A finding of obviousness is further supported by the prosecution history of the patent-in-suit. Defendant points out that during prosecution of the ’565 patent before the Patent and Trademark Office, the Examiner rejected a claim similar to claim 4 as an obvious combination of prior art. Specifically, the Examiner cited Redding for its disclosure of an adjustable pedal assembly comprising of a pedal movable in fore and aft directions on a pivotally movable guide rail mounted to a support member. The Examiner cited Smith for is disclosure of an electronic pedal position sensor attached to a pedal assembly support member, which the Examiner described as “old and well known in the art.” See Office Action of November 13, 2000, attached to Defendant’s Reply Brief, at Ex. 3. The Examiner stated his obviousness conclusion in the following manner:
Since the prior are [sic] references are from the field of endeavor, the purpose disclosed by Brown [sic] would have been recognized in the pertinent art of Redding. Therefore it would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to provide the device of Redding with the electronic throttle control means attached to a support member as taught by Smith.
Id. at 3.
Claim 4 of the ’565 patent was allowed by the Examiner, however, because of an added structural limitation, “wherein the position of said pivot (24) remains constant while said pedal arm (14) moves in fore and aft directions with respect to said pivot (24).” ’565 patent, col. 6, lines 33-36. Adding this structural limitation distinguished the patent-in-suit from Redding because the pedal pivot described in Red-ding does not remain constant while the pedal arm moves in fore and aft directions. Asano, however, discloses a pivot that does remain in a constant position while the pedal arm moves back and forth. Thus, the Court finds persuasive Defendant’s argument that if Asano had been cited to the Examiner, he would have found the combination of Asano and Smith to be obvious, just as he found the combination of Red-ding and Smith to be obvious.
i. Secondary Considerations
The final element of the Graham test for obviousness requires ascertaining the extent of any objective indicia of non-obviousness. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684. These so-called “secondary considerations” include commercial,, success, long-felt need, failure of others, skepticism and unexpected results. See 3M v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1573 :(Fed.Cir.1992). In some cases, such evidence is the most probative of obviousness. See Richardson-Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1483 (Fed.Cir.1997) (citing Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538). Secondary considerations, however, do not control the obviousness inquiry. See Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1483 (citing Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768 (Fed.Cir.1988)). In other words, secondary considerations “are but a part of the ‘totality of the evidence’ that is used to reach the ultimate conclusion of obviousness.” See Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1483.
Plaintiffs argue that the commercial success of the design depicted in the Engelgau patent supports a finding of non-obviousness. Commercial success, however, “is relevant only if it flows from the merits of the claimed invention.” Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1988). In other words, the party asserting commercial success must prove a nexus between the commercial success and the claimed invention. See Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1984).
Plaintiffs offer the declaration of Plaintiff Teleflex’s Director of Pedal Engineer