Trejo v. Hernandez (Apr. 29, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Amparo Trejo v. Miguel Angel Amaya Hernandez
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Maryland (MD)
Court
Supreme Court of Maryland
Decided
Apr. 29, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
AMPARO TREJO v. MIGUEL ANGEL AMAYA..., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1162579Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.UNREPORTED*Appellate Court of Maryland.AMPARO TREJOv.MIGUEL ANGEL AMAYA HERNANDEZ, et al.No. 0741, September Term, 2025|Filed: April 29, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Circuit Court for Prince George's County Case No. C-16-FM-24-008161Reed, Zic, Harrell, Glenn T, Jr. (Senior Judge, SpeciallyAssigned), JJ.OpinionOpinion by Reed, J.*1 The instant appeal arises out of Appellant's Petitionfor Custody and [Special Immigrant Juvenile Status “SIJS”]Predicate Findings for the Minor1 in the Circuit Courtfor Prince George's County, and her subsequent Motion toExpedite Hearing for petitions for SIJS findings because theMinor would soon be turning twenty-one. Appellant is theMinor's Aunt. The Circuit Court for Prince George's Countydenied Appellant's Emergency Motion to expedite. Thus, onApril 16, 2025, Appellant filed a Motion for Order Nunc ProTunc, requesting equitable relief, which the circuit court alsodenied. On June 10, 2025, Appellant filed the instant, timelyappeal to the circuit court's denial of the Motion for OrderNunc Pro Tunc.In bringing this appeal, Appellant presents two questionsfor appellate review, which we consolidate and rephrase asfollows:I. Did the circuit court err in denyingAppellant's Motion for Order NuncPro Tunc, concerning Appellant'sPetition for Custody and for SIJSpredicate findings?FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDThe Minor in this case was born on November 25, 2003, in ElSalvador. The Minor describes her life in El Salvador as “verydifficult[.]” She provides that she had limited access to foodand necessities because she didn't have sufficient financialsupport from her parents. She states that her father spent allhis time either at his job as a police officer or out drinking withhis friends, and that her mother would often leave the Minorand her sister alone to take care of themselves. The Minorsays that she had to make the food, do the laundry, clean thehouse, and make sure her sister went to school and did herhomework. The Minor states that she went to school when shecould, and that on the only route available to her to the schoolshe would often be harassed by MS-13 gang members.In 2021, the Minor decided to leave El Salvador and enterthe United States because her situation at home and theharassment from MS-13 gang members had not changed.Specifically, the Minor was aware of a girl who lived nearher in El Salvador who was taken and believed to be killedby MS-13 gang members. The Minor feared that this couldhappen to her as well if she remained in El Salvador.Once in the United States, the Minor first lived with her unclein Virginia. In 2022, she went to live with her Aunt AmparoTrejo (“Appellant”) in Maryland. The Minor states that sinceshe has been in the United States, her parents have notmade much of an effort to communicate with her. The Minorprovides that Appellant is “wonderful, kind, [and] loving[,]”that Appellant makes her feel safe and motivated and is moreof a mother figure for the Minor than her biological mother.The Minor states that she graduated from high school in May2024.On October 10, 2024, Appellant filed a Petition for Custodyand [Special Immigrant Juvenile Status “SIJS”] PredicateFindings for the Minor in the Circuit Court for Prince
AMPARO TREJO v. MIGUEL ANGEL AMAYA..., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2George's County. Specifically, Appellant alleges that theMinor's parents abandoned and neglected her and that theMinor would suffer severe discrimination and harassment ifshe had to return to El Salvador. On November 21, 2024,Appellant filed a Motion to Expedite Hearing for petitions forSIJS findings because Minor would be turning twenty-one onNovember 25, 2024, which would render her ineligible fora SIJS predicate order of factual findings. On November 22,2024, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County deniedAppellant's Emergency Motion to expedite. On April 16,2025, Appellant filed a Motion for Order Nunc Pro Tunc. OnMay 15, 2025, the Circuit Court denied the Motion for OrderNunc Pro Tunc. On June 10, 2025, Appellant filed the instant,timely appeal to the court's denial of the Motion for OrderNunc Pro Tunc.2DISCUSSIONA. Parties’ Contentions*2 Appellant raises four arguments in her brief on appeal.3First, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred by treatingthe delay in this case as jurisdictional rather than procedural.Specifically, Appellant argues that because the petition wasfiled before the Minor's twenty-first birthday, the circuit courthad jurisdiction.Specifically, Appellant argues:Because the petition was timely filedbefore the youth turned [twenty-one],the issue was procedural. Marylandcourts possess equitably powers tocorrect procedural lapses nunc protunc[.] (Pickeral v. Fed. Land Bankof Balt., 177 Md. 601 (1940); Kiserv. State Roads Comm'n, 153 Md. 76(1927); Kellum v. Smith, 151 Md. App.515 (2003)).4Next, Appellant argues that the circuit court had equitablepower to enter a nunc pro tunc SIJS Order. Specifically,Appellant argues that the Minor was substantively eligible fora SIJS predicate order, and that it was only denied because ofcounsel's delay and the court's refusal to expedite. Therefore,Appellant concludes that “[e]quity demands correction so thatthe child is not deprived of SIJS protection solely due toattorney error.”Third, Appellant argues that the Circuit Court's denial ofnunc pro tunc equitable relief deprives the Minor of the “bestinterests of the child” standard that was “designed to protecther.”Finally, Appellant argues that the Circuit Court's denial ofnunc pro tunc relief “defeats Congress's intent [in creatingSIJS] by leaving a substantively eligible youth unprotected.”Based on these four arguments, Appellant requests that thisCourt reverses and remands this case with instructions for thecircuit court to enter the custody and SIJS predicate ordersnunc pro tunc as of November 22, 2024.Notably, no Appellee brief has been filed in this case.B. Standard of ReviewThis Court recognizes that “[t]rial courts are vested withthe common law authority to correct certain errors nunc protunc.” Cave v. Elliot, 190 Md. App. 65, 77 (2010) (citingSapero & Sapero v. Bel Air Plumbing & Heating Contractors,41 Md. App. 251, 259 (1979)). Nunc pro tunc means “nowfor then” in Latin, meaning “a thing is done now, which shallhave the same legal force and effect as if done at the timewhen ought to have been done.” See Short v. Short, 136 Md.App. 570, 578-79 (2001) (citations omitted). “Nunc pro tuncentry is an entry made now of something actually previouslydone to have effect of former date; office being not to supplyomitted action, but to supply omission in record of actionreally had but omitted through inadvertence or mistake.” Id.The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is “to correct a clericalerror or omission as opposed to a judicial error or omission.”Cave, 190 Md. App. at 78 (citing In re Timothy C., 376Md. 414, 430 n. 10 (2003) (citations omitted); see also Statev. Johnson, 228 Md. App. 489, 512 (2016). On numerousoccasions this Court has referred to the Wisconsin SupremeCourt case, Bostwick v. Van Vleck, 106 Wisc. 387 (1900),which set out “[t]he test to be applied in determining whetheran error in a judgment is of judicial character, or a mereclerical mistake which may be corrected in the court where
AMPARO TREJO v. MIGUEL ANGEL AMAYA..., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3it was made at any time, saving intervening rights of thirdparties and with due regard to equitable concerns,” as being:*3 Whether the error relatesto something that the trial courterroneously omitted to pass uponor considered and passed uponerroneously, or a mere omission topreserve of record, correctly in allrespects, the actual decision of thecourt, which in itself was free fromerror. If the difficulty is found to be ofthe latter character, it may be remediedas a mere clerical mistake, which willnot have the effect to change thejudgment pronounced in the slightestdegree, but merely to correct the recordevidence of such judgment.Id. at 385-86.5 In other words, “to determine whether reliefcan be granted nunc pro tunc, we must distinguish whetherthere was a judicial or clerical error in properly entering theentry for judgment.” Short, 136 Md. App. at 579; see alsoid. at 580 (concluding that the Motion for Entry of JudgmentNunc Pro Tunc was properly denied because if there was anyerror, it was more likely a judicial error than a clerical error).C. AnalysisHere, the circuit court did not err by denying Appellant'sMotion for Order Nunc Pro Tunc. First, the alleged error, ofnot entering the order, was not merely clerical. See e.g. Short,136 Md. App. at 579. Entry of the requested order wouldnot simply “supply omission in record of action really hadbut omitted through inadvertence or mistake[,]” but wouldactually “supply omitted action[.]” This is not the purpose ofnunc pro tunc orders. See id. In other words, the court's denialof Appellant's motion was not a clerical error that can becorrected nunc pro tunc. Rather, Appellant urges the court touse its nunc pro tunc power to completely change the outcomethe court reached, which is improper. See id. at 578-79.Even if entry of the order nunc pro tunc were proper, which itis not, Appellant's argument would still fail because the Minoris not substantively eligible for a SIJS predicate order. Federallaw defines a Special Immigrant Juvenile as an immigrant“who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court [...]or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placedunder the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or anindividual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court[,]”and whose reunification with one or both of their parents is“not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similarbasis” under State law. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). To beeligible for SIJ status, a petitioner must: (1) be under 21 yearsof age at the time of filing the petition; (2) be unmarried at thetime of filing and adjudication; (3) be physically present in theU.S.; (4) be the subject of a juvenile court order that meets therequirements in 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c); and (5) obtain consentfrom the Secretary of Homeland Security to classification asa SIJ. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c).In Appellant's underlying Motion for Order Nunc Pro Tunc,Appellant concedes that her Emergency Motion was notrequested within the requisite time constraints and argues thatthe Minor should not be penalized because:Due to untimely filed the EmergencyMotion to Expedite Hearing whichwas requested a few days beforethe Minor reached 21 years old dueto unforeseeable circumstances, theemergency hearing was denied, and[the Minor] has since reached the ageof 21. The failure to file the Emergencymotion to Expedite Hearing within thenecessary time frame was through nofault of [Appellant] or [the Minor],but the fault of counsel in not filingthe emergency motion at least 30 daysbefore the age-out. [Appellant] shouldnot be penalized for counsel's mistake.See, e.g. Kiser v. State Roads Comm'n,153 Md. 76 (1927) (standing for theproposition that courts may issue nuncpro tunc orders if the delay was causedby others besides the petitioner, e.g.the court, or clerical errors)[.]6*4 However, on appeal Appellant argues that prong (1) issatisfied because the “Minor” was not yet 21 years old whenAppellant's Petition for SIJS findings was filed.
AMPARO TREJO v. MIGUEL ANGEL AMAYA..., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Regardless of Appellant's conflicting arguments concerningprong (1), the Minor would not have been eligible for anSIJS-predicate order because she cannot satisfy prong (4). Forprong (4)’s purposes, a “juvenile court” is a court located inthe U.S. that “has jurisdiction under State law to make judicialdeterminations about the dependency and/or custody and careof juveniles.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a). 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(i) provides that a juvenile court “must have made at leastone of the following judicial determinations related to thepetitioner's custodial placement or dependency[:]”(A) Declared the petitioner dependent upon the juvenilecourt; or(B) Legally committed to or placed the petitioner underthe custody of an agency or department of a State, oran individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenilecourt.Here, the Minor has not received either of these kinds oforders. Appellant sought entry of a custody order over theMinor, but one was never entered. Thus, prong (4) for SIJstatus could not be satisfied for the Minor. Additionally, the“best interests of the child” standard does not overcome thestatutory requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c).Therefore, irrespective of any alleged errors by Appellant'scounsel in this case, the Minor would not have beensubstantively eligible for SIJS status.CONCLUSIONAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court forPrince George's County.JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCEGEORGE'S COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BEPAID BY THE APPELLEE.All CitationsNot Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2026 WL 1162579Footnotes*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. Itmay be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).1We refer to her as “the Minor” to protect her identity because she was a minor at the outset of this case.2Notably, this is a final judgment, reviewable by this Court because with this denial, all claims against all partieswere disposed of. See e.g. Silbersack v. ACandS, Inc., 402 Md. 673, 678 (2008) (internal citations omitted).3The Court has identified several issues with the cases cited in Appellant's brief. Of the seven cases citedin Appellant's brief, three of them do not exist. Each of these citation irregularities will be addressed in turnin footnotes.Additionally, Appellant's brief notably makes many legal assertions without providing citations to supportthem. For example, the “Standard of Review” section does not contain a single citation.4We strike the portions of Appellant's brief as it pertains to this argument because the three cases cited assupport do not exist.5While not binding on this Court, this case was acknowledged as persuasive support in the following cases:Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 346-47 (1995); Short, 136 Md. App. at 579; In re Timothy C., 376 Md.at fn. 10.
AMPARO TREJO v. MIGUEL ANGEL AMAYA..., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.56As previously noted, this case does not exist.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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