Mbow v. Officer Michael Mackert et al. (2) (July 17, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Abybatou Mbow v. Officer Michael Mackert et al. (2)
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Maryland (MD)
Court
Supreme Court of Maryland
Decided
July 17, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
Brendan A. Hurson (J.) (unanimous Court)
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 2070013Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Maryland.ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff,v.OFFICER MICHAELMACKERT ET AL., Defendants.Civil No. 24-3674-BAH|Filed 07/17/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsLatoya Andrea Francis-Williams, Law Office of Latoya A.Francis-Williams LLC, Randallstown, MD, Sheridan ToddYeary, The Yeary Firm, LLC, Columbia, MD, for Plaintiff.Walter Timothy Sutton, Aleksander James Stathakis,Baltimore County Office of Law, Towson, MD, forDefendants.MEMORANDUM OPINIONBrendan A. Hurson United States District Judge*1 Plaintiff Abybatou Mbow (“Plaintiff”) brought suitagainst multiple individual police officers1 (the “CountyOfficers”) and Baltimore County, Maryland (“BaltimoreCounty”), alleging numerous claims in connection with analleged stop and detention of Plaintiff in May of 2024. SeeECF 11 (amended complaint).2 Pending before the Court isBaltimore County's motion to dismiss (the “Motion”). ECF32. Plaintiff filed a response, ECF 34, and Baltimore Countyfiled a reply, ECF 38. All filings include memoranda oflaw.3 Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds thatno hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025).Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the Motion isGRANTED in part and DENIED in part.I. BACKGROUNDThe Court summarized the relevant facts in its previousmemorandum opinion, see ECF 28, at 2–5, and recountsthem here for convenience. Plaintiff alleges in her amendedcomplaint that on May 6, 2024, she was unlawfully stoppedby Skinner and Mackert, ECF 11, at 5 11, while the twoofficers were assisting Broznowicz “with a missing personinvestigation” regarding a missing juvenile, id. at 4 8. The“only descript[ion]” Skinner and Mackert had of the missingjuvenile was that she was “Black,” “female,” and wearing a“black top.” Id. at 5 10. Following up on a tip, Mackert“responded to 7604 Old Harford Rd” to investigate a juvenilewho “was possibly walking on Hillcrest Avenue.” Id. 9.Skinner then “advised he had located a person matchingthe general description of the missing juvenile” and stoppedPlaintiff. Id. 10. Plaintiff alleges the stop occurred “solelybecause she is a black woman.” Id. 11. Plaintiff “repeatedlyinformed” Skinner and Mackert “that she was not the missingjuvenile and confirmed the name they were looking for wasnot her name.” Id. 12. Plaintiff “further explained that shedid not have identification with her” because “she had juststepped out to go to the store.” Id. She also alleges that she“complained” to the officers that their “actions were racist.”Id.Despite Plaintiff's “clear explanation and lack of anysuspicious behavior,” she alleges that Mackert and Skinner“continued to follow and harass her[,] frightening [her] andmaking her fear for her safety.” Id. 13. For example,when Plaintiff “tried to leave the officers’ presence,” Mackertand Skinner “jumped into their respective police vehiclesand cornered [Plaintiff] in an alley,” and “then used forceto physically restrain her” and “tak[e] photographs of herwithout her consent.” Id. 14. She alleges that she wasthen “forced to the ground as she cried out for help”and “handcuffed by both Skinner and Mackert, despite herprotests.” Id. 15. Mackert “berated Plaintiff, telling herthat the situation was her own fault,” allegedly stating, “youdid this to yourself.” Id. at 6 17. Plaintiff alleges that theepisode caused her to “sustain[ ] physical injuries, includingto her knees, from being forced to the ground” and allegesthat she also suffered “severe emotional trauma[.]” Id. 18.Mackert and Skinner “ultimately confirmed [Plaintiff] wasnot the missing person and released her from custody aftersome time.” Id. 16.*2 Later that same day, Plaintiff “went to the Parkville policeprecinct and reported the incident.” Id. 19. She claims that“Sergeant German ... dismissed her complaints, advising herthat the incident was her own fault for failing to provideidentification[.]” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the CountyOfficers “coordinated their statements” about the stop, “withthe goal of deterring and discouraging [Plaintiff] from filinga formal complaint.” Id. 20. Also, Plaintiff alleges that
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2“as retaliation for [Plaintiff] reporting this incident and infurtherance of their cover up,” “Mackert swore out criminalcharges against [Plaintiff] for two counts of assault ... andobstructing and hindering at common law.” Id. at 7 24.On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff appeared for a jury trial onher state criminal charges. Id. at 8 28. She alleges thatafter “Skinner entered the courtroom and sat immediately infront of [Plaintiff],” Plaintiff began to “shake with fear and[be]come overwhelmed with anxiety.” Id. ¶¶ 28–29. Plaintiff'scriminal charges were ultimately dismissed. Id. 30.Plaintiff alleges she has suffered “physical injury,humiliation, damage to her reputation[,] inconvenience,anxiety and severe emotional distress” and has been “forcedto seek medical and mental health attention as a result of thisincident, incurring substantial medical expenses and time lostfrom work, resulting in lost wages.” Id. at 7–8, ¶¶ 25–26. Shealso alleges, she has been harmed “reputation wise.” Id. at 8 31. Further, Plaintiff claims she Was “forced to retain counseland prepare for a criminal trial, which caused substantialfinancial hardship,” id. 27, including “attorneys’ fees andrelated expert fees,” id. 32. Plaintiff brought thirteen claimsrelated to this incident.In March of 2025, default was entered against BaltimoreCounty. ECF 15. Baltimore County filed a motion to vacatethe entry of default, ECF 22, which was granted, ECF 28; ECF29. The County Officers then filed a motion to dismiss. ECF25. The Court dismissed all claims against Broznowicz andLehnert and several claims against Skinner and Mackert. SeeECF 28; ECF 29. Baltimore County has now filed a motionto dismiss. ECF 32. That Motion is now ripe for resolution.II. LEGAL STANDARDFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissalsfor failure to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”In considering a motion under this rule, courts discount legalconclusions stated in the complaint and “accept as true all ofthe factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Ericksonv. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court then draws all reasonableinferences in favor of the plaintiff and considers whether thecomplaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. NemetChevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,253 (4th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when theplaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to drawthe reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.“The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions’or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause ofaction[.]’ ” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App'x745, 747 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the same time, a “complaintwill not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detailabout [the plaintiff's] claim to show that [the plaintiff] hasa more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.”Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4thCir. 2014).III. ANALYSIS4*3 Baltimore County moves to dismiss the following claimsagainst it: Count VIII (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violationof the Fourth Amendment); Count IX (racial discrimination);Count X (Monell claim for failure to train, superviseand discipline); Count XI (negligent hiring, retention, andsupervision under Maryland law); Count XII (42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for failure to investigate police misconduct); andCount XIII (negligent failure to investigate police misconductunder Maryland law).5 ECF 31-1, at 1.A. Municipal Liability ClaimsPlaintiff seeks to hold Baltimore County liable under a theoryof municipal liability for several claims, including violationof the Fourth Amendment (Count VIII), race discriminationin violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Maryland law (CountIX), failure to train, supervise, and discipline (Count X), andfailure to investigate police misconduct (Count XII). ECF 11,at 17–26.1. Duplicative ClaimsCount VIII is pled against the County Officers and BaltimoreCounty, while Count X is brought against Baltimore Countyonly. ECF 11, at 17, 22. As to Baltimore County, these claimsare duplicative. Claims are duplicative where they “stem fromidentical allegations, that are decided under identical legalstandards, and for which identical relief is available.” Doe v.Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore Cnty., 595 F. Supp. 3d 392, 417 (D.Md. 2022) (quoting Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010)). “As a matter of judicialeconomy, courts should dismiss a claim if it is duplicativeof another claim in the same suit.” Id. (quoting the same).Here, both claims allege a theory of municipal liability based
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3on Baltimore County Police Department's pattern or practiceof excessive force and unlawful detention and BaltimoreCounty's failure to “adequately train, supervise, or disciplineits police officers.” ECF 11, at 18, 22–23. The only apparentdifference between these claims is that under Count X,Plaintiff alleges Baltimore County violated not only theFourth Amendment but also the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.at 24. As such, Count VIII as brought against BaltimoreCounty does not appear to present any legal or factual theoriesthat are not already incorporated under Count X. Id. at18. Because these claims are duplicative, Count VIII willmove forward against Mackert and Skinner only as a FourthAmendment claim, and the Court will construe Count X as theonly Monell claim for excessive force and unlawful seizurebrought against Baltimore County. Id. at 22.2. Remaining Monell Claims*4 Under Monell, “a municipality is liable under § 1983 if itfollows a custom, policy, or practice by which local officialsviolate a plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Owens, 767 F.3dat 402 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of NewYork, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “There are three necessaryelements for Monell liability.” Lilly v. Balt. City Police Dep't,Civ. No. BAH-22-2752, 2025 WL 1709856, at *19 (D. Md.June 17, 2025). “First, the plaintiff must show a constitutionalharm that stems from the acts of a municipal employee takenin furtherance of some municipal policy or custom.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Milligan v. Cityof Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984)); seealso Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1389 (4th Cir. 1987).“As interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, a ‘policy or custom’can exist in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such asa written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisionsof a person with final policymaking authority; (3) throughan omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that‘manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens’;or (4) through a practice that is so ‘persistent and widespread’as to constitute a ‘custom or usage with the force of law.’” Lilly, 2025 WL 1709856, at *19 (quoting Lytle v. Doyle,326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003)). “Further, the plaintiffmust put forth facts showing that the policy's creation is fairlyattributable to the municipality.” Id. (quoting Spell, 824 F.2dat 1389). “Finally, the plaintiff must show an affirmativecausal link between the ‘policy or custom,’ and the particularinjury suffered by the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting the same). “[A]single act by a municipality may give rise to civil liability if itis shown that the officials of the municipality responsible forestablishing the challenged policy made a calculated choiceto follow the course of action deemed unconstitutional.” Id.(quoting Pachaly v. City of Lynchburg, 897 F.2d 723, 726 (4thCir. 1990)). “To avoid imposing respondeat superior liabilityon municipalities, a plaintiff must do more than identifysomething that the municipality ‘could have done’ to preventthe alleged injury.” Id. (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989)). Here, Plaintiff's Monell claimsare generally grounded on theories of “[d]eficient training asculpable municipal ‘policy’ ” and “[u]nconstitutional policepractices as municipal ‘custom, or usage’ by condonation.”Spell, 824 F.2d at 1389–90; see also e.g., ECF 11, at 22–23.Where a deficient training policy causes “specificconstitutional violations by deficiently trained police officers,the municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Spell,824 F.2d at 1389. “Training policy deficiencies can include(1) ‘express authorizations of unconstitutional conduct,’ (2)‘tacit authorizations’ of such unconstitutional conduct, and(3) failures to adequately ‘prohibit or discourage readilyforeseeable conduct in light of known exigencies of policeduty.’ ” Cottman et al. v. Balt. Police Dep't et al., Civ.No. SAG-21-00837, 2022 WL 137735, at *8 (D. Md.Jan. 13, 2022) (quoting Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390). “[T]heplaintiff must point out ‘a specific deficiency’ in training,‘rather than general laxness or ineffectiveness in training.’” Id. (quoting the same). “Second, a plaintiff must establishthat the municipality's failure to train showed a ‘deliberateindifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrainedemployees] come into contact.’ ” Id. (quoting Connick v.Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)) (alteration in original).“Finally, the plaintiff must show that ‘the officer's conductresulted from said training,’ or lack thereof.” Id. (quotingMcDowell v. Grimes, Civ. No. GLR-17-3200, 2018 WL3756727, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2018)). “It is, however,important to note that oftentimes ‘a plaintiff lacks specificdetails regarding the municipal actor's internal polices andtraining procedures before discovery. Although boilerplateallegations will not suffice, at the motion to dismiss stage,courts should not expect the plaintiff to possess a rich setof facts concerning the allegedly unconstitutional policy andthe responsible policymakers.’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson v.Baltimore Police Dep't, Civ. No. ELH-19-00698, 2020 WL1169739, at *34 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2020)).Where unconstitutional practices by police officers become“sufficiently widespread, ... they may assume the quality of‘custom or usage’ which, per § 1983, has the force of state‘law’ for purposes of invoking the remedies provided by §
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.41983.” Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390. “Under the condonation theoryof liability, a city violates § 1983 if municipal policymakersfail to put a stop to or correct a widespread patternof unconstitutional conduct.” Est. of Bryant v. BaltimorePolice Dep't, Civ. No. ELH-19-384, 2020 WL 673571,at *39 (D. Md. Feb. 10, 2020) (internal quotation marksomitted) (quoting Owens, 767 F.3d at 402). “A condonationclaim must make plausible that municipal officials engagedin ‘a persistent and widespread practice’, the ‘durationand frequency of which indicate ... actual or constructiveknowledge of the conduct[,]’ and that their failure to correctthe misconduct was ‘due to their deliberate indifference.’ ”Palma v. Montgomery Cnty., 598 F. Supp. 3d 288, 299 (D.Md. 2022) (quoting Est. of Bryant, 2020 WL 673571, at *39)(alteration in original); see also Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390.*5 Under Count X; Plaintiff alleges that Baltimore Countyis liable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendmentsbased on Baltimore County Police Department's “widespreadpattern and practice of condoning and permitting the use ofexcessive force, unlawful detention, racial profiling, and theharassment of Black individuals.” ECF 11, at 22. Plaintiffalso alleges that Baltimore County “has failed to adequatelytrain, supervise, or discipline its police officers in the properhandling of field interviews, interactions with victims andwitnesses, and the use of force, particularly when dealing withBlack individuals.” Id. at 22–23. These training deficiencies,Plaintiff alleges, have caused a policy or practice of “useof excessive force against Black individuals who do notpresent a threat to officer safety,” wrongful detention, andunlawful arrests. Id. at 23. Baltimore County concedes thatPlaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible Monellclaim based on excessive force. ECF 32-1, at 8 (stating that“Plaintiff fails to adequately plead a Monell claim that isnot based on excessive force”). Accordingly, Count X willproceed on that theory. Baltimore County argues, however,that Plaintiff has not supported a Monell claim based on anyother constitutional violations. Id.At this stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff has also sufficientlyalleged a Monell claim for unlawful seizure by “pair[ing]general averments of a policy or custom with particularexamples.” Ulloa v. Prince George's Cnty., Maryland, Civ.No. DKC 15-0257, 2015 WL 7878956, at *6 (D. Md. Dec.4, 2015). The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of thepeople to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonablesearches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A seizureis unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is notbased on probable cause.” Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 318(4th Cir. 2019) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,213 (1979)). “[T]he Fourth Circuit has explained that § 1983incorporates common law torts, such as false arrest and falseimprisonment, so as to create a ‘special species of tort liability,founded on rights originating in the Constitution.’ ” Osbornev. Giordades, Civ. No. RDB-14-182, 2015 WL 251956, at*5 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir.2000)). Thus, “false arrest and false imprisonment claims ...are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person inviolation of the Fourth Amendment[.]” Rogers v. Pendleton,249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001).As to condonation, Plaintiff alleges a pattern or practiceof “harass[ing], detain[ing], and us[ing] excessive forceagainst individuals, particularly people of color, without legaljustification.” ECF 11, at 18–19 (emphasis added). In supportof her failure to train theory, Plaintiff points to specificdeficiencies in training including “interview techniques,de-escalation strategies, and constitutional parameters,”including under “Baltimore County's Field Manual.” Id. at19. Plaintiff also points to, and provides factual details of,several cases (including her own) that allegedly involvedboth excessive force and unlawful seizure. ECF 11, at 6–7 23 (alleging that Alonzo Cox was “charged with resistingarrest,” that Howard Lewis was wrongfully arrested, andElijah Lockley was unlawfully arrested). Baltimore Countyfails to explain why these cases would support a Monell claimbased on the theory of excessive force, but not unlawfulseizure. See ECF 32-1, at 4–5 (citing ECF 11, at 14 65);cf. Ulloa, 2015 WL 7878956, at *4 (noting that a plaintiff's“string citation to ten lawsuits ... without further explanation”or factual allegations failed to support a Monell claim). Seeingno reason for any distinction, the Court concludes at thisearly stage of litigation that these allegations are sufficientto. support a plausible inference of municipal liability forboth theories of violation of the Fourth Amendment Plaintiffpursues—specifically, excessive force and unlawful seizure.Cf. Owens, 767 F.3d at 403 (finding a Monell claim plausiblyalleged where the plaintiff noted “the existence of ‘reportedand unreported cases’ and numerous ‘successful motions’—which, if true, would buttress his legal conclusion”). WhetherPlaintiff can ultimately prevail on a Monell claim under thesetheories remains to be seen, See id. (“Although prevailing onthe merits of a Monell claim is difficult, simply alleging sucha claim is, by definition, easier.... The recitation of facts neednot be particularly detailed, and the chance of success neednot be particularly high.”). However, at this stage, Plaintiffadequately pleads facts supporting a plausible inference of
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5municipal liability for excessive force and unlawful seizurein violation of the Fourth Amendment. Count X may proceedon these theories.*6 Plaintiff may not, however, ground a Monell claim on theviolation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.Because municipalities may not be held vicariously liableunder § 1983, “in most cases, a plaintiff's § 1983 claimsagainst a municipality ‘hinge on his ability to show that[individual defendants] violated his constitutional rights.’ ”Grim v. Baltimore Police Dep't, Civ. No. ELH-18-3864, 2020WL 1063091, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2020) (quoting Dawsonv. Prince George's Cnty., 896 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Md.1995)); see also Marryshow v. Town of Bladensburg, 139F.R.D. 318, 319 (D. Md. 1991) (“Under Section 1983, tohold the [supervisor and municipality] Defendants liable,Plaintiff must first establish that at least one [individual]Defendant violated his constitutional rights.”). Thus, if aplaintiff “fails in h[er] efforts to show that an activedefendant violated his constitutional rights, h[er] claimsagainst the County likewise fail.” Dawson, 896 F. Supp.at 540. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any individualCounty Officer violated her due process rights. Plaintiff'scomplaint instead focuses on the alleged violation of herconstitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. Seee.g., ECF 11, at 6 21 (alleging officers’ history of “deprivingvictims and witnesses of their constitutional rights to befree from excessive force and unreasonable searches andseizures”). Such claims are distinct. See Boeh v. Dail, Civ.No. EA-23-1020, 2025 WL 2637483, at *7 (D. Md. Sept.12, 2025) (explaining that “claims regarding an arrest withoutprobable cause and the use of excessive force during thecourse of an arrest arise under the Fourth Amendment and notthe Fourteenth Amendment's more general substantive dueprocess right” (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274–75 (1994)). Given that Plaintiff does not allege a violationof her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by anyof the individual County Officers, any Monell claim basedon this theory may not lie. Cf. Grim, 2020 WL 1063091,at *4 (“It is axiomatic that a Monell claim cannot liewhere there is no underlying constitutional violation bythe employee.” (citation modified)). Accordingly, Count Xcannot proceed based on a Fourteenth Amendment dueprocess violation. For the same reason, Plaintiff's claim thatBaltimore County failed to investigate police misconduct inviolation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count XII), see ECF11, at 27, is likewise dismissed.The same rationale also applies to Plaintiff's allegationof municipal liability against Baltimore County for racediscrimination under Count IX. Plaintiff initially broughtthis claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and “Maryland law”against Baltimore County and individual County OfficersMackert, Skinner, and Broznowicz. ECF 11, at 19. The Courtdismissed the claim against the County Officers becausePlaintiff abandoned her § 1981 claim and otherwise “failedto properly plead a standalone discrimination claim underMaryland law.” ECF 28, at 21. Given that Plaintiff has failedto allege an underlying claim of race discrimination againstany individual officers, a municipal liability claim againstBaltimore County based on the same theory cannot proceed.See Anderson v. Caldwell Cty. Sheriff's Off., 524 F. App'x 854,862 (4th Cir. 2013) (“No actionable claim against supervisorsor local governments can exist without a constitutionalviolation committed by an employee.”). Accordingly, CountIX is dismissed.B. Negligence ClaimsPlaintiff also advances two negligence theories againstBaltimore County under Maryland law: negligent hiring,retention, and supervision (Count XI) and negligent failure toinvestigate police misconduct (Count XIII). ECF 11, at 24,27. Baltimore County asserts that it is immune from suit fornegligence claims. ECF 32-1, at 10.“Maryland law is well settled that a county (or municipality)generally enjoys immunity against common law tort liabilityarising out of acts that are governmental, as opposed to actsthat are private or proprietary.” Clark v. Prince George'sCnty., 65 A.3d 785, 790 (Md. App. 2013) (citation omitted).“The operation by a county of its police department isquintessentially governmental.” Id. at 791. Accordingly, acounty cannot “be sued in its own capacity for commonlaw tort liability, including for the torts of negligent hiring[or] retention.” Id. Both of Plaintiff's claims for negligenthiring and negligent failure to investigate are grounded intheories of ordinary negligence. See, e.g., ECF 11, at 28(“Baltimore County owes a duty of care to its citizens toproperly investigate allegations of police misconduct[.]”). Assuch, Counts XI and XIII must be dismissed as BaltimoreCounty is immune from suit. Cf. Robinson v. Baltimore Cnty.,Maryland, Civ. No. LKG-21-02997, 2022 WL 3577267, at*5 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2022) (dismissing a negligence claimagainst Baltimore County because it “involve[d] the operationof the BCPD”).
ABYBATOU MBOW, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MICHAEL MACKERT ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6*7 Plaintiff argues that Evans v. Morsell, 395 A.2d 480(Md. 1978), demands a different result because “Marylandrecognizes negligent hiring/retention principles where anemployer knew or should have known of an employee'sdangerous propensities and the negligence proximatelycaused harm.” ECF 34-1, at 22. However, as BaltimoreCounty correctly points out, Evans is inapposite because itinvolves a private employer, not a county or municipality.ECF 38, at 9. Counts XI and XIII are dismissed.IV. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, Baltimore County's motion todismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Themotion is granted as to Count IX (race discrimination);Count XI (negligent hiring, retention, and supervision); CountXII (failure to investigate police misconduct); and CountXIII (negligent failure to investigate police misconduct),and these claims are DISMISSED. Count VII (IIED) isalso DISMISSED. Because the claims are duplicative, Courtconstrues Count VIII (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim) as broughtagainst Mackert and Skinner only, and Count X (Monellclaim) as brought against Baltimore County. Count Xsurvives on excessive force and unlawful seizure theoriesunder the Fourth Amendment. Because Baltimore County'sMotion does not address Count VI, which alleges thatBaltimore County violated Articles 24 and 26 of the MarylandDeclaration of Rights, that count also remains.A separate implementing order will issue.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 2070013Footnotes1Plaintiff's suit was filed against Officer Michael Mackert (“Mackert”), Officer Vincent G. Skinner (“Skinner”), Officer ThomasBroznowicz (“Broznowicz”), Corporal David A. Lehnert (“Lehnert”). ECF 11, at 1. Broznowicz and Lehnert have beendismissed from the action. See ECF 28; ECF 29.2The original complaint is docketed at ECF 1.3The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-generated page numbersat the top of the page.4The Court previously chronicled several inaccurate or non-existent case citations in Plaintiff's briefing. ECF 28, at 27–29. Plaintiff's counsel purported to “withdraw” those citations. See ECF 33, at 2–3. However, the Court observes that inPlaintiff's response to Baltimore County's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's counsel again cites to a non-existent case that shepreviously acknowledged as fake and subsequently withdrew. ECF 34-1, at 7 (citing to non-existent case “Eichholz v.Camp, 36 F.4th 908, 917 (4th Cir. 2022)” for the proposition that “Courts must accept factual allegations as true and drawreasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor”). Baltimore County points out the repeated reference to the same fake citationbut does not ask the Court to take any action. ECF 38, at 4 n.2. Given that this fabricated case does not affect the Court'sanalysis and noting that no action was requested by the County, the Court will not address this issue further at this time.However, suffice to say the Court has had enough of Plaintiff's fake citations and does not expect to see them again.5Baltimore County does not move to dismiss Count VI, which alleges Baltimore County violated Articles 24 and 26 ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights. See ECF 11, at 13. Baltimore County also does not move to dismiss Count VII,intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), but it is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff intended to bring the IIEDclaim against the County. Compare ECF 11, at 15 (naming Mackert, Skinner, Broznowicz, Lehnert, and Baltimore Countyas defendants), with id. at 16 (making allegations and claiming damages against Mackert, Skinner, Broznowicz, andLehnert only). Nevertheless, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's IIED claim against the County Officers because Plaintiff failedto allege any “extreme or outrageous conduct necessary to sustain an IIED claim.” ECF 28, at 18. The same reasoningapplies to the extent that claim was brought against the County and so Count VII will be dismissed in its entirety.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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