes v. Pride Ctr. of Maryland, Inc., Civ.No. JKB-23-1033, 2024 WL 249156, at *1 (D. Md. Jan.23, 2024) (vacating without objection by the plaintiff anOrder of Default when plaintiff filed an amended complaint).Consequently, the Court is justified in setting aside the entryof default as moot based solely on the filing of the amendedcomplaint. However, since Baltimore County does not arguethat the amended complaint moots the entry of default, theCourt will address its motion under Rule 55(c).“The disposition of motions made under Rule [ ] 55(c)...is a matter which lies largely within the discretion of thetrial judge.” Payne ex rel. Est. of Cahada v. Brake, 439 F.3d198, 204 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Consolidated Masonry &Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249,251 (4th Cir. 1967)). In Payne ex. rel. Est. of Cahada v.Brake, the Fourth Circuit set forth six factors for districtcourts to consider when determining whether to set aside anentry of default: “whether the moving party has a meritoriousdefense, whether it acts with reasonable promptness, thepersonal responsibility of the defaulting party, the prejudiceto the party, whether there is a history of dilatory action,and the availability of sanctions less drastic:” Id. at 204–05. “In weighing these factors, a district court should not‘place[ ] overarching emphasis on a single Payne factor.’ ”Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. v. Georg, Civ. No. RDB-21-0842,2023 WL 2185777, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2023) (citingColleton Preparatory Acad., 616 F.3d at 419).*4 Though it offers a valid explanation for the failure totimely respond to the initial complaint, Baltimore Countyspecifically addresses only one of the six Payne factors in itsmotion to vacate by asserting that it has several meritoriousdefenses to Plaintiff's claims including “qualified immunity,public official immunity, [and] governmental immunity.”ECF 22, at 4. Plaintiff argues that Baltimore County mustprovide specific factual grounds to support its meritoriousdefenses. ECF 24, at 3 (noting that Baltimore County “offersno affidavits or corporate records to support its immunitydefenses” and offers only “generic legal assertions withoutcase-specific analysis”).“[A]ll that is necessary to establish the existence of a‘meritorious defense’ is a presentation or proffer of evidence,which, if believed, would permit either the Court or the juryto find for the defaulting party.” United States v. Moradi,673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982). Stated differently, “[t]hequestion is not whether the defendant has fully proven adefense at this stage, but rather ‘whether there is somepossibility that the outcome after a full trial will be contraryto the result achieved by the default.’ ” Sec. & Exch. Comm'nv. Lee, Civ. No. ABA-24-296, 2025 WL 2781530, at *5 (D.Md. Sept. 30, 2025) (quoting Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v.Rooding, Civ. No. ELH-15-2572, 2016 WL 5144493, at *6(D. Md. Sept. 21, 2016)). However, a defaulting party muststill “make[ ] a factual showing that ‘would permit a findingfor the defaulting party.’ ” Acosta v. Vera's White Sands BeachClub, LLC, Civ. No. PX-16-782, 2019 WL 1767147, at *2(D. Md. Apr. 22, 2019) (quoting Russell v. Krowne, Civ. No.DKC-08-2468, 2013 WL 66620, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 3, 2013)).“A movant's burden for proffering a meritorious defense is
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4not onerous” as the moving party must only “allege sufficientfacts that, if true, would constitute a defense.” Id.Although Plaintiff takes issue with the lack of factual detailsin support of Baltimore County's proffered defenses, theCourt finds that these defenses—qualified immunity, publicofficial immunity, and governmental immunity—require littleadditional factual development in order to show that, if raised,they might permit a finding in Baltimore County's favor.The contours of these defenses are well-established and restprimarily on the fact that Baltimore County is a governmentalentity, a fact that is undisputed. Indeed, it is unclear what“affidavits or corporate records” could be offered in supportof Baltimore County's defenses. ECF 24, at 3. In short,Baltimore County offers enough as it relates to its proposeddefenses2 to justify vacating default, particularly in light ofthe Fourth Circuit's strong preference for deciding cases onthe merits. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Carrie Bell, Inc.,Civ. No. JKB-19-1517, 2019 WL 6255173, at *4 (D. Md.Nov. 22, 2019) (accepting the movant's “relatively threadbaredefense” that the defendant was “not ‘personally liable’ forany copyright infringement” as “possibl[y] meritorious” dueto “the Fourth Circuit's admonishment to interpret Rule 55(c)motions liberally”). Thus, the first of the Payne factors weighsin Baltimore County's favor.*5 “[A] party attempting to set aside an entry of default mustact with reasonable promptness in responding to the entry ofdefault.” Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins., 2016 WL 5144493, at *7(quoting Wainwright's Vacations, LLC v. Pan Am. AirwaysCorp., 130 F. Supp. 2d 712, 718 (D. Md. 2001)). “Courtsmust consider the specific ‘facts and circumstances of eachoccasion’ when determining whether a defendant acted ina reasonably prompt manner when moving to set aside adefault.” Propps v. Kirkpatrick, Civ. No. SAG-21-1744, 2021WL 4951930, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2021) (quoting Prescottv. MorGreen Solar Solutions, LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 529, 537(E.D.N.C. 2018)). Here, the Clerk entered default on March13, 2025 and, in accordance with the local rules, establisheda 30-day deadline for Baltimore County to move to vacate.ECF 15; ECF 16; see Loc. R. 108.2 (D. Md. 2025) (settingthe deadline to apply to vacate entry of default within thirty(30) days of service of the notice of default). BaltimoreCounty filed its motion 32 days after the entry of default,only two days late. ECF 22. Although Baltimore County doesnot explain its delay, courts have vacated default in casesinvolving substantially longer delays than the minor delaypresent here. See, e.g., Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co., 2016 WL5144493, at *7 (five weeks); Acosta, 2019 WL 1767147, at*3 (two months). Accordingly, the second Payne factor doesnot weigh against vacating default.The third and fifth Payne factors overlap and “can beaddressed together.” Timilon Corp. v. Empowerment Just.Ctr. Corp., 738 F. Supp. 3d 669, 682 (D. Md. 2024). “Inconsidering personal responsibility, district courts in theFourth Circuit have found that default judgment ‘is reservedonly for cases where the party's noncompliance representsbad faith or complete disregard for the mandates of procedureand the authority of the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting First Am.Fin. Corp. v. Homefree USA, Inc., Civ. No. ELH-12-2888,2013 WL 2902856, at *4 (D. Md. June 12, 2013). As noted,Baltimore County was properly served with Plaintiff's initialcomplaint. ECF 22, at 1. Correspondence between the partiesattached to the motion to vacate suggest that counsel forBaltimore County may have been confused about whether theCounty had been formally served, but there appears to be nodispute that Baltimore County had a copy of the complaintas early as January of 2025. See ECF 22-1 (January 24,2025 email between counsel discussing the complaint); ECF22-3 (February 19, 2025 email between counsel discussingthe same). Regardless, despite the delay in responding, therecord before the Court reflects that counsel were in contactwith one another soon after the filing of Plaintiff's lawsuitand had a genuine disagreement over whether service waseffectuated. This correspondence does not reveal bad faithor complete disregard of this Court's procedures on the partof Baltimore County.3 Further, Plaintiff does not allege thatBaltimore County has a history of dilatory actions in this, orany, case. Therefore, the third and fifth Payne factors do notweigh in Plaintiff's favor.Plaintiff argues that vacating the default will cause prejudiceto the Plaintiff because she “has already incurred substantialcosts from the default process.” ECF 24, at 9. Though thesecosts go without detail in Plaintiff's response, even if theywere incurred and recoverable despite the subsequent filing ofan amended complaint, “the Court may address this prejudicethrough a less drastic sanction than default—an award forattorney's fees and costs.” Atinus Works, LLC v. Greenclean,Inc., Civ. No. MJM-24-614, 2025 WL 487336, at *2 (D. Md.Feb. 13, 2025) (citing Mullinex v. John Crane Inc., 636 F.Supp. 3d 622, 628 (E.D. Va. 2022)). Thus, all totaled, sixPayne factors tip the balance in favor of vacating the entry ofdefault, and the Court will order that relief.*6 The parties initially appeared to dispute whetherBaltimore County 1) was required to respond to the initial
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5complaint or the amended complaint and 2) was properlyserved with the amended complaint. See ECF 13, at 2; ECF22, at 3 n.4. However, Baltimore County closes its motion byseeking an opportunity to respond to the amended complaint,thus putting to rest any issues related to service. ECF 22, at 5.The Court grants the request and Baltimore County's responseto the amended complaint is due within 14 days.III. THE COUNTY OFFICERS’ MOTION TO DISMISSFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissalsfor failure to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”In considering a motion under this rule, courts discount legalconclusions stated in the complaint and “accept as true all ofthe factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Ericksonv. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court then draws all reasonableinferences in favor of the plaintiff and considers whether thecomplaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. NemetChevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,253 (4th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when theplaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to drawthe reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.“The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions’or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause ofaction[.]’ ” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App'x745, 747 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the same time, a “complaintwill not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detailabout [the plaintiff's] claim to show that [the plaintiff] hasa more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.”Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4thCir. 2014).The County Officers move to dismiss the maliciousprosecution (Count IV), abuse of process (Count V), IIED(Count VII), and racial discrimination (Count IX) claimsagainst Skinner’ and Mackert. ECF 25-1, at 1–8. Broznowiczand Lehnert also seek dismissal of all claims against them.4Id. at 8–10. The Court addresses the viability of each claimin turn.A. Count IV: Malicious Prosecution Against Skinnerand MackertPlaintiff alleges malicious prosecution against Mackert andSkinner, claiming they “started and continued a criminalprosecution against Plaintiff [ ] by alleging offenses that[they] knew in advance to be false.” ECF 11, at 11 53.She further alleges that Mackert and Skinner “did so. withoutprobable cause” and with “malice, evil motive, and ill will ...to cover up their stalking, battering, arresting and injuringher the day prior.” Id. at 12 ¶¶ 54–55. Mackert and Skinnercontend that “Plaintiff's claims are simply a recital of theelements of malicious prosecution” and fail to meet therequisite pleading standard to maintain a claim. ECF 25-1, at3. The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiff has plausiblyalleged a claim for malicious prosecution.A malicious prosecution claim under Maryland law requires“that the defendant instituted or continued a criminalproceeding; the proceeding was resolved in favor of theaccused; there was no probable cause for the proceeding; andthe defendant acted with malice; or for the primary purposeother than that of bringing an offender to justice.” Burley v.Balt. Police Dep't., 422 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1035 (D. Md. 2019)(citing Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 130 (Md. 2000)).*7 First, Plaintiff plainly alleges, and Mackert and Skinnerdo not appear to dispute, that Mackert and Skinner instituteda criminal proceeding against Plaintiff and that the criminalcase was resolved in favor of Plaintiff with a nolle prosequijudgment. ECF 11, at 7–8. This allegation satisfies the firstand second elements of the claim. See Bailey-Bey v. Mosby,Civ. No. DLB-22-2778, 2023 WL 4948284, at *4 (D. Md.Aug. 3, 2023) (explaining that the Fourth Circuit has heldthat “dismissal of charges by way of nolle prosequi [i]ssufficient to meet the favorable termination requirement ofa malicious prosecution claim”) (citing Owens, 767 F.3d at390). Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges the fourth element, byclaiming that Skinner and Mackert brought criminal chargesagainst her and did so with the improper purpose of retaliationand “to cover up [Mackert and Skinner's] stalking, battering,arresting, and injuring her the day prior.” ECF 11, at 12 55. And while Plaintiff alleges that only Mackert “swore outcriminal charges” against her, Plaintiff further alleges that itwas Skinner who attended her criminal trial date and thusassisted in Plaintiff's criminal prosecution. Id. at 11 28.“Where a party instigates, aides or assist[s] in a criminalprosecution he/she may be liable even where he/she did notswear out a warrant.” Smithfield Packing Co., Inc. v. Evely,905 A.2d 845; 854 (Md. App. 2006) (citations omitted).With respect to the third element, Plaintiff asserts thatMackert and Skinner “arrested her without probable cause.”ECF 11, at 12 54. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claimfails because she “provides no further explanation or factual
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6detail(s) to support her legal conclusion.” ECF 25-1, at 3.Plaintiff counters that the complaint specifically “allege[s]Defendants ‘knew [the charges] to be false’ and acted toconceal their own misconduct.” ECF 26-1, at 7. Plaintiffcontends that “[t]hese allegations go beyond ‘mere labels’ byidentifying the retaliatory motive and factual context (post-reporting charges),” thus satisfying the lack of probable causeelement. Id.Probable cause means “ ‘a reasonable ground for belief in theexistence of such state of facts as would warrant institutionof the suit or proceedings complained of.’ ” Foy v. GiantFood Inc., 298 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting OneThousand Fleet Ltd, P'shp. v. Guerriero, 694 A.2d 952, 956(Md. 1997)). Here, Mackert and Skinner filed charges againstPlaintiff for assault pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Crim. L. §3-203 and common law obstructing and hindering. ECF 11,at 7 24. Md. Code Ann., Crim. L. § 3-203 provides that “[a]person may not intentionally cause physical injury to anotherif the person knows or has reason to know that the otheris ... a law enforcement officer engaged in the performanceof the officer's official duties[.]” Md. Code Ann., Crim. L. §3-203(c)(2)(i). The elements of an obstructing and hinderingcharge include:(1) A police officer engaged in the performance of a duty;(2) An act, or perhaps an omission, by the accused whichobstructs or hinders the officer in the performance of thatduty;(3) Knowledge by the accused of facts comprising element(1); and(4) Intent to obstruct or hinder the officer by the act oromission constituting element (2).Cover v. State, 466 A.2d 1276, 1284 (Md. 1983).As to the assault charge, the pleadings do not suggest thatPlaintiff assaulted (or injured) Mackert and Skinner whenshe was allegedly forced to the ground and handcuffed.Instead, Plaintiff alleges that she “cried out for help.” ECF11, at 5 15. Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, asthe Court must at this stage, merely yelling for assistancefails to establish probable cause for Mackert and Skinner tobring an assault charge against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's amendedcomplaint also plausibly alleges that Mackert and Skinnerlacked probable cause to bring the obstructing and hinderingcharge because Plaintiff properly alleges that she did notobstruct or hinder their investigation. Rather, Plaintiff claimsthat she cooperated with them by “repeatedly inform[ing][them] that she was not the missing juvenile,” “confirm[ing]the name they were looking for was not her name,” andadvising she did not “have identification with her as she hadjust stepped out to go to the store.” Id. 12.*8 Further, Plaintiff alleges that Mackert and Skinner didnot bring charges until after she attempted to complain abouttheir actions. Id. at 7 24. Plaintiff argues that this timingpoints to a “retaliatory-motive,” from which the Court caninfer that Mackert and Skinner lacked probable cause to filethe charges. ECF 26-1, at 7. Taking the allegations in the lightmost favorable to Plaintiff, the fact that Mackert and Skinnerdid not bring charges against her until after she attemptedto file a complaint supports a plausible inference that theylacked probable cause to bring the charges filed. Therefore,Plaintiff has adequately plead all four elements of a maliciousprosecution claim.B. Count V: Abuse of Process Against Skinner andMackertPlaintiff alleges that Mackert and Skinner engaged in an abuseof process because they “used the criminal justice process ...for an improper purpose, namely, to cover up their harassing,stalking, following of, detention, arrest, [and] excessive useof force on Plaintiff.” ECF 11, at 12 58. Mackert and Skinnercounter that “Plaintiff has not alleged any act(s) taken by Ofc.Skinner and/or Ofc. Mackert after the issuance of any legalprocess that constitutes an improper use of said process.” ECF25-1, at 5. The Court agrees with Mackert and Skinner.As the Supreme Court of Maryland observed, the tort of“abuse of process” exists to “provide a remedy for thosecases ‘in which legal procedure has been set in motion inproper form, with probable cause, and even with ultimatesuccess, but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplishan ulterior purpose for which it was not designed.’ ” OneThousand Fleet Ltd., P'shp, 694 A.2d at 956 (quoting W.Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 121, at897 (5th ed. 1984)). “To sustain a cause of action for abuseof process, the plaintiff must prove: first, that the defendantwilfully used process after it has issued in a manner notcontemplated by law; second, that the defendant acted tosatisfy an ulterior motive; and third, that damages resultedfrom the defendant's perverted use of process.” Id. (first citingKeys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 494 A.2d 200, 205 (Md. 1985);and then citing Berman v. Karvounis, 518 A.2d 726, 727 (Md.1987)). The. “mere issuance of the process itself ... is notactionable, even if it is done with an ‘ulterior motive’ or ‘bad
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7intention.’ ” Campbell v. Lake Hallowell Homeowners Ass'n,852 A.2d 1029, 1044 (Md. App. 2004). “[T]here is no liabilitywhere the defendant has done nothing more than carry outthe process to its authorized conclusion, even though withbad intentions.” Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 471 A.2d 297,311 (Md. 1984) (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Lawof Torts 846–47 (4th ed. 1971)).Plaintiff fails to plead that Mackert and Skinner engaged inany improper use of process after it was issued. ECF 11,at 12 ¶¶ 57–59. She merely pleads that they “initiated” thecriminal process “for a purpose other than that for which itwas designed[.]” Id. 59. As Mackert and Skinner maintain,“the mere issuance of the process itself ... is not actionable,even if it is done with an ‘ulterior motive’ or ‘bad intention.’” Campbell, 852 A.2d at 1044; see ECF 25-1, at 5 (“Evenif Defendants were to ‘initiate’ criminal proceedings withbad intent or motive, that alone does not support, or evenrelate, to an abuse of process claim.”). Plaintiff also allegesthat Mackert and Skinner “continued” the “criminal process,”ECF 11, at 12 59, but this again misses the mark becausePlaintiff fails to allege Mackert and Skinner perverted theprocess to satisfy an ulterior motive. See Herring v. CitizensBank & Trust Co., 321 A.2d 182, 189–90 (Md. App. 1974)(providing an example of abuse of process from “dictumin Zablonsky v. Perkins, 230 Md. 365, 370, 187 A.2d 314,317, [which] indicated that the filing of otherwise appropriatecriminal charges for larceny after trust in an attempt ‘to usethe State's criminal process as a private collection agency’might well be ‘a perversion of legal process to improper ends,which might give rise to an action for an abuse of process’ ”).Here, Plaintiff alleges that Mackert and Skinner did nothingmore than “carry out the [criminal] process to its authorizedconclusion.” Palmer Ford, Inc., 471 A.2d at 311. Even if donewith bad intentions, this allegation fails to support an abuseof process claim. See id.C. Count VII: IIED Claim Against All County Officers*9 IIED claims “may succeed only when the defendant'sconduct was ‘so outrageous that it goes beyond all possiblebounds of decency, and is regarded as atrocious, and utterlyintolerable in a civilized community.’ ” Williams v. WicomicoCnty. Bd. of Educ., 836 F. Supp. 2d 387, 399 (D. Md.2011) (quoting Borchers v. Hyrchuk, 727 A.2d 388, 392(Md. App. 1999)). “Moreover, the outrageous conduct mustcause a ‘severely disabling emotional response,’ such that ‘noreasonable man could be expected to endure it.’ ” Id. (quotingHarris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 616 (Md. 1977)). “[T]heextreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conductmay arise from his abuse of a position, or relation with anotherperson, which gives him actual or apparent authority overhim, or power to affect his interests.” Rubino v. New ActonMobile Indus., LLC, 44 F. Supp. 3d 616, 624 (D. Md. 2014)(alteration in original) (citing Harris, 380 A.2d at 616). As of2010, “[i]n the 30 years since the Court of Appeals recognizedthe tort of IIED, it has upheld such claims only four times.”Lasater v. Guttmann, 5 A.3d 79, 90 (Md. App. 2010). “Assuch, ‘[t]he tort of intentional infliction of emotional distressis rarely viable, and is to be used sparingly and only foropprobrious behavior that includes truly outrageous conduct.’” Williams, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 399 (alteration in Williams)(citing Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297,319 (Md. App. 1995)).The County Officers argue that Plaintiff's allegations thatshe was assaulted, battered, and photographed before beinghandcuffed and brought to the ground, even if motivated byracial animus, fail to “meet the demanding” pleading standardfor intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF 25-1,at 6. Plaintiff counters that the outrageous conduct standardhas been met because “[p]hysical restraint combined withracial targeting elevates conduct beyond ordinary negligenceor even assault.” ECF 26-1, at 10. She also argues that“unauthorized photography during detentions” has beenrecognized as “invasive and humiliating” to meet the requisitestandard for an IIED claim. Id.“For the claim to survive, Defendants must have disregardedentirely [the plaintiff's] dignity as a human being.” Awahv. Mansfield Kaseman Health Clinic, Civ. No. PX-21-938,2021 WL 6197415, at *9 (D. Md. Dec. 30, 2021) (collectingcases). The wrongs Plaintiff alleges here, including “forc[ing]her to be photographed”; “placing her in handcuffs”;and “intentionally. pull[ing] her to the ground,” thoughundoubtably serious, do not rise to the level of extreme andoutrageous conduct necessary to sustain an IIED claim. ECF11, at 15–16 69. As noted by the County Officers, Plaintiff'sargument that racial animus elevates the County Officers’conduct to an extreme and outrageous level primarily relieson her assertion that the Maryland Supreme Court in Okwav. Harper found that “officers’ racial slurs and excessiveforce during [a] traffic stop supported [an] IIED claim.” ECF26-1, at 10 (citing Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 196–96(2000)). The Court observes that the Okwa opinion does notinvolve a traffic stop, nor does it analyze an IIED claimbecause the IIED claim was dismissed by the lower court andnot appealed. See Okwa, 360 Md. at 177 n.9. Moreover, the
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8language quoted by Plaintiff in support of her argument doesnot appear anywhere in the Okwa opinion.Plaintiff also relies on Haines v. Vogel in support ofher proposition that “unauthorized photography duringdetentions [has been considered] invasive and humiliating”because supposedly in Haines, “non-consensual sexualizedphotography during arrest [was] deemed outrageous.” ECF26-1, at 10 (citing Haines v. Vogel, 250 Md. App. 209, 233(2021)). However, Haines did not involve an arrest, but rathera dispute between “estranged former spouses,” where theplaintiff brought an IIED claim against his ex-spouse, allegingthat she interfered with his relationship with their child.Haines, 250 Md. App. at 231. There was no allegation ofsexualized photography, and the court in that case dismissedthe plaintiff's IIED claim with a reminder that “claims of IIEDare reserved for the most serious and emotionally devastatingacts.” Id. at 233. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to allegethat the County Officers’ actions rise to the extreme andoutrageous level required to pursue an IIED claim.*10 The harms alleged by Plaintiff also fail to meet thesevere emotional distress prong of an IIED claim. Plaintiffargues that her “mental health consequences ... demonstratesevere and enduring harm satisfying [Harris]’s high bar.”ECF 26-1, at 11. The County Officers counter that “Plaintiffhas failed to plead that she cannot function or carry onwith ‘necessary matters’ as required” to satisfy the severeemotional distress prong of an IIED claim. ECF 27, at 7(quoting Leese v. Balt. City, 64 Md. App. 442, 472 (1985)).“In the context of an IIED claim, ‘mere allegations ofemotional trauma or humiliation are insufficient.’ ” Doev. Anne Arundel Cnty., Civ. No. JRR-23-3451, 2025 WL675059, at *25 (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2025) (quoting Grant v. AtlasRest. Grp., LLC, Civ. No. GLR-20-2226, 2021 WL 2826771,at *5 (D. Md. July 7, 2021)). “To survive a motion to dismiss,the facts alleged must give rise to the inference that, becauseof the defendant's egregious conduct, the plaintiff experienced‘severely disabling emotional trauma,’ ..., i.e., that she wasrendered ‘unable to function’ or ‘unable to attend to necessarymatters.’ ” Id. (quoting Lewis-Davis v. Baltimore Cnty. Pub.Sch. Infants & Toddlers Program, Civ. No. ELH-20-0423,2021 WL 1720235, at *14 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2021)). “Plaintiffsmust therefore ‘plead specific facts regarding the nature,intensity, and duration of the alleged emotional trauma.’ ” Id.(quoting Lewis-Davis, 2021 WL 1720235, at *14).Plaintiff vaguely lists her emotional distress symptoms as“physical and/or non-physical injury” and “pain, suffering,fear, fright, humiliation, inconvenience, embarrassment, andsevere emotional distress.” ECF 11, at 16 72. Plaintiff alsodescribes one instance where “the presence of Skinner caused[Plaintiff] to shake with fear and [be]come overwhelmed withanxiety,” and that she has been “forced to seek mental healthassistance.” Id. at 8 ¶¶ 26, 28, 31. And although Plaintiffargues that her “mental health consequences ... demonstratesevere and enduring harm,” ECF 26-1, at 11, Plaintiff failsto provide sufficient facts regarding the “nature, intensity,and’ duration” of her allegedly severe and enduring mentalhealth consequences. See Anne Arundel Cnty., 2025 WL675059, at *25. These allegations do not indicate that Plaintiffexperienced “severely disabling emotional trauma,” such thatshe was rendered “unable to function” or “attend to necessarymatters.” Id. For these reasons, Plaintiff's IIED claim isdismissed as to all four County Officers.D. Count IX: Racial Discrimination Against Mackert,Broznowicz, and SkinnerPlaintiff brings a racial discrimination claim against Mackert,Broznowicz, and Skinner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and“Maryland State Law.” ECF 11, at 19–21. 42 U.S.C. § 1981bans “all racial discrimination in the making of public andprivate contracts.” Nnadozie v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.,730 F. App'x 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Saint FrancisColl. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987)). Section 1981provides “[a]ll persons ... shall have the same right ... to makeand enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, andto the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings forthe security of persons and property as is enjoyed by whitecitizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).Mackert, Broznowicz, and Skinner argue that “when suit isbrought under § 1981 against a state actor, 42 U.S.C § 1983constitutes ‘the exclusive federal remedy for violation of therights guaranteed in § 1981.’ ” ECF 25-1, at 7 (citing Jett v.Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989)) (emphasisin ECF 25-1). Regardless of the accuracy of this statement,Plaintiff does not contest it and instead contends that shehas “sufficiently pled a standalone racial discrimination claimunder Maryland law,” specifically identifying Md. CodeAnn., State Gov't § 20-606. ECF 26-1, at 12.5 Thus, Plaintiff'sresponse reflects that she abandons her 42 U.S.C. § 1981claim and instead seeks to pursue Count IX as “a standaloneracial discrimination claim under Maryland law.” ECF 26-1,at 12.
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9*11 Plaintiff, however, has failed to properly plead astandalone discrimination claim under Maryland law. Thoughthe amended complaint vaguely references “Maryland StateLaw,” ECF 11, at 19, and “Maryland state law prohibitingracial discrimination,” id. at 21 95, Plaintiff only specifiesthe state statute under which she purportedly brings her racialdiscrimination claim in responding to the motion to dismiss.ECF 26-1, at 12 (stating that Plaintiff's claim of discriminationarises under Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 20-606). “Itis well settled that a plaintiff may not cure a defect in acomplaint or otherwise amend a complaint by way of heropposition briefing.” Allgaier v. Microbiologics, Inc., Civ.No. ELH-22-01900, 2023 WL 2837336, at *4 (D. Md. Apr.7, 2023), (collecting cases). Thus, Plaintiff cannot amend herpleading by filing a responsive brief that belatedly identifiesthe state law grounds for her discrimination claim.Even if the Court were to permit Plaintiff to proceedwith an allegation of a violation of § 20-606, theclaim would still fail. State Government Article § 20-606encompasses the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act,and applies to discrimination in employment relationships,not “discrimination in public accommodations, including lawenforcement actions, based on race,” as Plaintiff claims. ECF26-1, at 12; see, e.g., Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 20-606(a)(describing “[u]nlawful employment practices” including that“an employer may not ... fail to hire, discharge, or otherwisediscriminate against any individual ... because of ... theindividual's race” and other protected factors). Accordingly,Count IX must be dismissed.6E. Count VIII: § 1983 Claim Against BroznowiczPlaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allegingviolations of the Fourth Amendment, specifically forunlawful seizure, excessive force, and false arrest, againstMackert, Skinner, Broznowicz, and Baltimore County. ECF11, at 17. The County Officers seek to dismiss the claimagainst Broznowicz only. ECF 25-1, at 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 isnot itself a source of substantive rights but provides “a methodfor vindicating federal rights.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.266, 271 (1994) (quotation omitted). It allows suits againstany “person” acting under color of state law who subjectsthe claimant to “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, orimmunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to besecure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches andseizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV.*12 With respect to Broznowicz, Plaintiff does not appearto allege that he is responsible for the unlawful seizure,excessive force, or false arrest, but instead claims that he,along with “all named defendant officers spoke about Skinnerand Mackert's actions in assaulting and arresting [Plaintiff]then coordinated their statements and actions with the goalof deterring and discouraging [Plaintiff] from filing a formalcomplaint.” ECF 11, at 6 20. Specifically, she claimsthat Mackert and Skinner “coordinat[ed] with Broznowiczand Lehnert to discourage [Plaintiff] from filing a formalcomplaint in lying to her and leading her to believe she causedthe suffering and injury she endured” during the incident. Id.at 16 71.The County Officers move to dismiss the § 1983 claim againstBroznowicz on the ground that Plaintiff “does not specify orparse any conduct ... by Defendant Broznowicz that wouldimplicate § 1983 or the Fourth Amendment whatsoever”except to “mention that Ofc. Broznowicz ... allegedly ‘actedunder color of law.’ ” ECF 25-1, at 10 (quoting ECF 11,at 17 75). Plaintiff counters that “[s]upervisors may beliable for ‘integral participation’ in constitutional violations,including post-hoc conspiracies to conceal misconduct.” ECF26-1, at 14 (purportedly quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d1202, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2011)). She contends that she “hasplausibly alleged claims against Officers Broznowicz andLehnert by demonstrating their ‘integral participation’ ina coordinated cover-up scheme” based on her allegationthat “all officers ‘coordinated [...] to deter and discourage[Plaintiff] from filing a formal complaint.’ ” Id. at 13–14(quoting ECF 11, at 6 20). In reply, the County Officersfirst point out that “Plaintiff did not bring a § 1983 claimagainst Defendant Lehnert,” and then assert that by nowattempting to argue “supervisory liability” Plaintiff attemptsto impermissibly “bring a new theory of liability withoutamending her complaint. ECF 27, at 9–10. The CountyOfficers argue, in the alternative, that even if Plaintiff allegedsupervisory liability, she still fails to plausibly allege such aclaim. Id. at 10.Plaintiff's allegations relating to Broznowicz sound inconspiracy. See ECF 26-1, at 14 (claiming that Bronowicz wasinvolved in a “post-hoc conspirac[y] to conceal misconduct”).To establish a civil conspiracy under §, 1983, a plaintiff mustpresent evidence that defendants acted jointly in concert andthat some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy,which resulted in deprivation of a constitutional right. SeeHinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir.
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.101996). An essential element for a claim of conspiracy todeprive plaintiff of a constitutional right is an agreement todo so among the alleged co-conspirators. See Ballinger v.N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1006–07 (4thCir. 1987). Without an agreement, the independent acts oftwo or more wrongdoers do not amount to a conspiracy.See Murdaugh Volkswagen v. First Nat'l Bank, 639 F.2d1073, 1075–76 (4th Cir. 1981). “A conspiracy may ... ‘beinferred from the things actually done.’ ” Id. at 1075 (quotingOverseas Motors, Inc. v. Imported Motors Ltd., Inc., 375 F.Supp 499, 532 (E.D. Mich. 1974)). However, circumstantialevidence consisting of “coincidence piled on coincidence”is insufficient where the “proof of collusion is simply tooattenuated” to conclude there was a conspiracy to violate thelaw. Murdaugh, 639 F.2d at 1075.To the extent Plaintiff alleges that a conspiracy under 42U.S.C. § 1983 existed and involved Broznowicz, that claimfails. “To show joint, concerted action, plaintiffs must, atminimum, provide ‘specific circumstantial evidence thateach member of the alleged conspiracy shared the sameconspiratorial objective.’ ” Johnson v. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d550, 561 n.5 (E.D.N.C. 2018) (quoting Hinkle, 81 F.3d at421). “Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy do not satisfythis ‘meeting of the minds’ element and therefore fail to statea claim.” Id. (citing Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376–77 (4th Cir. 1995); and then citing Gooden v. Howard Cty.,954 F.2d 960, 970 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). Plaintiff baldlyasserts that Broznowicz, along with the other County Officers,coordinated their statements. ECF 11, at 6 20. The onlyfactual allegation she advances in support of this allegedcoordination is that “Sergeant German,” not a party to thisaction, “dismissed her complaints” and “advis[ed] her thatthe incident was her own fault[.]” Id. 19. Plaintiff fails toallege how Sergeant German's statements somehow indicatethat Broznowicz and the other County Officers joined in aconspiracy. In fact, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts relatedto Broznowicz at all, except that Mackert was assisting himwith a “missing person investigation.” Id. at 4 8. Thesesparse factual allegations combined with merely conclusorystatements do not give rise to a plausible § 1983 conspiracyclaim against Broznowicz.*13 The Court also agrees with the County Officers thatPlaintiff does not allege a supervisory liability claim under§ 1983 against Broznowicz, and even if she did, that claimwould fail. To plead supervisory liability in a § 1983 action,a plaintiff must allege:(1) That the supervisor had actual or constructiveknowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conductthat posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk ofconstitutional injury to ... the plaintiff; (2) that thesupervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequateas to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorizationof the alleged offensive practices; and (3) that there wasan affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inactionand the particular constitutional injury suffered by theplaintiff.Middleton v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, Civ. No.ELH-20-3536, 2022 WL 268765, at *11–12 (D. Md. Jan. 28,2022) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir.1994)).Plaintiff's complaint only references supervision with respectto her allegations against’ Baltimore County in general,not Broznowicz. See, e.g., ECF 11, at 21 96 (allegingthat “Baltimore County has failed to properly train andsupervise its officers”). Further, Plaintiff does not allegethat Broznowicz supervised Mackert or Skinner and insteadclaims that Mackert “was assisting [ ] Broznowicz[ ] with amissing person investigation.” Id. at 4 8. Plaintiff also doesnot allege that Broznowicz had any actual or constructiveknowledge of Mackert and Skinner's actions and does notplead any facts related to Broznowicz's response to theseactions.Additionally, Plaintiff cites Starr v. Baca in support of herargument that “[s]upervisors may be liable for ‘integralparticipation’ in constitutional violations, including post-hoc conspiracies to conceal misconduct.” ECF 26-1, at 13(quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)).While Starr does address the concept of supervisory liability,it does not stand for the broad proposition Plaintiff contendsit does and does little more than generally reaffirm existingjurisprudence addressing supervisory liability. See Starr, 652F.3d at 1207 (“Thus, when a supervisor is found liablebased on deliberate indifference, the supervisor is being heldliable for his or her own culpable action or inaction, notheld vicariously liable for the culpable action or inaction ofhis or her subordinates.”); id. at 1208 (“Starr alleges thatSheriff Baca's knowledge of the unconstitutional conditionsin the jail, including his knowledge of the culpable actionsof his subordinates, coupled with his inaction, amountedto acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct of hissubordinates.”).. Indeed, the alleged reference to supervisoryliability for “integral participation” does not appear on thepage cited by Plaintiff, or anywhere in the Starr opinion.
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11Regardless, the general principles of supervisory liabilityremain undisturbed by Starr, and liability cannot lie sincePlaintiff has failed to allege that Broznowicz was a supervisoror had knowledge of Mackert and Skinner's alleged unlawfulactions.Finally, the Court confirms that Plaintiff did not assert a §1983 claim against Lehnert, see ECF 11, at 17 (bringingher § 1983 claim specifically against defendants Mackert,Broznowicz, Skinner, and Baltimore County). Even if shehad, the alleged involvement of Lehnert mirrors that ofBroznowicz, see ECF 11, at 16 71 (alleging that Mackertand Skinner “coordinat[ed] with Broznowicz and Lehnertto discourage [Plaintiff] from filing a formal complaint”),therefore any alleged conspiracy against Lehnert fails for thesame reasons as the claim against Broznowicz. Plaintiff's §1983 claims asserted against Broznowicz (and any againstLehnert) must be dismissed.IV. CASE CITATION ISSUES*14 The Court observes that many of the case citationscontained in Plaintiff's filings—perhaps as many as half—appear to be inaccurate or non-existent. For example,Plaintiff's response to the motion to vacate misquotes caselaw. See, e.g., ECF 24, at 4 (misquoting Colleton PreparatoryAcad., Inc v. Hoover Universal Inc., 616 F.3d 413 (4thCir. 2010)), at 4–5 (incorrectly summarizing the facts ofPayton v. Guallart, No. 3:22-cv-00042 (W.D. Va. 2022),7 at5 (misquoting Consolidated Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v.Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d at 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1967), at6 (misquoting United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4thCir. 1982)). Baltimore County alleges that Plaintiff makeseven more significant errors in her response to the motionto dismiss, including citing to cases that do not appear toexist. See ECF 27, at 11 n.8. For example, Plaintiff cites to“Bush v. Lucas, 598 F. Supp. 3d 303, 316 (D. Md. 2022)” forthe proposition that “[s]tate law racial discrimination claimssurvive independently when pled with specific factual basis.”ECF 26-1, at 12 (italicization added). However, the Courthas not found a case by this name at the citation provided.The closest match appears to be Bush v. Lucas, 598 F.2d 958(5th Cir. 1979),8 which does not stand for the proposition thatPlaintiff proposes but instead addresses a claim of retaliatorydemotion. See Bush, 598 F.2d at 959.Plaintiff also quotes “Md. Comm'n on Hum. Rels. v. Balt. Cty.,439 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Md. 1982)” for the proposition that“[d]ismissal would contravene Maryland's ‘long-standingcommitment to eradicate discrimination’ ”). ECF 26-1, at13. However, the correct case name that corresponds withthis reporter information is Fields v. State, 439 A.2d 1121(1982). Plaintiff also’ directly quotes from “Eichholz v. Camp,36 F.4th 908, 917 (4th Cir. 2022),” see ECF 26-1, at 14(italicization added), but the closest case corresponding tothat reporter information is Inter-Coop. Exch. v. UnitedStates Dep't of Com., 36 F.4th 905 (9th Cir. 2022). Further,Plaintiff cites to a non-existent page of “Holloway v. State,232 Md. App 272, 290 (2017).” ECF 26-1, at 13. Thatopinion ends at page 285. See Holloway, 232 Md. App. at285. More significantly, Holloway does not stand for theproposition that Plaintiff suggests. Compare ECF 26-1, at13 (citing Holloway for the proposition that “harm directlylinked to discriminatory intent” is required to plead racialdiscrimination in Maryland), with Holloway, 232 Md. App.at 275 (involving appeal of petitioner's writ of coram nobisinvolving drug convictions, and not racial discrimination).Finally, as noted supra, Plaintiff quotes from Okwa v. Harper,360 Md. 161, 196–97 (2000), and Haines v. Vogel, 250 Md.App. 209, 233 (2021), but neither case contains the languageshe provides.Given the volume and significance of the errors noted above,Plaintiff must explain them. Courts within the Fourth Circuithave issued sua sponte show cause orders where a partyappears to have “cited to fictitious cases and misrepresentedthe holding of various cases” in a filing. See, e.g., Lafferty v.Theiss et al., Civ. No. SAG-24-2642 (May 12, 2025) (orderingcounsel to respond to “assertions regarding misrepresentationof citations and case content”); Neal v. Frayer, Civ. No.BAH-24-0778, 2025 WL 3204710, at *15 (D. Md. Nov. 17,2025) (accepting counsel's explanation for erroneous casecitations and not imposing sanctions); In re Richburg, 671B.R. 918, 921 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2025) (issuing a sua sponteshow cause order to address whether sanctions should beimposed for citation to fake cases); Benjamin v. CostcoWholesale Corp., 779 F. Supp. 3d 341, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2025)(collecting cases and noting that “[a]cross the country, courtshave issued a panoply of sanctions against attorneys whosubmitted fake cases”); Kruglyak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,774 F. Supp. 3d 767, 770 (W.D. Va. 2025). Accordingly, basedon the accusation that Plaintiff has included incorrect citationsand inaccurate descriptions of case content in her filings, theCourt orders Plaintiff's counsel to respond within twenty-one(21) days to the allegation of error noted by Baltimore Countyat ECF 27, at 11–12 n.8, and those chronicled by the Courtin this opinion.
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12V. CONCLUSION*15 For the foregoing reasons, Baltimore County's motionto vacate the entry of default is GRANTED, and BaltimoreCounty is to respond to the amended complaint withinfourteen (14) days. The County Officers’ motion to dismiss isGRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is deniedas to Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim but granted as tothe abuse of process claim, IIED claim, racial discriminationclaim, and the § 1983 claim against Broznowicz. All claimsagainst Lehnert and Broznowicz shall be DISMISSED.Further, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff's counsel to respondto the allegation that she included fake or inaccurate casecitations in her filings within twenty-one (21) days.A separate implementing order will issue.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 221711Footnotes1The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-generated page numbersat the top of the page.2Plaintiff's argument that Baltimore County's proposed defenses are too vague appears to rest primarily on the assertionthat the Fourth Circuit in Fidrych v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2020), determined that the party seeking tovacate default in that case presented a “jurisdictional defense [that] was ‘factually detailed and legally substantiated.’ ”ECF 24, at 3. To the extent the quotation used by Plaintiff implies that this language was lifted directly from the’ Fidrychopinion, the Court notes that the language does not appear anywhere in Fidrych. Moreover, the bulk of the discussion inFidrych addresses whether default judgment was entered, thus requiring excusable neglect to be set aside pursuant toFed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), or whether the lower court merely entered default, which requires mere “good cause” pursuant toFed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) to be set aside. Fidrych, 952 F.3d at 130. The details of the proof offered by Marriott, the defendantin that case, to overcome the entry of default went undiscussed and, whatever that proof was, it was not endorsed bythe appellate court as resoundingly as Plaintiff claims here. In fact, it remains unclear what proof was offered by Marriottsince the lower court opinion applying the Payne factors observed without additional detail that “Marriott has offeredsufficient proof of a meritorious defense to permit a finding in its favor on this factor.” Fidrych v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., No.2:17-CV-2195-PMD, 2017 WL 5889204, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 29, 2017), aff'd, 952 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2020).3In fact, it appears that counsel for Baltimore County promptly informed Plaintiff's counsel that the original complaintincluded allegations against individuals who did not work for Baltimore County, ECF 22-1, at 2. This email resulted inthe filing of the amended complaint which correctly named the officers allegedly involved in the incident. Compare ECF1, at 1, with ECF 11, at 1.4The claims against Broznowicz include IIED (Count VII), racial discrimination (Count IX), and a § 1983 claim (Count VIII).The sole claim brought against Lehnert is IIED (Count VII).5Though it need not reach the issue given Plaintiff's abandonment of her § 1981 claim, the Court notes that despite theCounty Officers’ argument to the contrary, “§ 1981 claims have proceeded against individual government officials.” Stoutv. Reuschling, Civ. No. TDC-14-1555, 2015 WL 1461366, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2015) (citing Alexis v. McDonald'sRestaurants of Massachusetts, Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 348 (1st Cir. 1995); then citing Morrow v. Farrell, 187 F. Supp. 2d 548,553 (D. Md. 2002); and then citing Gray v. Maryland, 228 F. Supp. 2d 628, 639 (D. Md. 2002)). “While § 1981 often isused to assert employment discrimination claims against private actors, it also protects against the ‘racially motivatedmisuse of government power’ by police officers.” Anderson v. Seat Pleasant Police Dep't, Civ. No. DLB-22-1542, 2023WL 5509167, at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-1981, 2024 WL 863658 (4th Cir. Feb. 29, 2024) (quoting Stout,2015 WL 1461366, at *5). As Judge Chuang noted, “[c]loser examination of Jett[, 491 U.S. at 701, Dennis v. Countyof Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1989), and a 1991 Amendment to § 1981] make clear that the rule articulated in thosecases applies only to lawsuits against state or municipal entities, not an action brought against a law enforcement officerin his individual capacity.” Stout, 2015 WL 1461366, at *6 (alteration added).6Moreover, Plaintiff also fails to provide factual support for her claims alleging racial discrimination. She alleges thatMackert and Skinner “acted with racial animus, singling Plaintiff out for harsher treatment based on her race.” ECF 11, at
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1312 95. However, Plaintiff's contention of racial animus is solely based on her allegation that she was stopped becauseshe met the description of the missing person that the County Officers were looking for. Id. at 5 ¶¶ 9–10. No other facts,as pled, point to racial animus or discrimination. Cf. Carey v. Baltimore Cnty., MD, Civ. No. RDB-22-0782, 2022 WL16951246, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 15, 2022) (plaintiff failed to provide factual support beyond his own speculation that a trafficstop and subsequent narcotics search were racially motivated); Stout, 2015 WL 1461366, at *2 (denying defendants’motion to dismiss a § 1981 racial discrimination claim where defendants called the plaintiff racial epithets while brutallyassaulting him); Artiga Carrero v. Farrelly, 270 F. Supp. 3d 851, 869 (D. Md. 2017) (plaintiff sufficiently alleged a raciallymotivated stop where the officer said he stopped her for a lack of insurance, but then questioned her on her immigrationstatus and family heritage and not her insurance).7Plaintiff does not provide the entire citation, but it appears she meant to cite Payton v. Guallart, No. 3:22-CV-00042, 2022WL 16636937 (W.D. Va. Nov. 2, 2022).8The Court also notes that reporter information similar to the case Plaintiff cites is found at Est. of Alvarez v. Johns HopkinsUniv., 598 F. Supp. 3d 301 (D. Md. 2022), which also does not pertain to racial discrimination but instead addressesclaims arising under the Alien Tort Statute.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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