Kasso v. Police Officers’ Fed'n of Minneapolis, No. 23-cv-2777 (Oct. 21, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Leila Kasso v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Minnesota (MN)
Court
Minnesota Supreme Court
Decided
Oct. 21, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Leila Kasso, Plaintiff, v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2963375Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Minnesota.Leila Kasso, Plaintiff,v.Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis, Defendant.Case No. 23-cv-2777 (KMM/DLM)|Filed 10/21/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S SECONDMOTION TO COMPEL RULE 45 SUBPOENADOUGLAS L. MICKO United States Magistrate Judge*1 This matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff LeilaKasso's Second Motion to Compel Rule 45 Subpoena. (Docs.103, (Motion), 105 (Memorandum).) Ms. Kasso seeks tocompel the production of documents and electronically storedinformation (“ESI”) from non-party City of Minneapolis(“the City”). The City opposes Ms. Kasso's subpoena,and argues that her motion should be denied. (Docs. 113(Memorandum in Opposition), 112 (Declaration).) The matteris now fully submitted and the motion is ripe for decision.For the reasons explained below, the Court grants in part anddenies in part Ms. Kasso's Second Motion to Compel Rule 45Subpoena (Doc. 103).BACKGROUNDPro se Plaintiff Leila Kasso is a former MinneapolisPolice officer who alleges discriminatory treatment on thebasis of race and sex by the Police Officers’ Federationof Minneapolis (“the Federation”) in violation of TitleVII. (Doc. 58.) Ms. Kasso filed her original complaintagainst the Federation on September 8, 2023, allegingmany causes of action, including violations of Title VII,violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),age discrimination, defamation, retaliation, and other claims.(Doc. 1.) Along with the Federation, she named as defendantsin her original complaint the City of Minneapolis and the Cityof Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”). (Id.) On January5, 2025, Ms. Kasso, filed a Second Amended Complaintagainst the Federation only, effectively dismissing the Cityand MPD from the lawsuit. (Doc. 58.)1On January 19, 2025, the Federation moved to dismiss Ms.Kasso's Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 59.) The Courtgranted in part and denied in part that Motion (Doc. 87.)Relevant here, Judge Menendez dismissed all but Plaintiff'sTitle VII claim for race and sex discrimination, finding thatMs. Kasso had pled facts sufficient to state a “straightforwardclaim that the Federation both undermined her employmentwith the MPD after a medical episode and then failed to assisther in re-securing her employment in the manner it wouldhave done for a white, male officer—even one facing far moreserious employment disputes.” (Id. at 9.)Once discovery began, Ms. Kasso propounded a Rule 45subpoena duces tecum on the City on July 22, 2025. (Doc.104-4.) The City timely objected to Plaintiff's subpoena onAugust, 5, 2025. (Doc. 112-1.)2 The record reflects thatattempts to meet-and-confer in good-faith pursuant to LocalRule 7.1 were unsuccessful. (See generally Doc. 104-7.)*2 Ms. Kasso's subpoena, which includes 23 requests, seeksa wide range of documents, ESI, and other information thatPlaintiff alleges are relevant to her original bevy of claimsagainst the Federation, even though the Court dismissed theoverwhelming majority of those claims. (See generally Doc.104-3.) In her Memorandum in Support of her Motion toCompel, Ms. Kasso generally contends that the City's refusalto produce discovery threatens her ability to prepare fortrial. (Doc. 105 at 1.) She makes few directed arguments insupport of her Motion, but does argue at length that the City'sobjections are without merit. (See generally Doc. 105.)The City objects to each of Plaintiff's requests. Primarily,the City objects because, from its perspective, Ms. Kasso'srequests are largely irrelevant to her Title VII claim. Buteven where her requests are marginally relevant, the Cityargues that her requests are unduly burdensome on a non-party. The City further contends that Plaintiff's Motion shouldbe denied because she has “wasted” the Court's and counsel'stime by using fictitious caselaw likely generated by ArtificialIntelligence (“AI”) and because she has “refused” to meet
Leila Kasso, Plaintiff, v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2and confer according to Local Rule 7.1. (Doc. 113 at 1.)Ultimately, given the breadth and depth of discovery Ms.Kasso seeks, the City urges the Court to understand herMotion as an attempt to contravene the discovery limitationsin her parallel case against the City and deny it accordingly.(Id.)ANALYSISI. PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION TO COMPELRULE 45 SUBPOENA IS GRANTED IN PART ANDDENIED IN PART.Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishesthat the scope of discovery in a civil case is limited to all non-privileged information that is “relevant to any party's claimor defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Courts construe the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) broadly, see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,501 (1947)), but the scope of discovery includes only whatis relevant to the actual claims or defenses that are at issue,see Sherman v. Sheffield Fin., LLC, 338 F.R.D. 247, 252 (D.Minn. 2021). And it is the party that seeks discovery whomust make a threshold showing that the information soughtis relevant to the claims or defenses in the case. Id. (citingHofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992)).If that occurs, then “the party resisting production bears theburden of establishing lack of relevancy or undue burden.”Inline Packaging, LLC v. Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc., No.15-cv-3183 (ADM/LIB), 2016 WL 6997113, at *7 (D. Minn.Sept. 6, 2016) (quoting St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Com. Fin.Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000)).Beyond being relevant, Rule 26 requires that informationsought in discovery also be “proportional to the needs of thecase.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Factors important to a court'sproportionality analysis include “the importance of the issuesat stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources,the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, andwhether the burden or expense of the proposed discoveryoutweighs its likely benefit.” Id. Along with these constraints,a district court “must limit discovery if it determines that it canbe obtained from some other source that is more convenient,less burdensome, or less expensive.” Johnson Tr. of OperatingEng'rs v. Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc., 950 F.3d 510,524-25 (8th Cir. 2020).When a party wishes to compel a nonparty to producediscovery in a lawsuit, Rule 45 provides that a nonpartymay be commanded by subpoena to “produce designateddocuments, electronically stored information, or tangiblethings in that person's possession, custody, or control.” Fed.R. Civ. P. 45(a). But “[a] party or attorney responsible forissuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable stepsto avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a personsubject to the subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). When anon-party is subpoenaed, the concern for burden under Rule45(d)(1) carries “special weight” in a court's analysis. In rePork Antitrust Litigation, No. 18-cv-1776 (JRT/HB), 2022WL 972401, at *7 (D. Minn. March 31, 2022) (“Concernfor the burden on a non-party subject to a subpoena carriesspecial weight when balancing competing needs.”). Thisconcern reflects the reality that non-parties, unlike partiesto a civil action, neither anticipate nor elect to exposethemselves to discovery processes. When a Rule 45 subpoenaimposes undue burden on a non-party or requests irrelevantinformation, the Court must quash or modify that subpoena.Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv).*3 Ms. Kasso propounds 23 distinct requests upon the City,a non-party to this action. The Court considers each of Ms.Kasso's requests, balancing the considerations set out by Rule26 and Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.A. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as toRequests No. 1-7, 13-15.In these requests, Ms. Kasso seeks “ESI and Phone Records”for nine non-party City employees: John Laluzerne, ThomasSchmid, Henry Halvorson, David Garman, Bob Kroll,Eric Hagle, Destiny Xiong, Erin Grabowski, and MedariaArradondo. (Doc. 104-3 at 3-9.) She requests the workcell phone number associated with each individual; all textmessages sent or received by each individual on any workcell phone or device; a log of all numbers called and receivedby each individual on any work cell phone or device; and allCity of Minneapolis email data from the named individuals’official email account, including content and attachments.(Id.) While the temporal scope of her requests varies perrequest, Request Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 13, and 14 seek documentsand ESI from before the year 2018.3 (See Doc. 104-3 at 3,4,6-9.) As to Request No. 15, Ms. Kasso seeks only contactdetails for a former MPD Lieutenant Richard Jackson. (Doc.104-3 at 10.)
Leila Kasso, Plaintiff, v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Ms. Kasso contends that the information she seeks in theserequests is relevant to her Title VII claim against theFederation, as well as to her original host of claims dismissedby the Court. The City objects, noting that these requests arenot relevant to show that the Federation selectively assistswhite male officers; that the requests are not proportional tothe needs of the case; and that the requests are not fashionedto limit burden on a non-party. In support of its last point,the City asserts that producing the email data from theseindividuals’ accounts alone would amount to a more than amillion email records. (Doc. 113 at 5.)As an initial matter, the Court reiterates that Rule 45subpoenas duces tecum govern the production of “documents,electronically stored information, or tangible things.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 45(a)(B). Ms. Kasso's requests for non-party phonenumbers and addresses are not requests for documents, ESI,or a tangible things. While Rule 33 may command that sort ofinformation (though only against parties), Rule 45 does not.Accordingly, the Court denies these requests to the extent Ms.Kasso seeks information that lies beyond the ambit of Rule45. Request No. 15 is denied fully on this basis.Secondly, these requests are not relevant. In almost everyrequest, Ms. Kasso seeks discovery related to claims thatare no longer a part of her lawsuit. But Rule 26 makesdiscoverable only nonprivileged information that is relevantto a party's claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Inshort, Ms. Kasso's requests must be relevant to her operativeclaim, that is, her Title VII claim against the Federation. YetMs. Kasso repeatedly invokes her dismissed claims as thebasis of relevance in these requests. Ms. Kasso's requestsare therefore denied insofar as they invoke her dismissedclaims. The Court also denies these requests where they seekinformation beyond the relevant temporal scope determinedby the Court.*4 To the extent that Ms. Kasso does seek informationrelevant to her Title VII claim, these requests must bedenied because they run afoul of Rule 26’s proportionalityrequirement. In seeking all email, text, and phone recordsrelated to these individuals without limitation, Ms. Kassorequests a sea of information in which she would find littleto do with her claim against the Federation. No doubt, theserequests encompass some relevant information: casting sowide a net, how could one not catch a few fish? But as written,the Court cannot grant these requests. Plaintiff's requests aresimply too broad, and their relevance too meager, to satisfyRule 26’s proportionality requirement.The overbreadth of Ms. Kasso's requests marks a failureto reduce the burden on the City as required by Rule 45.As the City observes, compliance with these requests wouldcompel a non-party to produce, review, and redact more than amillion emails alone. (Doc. 112 at 5.) Attention to the “specialweight” that burden on non-parties merits in the Rule 45analysis, and to the foregoing considerations, calls for denialof these requests.B. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as toRequests No. 8 and No. 20.In Request No. 8, Ms. Kasso compels the production ofVisinet Case Records and ESI concerning her bicycle accidenton May 20, 2018. (Doc. 104-3 at 7.) Plaintiff argues only thatthese records are relevant to “the reported basis of the City'sclaim of defense.” (Id.)Through Request No. 20, Plaintiff seeks comprehensiveinformation about her insurance coverage by MedicaInsurance during her employment with the City ofMinneapolis. (Doc. 104-3 at 13.) She states that thisinformation is relevant to show that the City “knew inNovember 30, 2018 they had no intention to reinstatePlaintiff.” (Id.)Although Ms. Kasso declares otherwise (See Doc. 104-3 at1), the City is not a defendant to this action. It is a non-party.Because it is not a defendant, it has no defense that couldprovide a basis of relevance under Rule 26. What the Cityknew, and when, may be relevant to Ms. Kasso's suit againstthe City, but not her suit against the Federation. The Courtdenies these requests.C. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as toRequest No. 9.In this request, Ms. Kasso seeks “Court and ArbitrationCase Numbers (Career to Present): for John Laluzerne,Eric Hagle, Bob Kroll, David Garman, Sherry Appledorn,Troy Carlson, David O'Conner.” (Doc. 104-3 at 7.) Ms.Kasso states that these records are relevant to show howthe named individuals enjoyed “decades of benefits fromthe Federation... yet the Federation failed to assist thePlaintiff...” (Id.) The City objects. It argues that Ms. Kasso'srequest should be understood as an interrogatory directedat a non-party; that court records are publicly available andcompelling production from a non-party imposes an undueburden; and lastly that the Federation is better equipped to
Leila Kasso, Plaintiff, v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4supply discovery related to labor arbitrations. (Doc. 113 at24).)As the City correctly notes, Plaintiff's request for thenumbers related to certain court cases and arbitration recordsconstitutes an interrogatory properly governed by Rule 33,which cannot be propounded against a non-party. In anyevent, this request would unduly burden a non-party. Courtcase numbers are publicly available and do not require use ofa Rule 45 subpoena. Arbitration records, though not publiclyavailable, are more appropriately sourced from the party tothis action, the Federation. For these reasons, the Court deniesthis request.D. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Granted as toRequest No. 10.In this request, Ms. Kasso moves the Court for an Ordercompelling the production of disciplinary files held byCity related to Bob Kroll, David Garman, John Laluzerne,Thomas Schmid, Pete Brazaeu, Heather Jorges, SherryAppledorn, and Sherral Schmidt. (Doc. 104-3 at 8.) Ms.Kasso further requests that the City produce these files intheir native format, with all associated metadata, transcripts,and outcomes. (Doc. 104-3 at 7-8.) Among other claims, sheasserts that these files are relevant to show that the Federationdiscriminates by selectively assisting white, male officers—such as the named officers here—in workplace disputes.(Doc. 104-3 at 7-8.) The City argues that the request shouldbe denied because Ms. Kasso seeks confidential informationthat harms privacy interests; because the request is not time-limited; and because Ms. Kasso makes no showing that thenamed individuals were similarly situated to herself. (Doc.113 at 26.)*5 Balancing both parties’ positions, the Court grants thisrequest as to the years 2018 through 2020. In a Motion toCompel, Ms. Kasso need not prove her case in full—she onlyneeds to meet the threshold showing set out in Rule 26 and45. Here, Ms. Kasso has made that showing. At this point inlitigation, Ms. Kasso need not prove that these officers weresimilarly situated to herself for the purposes of her Title VIIclaim. The Court also determines that the privacy interestsare not outweighed by Plaintiff's interest in these files. Andalthough a non-party, the City is best situated to provide therequested documents, and the burden imposed is not undue.4Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted as toRequest No. 10 to the extent Ms. Kasso seeks disciplinaryfiles for the named individuals from the years 2018 through2020.E. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as toRequest No. 11.Ms. Kasso next requests a list of “dollar amounts” theCity has paid out to a list of nine named individuals “inCriminal or Civil cases due to the following officers’ actionsor inactions.” (Doc. 104-3 at 8.) Plaintiff argues that therelevance of these files relates to “comparative analyses” onthe City's payouts to white officers, to demonstrate that theCity maintains employment of “mostly White male officerswho repeatedly cause violations working in the City ofMinneapolis and backed by the Federation.” (Id.)The Court denies this request. While arguably topical, acomprehensive evaluation of settlement pay-outs is notrelevant to Ms. Kasso's claim against the Federation norproportional to the needs of this case. Moreover, civilsettlement records are publicly available through the City'sown webpage such that Ms. Kasso does not need a Rule45 subpoena to access the information she seeks. For thesereasons, Plaintiff's request No. 11 is denied.F. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as to RequestNo. 12.In this request, Plaintiff seeks employment reviews of BobKroll and David Garman from January 1, 2005-January 1,2009, to demonstrate, she argues, the advantages enjoyedby these two white male officers compared to the Plaintiff,a Black female. (Doc. 104-3 at 8.) Other disqualifyingreasons aside, Plaintiff's request falls well outside the relevanttemporal scope for her claim. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel isdenied as to Request No. 12.G. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as toRequests No. 16, 17, 22.Through Request No. 16, Ms. Kasso seeks a troveof ESI and documents related to MPD officer MollyFischer's apparent concussion, including her medical file,hospital documentation, case number, police report, medicalauthorization, the identity of the Federation Representativenotified to assist her, and any reinstatement processes Ms.Fischer underwent to return to work. (Doc. 104-3 at 10.)Ms. Kasso states that these documents are relevant to showa “pattern and practice of discrimination.” (Id.) The City
Leila Kasso, Plaintiff, v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5objects, noting that this request is, essentially, a nine-partinterrogatory directed toward a non-party. (Doc. 113 at 30.)Through Request No. 17, Ms. Kasso seeks ESI related tothe “Work force database for the Fourth Precinct with acopy of all shifts and departments in the Minneapolis fourthprecinct from January 1, 2018, January 1, 2019 and fromJanuary 1, 2020-January 1, 2022” in order to determine theidentity of the “White male officer with whom suffered [sic]a severe accident.” (Doc. 104-3 at 10-11.) Plaintiff suggeststhis information is relevant to show how the Federationassisted this unidentified white male officer who suffered ahead injury, assistance which the Plaintiff alleges she didnot receive. (Id.) The City objects. In its Memorandum, theCity explains that Workforce Director is a timekeeping andscheduling software used by the MPD. (Doc. 113 at 31). TheCity asks the Court to deny this request on the grounds thatit unduly burdens a non-party to produce a vast amount ofconfidential and irrelevant data. (Id.)*6 Through Request No. 22, Ms. Kasso seeks informationrelated to MPD's “Employee Intervention System,” includingthe identity of individuals related to Plaintiff's involvementin that program, and information about whether the“Plaintiff was referred to counseling or in house “police”counseling.” (Doc. 104-3 at 14.) In arguing for the relevanceof this request, Ms. Kasso merely states that these recordswill be used during trial. (Id.) The City objects. It writesthat Plaintiff erroneously identifies MPD's Early InterventionSystem, a non-disciplinary program that identifies andsupports struggling police officers. (Doc 113 at 36.) TheCity argues that Plaintiff's unrestricted request related to thisprogram is overbroad, impinges on private personnel data,and unduly burdens a non-party. (Doc. 113 at 36.)In these requests, Ms. Kasso seeks mere needles inhaystacks of irrelevance. Ms. Kasso's requests seek reams ofpersonal, often sensitive details about City employees withoutlimitation. To the extent Ms. Kasso seeks a sliver of relevantinformation in each request, it is eclipsed by the irrelevanceof the information sought and outweighed by the burden ofproduction on a non-party. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel isdenied as to Request Nos. 16, 17, and 22.H. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as toRequest No. 18.Through this request, Plaintiff seeks her own personnel anddisciplinary files in native format. (Doc. 104-3 at 11.) Ms.Kasso does not explain how this request is relevant to herTitle VII claim against Federation. The City objects to thisrequest, and adds that it has already produced this material inthe parallel lawsuit. (Doc. 112 at 5.)A Rule 45 subpoena compels the production of informationto which a litigant does not have access in the interest ofsettling disputes. Rule 26 requires the Court to limit discoveryif the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative orduplicative...” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Because Ms. Kassois already in possession of her own personnel and disciplinaryfiles, then compelling the production of this discovery wouldbe duplicative. See also Minn. Stat. § 181.961 (settingforth state-law statutory basis for personnel records reviewrequests). Accordingly, Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel isdenied as to Request No. 18.I. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as to RequestNo. 19.Plaintiff's next request is two-fold. First, Ms. Kasso requestsgeneral contact information related to the Axon Body CameraCorporation “or any entity that provides body camera servicesto the City of Minneapolis.” (Doc. 104-3 at 12.) Second, sherequests body camera footage from May 20, 2018, the dateof her bicycle accident. (Id.) She requests this informationto refute claims regarding Plaintiff's medical condition madeby the City officers. (Id.) The City objects. Among otherreasons, the City represents to the Court that Ms. Kassoalready possesses video footage of her bicycle accident suchthat she need not compel it here. (Doc. 112 at 5.)As to Axon Body Camera's information, Ms. Kasso's requestis a request for an interrogatory beyond Rule 45’s purview.Moreover, the information Ms. Kasso seeks is a publiclyavailable corporate address; filing a motion to compel the Cityto provide that information does little beyond giving credenceto the City's complaint that Ms. Kasso has not taken steps toavoid imposing undue burdens on this nonparty. Additionally,her request for body camera footage is unnecessary. As withRequest No. 18, because Plaintiff is already in possession ofthe body camera footage she requests, this request is denied.Accordingly, Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is denied as toRequest No. 19.J. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as to RequestNo. 21.Plaintiff next requests contact details for the City's emailand cellphone service providers, including general corporatecontact details. (Doc. 104-3 at 14.) She also requests all
Leila Kasso, Plaintiff, v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6emails and text messages “regarding the Plaintiff from anyFederation Representative to any individual from January 1,2016, until May 20, 2020.” (Doc. 104-3 at 14.) Ms. Kassomakes no relevance showing for this request.*7 The City objects. It argues first that this request is aninterrogatory, and secondly that it is irrelevant to Plaintiff'sclaim against the Federation. The City further objects thatMs. Kasso's requests for emails about herself on the groundsthat this request is overly broad and unduly burdensome, andwould require the City to produce, review, and redact overa 1,000 emails. (Doc. 112 at 5.) The City then notes thatproduction of all text messages related to Plaintiff would beoverly burdensome because it would require the City to obtainall phone numbers and email addresses used by the Federationover four years. (Doc 114 at 35-36.)The Court denies this request. The City correctly notes, andthe Court agrees, that general contact information of theCity's email and cellphone service providers are interrogatoryrequests beyond the ambit of Rule 45. While Ms. Kasso'srequests for emails and text messages from FederationRepresentatives regarding herself are likely relevant, Ms.Kasso bears the burden of proving the relevance of theinformation she seeks. See Sherman v. Sheffield Fin., LLC,338 F.R.D. 247, 252 (D. Minn. 2021) (“the party seekingdiscovery is required to make a threshold showing ofrelevance before production of information is required.”).Because Ms. Kasso has made no showing of relevance, theCourt denies this request as written.K. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is Denied as toRequest No. 23.Plaintiff's final request seeks the production of “all ESI,documentation, notes reports, written information, medicalopinions and any communications has [sic] with “RiskManagement, Occupational Health Consultants, and Healthand Wellness.” (Doc. 104-3 at 14.) Ms. Kasso states merelythat this information is relevant for use at trial. (Id.)This request is denied. This request is so ambiguous as to beindecipherable. It appears to request vast stores of informationwith no showing of how the discovery sought is relevant toMs. Kasso's Title VII claim.II. MS. KASSO'S OTHER REQUESTS FOR RELIEFARE DENIED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.Along with her enumerated requests for production, Ms.Kasso asks this Court for three further forms of relief. First,she seeks a ruling that the City's objections are waived foruntimely filing. (Doc. 103 at 3.) Second, she requests anaward of reasonable costs and fees under Rule 37(a)(5).(Id.) Lastly, she requests an adverse inference instruction forevidence allegedly withheld by the City in bad faith, any otherrelief the Court deems just and proper. (Id.) The Court hasalready noted the basis of its denial of Ms. Kasso's first requestfor relief. For the following reasons, the Court denies Ms.Kasso's second and third requests for relief.A. Ms. Kasso is not entitled to Attorneys’ Fees orExpenses.Ms. Kasso seeks fees and costs from the City. If a motionto compel is granted in part and denied in part, a court may“apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). Based on the record before it, the Courtconcludes that expenses are unwarranted. Although the Courtgrants Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel in part, the evidence ofPlaintiff's good faith efforts to obtain discovery before filingof her Motion are, at best, conflicting. (See Doc. 112 at 1-2;Doc. 114 at 4-5.) Regardless, the City's objections to Ms.Kasso's requests are substantially justified. The City is a non-party to this action and Ms. Kasso's requests have been far-reaching, largely irrelevant, and often unduly burdensome.This is demonstrated by, among other things, the fact that Ms.Kasso's motion is granted with respect to a single request outof the 23 that are the subject of her motion. Plaintiff is stronglyencouraged to review Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45(d)(1) and 37(a)(5)(C), which contemplate the payment of feesand expenses—and apportionment of such payment—basedon the merits of the motion. Here, the Court will not orderpayment of expenses to Ms. Kasso.B. No Adverse Inference Instruction is Warranted.*8 Plaintiff seeks an adverse inference instruction. Anadverse inference instruction is an extreme measure topenalize and deter failures to properly preserve ESI. Fed.R. Civ. P. 37, subdiv. (e)(2). Only when a party acts “withintent to deprive another party of the information's use in thelitigation” may the Court instruct the jury at trial that suchevidence would be unfavorable to the party responsible forthe loss. Id. Not only is there zero evidence the City intendedto deprive Ms. Kasso of the requested information's use, butalso, despite Ms. Kasso's repeated assertions otherwise, theCity is not a party to this litigation. Therefore, an adverseinstruction against the City as a non-party makes no sense.
Leila Kasso, Plaintiff, v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7III. PLAINTIFF'S CITATIONS VIOLATE RULE 11.Finally, the Court must address Plaintiff's use of inaccurateand nonexistent caselaw consistent with irresponsible use ofAI. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 imposes a “personal,nondelegable responsibility” to “validate the truth and legalreasonableness of the papers filed” in an action. Pavelic& LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126–27(1989). Federal courts throughout the country have reiteratedthe same: the use of nonexistent caselaw generated by AIrepresents an abdication of the duty of truthfulness and anabuse of the legal system. Kohls v. Ellison, No. 24-CV-3754(LMP/DLM), 2025 WL 66514, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 10,2025) (describing how AI-generated sources in a declaration“shatters [the declarant's] credibility with this Court”); Matav. Avianca, Inc. 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)(“An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversaryby relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversarysystem.”). Beyond plain violation of Rule 11, the harms ofcitations to fake AI-caselaw include sullying the reputationof the judiciary, wasting time, and denigrating the otherwisevalid claims of litigants. See Morgan v. Cmty. AgainstViolence, No. 23-cv-353-WPJ/JMR, 2023 WL 6976510, at *8(D.N.M. Oct. 23, 2023).Ms. Kasso's use of fictitious and non-existent caselaw violatesunder Rule 11. Ms. Kasso has repeatedly cited to caselawthat does not exist. (See Doc. 103 at 2 (citing to Klingensteinv. Pettit, 297 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (S.D.N.Y 2003) whichdoes not exist), 3, (citing to In re Application of Time, Inc.,1999 WL 804090, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1999) but In reApplication of Time, Inc. is a case from the Eastern Districtof Louisiana, and the quoted language appears nowhere inthe case); Doc 105 at 2, (citing Miller v. Pruneda, 236 F.R.D.277, 282 (N.D. Tex. 2006) but Miller is a 2004 case from theNorthern District of West Virginia, and does not support Ms.Kasso's proposition.) She has also often cited to real casesfor propositions for which they clearly do not stand. (SeeDoc. 105 at 2-3 (citing to Martindell v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp.,594 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1979); Andritz Sprout-Bauer,Inc., v. Beazer East, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 609, 631 (M.D. Pa.1997); Doc. 102 at 3.) In doing so, Ms. Kasso has abdicatedher duty of truthfulness to the Court under Rule 11, wastedtime and resources, and jeopardized the integrity of her ownclaims and the success of her suit. The Court acknowledgesthe utility of AI to the pro se litigant, especially faced withsteep barriers to access legal education and resources. Butpro se litigants, including Ms. Kasso, are not exempt fromfollowing the substantive and procedural requirements ofthe law. Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984)(“Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally,pro se litigants are not excused from failing to comply withsubstantive and procedural law.”). Liberal construction doesnot mean anything goes. And Ms. Kasso's pro se status willnot protect her from the “steep consequences” that courtsacross the country have imposed for the use of fake, AI-generated sources. Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir.2024) (referring attorney for potential discipline for use offake, AI-generated citations in a filing); see also Kohls v.Ellison X Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 466(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (sanctioning attorney for including fake, AI-generated legal citations in a filing); Kruse v. Karlan, 692S.W.3d 43, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (dismissing appeal basedon litigant's use of fake, AI-generated legal citations). TheCourt thus warns Plaintiff that further use of fictitious andinaccurate authorities will not be tolerated.ORDER*9 Accordingly, based on the above and on all the files,records, and proceedings in this action, IT IS ORDEREDthat:1. Plaintiff Leila Kasso's Second Motion to Compel Rule45 Subpoena (Doc. 103) is GRANTED IN PART andDENIED IN PART.a. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is GRANTED asto Request No. 10. The City must produce anydocuments related to that request with 21 days of thisOrder.b. Ms. Kasso's Motion to Compel is DENIED as to allother Requests.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2963375
Leila Kasso, Plaintiff, v. Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Footnotes1However, Ms. Kasso maintains an ongoing parallel suit against the City (Kasso v. City of Minneapolis et al.,23-cv-2782) broadly arising from the same set of circumstances.2Ms. Kasso's contention that the City has waived its right to object lacks merit. Rule 45 directs that an objection“must be served before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena isserved.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). Ms. Kasso served the City with a subpoena on July 22, 2025. (Doc.104-4.) The City objected on August, 5, 2025—within fourteen days of service of Ms. Kasso's subpoena.(Doc. 112-1.) The City therefore timely objected to Ms. Kasso's subpoena.3The Court has determined that the relevant temporal scope for Plaintiff's Title VII claim is likely 2018 to 2020.(Doc. 87 at 10.)4While the City frequently objects to the format of production requested by Ms. Kasso, it does not do so here.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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