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DHS
(Oct. 17, 2025)
Case details
Full caption
Twyla Leach Minnesota DHS et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Minnesota (MN)
Court
Minnesota Supreme Court
Decided
Oct. 17, 2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Twyla
Leach
(Martin)
d/b/a
Home
Care
Staffing,
Plaintiff,
v....,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
1
2025
WL
2962486
Only
the
Westlaw
citation
is
currently
available.
United
States
District
Court,
D.
Minnesota.
Twyla
Leach
(Martin)
d/b/
a
Home
Care
Staffing
,
Plaintiff,
v.
Minnesota
Department
of
Human
Services,
UCare
Minnesota,
and
HealthPartners,
Inc.
,
Defendants.
Civ.
No.
25-3220
(PAM/SGE)
|
Filed
10/17/2025
MEMORANDUM
AND
ORDER
Paul
A.
Magnuson
United
States
District
Court
Judge
*1
This
matter
is
before
the
Court
on
Plaintiff
Twyla
Leach
(Martin)
d/b/a
Home
Care
Staffing's
Motion
for
a
temporary
restraining
order.
1
For
the
following
reasons,
the
Motion
is
denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Twyla
Leach
(Martin)
d/b/a
Home
Care
Staffing
is
enrolled
as
a
Minnesota
Health
Care
Programs
provider,
approved
to
provide
housing
stabilization
services
under
Minn.
Stat.
§
265B.051.
(Decl.
of
Melanie
LaBrie
(Docket
No.
50)
¶
2.)
Defendant
Minnesota
Department
of
Human
Services
(“DHS”)
is
a
state
agency
responsible
for
administering
Medicaid
in
Minnesota.
(Am.
Compl.
(Docket
No.
39)
¶
11.)
Defendants
UCare
Minnesota
and
HealthPartners,
Inc.
are
managed-care
organizations
that
contract
with
DHS
to
administer
payments
to
vendors
and
seek
Medicaid
reimbursements.
See
Minn.
Stat.
§
256B.064,
subd.
1b
.
Federal
and
state
law
require
the
DHS
commissioner
to
withhold
payments
to
a
Medicaid
provider
if
DHS
determines
that
there
is
a
“credible
allegation
of
fraud”
while
an
investigation
is
pending.
Id.
§
256B.064,
subd.
2(b)
;
see
42
C.F.R.
§
455.23(a)(1)
.
The
withholding
period
ends
when
“the
commissioner
determines
there
is
insufficient
evidence
of
fraud
by
the
vendor,
or
after
legal
proceedings
relating
to
the
alleged
fraud
are
completed.”
Minn.
Stat.
§
256B.064,
subd.
2(d)
.
In
summer
2025,
DHS
determined
that
there
is
a
credible
allegation
of
fraud
against
Plaintiff
for
overbilling,
and
DHS
is
investigating
that
potential
fraud.
(LaBrie
Decl.
¶
6.)
DHS
also
referred
the
matter
to
law
enforcement,
which
is
also
investigating
Plaintiff.
(
Id.
)
On
August
1,
2025,
DHS
sent
Plaintiff
a
“Notice
of
Payment
Withold,”
informing
her
that
a
temporary
withholding
would
begin
on
that
date
and
“continue
until
DHS
or
a
prosecuting
authority
determines
that
there
is
insufficient
evidence
of
fraud,
or
until
legal
proceedings
related
to
the
alleged
fraud
are
complete.”
(
Id.
Ex.
C
at
1.)
Because
DHS
“placed
a
hold”
on
Plaintiff,
HealthPartners
and
UCare
suspended
payments
to
Plaintiff,
as
required
by
law.
(Aff.
of
Martin
J.
Michael
(Docket
No.
53)
¶¶
4–5;
Def.
UCare's
Mem.
in
Opp'n
(Docket
No.
56)
at
4.)
Plaintiff
exercised
her
right
to
submit
written
evidence
to
DHS
demonstrating
that
the
temporary
withhold
should
be
lifted.
(LaBrie
Decl.
¶
13.)
DHS
reviewed
the
materials
and
upheld
the
temporary
withhold.
(
Id.
¶¶
15–16.)
This
lawsuit
followed.
Plaintiff
alleges
claims
for
unjust
enrichment,
violations
of
federal
Medicaid
laws,
a
violation
of
due
process
against
DHS,
and
claims
of
breach
of
contract
against
UCare
and
HealthPartners
and
tortious
interference
with
contract
against
DHS.
Plaintiff
moves
for
emergency
injunctive
relief,
and
although
the
Motion
does
not
state
explicitly
the
relief
she
seeks,
in
the
Amended
Complaint,
Plaintiff
asks
that
the
Court:
(1)
enjoin
Defendants
from
continuing
to
withhold
payments
from
her,
(2)
order
that
all
withheld
payments
be
immediately
released
to
her,
(3)
enjoin
the
agencies
investigating
Plaintiff
from
contacting
her
clients,
and
(4)
declare
that
the
temporary
withholding
of
payments
violates
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
United
States
Constitution
and
federal
laws
governing
Medicaid.
(Am.
Compl.
at
8.
2
)
Plaintiff
also
seeks
to
supplement
her
Amended
Complaint.
The
Court
will
discuss
the
Motions
in
turn.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standing
*2
Article
III
of
the
United
States
Constitution
limits
the
jurisdiction
of
federal
courts
to
justiciable
cases
and
controversies.
U.S.
Const.
art.
III,
§
2;
Lujan
v.
Defenders
of
Wildlife
,
504
U.S.
555,
559–60
(1992)
.
Standing
is
an
“essential
and
unchanging
part
of
the
case-or-controversy
requirement
of
Article
III
.”
Lujan
,
504
U.S.
at
560
(citation
omitted).
To
satisfy
Article
III
standing
requirements,
a
plaintiff
must
demonstrate:
Twyla
Leach
(Martin)
d/b/a
Home
Care
Staffing,
Plaintiff,
v....,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
2
(1)
[she]
has
suffered
an
injury
in
fact
that
is
(a)
concrete
and
particularized
and
(b)
actual
or
imminent,
not
conjectural
or
hypothetical;
(2)
the
injury
is
fairly
traceable
to
the
challenged
action
of
the
defendant;
and
(3)
it
is
likely,
as
opposed
to
merely
speculative,
that
the
injury
will
be
redressed
by
a
favorable
decision.
Friends
of
the
Earth,
Inc.
v.
Laidlaw
Env't.
Servs.
(TOC),
Inc.
,
528
U.S.
167,
180–81
(2000)
(quotations
omitted).
Whether
the
plaintiff
has
established
the
three
elements
of
standing
is
an
“inescapable
threshold
question.”
Advantage
Media,
L.L.C.
v.
City
of
Eden
Prairie
,
456
F.3d
793,
799
(8th
Cir.
2006)
(citing
Lujan
,
504
U.S.
at
560
).
If
a
plaintiff
lacks
standing,
the
court
has
no
subject-matter
jurisdiction
and
must
dismiss
the
claim.
See
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
12(h)(3)
.
UCare
argues
that
Plaintiff
lacks
standing
to
bring
her
claims
against
it
because
she
cannot
show
that
“UCare's
ministerial
compliance”
with
DHS's
legal
requirement
to
withhold
payments
is
an
injury
traceable
to
UCare.
(Def.
UCare's
Mem.
in
Opp'n
at
5.)
Plaintiff
does
not
respond
to
UCare's
argument
and
thus
appears
to
have
waived
any
objection
to
it.
The
Court
concludes
that
Plaintiff
has
not
established
standing
as
to
her
claims
against
UCare
or
HealthPartners.
Therefore,
the
Court
denies
Plaintiff's
Motion
for
injunctive
relief
as
to
those
Defendants
and
dismisses
the
claims
against
them,
as
the
Court
lacks
subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Even
if
Plaintiff
established
standing,
her
Motion
would
fail
regarding
UCare
and
HealthPartners,
as
described
below.
B.
Younger
Abstention
In
Younger
v.
Harris
,
401
U.S.
37
(1971)
,
and
its
progeny,
the
Supreme
Court
has
made
clear
that
lower
federal
courts
must
decline
to
hear
challenges
to
pending
state
actions
involving
important
state
interests.
See,
e.g.,
Middlesex
Cnty.
Ethics
Comm.
v.
Garden
State
Bar
Ass'n
,
457
U.S.
423,
432
(1982)
(dismissal
appropriate
in
light
of
pending
attorney
disciplinary
proceeding);
Moore
v.
Sims
,
442
U.S.
415
(1979)
(dismissal
appropriate
in
light
of
pending
child
custody
proceedings).
The
principles
espoused
in
Younger
are
often
referred
to
as
the
“
Younger
abstention
doctrine.”
The
Younger
doctrine
applies
when
(1)
there
are
ongoing
state
proceedings
involving
the
same
or
related
matters
to
the
federal
proceeding;
(2)
those
proceedings
involve
important
state
interests;
and
(3)
the
federal
court
plaintiff
has
an
adequate
opportunity
to
raise
questions
of
federal
law
in
the
state
proceedings.
Middlesex
Cnty.
Ethics
Comm.
,
457
U.S.
at
432
.
Defendants
UCare
and
HealthPartners
argue
that
the
Younger
abstention
doctrine
prevents
the
Court
from
taking
action
here.
The
Court
disagrees.
Although
the
state
is
investigating
Home
Care
Staffing
for
allegations
of
fraud,
both
civilly
and
criminally,
there
exists
no
underlying
state
judicial
proceeding,
although
that
may
change
pending
the
results
of
the
investigations.
Additionally,
DHS
lacks
the
authority
to
hear
or
resolve
the
constitutional
claims
Plaintiff
raises.
See
Minn.
Stat.
§
256.01,
subd.
2
(list
of
the
DHS
commission's
powers
and
duties
does
not
include
adjudicating
constitutional
issues).
Thus,
the
Court
determines
the
Younger
abstention
is
inapplicable
here.
*3
Although
Plaintiff
argues
that
the
Younger
abstention
does
not
apply,
the
Court
reached
its
conclusions
separately
from
Plaintiff's
arguments,
as
the
Court
is
gravely
concerned
with
Plaintiff's
briefing
on
the
subject.
(Docket
No.
77.)
A
legal
citation
provided
in
Plaintiff's
supplementary
memorandum
includes
a
quotation
not
found
within
the
case
cited,
nor
could
the
Court
locate
the
quotation
elsewhere.
With
the
proliferation
of
litigants
employing
artificial
intelligence
to
assist
in
legal
research,
the
Court
strongly
cautions
Plaintiff
against
using
such
research
tools
to
provide
inaccurate
information
to
the
Court.
In
this
instance,
the
Court
extends
leniency
as
Plaintiff
is
proceeding
pro
se;
however,
the
Court
will
strike
any
further
submissions
that
include
what
appear
to
be
hallucinated
citations
or
quotations
and
may
take
further
action
as
appropriate.
C.
Motion
for
Preliminary
Injunction
Injunctive
relief
is
“an
extraordinary
remedy
that
may
only
be
awarded
upon
a
clear
showing
that
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
such
relief.”
Winter
v.
Natural
Res.
Def.
Council,
Inc.
,
555
U.S.
7,
22
(2008)
(citation
omitted).
When
deciding
whether
to
issue
a
preliminary
injunction,
courts
consider
four
factors:
(1)
the
movant's
likelihood
of
success
on
the
merits;
(2)
the
threat
of
irreparable
harm
to
the
movant;
(3)
the
balance
of
harm
the
injunction
would
have
on
the
movant
and
the
opposing
party;
and
(4)
the
public
interest.
Dataphase
Sys.,
Inc.
v.
CL
Sys.,
Inc.
,
640
F.2d
109,
113
(8th
Cir.
1981)
.
While
Twyla
Leach
(Martin)
d/b/a
Home
Care
Staffing,
Plaintiff,
v....,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
3
no
factor
is
dispositive,
“the
absence
of
a
likelihood
of
success
on
the
merits
strongly
suggests
that
preliminary
injunctive
relief
should
be
denied.”
Barrett
v.
Claycomb
,
705
F.3d
315,
320
(8th
Cir.
2013)
(quoting
CDI
Energy
Srvs.,
Inc.
v.
West
River
Pumps,
Inc.
,
567
F.3d
398,
402
(8th
Cir.
2009)
).
1.
Likelihood
of
Success
on
the
Merits
To
demonstrate
a
likelihood
of
success
on
the
merits,
Plaintiff
must
establish
that
she
has
a
“fair
chance
of
prevailing”
on
a
claim.
Planned
Parenthood
of
Minn.,
N.
Dak.,
S.
Dak.
v.
Rounds
,
530
F.3d
724,
732
(8th
Cir.
2008)
.
Plaintiff
submits
no
evidence
to
show
that
she
is
likely
to
prevail
on
any
claim.
Plaintiff
does
not
dispute
that
she
is
under
investigation
for
fraud.
Rather,
she
attempts
to
litigate
any
potential
underlying
fraud
in
this
court,
where
that
is
not
at
issue.
The
law
requires
DHS
to
“suspend
all
Medicaid
payments
to
a
provider
after
[DHS]
determines
there
is
a
credible
allegation
of
fraud
for
which
an
investigation
is
pending
under
the
Medicaid
program
against
an
individual
or
entity
unless
[DHS]
has
good
cause
to
not
suspend
payments
or
to
suspend
payment
only
in
part.”
42
C.F.R.
§
455.23(a)(1)
.
Plaintiff
fails
to
provide
any
authority
to
support
that
the
Court
could
order
injunctive
relief
under
these
circumstances,
nor
could
she
do
so,
as
no
such
authority
exists.
The
Court
cannot
order
injunctive
relief
that
conflicts
with
the
law.
This
alone
dooms
Plaintiff's
Motion.
In
any
event,
the
sparse
facts
alleged
in
the
Amended
Complaint
do
not
identify
the
elements
of
any
of
Plaintiff's
claims
and
are
devoid
of
any
mention
of
Defendants’
specific
conduct
that
allegedly
violated
the
law.
Further,
Plaintiff
provides
no
support
for
her
argument
that
42
U.S.C.
§
1396a
or
the
various
federal
regulations
under
which
she
brings
her
claims
allow
for
a
private
right
of
action.
Plaintiff
fails
to
provide
any
support
for
her
claims
that
Medicaid
providers
have
a
protected
property
interest
in
Medicaid
payments
while
an
underlying
fraud
investigation
is
ongoing.
And
she
provides
no
basis
to
bring
constitutional
claims
against
private
entities—UCare
and
HealthPartners—and
does
not
allege
that
they
acted
under
the
color
of
law.
Moreover,
neither
her
Motion
for
a
temporary
restraining
order
nor
her
reply
memorandum
mention
any
of
the
claims
in
her
Amended
Complaint,
instead
asserting
bald
conclusions
about
the
four
Dataphase
factors.
Plaintiff
utterly
fails
to
show
a
likelihood
of
success
on
the
merits.
2.
Irreparable
Harm
*4
“Irreparable
harm
occurs
when
a
party
has
no
adequate
remedy
at
law,
typically
because
its
injuries
cannot
be
fully
compensated
through
an
award
of
damages.”
Gen.
Motors
Corp.
v.
Harry
Brown's,
LLC
,
563
F.3d
312,
319
(8th
Cir.
2009)
.
“[T]o
demonstrate
irreparable
harm,
a
party
must
show
that
the
harm
is
certain
and
great
and
of
such
imminence
that
there
is
a
clear
and
present
need
for
equitable
relief.”
Novus
Franchising,
Inc.
v.
Dawson
,
725
F.3d
885,
895
(8th
Cir.
2013)
(quoting
Iowa
Utils.
Bd.
v.
Fed.
Commc'ns
Comm'n
,
109
F.3d
418,
425
(8th
Cir.
1996)
).
“Failure
to
show
irreparable
harm
is
an
independently
sufficient
ground
upon
which
to
deny
a
preliminary
injunction.”
Watkins
Inc.
v.
Lewis
,
346
F.3d
841,
844
(8th
Cir.
2003)
(citing
Adam–Mellang
v.
Apartment
Search,
Inc.
,
96
F.3d
297,
299
(8th
Cir.
1996)
).
Plaintiff
argues
that
irreparable
harm
has
occurred
because
she
has
suffered
economic
injuries,
including
unpaid
claims,
lost
revenue,
and
business
hardship.
But
“economic
loss
does
not,
in
and
of
itself,
constitute
irreparable
harm
....
Recoverable
monetary
loss
may
constitute
irreparable
harm
only
where
the
loss
threatens
the
very
existence
of
the
[plaintiff]’s
business.”
Packard
Elevator
v.
I.C.C.
,
782
F.2d
112,
115
(8th
Cir.
1986)
.
Since
DHS
began
withholding
payments,
Plaintiff
has
submitted
36
new
claims
for
reimbursement
in
a
total
amount
of
$9,936.13.
(La
Brie
Decl.
¶¶
10,
12.)
The
withhold
does
not
prevent
Plaintiff
from
continuing
to
provide
services
to
Medicaid
and
non-Medicaid
clients,
it
only
prevents
her
from
receiving
Medicaid
funds
to
reimburse
her
services
during
the
withhold
period.
(
Id.
¶
9.)
She
projects
that
her
business
could
fail
because
of
the
withhold,
but
that
is
mere
speculation.
A
court
may
only
order
injunctive
relief
if
the
plaintiff
demonstrates
that
the
threat
of
injury
is
“real
and
immediate.”
O'Shea
v.
Littleton
,
414
U.S.
488,
496
(1974)
.
If
the
investigation
concludes
without
any
finding
of
wrongdoing,
all
of
the
withheld
payments
will
be
later
issued
to
Plaintiff.
(LaBrie
Decl.
¶
11.)
Further,
Plaintiff
argues
that
irreparable
harm
has
occurred
because
her
clients
are
suffering
as
they
are
not
receiving
the
housing
services
she
provides.
Although
Plaintiff
contends
that
her
clients
will
be
harmed
in
the
absence
of
injunctive
relief,
“[t]he
irreparable-harm
analysis
focuses
on
the
moving
party,
not
the
nonmoving
party
or
some
third
party
.”
Kansas
v.
United
States
,
124
F.4th
529,
534
(8th
Cir.
2024)
(emphases
in
original)
(quoting
Walsh
v.
Ahern
Rentals,
Inc.
,
No.
21-16124,
2022
WL
118638,
at
*2
n.2
(9th
Cir.
Jan.
12,
2022)).
Plaintiff
fails
to
demonstrate
irreparable
harm.
3.
Balance
of
Harms
and
Public
Interest
Twyla
Leach
(Martin)
d/b/a
Home
Care
Staffing,
Plaintiff,
v....,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
4
The
remaining
Dataphase
factors
weigh
sharply
against
the
relief
Plaintiff
seeks
as
she
has
not
demonstrated
that
the
balance
of
harms
or
public
interest
weigh
in
favor
of
issuing
an
injunction.
Plaintiff
fails
to
provide
any
reason
why
the
difficulties
she
faces
due
to
her
own
business
decisions
outweigh
the
harm
that
Defendants
would
incur
should
the
Court
order
that
payments
be
released
to
her.
Also,
there
is
no
doubt
that
the
public
interest
heavily
weighs
in
favor
of
protecting
against
fraud
in
government
programs
and
courts
upholding
clearly
enunciated
statutory
authority
to
monitor
the
same.
Plaintiff's
conclusory
allegations
fail
to
meet
the
high
burden
to
warrant
emergency
injunctive
relief,
and
the
Court
denies
her
Motion.
D.
Motion
to
Amend
Rule
15
allows
a
court
to
“permit
a
party
to
serve
a
supplemental
pleading
setting
out
any
transaction,
occurrence,
or
event
that
happened
after
the
date
of
the
pleading
to
be
supplemented.”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
15(d)
.
Plaintiff
seeks
to
amend
her
pleadings
to
include
documents
drafted
after
this
lawsuit
began,
expert
reports
created
for
this
litigation,
and
a
“Report
on
Exhibits
J-S
for
Supplemental
Critical
Evidence”
that
she
appears
to
have
drafted.
These
documents
are
plainly
not
those
contemplated
by
the
Rule
and
Plaintiff's
Motion
to
Supplement
Evidence
is
denied.
CONCLUSION
*5
Accordingly,
IT
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED
that:
1.
Plaintiff's
Addendum
and
Renewed
Motion
for
Temporary
Restraining
Order
(Docket
No.
41)
is
DENIED
;
2.
Plaintiff's
claims
against
Defendants
UCare
and
HealthPartners
are
DISMISSED
as
the
Court
lacks
subject-matter
jurisdiction;
3.
Defendants
UCare
and
HealthPartners’
Motions
to
Dismiss
(Docket
Nos.
63,
73)
are
found
as
MOOT
;
and
4.
Plaintiff's
Motion
to
Amend
(Docket
No.
45)
is
DENIED
.
All
Citations
Slip
Copy,
2025
WL
2962486
Footnotes
1
Plaintiff
styles
her
Motion
as
one
for
a
temporary
restraining
order.
Because
Defendants
received
notice
of
the
Motion
and
had
an
opportunity
to
respond,
the
Court
will
treat
the
Motion
as
one
for
a
preliminary
injunction.
See
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
65(a)
–
(b)
.
2
This
citation
refers
to
the
ECF
page
number.
End
of
Document
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
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