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Loftong v. Grove Farms
(June 2, 2025)
Case details
Full caption
COUNTY v. BOLIN GROVE FARMS, LLC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Minnesota (MN)
Court
Minnesota Supreme Court
Decided
June 2, 2025
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
2
of
22
to
by
Attorney
Price
in
her
responsive
filing
were
Rules
3.1
and
3.3
of
the
Mississippi
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct,
such
Rules
pertaining
to
meritorious
claims
and
contentions
and
candor
toward
the
Tribunal,
Rule.
A
hearing
was
held
on
Briggs’
motion
on
September
11;
2025,
and
the
Court,
having
considered
the
filings
of
the
parties,
the
applicable
law,
and
the
arguments
of
counsel,
now
finds
as
follows:
I.
DISCOVERY
VIOLATIONS
Briggs
urges
the
Court
to
impose
the
ultimate
sanction
of
dismissal,
along
with
reasonable
expenses
and
attorneys’
fees,
stemming
from
what
they
argue
is
Lofton’s
abuse
of
the
discovery
process
through
the
production
of
fraudulent
documentation
and
rendering
of
false
claims,
specifically
in
reference
to
Lofton’s
proof
of
damages
relative
to
two
vendors,
namely
Elite
Consultants
and
Paramount
Farms.
The
Court
will
address
each
vendor
in
turn.
Elite
Consultants
Elite
Consultants,
owned
by
John
Babinski,
was
engaged
by
Lofton
to
provide
environmental
remediation
services
over
a
number
of
days
in
February
2020
following
the
hydraulic
fluid
leak
giving
rise
to
the
instant
cause
of
action.
In
an
effort
to
support
his
claim
for
damages
related
to
work
performed
by
Elite
Consultants,
Lofton
propounded
upon
Briggs
in
his
Answer
to
First
Set
of
Interrogatories
and
Request
for
Production
of
Documents
Propounded
by
Defendarit/Cross-Defendant
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.
[MEC
#55]
and
Response
to
Third
Set
of
Interrogatories
and
Fourth
Requests
for
Production
of
Documents
Propounded
by
Defendant/Cross-Defendant
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.
[MEC
#142],
his
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses.
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses,
MEC
#174-1
at
pp.
7-88.
Lofton’s
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses
is
comprised
of
Oil
Spill
Work
Logs
dated
February
15,
2020,
through
February
27,
2020;
receipts/invoices;
checks;
credit
card
statements;
and
what
the
parties
have
termed
“acknowledgments
of
payment,”
or
documents
on
B&B
Landscaping
letterhead
purportedly
signed
by
Lofton
and
various
vendors
showing
proof
of
payment
for
work
performed.
Id.
Included
within
such
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses
are
two
receipts,
Receipt
#109
and
Receipt
#110,
from
Elite
Consultants,
that
Briggs
alleges
to
be
fraudulent.
.
'
Page2of22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
20Ô
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
3
of
22
Receipt
#109
is
dated
March
23,
2020,
and
reflects
that
Lofton
paid
Elite
Consultants
$2,175.00
“[f|or
absorbent
boom
and
application.”
Id.
at
p.
21.
Receipt
#110
is
dated
March
30,
2020,
and
reflects
that
Lofton
paid
Elite
Consultants
$31,585.00
for
“(cjonsulting
and
assisted
with
the
process
of
reclamation
of
the
property.”
Id.
at
p.
75.
All
told,
such
receipts
reflect
that
by
March
30,
2020,
Lofton
had
paid
Elite
Consultants
a
total
of
$33,760.00.
In
April
2024,
Lofton
sat
for
a
deposition
and
was
questioned
about
his
claim
for
damages
relative
to
work
performed
by
Elite
Consultants.
During
such
deposition,
Lofton
offered
the
following
testimony:
Q:
Let’s
look
at
Elite
Consultants,
LLC.
And
their
charge
is
$31,585.
Now,
is
this
Mr.
Babinski’s
bill?
A:
Yes,
sir.
Q:
And
how
did
you
pay
that
bill?
A:
Well,
I
--1
tried
to
pay
him
with
a
check,
but
he
was
going
through
a
divorce
and
said
he
wouldn’t
take
a
check,
so...
Q:
Did
you
ever
give
him
a
check
that
bounced?
A:
Well,
I
gave
him
a
check,
because
we
didn’t
know
when
we
were
going
—
that
was
our
agreement,
I
was
going
to
pay
him
when
I
got
paid.
And
he
was
like,
“Well,
write
me
a
check
showing
me
that
and
that
will
be
all
right.
At
least
I
can
show
the
Court,
you
know,
that
you
did
say
that
you
were
going
to
pay
me
this
amount.”
So,
I
wrote
him
a
check
to
hold
until
we
got
paid,
and
he
went
the
veiy
next
day
and
tried
to
cash
it.
Q:
So,
did
you
ever
give
Mr.
Babinski
$31,585?
A:
30,000.
Me
and
him
kind
of
went
south
after
that
cash
checking
deal,
and
he
told
me
he
could
not
take
a
check
because
he
was
divorced.
And
I
took
him
30,000.
And
I
said,
“You
can
either
take
30
or,”
you
know.
Q:
So,
when
you
took
him
$30,000,
was
that
a
check?
A:
Cash.
Q:
So,
you
gave
Mr.
Babinski
$30,000
cash?
A:
Yes,
sir.
Deposition
of
Brian
Lofton,
MEC
#163-9
at
236:13-237:19.
Accordingly,
while
Lofton
represented
to
Briggs
through
his
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses
that
he
had
paid
Elite
Consultants
$2,175.00
as
of
March
23,2020
(Receipt
#109)
and
an
additional
$31,585.00
as
Page
3
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
4
of
22
of
March
30,
2020
(Receipt
#110),
for
a
total
of
33,760.00,
by
Lofton’s
own
testimony,
the
most
he
ever
possibly
paid
Babinski
was
$30,000.00?
While
this
discrepancy
alone
demonstrates
to
the
Court
that
Lofton
abused
the
discovery
process
by
producing
knowingly
fraudulent
documentation
to
Briggs
in
discovery,
it
appears
that
such
deception
runs
even
deeper.
Prior
to
Lofton
filing
the
instant
cause
of
action,
he
and
Attorney
Price
were
in
discussions
with
Briggs’
in-house
counsel,
Yolanda
Brown,
in
an
attempt
to
resolve
matters
without
the
need
for
formal
litigation.
During
the
course
of
such
pre-suit
communications,
Lofton
submitted
documentation
to
Attorney
Brown
that
was,
in
Attorney
Price’s
own
words,
“not
true”
and
“fraudulent,”
to
include
the
very
same
receipts,
Receipt
#109
and
Receipt
#110,
that
Lofton
later
turned
over
to
Briggs
in
discovery
as
proof
of
damages.
This
is
what
Attorney
Price
had
to
say
about
such
records:
There
were
several
issues
with
the
information
we
provided
to
them,
and
we
will
have
to
deal
with
them
if
we
want
to
be
successful
in
proving
our
case.
To
put
it
bluntly,
the
numbers
just
don’t
add
up
and
if
I
noticed
it,
then
they
know
it
too.
They
are
already
suspicious
of
any
document
personally
generated
by
you
because
of
the
Babs
issue.
From
their
standpoint
you
provided
them
with
“paid
in
full”
receipts
from
Babs
and
even
a
signed
acknowledgment
from
Babs
swearing
that
he
received
his
payment
in
March»
Then
an
email
is
sent
from
Babs
saving
that
he
never
signed
this
document
and
he
never
received
any
money
from
you.
Even
though
the
issue
have
[sic]
now
been
settled,
they
still
know
that
we
sent
an
invoice
that
we
claimed
had
been
paid
and
an
acknowledgment
that
we
claimed
had
been
signed,
and
it
was
not
true.
August
26,2020,
Email,
MEC
#163-3
at
p.
2
(emphasis
added).
And,
ELITE
CONSULTANTS
-
SAYS
YOU
MADE
8
CASH
PAYMENTS
TOTALING
$31,585.00
(INVOICE
#110)
AND
ALSO
SAYS
THAT
A
CREDIT
CARD
WAS
USED
TO
PAY
$2,627.85
(INVOICE
#109)
HOWEVER,
THAT
INVOICE
IS
FOR
$2,175.00.
ALSO,
THE
RECEIPTS
(109)
AND
(110)
DATED
MARCH
23
rd
AND
30
th
SAY
THAT
YOU
PAID
BABS
IN
FULL
ON
THISE
TSIC1
DATES.
HOWEVER,
THEN
BABS
TOLD
HER
HE
HAD
NOT
SIGNED
ANY
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
THAT
HE
HAD
NOT
BEEN
PAID
A
DIME
AS
OF
AUGUST,
2020.
BASED
ON
THE
SCREENSHOT
THAT
YOU
SENT
ME
ON
8/12/20,
BABS
HAS
NOW
TOLD
HER
1
Briggs
has
produced
a
Sworn
Affidavit
of
John
K.
Babinski
wherein
Mr.
Babinski
attests
that,
as
of
November
22,
2024,
he
has
not
received
any
payment
from
Lofton
for
the
environmental
remediation
work
he
performed
at
Bolin
Planation.
Sworn
Affidavit
of
John
K.
Babinski,
MEC
#163-11.
While
Briggs
urges
the
Court
to
consider
such
swom
affidavit
as
evidence
that
Lofton
perjured
himself
during
his
April
2024
deposition,
the
Court
declines
to
take
a
position
on
what
it
considers
to
be
a
question
of
credibility.
Page
4
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
5
of
22
THAT
THIS
HAS
BEEN
SETTLED
BETWEEN
THE
TWO
OF
YOU,
BUT
I
DON’T
HAVE
PROOF
THÀT
HE
ACTUALLY
SENT
THE
EMAIL
TO
YOLANDA,
AND
NOW
YOLANDA
.
IS
SUSPICIOUS
OF
EVERY
DOCUMENT
THAT
WAS
GENERATED
BY
OUR
SIDE
SINCE
SHE
KNOWS
THAT
THE
RECEIPTS
AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
OF
PAYMENT
WERE
BOTH
FRAUDULENT.
Attachment
to
August
26,2020,
Email,
MEC
#163-4
(emphasis
added).
Based
upon
the
above,
it
is
clear
to
the
Court
that
not
only
did
Lofton
knowingly
and
intentionally
produce
fraudulent
proof
of
damages
during
th.e
course
of
discovery
but
Attorney
Price
was
likewise
aware
that
such
documents
were
fraudulent
and
aided
Lofton
in
the
perpetration
of
such
fraud
upon
both
counsel
opposite
and
the
Court.
Paramount
Farms
Paramount
Farms,
which
Lofton
alleges
is
owned
by
Bryant
Whitfield,
although
Bryant
Whitfield
disputes
such
ownership,
see
Deposition
of
Bryant
Whitfield,
MEC
#181-1
at
9:23-10:4
(testifying
that
he
is
not
the
owner
of
Paramount
Farms),
is
alleged
to
have
provided
sodding
services
to
Lofton
in
connection
with
the
hydraulic
fluid
leak.
See
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants’
Responses
to
First
Combined
Set
of
Interrogatories
and
Request
for
Production
of
Documents
Propounded
by
Defendants,
Bolin
Grove
Faims,
LLC,
Bolin
Plantation,
LLC,
and
Walter
Roop,
MEC
#163-5
at
p.
4
(“Mr.
Whitfield
has
knowledge
of
the
amount
of
sod
that
was
needed
to
repair
the
area
damaged
by
the
oil
spill.
He
was
the
one
that
provided
the
sod.”).
According
to
Lofton’s
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses
and
April
2024
deposition
testimony,
Lofton
utilized
the
services
of
Paramount
Farms
on
or
about
February
18,
2020,
and
March
24,
2020,
in
relation
to
the
instant
litigation.
February
18,2020
According
to
Lofton’s
testimony,
in
January
2020
prior
to
the
hydraulic
fluid
leak,
Lofton’s
company,
Keaton
Landscaping
and
Pressure
Washing,
LLC
d/b/a
B&B
Landscaping
&
Pressure
Washing,
accepted
a
job
for
“final
grading,
sod
installation
&
flowerbed
installation”
at
a
house
located
on
Craft
Road
in
Hernando,.
MS.
Deposition
of
Brian
Lofton,
MEC
#163-9
at
246:1-8.
Lofton
testified
that
as
a
result
of
the
clean-up
efforts
he
was
engaged
in
at
Bolin
Farms,
when
the
time
came
to
perform
such
job
he
was
Page
5
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
6
of
22
unable
to
and
contracted
out
the
same
to
Paramount
Farms.
Id.
at
240:9-11.
Lofton
testified
that
upon
completion
of
the
job,
the
homeowner
paid
Lofton
$5,650
for
the
work
and
Lofton
immediately
turned
the
same
over,
in
cash,
to
Paramount
Farms.
Id.
at
240:11-14;
246:9-25.
As
proof
of
such
transaction
between
Lofton
and
Paramount
Farms,
Lofton
produced
his
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses
containing
an
Oil
Spill
Work
Log
dated
February
17,
2020,
an
invoice
from
Paramount
Farms
dated
February
18,
2020,
and
an
acknowledgement
of
payment
dated
September
28,
2020.
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses,
MEC
#174-1
at
pp.
22-23,
30,
and
79.
When
Bryant
Whitfield
was
questioned
about
such
business
transaction
at
his
March
2025
deposition,
he
testified
that
the
February
18,
2020,
invoice
produced
by
Lofton
was
actually
a
work
order
or
estimate
and
did
not
reflect
work
that
Paramount
Farms
had
actually
performed.
Deposition
of
Bryant
Whitfield,
MEC
#163-13
at
23:17-24:13;
27:20-24.
Indeed,
per
Whitfield,
such
invoice/work
order
was
generated
in
June
2020
at
Lofton’s
request.
Id.
at
48:3-25.
As
proof
of
such
assertion,
Whitfield
produced
the
following
text
message
purportedly
from
Lofton
dated
June
12,
2020,
at
9:27
AM,
that
prompted
Whitfield
to
create
such
document:
Hey,
can
you
do
me
a
favor?
I’m
trying
to
get
together
a
bunch
of
invoices
and
receipts
together
from
when
the
tornado
came
through
for
my
insurance.
Can
you
send
me
a
receipt
showing
you
I
paid
you
$5,650
on
2-18-20?
Put
on
the
receipt
that
it
was
for
sod
and
landscaping.
Id.
at
47:12-19.
Whitfield
also
testified
that
he
never
received
$5,650
in
cash
from
Lofton,
Id.
at
29:20-22;
31:7-25;
41:25-42:3.
Furthermore,
when
Whitfield
was
shown
a
copy
of
the
acknowledgment
of
payment
produced
by
Lofton
in
discovery
as
further
proof
of
damages,
Whitfield
testified,
again,
that
Lofton
had
never
paid
him
$5,650
in
cash
as
reflected
on
such
acknowledgment
of
payment
and,
moreover,
that
the
signature
affixed
thereon
which
purports
to
be
that
of
Bryant
Whitfield,
was.
not
his
and
that
he
had
never
given
Lofton
permission
to
sign
anything
on
his
behalf.
Id.
at
40:2-23;
44:4-7.
While
Briggs
points
to
Whitfield’s
testimony
as
proof
that
Lofton
engaged
in
fraudulent
conduct
during
the
discovery
process,
and
while
such
testimony
certainly
raises
red
flags,
the
Court
is
not
convinced.
Page
6
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
8
of
22
The
Court
finds
that
because
Lofton’s
sworn
testimony
and
the
acknowledgment
of
payment
Lofton
produced
in
discovery
reflect
two
differing
explanations
as
to
the
work
allegedly
performed
by
Paramount
Farms
and
the
damages
allegedly
incurred
by
Lofton
as
a
result,
that
either
Lofton
perjured
himself
during
his
April
2024
deposition
or
produced
fraudulent
documentation
during
the
discovery
process.
The
Court
need
not
decide
which
violation
Lofton
is
guilty
of
as,
regardless,
it
is
clear
to
the
Court
that
Lofton
abused
the
discovery
process.
March
24,2020
Also
attached
to
Lofton’s
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses
is
a
second
invoice
from
Paramount
Farms
in
the
amount
of
$3,690.00
for
the
following
work:
Delivery
fee
Description
Rate
Qty
Line
Total
Bermuda
Pallet
Tifway
419
Bermuda
Pallet
450sqft
$85.00
8
$680.00
Bermuda
Big
Roll
Bermuda
Roll
360sqft
$65.00
.
44
$2,860.00
Delivery
$150.00
1
$150.00
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses,
MEC
#174-1
at
p.
80.
Such
invoice
is
dated
March
24,
2020,
and
contains
handwritten
notations
stating
“3,675.00”
and
“I
paid
with
check
#
1768”.
Id.
Additionally,
written
on
a
yellow
sticky
note
affixed
thereto,
is
a
handwritten
notation
that,
yet
again,
references
“check
#.1768.”
Id.
When
questioned
about
such
invoice,
Whitfield
was
unable
to
state
one
way
or
another
whether
Paramount
Farms
had
performed
such
work
for
Lofton
in
connection
with
the
oil
spill
clean-up
at
Bolin
Plantation.
Deposition
of
Bryant
Whitfield,
MEC
#163-13
at.
32:21-36:15;
42:4-11.
However,
as
with
the
invoice
generated
by
Whitfield
in
relation
to
the
work
.Lofton
alleges
Paramount
Farms
performed
on
or
about
February
18,
2020,
Whitfield
was
again
able
to
produce
a
text
message
purportedly
from
Lofton
timestamped
later
the
same
day
of
Lofton’s
February
18,
2020,
request
which
reads
as
follows:
Page
8
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
9
of
22
One
more
receipt
I
need
from
you.
Send
me
a
receipt
where
I
paid
for
a
load
of
sod
delivered
to
Bolin
Plantation,
8
pallets,
680;
44
rolls,
$2,860;
deliver,
150;
total
$3,690....
Date
it
for
March
the
...
24th.
Id.
at
49:7-16.
It
is
certainly
not
lost
on
the
Court
that
such
text
message
contains
the
exact
description
of
the
work
reflected
on
the
March
24,
2020,
invoice.
See
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses,
MEC
#174-1
at
p.
80.
As
proof
that
such
invoice
had
been
paid,
Lofton
included
within
his
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses
a
check
numbered
1768.
Id.
at
81.
Such
check
is
written
out
to
Paramount
Farms
in
the
amount
of
$3,675
and
is
dated
February
24,
2020.
Id.
Setting
aside
the
fact
that
the
check
is
written
for
an
amount
that
does
not
match
the
total
amount
of
the
invoice,
although
it
does
match
the
handwritten
figure
on
the
invoice
produced
by
Lofton,
and
the
fact
that
the
check
is
dated
February
24,2020,
or
an
entire
month
before
the
work
was
even
invoiced,
both
of
which
give
the
Court
cause
for
concern,
most
troubling
to
the
Court
is
that
the
check
reflects
in
the
memo
section
that
it
is
for
invoice
number
3332.
Id.
The
Court
finds
such
reference
to
invoice
number
3332
troubling
because,
in
looking
at
the
invoice
produced
by
Lofton,
while
there
is
no
visible
invoice
number,
indeed
Whitfield
testified
that
the
invoice
number
would
normally
appear
in
the
exact
location
where
the
redundant
yellow
sticky
note
was
placed
prior
to
being
turned
overby
Lofton,
Deposition
of
Bryant
Whitfield,
MEC
#163-13
at
36:3-6,
the
following
excerpt
from
Attorney
Price’s
August
26,2020,
email
offers
the
Court
some
concerning
insight
into
this:
PARAMOUNT
FARMS-
THERE
WERE
TWO
SEPARATE
INVOICES.
...
ON
THE
SECOND
INVOICE,
SAID
YOU
WROTE
A
CHECK
FOR
$3,675
FOR
INVOICE
#3332
(IN
MEMO)
BUT
THE
INVOICE
IS
3403
AND
IS
FOR
$3,690.00.
(Need
proof
of
how
invoice
3403
was
paid
because
even
the
vendor
did
not
acknowledge
payment
of
this
invoice).
Attachment
to
August
26,
2020,
Email,
MEC
#163-4
(emphasis
added).
Accordingly,
the
invoice
produced
by
Lofton
in
his
Itemized
Labor
and
Expenses
in
the
amount
of
$3,690.00
is
invoice
number
3403,
not
invoice
number
3332
for
which
check
number
1768
corresponds.
Moreover,
as
Attorney
Price
notes
in
her
email,
proof
of
payment
relative
to
invoice
number
3403
was
still
needed,
further
confirming
that
check
number
1768
was
not
proof
of
payment
as
to
invoice
number
3403.
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Page
10
of
22
Despite
having
called
such
discrepancies
to
Lofton’s
attention
as
early
as
August
26,2020,
Lofton,
and
Attorney
Price,
nevertheless
proceeded
to
produce
to
Briggs
the
same
invoice
(number
3403)
and
the
same
check
(number
1768)
as
proof
of
damages,
albeit
this
time
with
a
yellow
sticky
note
covering
the
invoice
number
and
some
handwriting
to
seemingly
explain
or
otherwise
legitimize
the
inconsistent
dollar
amounts
reflected
on
the
invoice
versus
on
the
check.
It
is
clear
to
the
Court
that
both
Lofton
and
Attorney
Price
were
aware
of
the
fraudulent
proof
of
damages
when
they
exchanged
the
same
during
the
course
of
discovery.
n.
DISCOVERY
SANCTIONS
Having
found
that
both
Lofton
and
his
counsel,
Attorney
Price,
abused
the
discovery
process
by
producing
knowingly
fraudulent
documentation
to
bolster
Lofton’s
claim
for
damages,
the
Court
must
now
determine
whether
Briggs’
requested
sanction
of
a
dismissal
of
Lofton’s
claims
with
prejudice
and
reasonable
expenses
and
attorneys’
fees
is
appropriate
pursuant
to
Rule
37(e)
of
the
Mississippi
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
and
the
Mississippi
Litigation
Accountability
Act.
Rule
37(e)
of
the
Mississippi
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
Pursuant
to
Rule
37(e)
of
the
Mississippi
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
“the
court
may
impose
upon
any
party
or
counsel
such
sanctions
as
may
be
just,
including
the
payment
of
reasonable
expenses
and
attorneys’
fees,
if
any
party
or
counsel
...
abuses
the
discovery
process
in
seeking,
making
or
resisting
discovery.”
MRCP
Rule
37(e).
“The
decision
to
impose
sanctions
for
discovery
abuse
is
vested
in
the
trial
court’s
discretion.
The
provisions
for
imposing
sanctions
are
designed
to
give
the
court
great
latitude.
The
power
to
dismiss
is
inherent
in
any
court
of
law
or
equity,
being
a
means
necessary
to
orderly
expedition
of
justice
and
the
court’s
control
of
its
own
docket.”
Pierce
v.
Heritage
Properties,
Inc.,
688
So.2d
1385,
1388
(Miss.
1997)
(internal
citations).
“While
the
severest
of
sanctions
should
be
reserved
for
extreme
circumstances,
the
district
court
does
not
abuse
its
discretion
by
imposing
the
sanction
of
dismissal
when
a
party
demonstrates
flagrant
bad
faith
and
callous
disregard
for
its
responsibilities.”
Id.
at
1390
(citing
Medina
v.
Foundation
Reserve
Insurance
Co.,
870
P.2d
125,126
(1994)).
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Page
11
of
22
In
determining
whether
dismissal
of
Lofton’s
cause
of
action
is
an
appropriate
sanction
under
Rule
37(e)
for
the
abuse
uncovered
here,
the
Court
must
consider
the
following
Pierce
factors:
(1)
Whether
the
discovery
violations
were
the
result
of
willfulness
or
bad
faith;
(2)
Whether
the
deterrent
value
of
Rule
37
may
be
achieved
by
lesser
sanctions;
(3)
Whether
the
wronged
party
has
suffered
prejudice
as
a
result
of
the
discovery
violation;
and
(4)
Whether
the
discovery
abuse
is
attributable
solely
to
trial
counsel
instead
of
a
blameless
client.
City
of
Jackson
v.
Rhaly,
95
So.3d
602,
608
Q12)
(Miss.
2012)
(citing
Pierce,
688
So.2d
at
1389)).
(1)
Whether
the
discovery
violations
were
the
result
of
willfulness
or
bad
faith
“A
finding
of
willfulness
may
be
based
upon
either
a
willful,
intentional,
and
bad
faith
attempt
to
conceal
evidence
or
a
gross
indifference
to
discovery
obligations.”
Pierce,
688
So.2d
at
1390
(citing
Medina
v.
Foundation
Reserve
Insurance
Co.,
870
P.2d
125,126
(1994)).
With
respect
to
those
damages
being
claimed
by
Lofton
for
work
performed
by
Elite
Consultants,
Lofton,
through
Attorney
Price,
submitted
paid-in-full
invoices
that,
per
Attorney
Price’s
August
26,2020,
email,
were
known
to
be
fraudulent,
a
fact
that
Lofton
himself
confirmed
during
his
deposition.
As
to
those
damages
claimed
by
Lofton
for
work
performed
by
Paramount
Farms
on
February
18,
2020,
not
only
were
significant
questions
raised
as
to
the
veracity
of
the
“invoice”
Lofton
produced
as
proof
of
payment,
but
the
acknowledgment
of
payment
produced-by
Lofton
to
“release”
the
defendants
from
any
financial
liability
to
Paramount
Farms,
itself
of
questionable
authenticity,
misrepresented
both
the
work
performed
by
Paramount
Farms
and
the
nature
of
any
alleged
financial
injury
suffered
by
Lofton.
Finally,
as
to
those
damages
claimed
by
Lofton
for
work
performed
by
Paramount
Farms
on
March
24,
2020,
Lofton,
through
Attorney
Price,
submitted
a
paid-in-full
invoice
and
check
that
was
known
by
both
Lofton
and
Attorney
Price
to
be
unrelated
to
the
claimed
damages.
Rather
than
address
this
fraud,
a
yellow
sticky
note
was
simply
placed
on
the
mismatched
invoice
to
conceal
the
invoice
number,
some
handwritten
notes
were
added
to
the
invoice,
and
the
same
bad
invoice
and
check
were
turned
over
to
Briggs
in
discovery.
Page
11
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Page
12
of
22
There
can
be
no
question
that
both
Lofton
and
Attorney
Price’s
conduct
during
discovery
was
the
result
of
their
gross
indifference
to
their
discovery
obligations.
To
acknowledge
one
day
that
certain
documentation
is
fraudulent
and
the
next
submit
the
very
same
documentation
as
proof
of
damages
was
a
blatant,
“willful,
intentional,
and
bad
faith
attempt”
by
Lofton
to
deceive
both
Briggs
and
this
Court.
(2)
Whether
the
deterrent
value
of
Rule
37
may
be
achieved
by
lesser
sanctions
The
Court
has
considered
the
deterrent
value
of
lesser
discovery
sanctions,
to
include
assessing
attorneys’
fees
and
reasonable
expenses
incurred
by
Briggs
in
uncovering
such
abuse,
excluding
such
evidence
of
damages
at
trial,
and
disallowing
recovery
as
to
such
damages,
or
any
combination
thereof.
However,
in
light
of
the
egregiousness
of
such
violations
and
Lofton’s
response
thereto,
the
Court
does
not
find
that
anything
less
than
dismissal
would
serve
sufficient
deterrent
value.
Much
of
the
discovery
abuse
uncovered
by
Briggs
was
exposed
by
the
August
26,
2020,
email
written
by
Attorney
Price.
Rather
than
acknowledging,
as
the
August
26,2020,
email
did,
that,
for
example,
the
paid-in-full
invoices
for
Elite
Consultants
were
fraudulent
and,
perhaps,
had
been
inadvertently
provided
to
Briggs
in
discovery,
Lofton
denies
any
wrongdoing
and
instead
attempts
to
distract
from
such
deception
by
scolding
Briggs
for
even
using
such
August
26,2020,
disclosures
against
him:
“Briggs
relies
heavily
on
the
[August
26,
2020]
pre-suit
correspondence
between
Attorney
Price
and
Lofton
intended
to
be
privileged
information
and
sent
only
to
one
other
party
with
the
expectation
of
him
being
a
Co-Plaintiff
to
allege
that
Lofton
submitted
fraudulent
documentation.”
Plaintiffs’
Response
in
Opposition
to
Motion
to
Dismiss
and
Motion
for
Reasonable
Expenses
and
Attorneys’
Fees
Filed
by
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.,
MEC
#174
at
p.
4.
Then,
after
placing
blame
on
the
disclosure
of
the
August
26,
2020,
email,
Lofton
attempts
to
characterize
such
fraudulent
documentation
as
merely
reflective
of
“the
real-world
limitations
of
a
small
business
responding
to
an
urgent
situation”
rather
than
anything
fraudulent
or
otherwise
deceptive..
Id.
at
p.
9.
Lofton
also
attempts
to
reframe
the
narrative
surrounding
such
August
26,
2020,
email,
by
urging
the
Court
to
see
such
email
as
something
to
be
lauded:
Page
12
of
22
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Page
13
of
22
There
is
no
indication
that
Lofton
or
Attorney
Price
attempted
to
deceive
Briggs
or
the
Court.
On
the
contrary,
this
type
of
internal
review
reflects
caution
and
transparency,
not
bad
faith.
This
candid
legal
advice
-
taken
out
of
context
by
Briggs
-
shows
Attorney
Price
preparing
her
client
for
scrutiny,
not
instructing
him
to
fabricate
anything.
In
fact,
Attorney
Price
goes
on
to
advise
that
expenses
should
be
removed
unless
they
can
be
supported
by
checks
or
credit
card
statements.
The
takeaway
is
clear:
Both
Attorney
Price
and
Lofton
went
above
and
beyond
to
comply,
not
conceal.
Id.
at
4.
While
the
Court
may
have
been
inclined
to
give
some
weight
to
Lofton’s
argument
that
such
email
was
intended
to
prepare
Lofton
for
the
scrutiny
of
litigation,
any
such
inclination
was
abandoned
when
neither
Lofton
nor
Attorney
Price
heeded
such
“candid
legal
advice”
and
proceeded
to
produce
the
very
same
fraudulent
invoices
to
Briggs
in
discovery.
While
the
Court
understands
that
Lofton
is
displeased
that
such
August
26,
2020,
email,
having
been
stripped
of
any
attorney-client
or
common-interest
privilege,
became
part
of
the
record,
rather
than
protest
such
disclosure
or
present
it
as
something
it
clearly
was
not,
the
Court
would
have
hoped
to
see
from
Lofton
some
acknowledgment
and
acceptance
that
Lofton
allowed
fraudulent
documentation
to
be
produced
during
the
discovery
process.
It
has
become
abundantly
clear
to
the
Court
that
but
for
such
August
26,
2020,
email
having
come
to
light,
there
is
every
likelihood
that
the
discovery
abuses
uncovered
by
Briggs
would
have
gone
undetected
and
the
fraud
that
Lofton
and
Attorney
Price
were
perpetrating
upon
Briggs
and
this
Court
would
have
continued
unabated.
The
blame
shifting
and
misdirection
employed
by
Lofton
in
an
effort
to
downplay
any
culpability
for
the
pattern
of
discovery
abuses
that
occurred
here
is
disheartening
and
indicates
to
the
Court
a
refusal
by
Lofton
to
appreciate
the
seriousness
of
these
transgressions
and
the
Court
finds
that
any
sanction
lesser
than
dismissal
would
serve
no
deterrent
value.
See,
e.g.,
Edwards
v.
Coca
Cola
Bottling
Company
United,
Inc.,
264
So.3d
763
(Miss.
2019)
(affirming
trial
court’s
dismissal
where
plaintiff
offered
false
responses
in
her
interrogatory
responses
and
deposition
about
her
medical
history);
Scoggins
v.
Ellzey
Beverages,
Inc.,
743
So.2d
990
(Miss.
1999)
(affirming
trial
court’s
dismissal
where
plaintiff
offered
false
responses
in
her
interrogatory
responses
and
deposition
about
her
medical
history);
Pierce
v.
Heritage
Properties,
Inc.,
688
So.2d
1385
(Miss.
1997)
(affirming
trial
court’s
dismissal
where
plaintiff
lied
under
oath
on
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Page
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multiple
occasions);
Mubarak
v.
Sullivan,
296
So.3d
156
(Miss.
Ct.
App.
2020)
(affirming
trial
court’s
dismissal
where
plaintiff
lied
under
oath
about
her
medical
and
pharmaceutical
history)
(3)
Whether
the
wronged
party
has
suffered
prejudice
as
a
result
of
the
discovery
violation
As
reflected
by
both
Briggs’
motion
and
in
the
Affidavit
of
Alison
O’Neal
McMinn
[MEC
#196]
.
and
billing
records
submitted
therewith,
Briggs
endured
“major
inconvenience
in
time,
attorney
fees
and
general
frustration”
in
uncovering
Lofton’s
abuses.
Scoggins
v.
Ellzey
Beverages,
Inc.,
743
So.2d
990,
997
(p3)
(Miss.
1999).
The
Court
has
no
reason
to
doubt
that
Briggs
devoted
a
substantial
amount
of
time,
resources,
and
effort
in
uncovering
such
fraud
because
it
too
has
spent
a
disproportionate
amount
of
its
own
time
sorting
through
the
records
turned
over
and
piecing
together
the
precise
nature
and
extent
of
Lofton’s
violations.
Moreover,
as
noted
by
Briggs,
“due
to
Lofton’s
deception
and
admission
that
he
has
no
other
evidence
besides
his
own
signed
acknowledgments
to
support
his
claims
for
damages,”
such
signed
acknowledgments
being
of
the
same
general
form
as
the
one
at
issue
with
respect
to
Paramount
Farms,
Briggs
would
be
forced
to
conduct
additional
discovery
and
incur
additional
expense
to
re-depose
Lofton
and
depose
other
contractors
Lofton
alleges
he
paid
in
connection
with
work
done
relative
to
the
oil
spill
clean-up.
The
Court
also
notes
that
the
need
to
conduct
such
extensive
additional
discovery
at
this
late
stage
would
introduce
significant
further
delays
in
bringing
this
dispute
to
a
resolution
for
Briggs.
Accordingly,
the
Court
finds
that
Briggs
has
been,
and
will
continue
to
be,
substantially
prejudiced
as
a
result
of
Lofton’s
discovery
violations.
However,
the
Court
notes
that
Sunbelt,
who
ore
tenus
joined
such
motion,
has
not
demonstrated
to
the
Court
how
it
was
substantially
prejudiced
by
Lofton’s
misconduct
and,
accordingly,
has
failed
to
satisfy
this
prong
of
the
Pierce
factors.
(4)
Whether
the
discovery
abusé
is
attributable
solely
to
trial
counsel
instead
of
a
blameless
client
Finally,
there
can
be
no
doubt
that
Lofton
was
complicit
in
the
discovery
violations
uncovered.
As
evidenced
by
his
discovery
responses,
Lofton
turned
over
fraudulent
documentation
during
the
discovery
process
in
an
attempt
to
support
his
claim
for
damages.
Page
14
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
15
of
22
There
is
also
no
doubt
that
when
Lofton
turned
over
such
fraudulent
documentation
in
discovery,
he
did
so
knowing
that
such
documentation
was
fraudulent.
In
this
regard,
the
August
26,
2020,
email
unequivocally
shows
that
Lofton
was
aware
of
the
fraudulent
documentation
and,
in
spite
of
such
knowledge
and
with
the
apparent
expectation
that
such
August
26,2020,
email
would
not
be
seen
by
Briggs,
submitted
to
Briggs
as
proof
of
damages
the
very
same
fraudulent
documentation
identified
in
Attorney
Price’s
pre-suit
email.
This
is
not
a
situation
where
Lofton
mistakenly
turned
over
fraudulent
documentation
or
otherwise
held
a
sincere
belief
in
the
veracity
of
such
documentation.
Lofton,
in
a
display
of
complete
and
deliberate
disregard
for
his
discovery
obligations,
provided
Briggs
with
knowingly
fraudulent
records
in
an
effort
to
bolster
his
damages
claim.
Conclusion
The
truth-seeking
function
of
not
only
the
discovery
process
but
the
judicial
process
as
a
whole
can
only
work
when
the
participants
and
their
attorneys
therein
conduct
themselves
with
integrity.
Lofton’s
own
“flagrant
bad
faith
and
callous
disregard”
for
his
discovery
obligations,
his
refusal
to
acknowledge
the
egregious
manner
in
which
he
abused
the
discovery
process,
and
the
substantial
prejudice
that
Briggs
has
suffered
and
would
continue
to
suffer
if
it
were
required
to
continue
its
litigation
against
such
an
actor,
have
left
the
Court
with
no
other
choice.
Accordingly,
IT
IS,
THEREFORE,
ORDERED
that
that
Motion
to
Dismiss
and
Motion
for
Reasonable
Expenses
and
Attorneys
’
Fees
filed
by
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.,
and
joined
by
Sunbelt
Rentals,
Inc.,
be,
and
the
same
hereby
is,
GRANTED
as
to
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.
and
DENIED
as
to
Sunbelt
Rentals,
Inc.
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
Plaintiffs’
Brian
Lofton
and
Keaton
Landscaping
and
Pressure
Washing,
LLC
d/b/a
B&B
Landscaping
&
Pressure
Washing
claims
against
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.,
as
stated
herein
are
finally
dismissed
with
prejudice.
Mississippi
Litigation
Accountability
Act
Pursuant
to
the
Mississippi
Litigation
Accountability
Act,
“if
the
court...
finds
that
an
attorney
or
party
unnecessarily
expanded
the
proceedings
by
other
improper
conduct
including,
but
not
limited
to,
Page
15
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
19
of
22
Attorney
Price
additionally
attempted
to
lay
blame
at
the
feet
of
the
Mississippi
Bar
Association,
stating:
Plaintiffs’
counsel
has
never
used
any
version
of
artificial
intelligence
before
(knowingly)
but
was
confident
when
[sic]
information
presented
this
way
because
the
Mississippi
Bar
Association
has
recently
added
it
as
a
paid
service
to
be
used
with
FastCase,
and
the
cases
referenced
in
Plaintiffs’
responses
were
authenticated
showing
they
were
real.
Plaintiffs
[sic]
Response
to
Order
of
the
Court,
MEC
#185
at
p.
^8.
The
Court
does
not
find
the
fact
that
the
Mississippi
Bar
Association
now,
apparently,
enables
members
to
subscribe
to
an
artificial
intelligence
tool
on
Fastcase
is
any
sort
of
justification
for
Attorney
Price’s
wholesale
reliance
on
what
such
Al
tool
generated
without
the
exercise
of
any
sort
of
quality
control
to
ensure
its
accuracy.
Attorney
Price
further
attempted
to
minimize
the
seriousness
of
her
misconduct:
Here,
the
inclusion
of
inaccurate
citations
was
inadvertent
and
not
intended
to
mislead
the
Court,
and
is
in
fact
good
law,
just
with
the
incorrect
citations....
While
Plaintiffs’
counsel
acknowledges
that
certain
authorities
citied
do
not
exist,
the
citations
were
generated
through
the
use
of
an
artificial
intelligence
research
tool
that
presented
them
as
legitimate
and
verifiable
as
with
using
FastCase.
Plaintiffs
[sic]
Response
to
Order
of
the
Court,
MEC
#185
at
9-10.
There
is
nothing
“inadvertent”
about
citing
to
cases
that
do
not
exist
or
to
cases
that
do
not
stand
for
the
legal
proposition
or
quotation
for
which
they
are
cited.
Counsel’s
reliance
upon
artificial
intelligence
to
respond
to
Briggs’
motion
was
a
deliberate
act,
as
was
her
decision
to
blindly
rely
upon
the
authorities
produced
thereby.
Finally,
Attorney
Price
attempted
to
portray
to
the
Court
that
she
was
proactive
in
responding
to
such
misrepresentations:
Upon
discovery
that
the
citations
could
not
be
located
in
any
recognized
legal
database,
Plaintiffs’
counsel
filed
a
corrected
version
of
each
pleading
and
ceased
reliance
on
such
sources
absent
independent
verification.
Plaintiffs
[sic]
Response
to
Order
of
the
Court,
MEC
#185
at
5110.
The
Court
would
note
that
not
only
did
Attorney
Price
make
no
attempt
to
file
a
“corrected”
version
of
her
responsive
filing
prior
to
the
Court’s
September
2,
2025
Order
herein,
but
that
Attorney
Price’s
Page
19
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
21
of
22
This
Court
has
the
“inherent
authority
to
impose
sanctions
upon
those
who
abuse
the
judicial
process.”
Macvaugh
v.
State,
385
So.3d
443,
451
(Miss.
Ct.
App.
2023)
(quoting
Tricon
Metals
&
Servs.
Inc.
v.
Topp,
537
So.2d
1331,1335
(Miss.
1989)).
And
there
is
no
question
that
“submitting
fictitious
cases
and
quotations
to
the
Court
degrades
[and]
impugns
the
integrity
of
the
Court”
and
“is
an
abuse
of
the
adversary
system.”
Malone-Bey
v.
Lauderdale
County
School
Board,
2025
WL
2098352
*4
(S.D.
Miss.
July
25,2025)
(internal
citations
and
quotation
marks
omitted).
For
citing
to
no
fewer
than
fourteen
(14)
erroneous
case
law
citations
in
her
responsive
filing,
such
misrepresentations
impugning
the
integrity
of
the
Court
and
interfering
with
the
administration
of
justice,
IT
IS,
THEREFORE,
ORDERED
that
sanctions
be
imposed
against
Attorney
Price
as
follows:
1.
The
Court
awards
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.,
$7,472.00
in
reasonable
attorneys’
fees
and
costs
incurred
by
its
counsel
in
researching,
replying
to,
and
arguing
against
Plaintiffs
’
Response
in
Opposition
to
Motion
to
Dismiss
and
Motion
for
Reasonable
Expenses
and
Attorneys
’
Fees
Filed
by
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.
and
Plaintiffs
’
Response
in
Opposition
to
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
and
for
Sanctions
Filed
by
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.
2
such
amount
to
be
paid
in
full
by
Attorney
Price
within
thirty
(30)
days
of
the
entry
of
this
Order.
Attorney
Price
is
to
coordinate
such
payment
with
Briggs’
counsel
of
record,
Attorney
Alison
McMinn,
or
her
designee.
2.
Within
sixty
(60)
days
from
the
date
of
this
Order,
Attorney
Price
shall
attend
and
complete
six
(6)
hours
of
approved
CLE
courses
on
Artificial
Intelligence.
On
or
before
November
25,
2025,
Attorney
Price
shall
file
in
MEC
proof
of
attendance
and
a
certificate
of
compliance
showing
strict
adherence
with
this
Order;
2
The
Court,
by
its
Order
Denying
Defendant
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.’s
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
as
Moot,
awarded
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.,
reasonable
attorneys’
fees
and
costs
incurred
by
its
counsel
in
researching,
replying
to,
and
arguing
against
Plaintiffs'
Response
in
Opposition
to
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
and
for
Sanctions
Filed
by
Briggs
Equipment,
Inc.
as
a
sanction
for
Attorney
Price’s
reliance
on
hallucinated
cases
in
her
responsive
filing,
such
fees
and
costs
to
be
combined
with
the
reasonable
attorneys’
fees
and
costs
incurred
by
Briggs’
counsel
in
researching,
replying
to,
and
arguing
against
Lofton’s
response
herein.
Page
21
of
22
Case:
17Cll:21-cv-00059-CW
Document
#:
200
Filed:
09/26/2025
Page
22
of
22
3.
3.
At
the
September
11,
2025
hearing,
Attorney
Price
indicated
that
she
had
self-reported
to
the
Mississippi
Bar
and
further
cited
FastCase,
a
paid
service
rendered
by
the
Mississippi
Bar,
as
a
source
for
the
fourteen
(14)
cited
hallucinated
cases.
Attorney
Price
shall
send
a
certified
copy
of
this
Order
by
both
email
and
U.S.
Mail
to
The
Mississippi
Bar
for
review.
On
or
before
October
1,2025,
Attorney
Price
shall
file
in
MEC
a
certificate
of
compliance
showing
conformity
with
this
Order.
Such
certificate
of
compliance
shall
include
the
name,
physical
address
and
email
address
such
Order
was
sent
to
as
well
as
the
date
sent;
and
Attorney
Price
shall
send
a
letter
to
Plaintiffs
Brian
Lofton
and
Keaton
Landscaping
and
Pressure
Washing,
LLC
d/b/a
B&B
Landscaping
&
Pressure
Washing
explaining
to
Plaintiffs
her
reliance
on
artificial
intelligence
in
generating
her
responsive
filing
herein.
On
or
before
October
1,
2025,
Attorney
Price
shall
file
in
MEC
a
copy
of
such
letter
and
certificate
showing
compliance
with
this
Order.
SO
ORDERED
this
the
day
of
September,
2025,
CEÏZSTEÉ.
WILSON
CIRCUIT
COURT
JUDGE
Page
22
of
22
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