Saur. The decree made due provision for the possibility that either Saur or Eexford might refuse to proceed as directed, but such provisions require no discussion. From such decree, plaintiff appeals.
The only question of importance brought here is whether plaintiff Saur is entitled to partition, under the statute, on theory that the parties in interest are tenants in common.
They are such tenants since neither the deed of 1930 nor any other instrument or agreement, oral or written, is shown as having imposed any duties upon the “trustee” grantees. Our statute of uses and trusts (CL 1948, § 551.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §26.51 et seq.]) abolished passive or naked trusts and, therefore, upon delivery of the 1930 deed each member of the club, being entitled to possession and use of the lands, acquired a legal estate therein equal to his beneficial interest free of any active trust and subject to partition as was effectively decreed by the chancellor. See Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich 91, 97 (90 Am Dec 225); Rothschild v. Dickinson, 169 Mich 200; and Woolfitt v. Histed, 208 Mich 308.
Finding no reason for disagreement with the chancellor’s findings and decree of disposition, same should be confirmed and affirmed. It is so ordered. No costs.
Carr, C. J., and Dethmers, Kelly, Kavanagh, Souris, and Otis M. Smith, JJ., concurred.
O’Hara, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
On Application por Rehearing.
The publie sale provisions of past and present statutes relating to partition,* even when such provisions are invoked properly before a court of equity, are permissive rather than mandatory. They do
*
CL 1948, § 631.1 et seq. (Stat Ann § 27.2012 et seq.); RJA 1961, § 3301 et seq. (CL 1948, § 600.3001 et seq., Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.3301 et seq.).