Meziane v. Aitouche (Apr. 23, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Fatima Meziane v. Abdelouahab Aitouche
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Maryland (MD)
Court
Supreme Court of Maryland
Decided
Apr. 23, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1101776Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.UNREPORTED*Appellate Court of Maryland.FATIMA MEZIANEv.ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHENo. 1197, September Term, 2025|Filed: April 23, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No.: C-15-FM-23-003513Berger, Friedman, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge,Specially Assigned), JJ.OpinionOpinion by Sharer, J.*1 Abdelouahab Aitouche (“Father” and appellee) filed acomplaint for an absolute divorce in the Circuit Court forMontgomery County, seeking, among other relief, custodyof the three minor children he shares with Fatima Meziane(“Mother” and appellant). After an extended contestedcustody trial, the court granted Father sole legal and primaryphysical custody of the children with supervised visitation forMother. Mother moved to alter or amend the custody decision,which the court denied.1Mother appeals, presenting the following issues for ourreview, which we have condensed and rephrased for clarity2:1. Did the circuit court err or abuse its discretion inexcluding or limiting the testimony of some of Mother'switnesses?2. Did the circuit court err or abuse its discretion in itsfactual determinations, analysis, and ultimate custodydecision?Finding neither error nor abuse of discretion, we shallaffirm.3BACKGROUND*2 Although we have reviewed the extensive record as awhole, we need not report the entire factual and proceduralbackground in this case as the parties themselves are awareof it. See, e.g., Teixeira v. State, 213 Md. App. 664, 666(2013). What we do set forth in this opinion is what we deemnecessary to put the matter in context and to address the issueson appeal.The parties met in Algeria in June 2013 and were married ina religious ceremony there soon after. Father moved to theUnited States from Algeria roughly thirty years ago. He has aPh.D. and is employed as a scientist for the National Institutesof Health for twenty years. Father owned the marital home inGermantown, Maryland before the parties met. At the time,Mother was a college student in Algeria, but she moved tothe United States after meeting Father, and they were marriedin a civil ceremony in Rockville, Montgomery County, onSeptember 24, 2013.The parties had three children during the marriage: I. (boy,age ten); M. (girl, age eight); and V. (boy, age five). Thechildren all attend school near the marital home. They alsoattend Sunday religious school at the Islamic Center.V. has been diagnosed as autistic and is non-verbal. Hisdiagnosis and treatment has caused friction between theparties, and they have disagreed as to his treatment andeducation. Ultimately, after obtaining a second opinion,which confirmed the diagnosis, Father enrolled V. in AppliedBehavior Analysis (“ABA”) therapy. V. continues to receivetherapy three times per week, which takes place at Father'shome. At the time of trial, Mother had not participated in V.’sABA therapy; however, V.’s ABA therapy supervisor testifiedthat Mother e-mailed her a week earlier to ask how Mothercould be involved in sessions or treatment.In 2018, the parties began living separate and apart in themarital home. Mother slept in the primary bedroom, while
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Father slept in M.’s room. According to Father, the partiesstarted living separately because Mother picked fights severaltimes per day “over any existing things.” According toMother, the parties’ relationship soured because Father wascontrolling and just wanted her to be home and did not wanther to have friends, drive a car, or learn English.On June 1, 2023, Father filed a complaint for an absolutedivorce, to which Mother timely counterclaimed. The circuitcourt held a pendente lite (“PL”) hearing on October 30,2023. On November 7, 2023, the court issued a PL Orderawarding Father primary physical custody and allowingMother supervised access. Father was also granted use andpossession of the marital home. Mother's motion to modifythe order was denied.On January 22, 2024, Mother sought a protective order inthe District Court, sitting in Montgomery County. Later thatmonth, the District Court entered a Temporary ProtectiveOrder and transferred the case to the circuit court.Over the course of several months, the circuit court helda seven-day hearing.4 In the end, the court found, by apreponderance of the evidence, that Father committed abuseagainst Mother and that Mother was fearful as a result.The court further found, however, that Mother sought theprotective order, in part, as an end-run around the PL Orderafter her efforts to overturn it failed. The court declined tomodify the custody provisions of the PL Order because itfound, under Md. Code, Family Law (“FL”) § 9-101, thatthere were reasonable grounds to believe that Mother hadabused the children. Accordingly, on June 28, 2024, the courtgranted Mother a final protective order against Father that didnot affect the custody arrangement.*3 Soon after, Mother sought protective orders relating to allthree children. All three were denied for lack of jurisdiction.She also attempted to obtain the same relief in the custodycase but that too was denied.Following these proceedings, at Mother's request and overFather's opposition, the court appointed a Best InterestAttorney (“BIA”) for the children.The custody trial was initially scheduled for four days.The hearing was ultimately held on seven days—notincluding three status conferences—over the course of threemonths. Both parties testified at the hearing. The courtalso heard testimony from the court-appointed custodyevaluator; a psychiatrist who performed a court-orderedpsychological evaluation on Mother; the parties’ formermarriage counselor; two former visitation supervisors; V.’sABA therapy supervisor; a licensed clinical social workerwho worked with Mother as part of the Abused PersonsProgram; a psychologist who performed a trauma assessmentof Mother; and Mother's sister (“Maternal Aunt”).During the trial, the parties produced substantial evidenceof various injuries that the children had suffered duringthe marriage. Each party claimed that the other parent wasresponsible for the injuries.On June 16, 2025, the circuit court entered a custodyorder and, two days later, issued an accompanying 102-pagememorandum opinion. After addressing the custody factorsset forth in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 304–11 (1986)and Montgomery County Department of Social Services v.Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420 (1978), the court found thatmuch of Mother's testimony was not credible. Further, underFL § 9-101, the court found reasonable grounds to believethat Mother had neglected the children, and it did not find thatthere was no likelihood of further neglect without supervisedaccess.Given these findings, the circuit court granted Fathersole legal and primary physical custody. Mother wasgranted supervised visitation through the court supervisioncenter every other weekend, and through a private custodysupervisor for two hours every week, as well as certainholidays. Mother was also granted daily, virtual access (text,phone, or video) with each of the children through a court-approved app for up to ten minutes per child, and the courtauthorized her to participate in V.’s ABA therapy on hercustodial days. This appeal followed.We shall provide additional facts and circumstances asnecessary to the resolution of the issues presented in thisappeal.DISCUSSIONI.Both before and during trial, the circuit court excludedor limited the testimony of several of Mother's witnessesdue to her discovery violations. Among these was Dr.
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Jessica Hasson.5 The court had directed Mother to meetwith Dr. Hasson early in the proceedings about receiving apsychological evaluation before ultimately selecting anotherpsychologist.6 Mother designated Dr. Hasson as an expertwitness on November 8, 2024, more than a year after thedeadline set by the court's scheduling order and less than amonth before the initial trial date. The designation did notprovide the substance of any findings or opinions to whichDr. Hasson was expected to testify. See Md. Rule 2-402(g)(1)(A). Accordingly, Father moved to strike the designation.At a hearing on December 2, 2024, Mother explainedthat she intended Dr. Hasson to serve as a rebuttal expertto the psychologist who had performed the court-orderedexamination of Mother—and whom Father had designatedas an expert witness. Although the court ultimately grantedFather's motion and struck Mother's designation, it made clearthat Mother could call Dr. Hasson as a rebuttal witness.*4 Later, during trial, Mother indicated that she intendedto call Dr. Hasson to testify as a fact witness and rebuttalexpert. After Father orally moved in limine to exclude severalof Mother's witnesses due to her discovery failure, the courtissued an order directing Mother to supplement her responseswithin six days. The court then held a status conference onFebruary 13, 2025, to resolve Mother's lingering discoverydeficiencies because Father still objected to several witnesses,including Dr. Hasson, based on Mother's continued failureto provide the substance of findings and opinion on whichshe was expected to testify. The court announced that Dr.Hasson could testify regarding a letter she had submittedto the court detailing her reservations about conducting apsychological evaluation of Mother, but “only to the extentthat such testimony or evidence constitute[d] fact testimony,as opposed to expert testimony, except to the extent that thematters set forth in the letter would constitute expert rebuttalevidence.”Finally, on March 4, 2025, Mother offered “to compromise”and suggested that she would be satisfied if the court acceptedDr. Hasson's letter into evidence. The parties eventuallystipulated to the admissibility of the letter, and the courtalso accepted Dr. Hasson as an expert in psychologicalevaluations. Although the court indicated that Mother couldstill call Dr. Hasson to testify as a fact witness, she ultimatelychose not to do so.On appeal, Mother contends that the court erred in limiting Dr.Hasson's testimony. In her view, the court should have lookedpast her discovery violation because Dr. Hasson's testimonywould have shown that “the psychological testing instrumentsused in the court-ordered evaluation were not compatible withnon-native English speakers.” Her argument is not persuasive.Standard of Review“Normally, we evaluate a trial court's discovery sanction in acivil case through a well-defined lens—abuse of discretion.”A.A. v. Ab.D., 246 Md. App. 418, 441 (2020). That said,“before we look through that lens in a child custody case, wemust be satisfied that the court has applied the best interestsof the child standard in its determination.” Id.In a child custody case, the trial court's broad discretion“to exclude evidence is not only measured by the potentialprejudice to the parties, but is constrained by a court's absoluteand overriding obligation to conduct a thorough examinationof all possible factors that impact the best interests of thechild.” Kadish v. Kadish, 254 Md. App. 467, 495 (2022)(cleaned up). Before excluding evidence as a sanction, “thecourt should take a proffer or otherwise ascertain what theevidence is that will be excluded, and then assess whetherthat evidence could assist the court ... in its determination ofthe best interests of the child[.]” A.A., 246 Md. App. at 448–49. We then review any discovery sanction imposed after thecourt completes this assessment for an abuse of discretion. Id.at 449.AnalysisInitially, we observe that the court's sanction was permissibleunder the Maryland Rules and was not disproportionateto Mother's violation. Discovery sanctions are “intended torelieve the surprise or prejudice a party suffers when [their]opponent fails to abide by the discovery rules.” Watson v.Timberlake, 251 Md. App. 420, 437 (2021). Mother did notdesignate Dr. Hasson as an expert witness until just over threeweeks before trial, leaving Father with no time to deposeher. Moreover, Mother did not initially disclose the substanceof findings and opinions to which Dr. Hasson was expectedto testify, making it impossible for Father to meaningfullyprepare to examine her.The record reflects that the trial court took an initial profferof the proposed evidence during the February 13, 2025,status conference and a more thorough proffer at the March4, 2025, hearing.7 The record also makes clear that the
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4court remained conscious of its responsibility to balance theprejudice to Father for Mother's discovery failure against thebest interests of the children—with the latter being the court's“main focus”—when considering the appropriate sanction.The court ultimately determined that Dr. Hasson would notassist it in its determination of the children's best interests.Dr. Hasson had never met with the children, and she metwith Mother only once and did not perform an evaluation ofher. The court also noted that the testing limitations indicatedby Dr. Hasson were already noted by the court-appointedevaluator in his report.*5 Further, the court imposed a limited sanction designed toensure that it remained as well-informed as possible as to thechildren's best interests. The court did not completely excludeDr. Hasson as a witness and made clear that she could stilltestify about her interactions with Mother and reasons behindthe letter she sent to the court. That letter was admitted intoevidence by the parties’ agreement, but Mother chose not tohave Dr. Hasson testify.We conclude that the circuit court limited Dr. Hasson'stestimony only after determining that it would not be usefulin determining the children's best interests. The sanction waspermissible under the Maryland Rules and was proportionateto Mother's violation. Moreover, the evidence that Motherwanted to present through Dr. Hasson—i.e., the limitationsof performing a psychological evaluation on non-nativeEnglish speakers—was still entered into evidence through Dr.Hasson's letter and was accounted for in the court-orderedevaluator's report. The court did not err or abuse its discretion.II.Mother next contends that the court erred in its custodydecision.First, Mother takes issue with the court's considerationof certain evidence. She argues that the court should nothave dismissed the recommendation of the court-appointedcustody evaluator “without explanation[.]” Conversely, sheargues that the court should not have relied on theBIA's position because the BIA did not perform anindependent investigation. Further, Mother contends that thecourt “misappl[ied] domestic-violence evidence [by] treatingtrauma-related responses as parental unfitness” and that it“minimiz[ed] evidence of Father's violence[.]”Second, Mother takes issue with the restrictions the courtplaced on visitation. She argues that the court shouldnot have “impos[ed] indefinite supervised visitation andsevere communication restrictions without applying the least-restrictive-alternative principle[.]” Relatedly, she contendsthat the access and communication arrangements are“incompatible” with V.’s non-verbal autism.Lastly, Mother argues that the court did not sufficientlyexplain the reasoning behind its decision.None of these arguments has merit.Legal Framework“In all custody and visitation determinations, the bestinterest of the child is the overarching consideration[,]”Michael Gerald D. v. Roseann B., 220 Md. App. 669,680 (2014) (cleaned up), and in our review, “is alwaysdeterminative[,]” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 626 (2016)(cleaned up). For custody determinations, given the “uniquecharacter of each case” and “the subjective nature of theevaluations and decisions that must be made[,]” id. at 629(cleaned up), Maryland courts have identified the Taylor andSanders factors as the primary, yet non-exclusive, factorsa court should consider in weighing the advantages anddisadvantages of alternative environments, without focusingon any single factor.8 Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 420–21.Indeed, “none of the major factors in a custody case hastalismanic qualities, and no single list of criteria will satisfythe demands of every case.” Santo, 448 Md. at 630 (cleanedup). Instead, the court examines “the totality of the situationin the alternative environments[.]” Best v. Best, 93 Md.App. 644, 656 (1992). The test ultimately “begins and endswith what is in the best interest of the child.” Azizova v.Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 347 (2019).*6 Beyond the Taylor/Sanders factors, under FL § 9-101,when a circuit court is “faced with a history of child abuseor neglect by a party seeking custody or visitation,” it must“give specific attention to the safety and well-being of thechild in determining where the child's best interest lies[.]” Inre Adoption No. 12612, 353 Md. 209, 238 (1999). If the courtfinds “evidence of abuse” or neglect, it must “deny custodyor unsupervised visitation unless the court makes a specificfinding that there is no likelihood of further child abuse orneglect.” In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 706 (2001) (emphasisomitted).
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Although parents have a fundamental right to raise their ownchild, “the best interests of the child may take precedenceover the parent's liberty interest in the course of a custody,visitation, or adoption dispute.” Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md.204, 219 (1998). To be sure, “as a general rule, a parent,who is not granted custody, will be given a right to liberalvisitation with [their] child at reasonable times and underreasonable conditions[.]” Michael Gerald D., 220 Md. App. at680 (cleaned up). But “this right is not absolute, and when thechild's health or welfare is at stake visitation may be restrictedor even denied.” Id. (cleaned up).The Circuit Court's DecisionWe first summarize the circuit court's findings for each of theTaylor/Sanders factors:• Fitness of the parents: Father was fit to have legal andphysical custody of the children because, although hehad physically abused Mother on at least two occasionsand used corporal punishment against I. and M., Fatheracknowledged his parenting deficiencies and had takensteps to remedy them. On the other hand, Mother was notfit to have custody because, although she had taken somesteps to improve her parenting, such as taking classes onautism, unlike Father, these classes were not sufficientto assure the court that Mother could safely parent allof the children in an unsupervised setting, and, moreimportantly, Mother still denied any responsibility forthe injuries that the children received in her care;• Character and reputation of the parties: no negativeevidence presented;• Desire of the natural parents and agreements betweenthe parties: Father sought sole legal and primaryphysical custody, and Mother sought primary physicalcustody and joint legal custody with tie-breakingauthority;• Potentiality of maintaining natural family relations:most of both parties’ family members live in Algeria, soit would be “easy to fashion an order” allowing for videocontact but not for the maintenance of in-person contactunless the family members visit the United States;• Preference of the children: the children are youngand have made inconsistent statements about theirpreferences, but they ultimately wish to be with bothparents for significant time;• Material opportunities affecting the future life of thechildren: both parties are employed and able to supportthe children, though Father's income is higher thanMother's;• Age, health, and sex of the children: I. is ten; M. is eight;and V. is five. The children are all physically healthy, butV. has been diagnosed with autism;• Geographic proximity of parental homes: the parties liveclose enough to allow for frequent access;• Length of separation from the natural parents: thechildren have not been separated from either parent,though Mother has had only supervised access with themfor almost two years;• Capacity of parents to communicate: the parties cannotcommunicate and reach shared decisions affecting thechildren's welfare because Mother “cannot or will notengage in a good faith give and take of information andoptions”;*7 • Willingness of parents to share custody: Motherstated that she is willing to share custody, but Father isnot;• Relationship established between child and each parent:the children have strong bonds with both parents;• Potential disruption of child's social and school life: thecourt's order would not disrupt the children's social orschool lives;• Demands of parental employment: both parties areemployed but capable of working their employmentresponsibilities around their childcare responsibilities;• Sincerity of parents’ request: both parties’ requests weresincere;• Impact on state or federal assistance, and benefit toparents: not applicable.After addressing these factors, the court made additionalfindings concerning evidence of abuse and neglect. Thecourt found that Father had abused Mother on at least twooccasions, but it found no credible evidence that he abusedthe children. On the other hand, the court found, by a
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6preponderance of the evidence, that Mother had neglected thechildren and that they “suffered significant injuries as a resultof this neglect.” Under the circumstances, the court could notfind that there was no likelihood of further neglect withoutsupervised access.Standard of ReviewOur appellate courts “practice a limited review of a trialcourt's decision concerning a custody award.” Wagner v.Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 39 (1996). This practice involvesthree interrelated standards of review. In re Yve S., 373 Md.551, 586 (2003). First, factual findings are reviewed for clearerror. In re R.S., 470 Md. 380, 397 (2020). Second, we reviewwhether the court erred as a matter of law without deference,under a de novo standard of review. Id. Finally, ultimateconclusions of the court, “when based upon sound legalprinciples and factual findings that are not clearly erroneous,will stand, unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”Id. (cleaned up).Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous “[i]f there isany competent material evidence” to support them. FantasyValley Resort, Inc. v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 92 Md. App. 267,275 (1992). Further, “[t]he burden of demonstrating that acourt committed clear error falls upon the appealing party.”Christian v. Maternal-Fetal Med. Assocs. of Md., LLC, 459Md. 1, 21 (2018). Moreover, an abuse of discretion occurswhere “no reasonable person would take the view adopted bythe trial court, or when the court acts without reference to anyguiding rules or principles.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No.3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 (1997) (cleaned up).AnalysisA. Custody Evaluator's RecommendationStephanie Hesse was the court-appointed custody evaluator.The court called her as its own witness and accepted heras an expert in custody evaluation. The court also admittedinto evidence both Hesse's report and the custody file. Hesserecommended that the parties have joint legal custody withtie-breaking authority to Mother “[p]rimarily because of [the]power imbalance between the parties.” For physical custody,she recommended a ramp-up schedule that eventually wouldallow Mother shared physical custody.*8 On appeal, Mother challenges the court's rejection ofHesse's recommendations. She contends Hesse's opinionshould have been given more weight because of her role as thecourt-appointed custody evaluator. Mother cites no authorityrequiring the trial court to credit Hesse's opinion simplybecause she was the court-designated custody evaluator.9Mother also ignores that Hesse's opinion was undercut byother evidence, including the custody file itself.Generally, a “trial judge need not accept the testimony ofany expert.” Quinn v. Quinn, 83 Md. App. 460, 470 (1990).“An expert's opinion has no greater probative value than thesoundness of the reasons given for the opinion.” Goicocheav. Goicochea, 256 Md. App. 329, 354 (2022) (cleaned up).Further, “[w]here there are two experts, the trier of fact mustevaluate the testimony of both of them and decide whichopinion, if any, to accept.” Id. (cleaned up).Here, the court noted that the reliability of Hesse's opinionwas diminished because she “did not have access to anyinformation about this case after November 9, 2024, thedate of her report[.]” The court also observed that Hesse didnot witness Mother's testimony at trial where she testifieduntruthfully about the children's injuries and other matters.Consequently, the court determined that Hesse's findings thatdepended on Mother's credibility could not be relied upon.The court also found that some of Hesse's findings werecontradicted by the evidence. For example, Hesse stated thatFather was not adequately meeting the children's medicalneeds and had not sought education about autism or caringfor children with special needs. The medical and schoolrecords in the custody file, however, indicated that Father wasobtaining appropriate necessary medical care for the children.The court also credited testimony from Father and otherwitnesses that not only did Father seek education regardingV.’s autism, but he was also the driving force behind V.’sevaluation, diagnosis, and ABA therapy.As for Hesse's perceived imbalance of power between Fatherand Mother, the court acknowledged that “[t]hat may havebeen true for language and financial reasons when [Mother]first came to the United States, but by 2022, ... [Mother]had financial and physical independence.” Indeed, the courtnoted that the communications between the parties admittedinto evidence at trial indicated no such power imbalancein favor of Father. If anything, they showed that Motherwas more aggressive. This conclusion was also consistentwith testimony from Elizabeth Petrolle, the parties’ former
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7marriage therapist, who described Mother as “very strong-willed” and “rigid and inflexible in her thinking,” whileFather is “calm and easygoing, sometimes to the point ofbeing a pushover.” The court expressly credited Petrolle'sperception of the parties over that of other witnesses becauseonly she had real-time communications with them.The court recognized that Hesse's evaluation was “limited inits breadth and scope due to the resources and caseload ofthe evaluator and the inability to review evidence after thedate of the report.” In other words, the court received moreevidence and had more time to review that evidence than didHesse. The court was “entitled to weigh [Hesse's evaluation]along with contradictory testimony and its own observations.”Yve S., 373 Md. at 609 (cleaned up). Its decision to reject herrecommendations was reasonable, logical, and explained indetail. See Goicochea, 256 Md. App. at 355. Thus, the courtwas not clearly erroneous in relying on other evidence thatcontradicted Hesse's opinion.B. BIA's Position*9 Mother next contends that the court should not have givenany weight to the BIA's position because the BIA did notperform an independent investigation. We see no error.Generally, there are three roles that a BIA can fulfill:“the waiver role (to decide whether to waive the patient-psychiatrist privilege for the child); the guardian ad litemrole (attorney for the child); and the role of investigator (aninvestigative report to the court by counsel, social worker,psychiatrist, psychologist, or trained investigator with orwithout recommendations).” Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26,40 (1993) (cleaned up), abrogated on other grounds by Fox v.Wills, 390 Md. 620 (2006). “The extent of the task assigned tothe child's counsel is dictated by the court.” Miller v. Bosley,113 Md. App. 381, 400 (1997).The order appointing the BIA here designated her to fulfillboth the waiver role and the guardian ad litem role. Amongother things, it also required the BIA to “ensure that thechild(ren)’s position [was] made part of the record whetheror not different from the position the [BIA] advocate[d.]”Although the appointment order authorized the BIA toconduct discovery, nothing suggested that she was to fulfillthe role of investigator. Indeed, the order expressly forbadeher from “fil[ing] a written report with the [c]ourt[.]”Accordingly, the court was not clearly erroneous in relyingon the BIA's position even though she did not perform anindependent investigation.10C. Fitness of ParentsMother next contends that the court improperly consideredher “trauma-related responses as [evidence of] parentalunfitness[.]” In assessing Mother's parental fitness, the circuitcourt found that she had “obstructed proper medical care forthe Minor Children on several occasions.” The court alsofound that Mother “allowed the Minor Children to sustainsignificant injuries while they were in her care” and thatshe “insisted[ ] that the Minor Children sleep in conditionsthat were at best unsanitary.” Mother does not dispute thatthe court's findings were supported by competent materialevidence and stresses that she “does not ask this Court toreweigh the evidence.” Rather, she contends that the courtshould not have considered that evidence in the first placewhen analyzing this factor. In Mother's view, evidence thatis “consistent with the experiences of individuals who haveendured intimate-partner violence ... should not be treated asevidence that [they] pose[ ] a risk to the children.” We are notpersuaded.The court here acknowledged that some of Mother's actionsmay have stemmed from her trauma, but it concluded that thiswas “relevant ... only to the extent that it allow[ed] [Mother]to get proper treatment to address her parenting deficits.”This reasoning is consistent with our holding in Gizzo v.Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 202–04 (2020). There, weaffirmed a circuit court's conclusion that a mother was fitto have custody despite having been previously convicted ofneglecting her child. Id. at 202–03. The court had creditedthe mother's testimony that she had “worked to overcomeher mental health challenges and other challenges” and foundthat “there was no evidence presented regarding any currentissues with her parenting ability.” Id. at 202–03 (cleaned up).We “s[aw] nothing unreasonable in the court's conclusion that[the] [m]other had sufficiently demonstrated her fitness as aparent during the three years that followed her conviction forneglect.” Id. at 204.*10 Here, in contrast, the court found that, although Mother“has taken some steps to improve her parenting, such as takingclasses on autism[,] [t]hose classes ... [were] not sufficient toassure the [c]ourt that [Mother] c[ould] safely parent all ofthe Minor Children in an unsupervised setting.” Moreover,the therapy Mother was receiving was not “the therapythat ha[d] been recommended.” But “[t]he most concerning
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8evidence that the [c]ourt received was [Mother's] denial ofany responsibility for the injuries the Minor Children receivedand her attempts to blame [Father] for the injuries.” Indeed,the court noted that Mother still “denies any deficits andtakes no accountability for the [children's] injuries.” In otherwords, unlike in Gizzo, there was evidence of current issueswith Mother's parenting ability, and she had not sufficientlyworked to overcome her deficiencies.As the circuit court reasoned, even if Mother's actionswere the result of her trauma, that is relevant only tothe extent it allows her to get proper treatment to addressher parenting deficiencies. Indeed, the court acknowledgedHesse's expert testimony that experiencing domestic violenceis “something to take into consideration because it can impacta party's ability to parent.” Put simply, the court was notrequired to excuse Mother's conduct merely because it mayhave been related to her own trauma. And in any event,Mother's past neglect of the children was not the basis forthe court's conclusion that she was unfit to have custody.Rather, the court was concerned about her continued refusalto acknowledge her deficiencies or accept any responsibilityfor the children's injuries and her failure to take appropriatesteps to ensure they would not be injured again under hercare. Overall, the court made a reasonable conclusion that,given the lack of evidence showing any attempt to addressher deficiencies, there was insufficient evidence to assure thecourt that Mother was fit to have custody of the children atthis time.D. Evidence of AbuseThe circuit court found that Father physically abused Motheron at least two occasions. On appeal, Mother contends thatthe court did not sufficiently consider this “evidence ofFather's violence” against her.11 In essence, she argues thatthe protective order she had against Father should have beengiven more weight in the court's custody determination. Thisargument reflects a misunderstanding of the court's statutoryobligation.To be sure, FL § 9-101.1 requires “the court, when itreceives evidence of a party's history of violence againstcertain household members, to give due consideration to suchviolence in determining what is in a child's best interest.”Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 199 (cleaned up). But the statute “doesnot scrap the overall best interest of the child standard in favorof another single, alternative standard[.]” In re Adoption No.12612, 353 Md. at 238.*11 Here, the court recognized that FL § 9-101.1(c) requiredit to fashion its order to “safeguard against further abuse of[Mother] by [Father].” But because the protective order wasalready in place, the court concluded that additional protectivearrangements were unnecessary at this time because that order—as well as the overall custody schedule—would maintainminimal in-person interactions between the two parents.Beyond this, FL § 9-101.1 obligated the court only “to givedue consideration” to Father's violence against Mother indetermining what was in the children's best interest andto make a custody arrangement that best protected thechildren. Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 199 (cleaned up). To thatend, although the court found no credible evidence thatFather has abused or neglected the children, it noted thathe had used corporal punishment in the past. In framing itsoverall analysis, the court acknowledged expert testimonythat if a parent commits “domestic violence toward a spouse,that parent is more at risk for potentially abusing [m]inor[c]hildren, and there is a greater probability that the parenthas impaired parenting skills.” Given the history of domesticviolence in the family, the court determined that continueduse of corporal punishment was not in the children's bestinterest and included a provision in the final custody orderforbidding both parties from using it. Thus, the court gave dueconsideration to Father's violence against Mother, and we findnothing unreasonable about this exercise of discretion.E. Restrictions on VisitationNext, Mother argues that the court erred “by imposingindefinite supervised visitation and severe communicationrestrictions without applying the least-restrictive-alternativeprinciple.” She further contends that the “access andcommunication arrangements [are] incompatible with [V.’s]non-verbal autism[.]” Again, we are not persuaded.The “least-restrictive-alternative principle” is not a conceptrecognized in Maryland custody law.12 Instead, limitationson visitation are discretionary and need only be “reasonable.”Boswell, 352 Md. at 220. See also Michael Gerald D., 220Md. App. at 686. Moreover, if the court finds reasonablegrounds to believe that a child has been neglected by a partyand does not find that there is no likelihood of further neglectby that party, “it must deny custody or visitation rights tothat party except for a supervised visitation arrangement thatassures the safety and the physiological, psychological, and
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9emotional well-being of the child.” Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at193 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). See also FL § 9-101.Here, the court found reasonable grounds to believe thatMother neglected the children and did not find thatthere was no likelihood of further neglect. As a result,it was required to deny custody and visitation rights toMother except for supervised visitation. See FL § 9-101(b).Although we acknowledge the potential difficulties of remotecommunication due to V.’s autism, this does not render therestrictions unreasonable.13 Indeed, under FL § 9-101, theywere mandatory. Moreover, the court ensured that Motherwould still have in-person access to V., albeit supervised,and directed that she be permitted to participate in V.’s ABAtherapy on her custodial days.*12 Additionally, and contrary to Mother's argument, thecourt was not required to announce “a timetable, benchmarks,or conditions for transition to unsupervised access.” “FL §9-101 does not address the steps that a parent, who is deniedvisitation with [their] child, may take to regain” unsupervisedvisitation or custody in the future. Michael Gerald D., 220Md. App. at 681. “Nor does it affect the parent's legal rightto move to modify a visitation order upon a showing of amaterial change of circumstances.” Id. (cleaned up). Althoughthe court here did not mention what Mother could do to regainunsupervised access, it also did not suggest that, if Motherwere to seek unsupervised visitation sometime in the future,it would not consider such a motion. “[G]iven the well-settledlegal precept that visitation orders are subject to modificationupon a showing of a material change in circumstances, wehave no reason to doubt that [Mother] was informed ofthis possibility by counsel, regardless of whether the courtexpressly mentioned it in rendering its decision or not.” Id.at 682.14We see no abuse of discretion in the court's visitationrestrictions.F. Sufficiency of ExplanationFinally, Mother argues that the court did not adequately“explain the basis for its custody determinations, renderingthe order inadequate for appellate review.” The extensiverecord developed during the life of this litigation offers a clearrejection of that assertion.Although “[t]rial judges are not obliged to spell out in wordsevery thought and step of logic[,]” Meek v. Linton, 245Md. App. 689, 730 n.6 (2020) (cleaned up), the court herecame close. For more than ninety pages of its 102-pagememorandum opinion, the court comprehensively detailedthe evidence, all the while explaining what it found credibleand why. The court then turned to the Taylor/Sanders factorsand FL § 9-101 and made findings for each, citing relevantevidence and explaining why it gave certain evidence moreweight than other, contrary evidence. Although some of thecustody factors favored the parties equally, others favoredFather, and none favored Mother.Indeed, we have seldom seen a more meticulous and detailedexplanation of the basis for custody determinations. We aresatisfied that the court did not “act[ ] without reference to anyguiding rules or principles.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No.3598, 347 Md. at 312 (cleaned up). We find neither error norabuse of discretion.JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FORMONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TOBE PAID BY APPELLANT.All CitationsNot Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2026 WL 1101776Footnotes*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. Itmay be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.101The circuit court subsequently entered a judgment of absolute divorce and addressed disposition of maritalproperty, a monetary award, alimony, child support, and attorneys’ fees. Those issues are the subject of aseparate appeal (No. 2615, Sept. Term, 2025), and we express no view on them here.2Mother phrased her issues as follows:1. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by rejecting the findings and recommendations ofits own court-appointed custody evaluator without explanation and imposing an extremely restrictivecustody arrangement.2. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by misapplying domestic-violence evidence andtreating trauma-related responses as parental unfitness while minimizing evidence of Father'sviolence.3. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by relying on the Best Interest Attorney's positiondespite the absence of an independent investigation.4. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by excluding Mother's fact and expert witnesses,thereby preventing her from presenting material evidence regarding parenting and caregiving.5. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by imposing indefinite supervised visitation and severecommunication restrictions without applying the least-restrictive-alternative principle.6. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by imposing access and communication arrangementsincompatible with the youngest child's non-verbal autism.7. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by failing to explain the basis for its custodydeterminations, rendering the order inadequate for appellate review.8. Whether the Circuit Court failed to comply with Maryland Family Law § 9-101.3 and the GeneralAssembly's mandates governing custody cases involving domestic violence and child abuse.3Both Mother and Father were represented by counsel throughout the circuit court proceedings, but both areself-represented in this appeal.We suspect that Mother may have used generative AI to assist in drafting her briefs, as many of the citations inher brief do not stand for the stated proposition. For example, on page 11 of her principal brief, Mother states,“Although a court is not bound to adopt an evaluator's recommendations, it may not disregard uncontrovertedexpert observations or substitute a contrary outcome without explaining why the evaluator's findings wererejected.” In support, she cites In re Yves S., 373 Md. 551, 586–87 (2003) and Karanikas v. Cartwright, 209Md. App. 571, 589–90 (2013). Neither of these cases support the stated proposition.To be sure, citations of inapposite authority is not uncommon in pro se filings, and, alone, it does notnecessarily indicate the use of AI, but Mother's principal brief also contains two apparently fictitious citations:• Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Md. App. 654, 667–68 (2015), see Appellant's Br. at 13, does not exist. Thereis no Maryland case bearing this caption, and the principal cite leads to Assateague Coastal Tr.,Inc. v. Schwalbach, 223 Md. App. 631 (2015) (a zoning appeal), while the pincite leads to Smith v.Rowhouses, Inc., 223 Md. App. 658 (2015) (a lead-paint case). Mother did not include this case inher Table of Authorities.• Bradley v. Bradley, 174 Md. App. 234, 248–50 (2007), see Appellant's Br. at 16, does not exist.There are five Maryland cases with this caption, but none from the indicated year or concerning
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11supervision: 208 Md. App. 249 (2012) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); 214 Md. App. 229(2013) (alimony); 117 Md. 515 (1912), 119 Md. 645 (1913), and 123 Md. 506 (1914) (a trio of probateappeals). Mother's citation leads to Gunby v. Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 174 Md.App. 189 (2007) (a declaratory-judgment case about riparian rights). Mother included this case in herTable of Authorities but with a different citation: 79 Md. App. 490 (1989), which leads to State Dep'tof Assessments and Tax'n v. Loyola Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 79 Md. App. 481 (1989) (a franchise-tax case).We recently discussed in Mezu v. Mezu, 267 Md. App. 354, 367–68 (2025), there are potential dangers ofusing AI to conduct legal research or generate filings, including the risk of “hallucinated” citations. Moreover,“[t]he citation of fake cases in a brief or other pleading filed with a court implicates multiple Maryland Rules.”Id. at 368. Indeed, attorneys who submit filings containing fake citations may be referred to the AttorneyGrievance Commission depending on the nature and severity of the misconduct. See id. at 374. Althoughthere is no parallel disciplinary action for pro se litigants, at the least, Rule 1-311(c) authorizes us to strike theoffending filing. Where, as here, the filing is an appellant's principal brief, striking it could result in dismissalunder Rule 8-602(c)(5) for failure to file a brief. See Md. Rule 1-311(c) (“[T]he action may proceed as thoughthe [struck] pleading or paper had not been filed.”).That said, given the significant rights involved for the parties here, we shall exercise our discretion and takeno action regarding Mother's brief and will address the merits of her appeal. This does not excuse Mother'ssuspected misconduct. Rather, despite her reliance on inapposite and apparently fictitious authorities, wecan sufficiently address the issues raised.4At the custody trial, the transcript of the ruling in the protective order case was admitted into evidence overMother's objection, and the court took judicial notice of those proceedings. Mother does not challenge thisevidentiary ruling on appeal.5Dr. Hasson's name is also spelled at various points in the record as “Hassan.” We use the spelling from thesignature line of Dr. Hasson's letter to the court.6In her principal brief, Mother does not identify any witness who was excluded or limited, nor does she explainhow the circuit court's decision to do so was erroneous. She states only that “the court ruled that several ofMother's fact witnesses would not be permitted to testify, including witnesses who had firsthand experienceobserving Mother's caregiving and parenting over time” and asks us to vacate and remand so that she maybe “permitted to present relevant witness testimony concerning her parenting and caregiving.”Dr. Hasson is the only witness about whom Mother presents specific argument, and she does so for the firsttime in her reply brief. Accordingly, we limit our review to the rulings regarding Dr. Hasson. See Diallo v.State, 413 Md. 678, 692 (2010) (“Arguments not presented in a brief or not presented with particularity willnot be considered on appeal.” (cleaned up)); Van Meter v. State, 30 Md. App. 406, 408 (1976) (“Surely it isnot incumbent upon this Court, merely because a point is mentioned as being objectionable at some pointin a party's brief, to scan the entire record and ascertain if there be any ground, or grounds, to sustain theobjectionable feature suggested.” (cleaned up)). See also Md. Rule 8-504(a). Even this is an exercise of ourdiscretion because we “ordinarily do not consider issues that are raised for the first time in a party's replybrief.” Gazunis v. Foster, 400 Md. 541, 554 (2007).7At various points throughout trial, the court also took proffers for several of Mother's other proposed witnesses.Of these, only Mother's neighbor was excluded entirely from testifying because Mother compounded herdiscovery failure when she arguably violated the rule on witnesses by texting the witness during trial, see Md.
FATIMA MEZIANE v. ABDELOUAHAB AITOUCHE, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12Rule 5-615, and then attempted to conceal her violation by improperly redacting the texts in her supplementaldiscovery disclosure.8In Sanders, we set out the following non-exclusive factors for a circuit court to consider in child custodydeterminations: (1) fitness of the parents; (2) character and reputation of the parties; (3) desire of the naturalparents and agreements between the parties; (4) the ability to maintain natural family relations; (5) preferenceof the child; (6) material opportunities affecting the future life of the child; (7) age, health, and sex of the child;(8) residences of parents and opportunity for visitation; (9) length of separation from the natural parents; and(10) prior voluntary abandonment or surrender. Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 420.In Taylor, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered the following factors as relevant in making jointcustody determinations, several of which overlap with those laid out in Sanders: (1) capacity of the parentsto communicate and to reach shared decisions affecting the child's welfare; (2) willingness of parents toshare custody; (3) fitness of the parents; (4) relationship established between the child and each parent;(5) preference of the child; (6) potential disruption of child's social and school life; (7) geographic proximityof parental homes; (8) demands of parental employment; (9) age and number of children; (10) sincerity ofparents’ requests; (11) financial status of the parents; (12) impact on state or federal assistance; (13) benefitto parents; and (14) other factors. Taylor, 306 Md. at 304–11.9But see supra note 3.10In any event, the circuit court does not appear to have given significant weight to the BIA's position. Althoughthe court noted the BIA's recommendation alongside the parties’ positions, it did not factor into the court'sanalysis of the relevant custody and visitation factors.11In her principal brief, Mother claims that “[t]he court's analysis conflicts with the trauma-informed principlesmandated by [FL] § 9-101.3.” This argument is misplaced. FL § 9-101.3 sets forth a directive for judgesto participate in training on domestic violence, child abuse, and implicit bias—it provides nothing aboutwhat a court must consider when making a custody determination. The constitutionality of such a trainingmandate by the legislature has been questioned, see, e.g., Letter from Attorney General Brian E. Frosh toGovernor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr. (dated May 11, 2022) (advising that if such a training program is consideredmandatory, it would “improperly intrude[ ] on the constitutional grant of judicial authority and violate[ ] theprinciple of separation of powers in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights”). We need not resolvethe issue because the statute is irrelevant to whether the court erred in its custody analysis. See Robinson v.State, 404 Md. 208, 217–18 (2008) (noting Maryland appellate courts do not decide “constitutional issue[s]unless it is necessary to do so”). In any event, the circuit court acknowledged that it “received evidence of thepotential impact of abuse on an intimate partner, and the impact on children of witnessing a parent's abuse[,]”and expressly “account[ed] for that in reviewing the evidence[.]”12This compounds our suspicions about Mother's potential use of generative AI in drafting her brief. See supranote 3.13We note, however, that despite what she claims in her brief, Mother did not testify about any specific difficultiesshe experienced with the remote communication.14Indeed, the circuit court has scheduled regular review hearings and, after one that occurred while this appealwas pending, expanded Mother's visitation rights to allow for up to one hour of unsupervised access with thechildren during her court-supervised visitation periods.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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