Madigan v. Graco Inc. (Feb. 4, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Sophia Madigan v. Graco Inc.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Minnesota (MN)
Court
Minnesota Supreme Court
Decided
Feb. 4, 2026
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 296444Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Minnesota.Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff,v.Graco Inc., Defendant.File No. 24-cv-1416 (ECT/EMB)|Filed 02/04/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsCharlie R. Alden, Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC, Burnsville,MN, for Plaintiff Sophia Madigan.Grant Daniel Goerke and Stephanie D. Sarantopoulos, LittlerMendelson, P.C., Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant Graco Inc.OPINION AND ORDEREric C. Tostrud United States District Court*1 Plaintiff Sophia Madigan claims her former employer,Defendant Graco Inc., discriminated against her based on herpregnancy. She asserts claims under federal and Minnesotalaw. Graco seeks summary judgment, and the motion will begranted. The record cannot reasonably be construed to supportMs. Madigan's discrimination theories.I1Ms. Madigan worked for Graco as a machinist. Ms. Madiganbegan her Graco employment in September or October of2018. Madigan Tr. [ECF No. 25-1 at 18–74] 21:24–22:6.Graco hired her originally as an intern in its Minneapolisor “Riverside” manufacturing facility. Id. 22:13–23:1, 27:7–25. In May 2019, Ms. Madigan transitioned from internto full-time Graco machinist, working on machines withcomputer numerical control—CNC, for short—and at somepoint in 2022 she advanced from a level C machinist to alevel B machinist. Id. 23:14–24:25. As a level B machinist,Ms. Madigan worked on maintaining machines, “makingparts, moving metal and loading machines with differentmetals,” “making adjustments to programs and adjustmentsto measuring tools,” entering information into machines,cleaning parts, inspecting parts, and packing parts in totesor boxes so they could be transported to the next step inthe manufacturing process. Id. 25:9–26:6; see ECF No. 25-1at 76 (Graco's posted job description for CNC MachinistB); Madigan Tr. 28:19–30:11 (testifying to accuracy ofofficial job description). At some point after 2021, Ms.Madigan worked three 12-hour shifts on Friday, Saturday, andSunday. Madigan Tr. 45:17–46:17. On top of those 36 hours,Graco provided a “four-hour fill”—in essence counting Ms.Madigan's time as a full 40-hour work week. Id. 47:8–15. Shedid not work other days unless she filled in for a coworker,attended training, or was asked to come in. Id. 48:23–50:8.On those rare occasions, Ms. Madigan worked 8-hour shifts.Id. 48:23–49:8.The job exposed Ms. Madigan to certain chemicals and loudnoises and required her to lift heavy objects. Ms. Madigan wasexposed to materials with lead and unspecified but dangerouschemicals in cutting oils. Madigan Tr. 34:11–35:20, 37:8–38:12. She wore an N-95 mask to avoid breathing particlesfrom the metal, and gloves to protect her fingers. Id. 35:24–37:7. The production floor was very loud. Ms. Madiganalways wore hearing protection, sometimes just earplugs, andsometimes noise-cancelling headphones over earplugs. Id.32:5–14. Initially, Ms. Madigan worked at a machining areacategorized as a “high-level noise area,” and she was requiredto have annual hearing tests because of the “dangerous” noiselevel. Id. 33:2–15. In 2021, she moved to a second machiningarea, still at the Riverside facility; while working there, shewas not required to take hearing tests but continued to wearhearing protection. Id. 33:21–34:10. She also was required tolift objects of 45 pounds or more, sometimes “up to 60, 70pounds.” Id. 40:15–21; see ECF No. 25-1 at 77. Lifting heavyobjects was necessary to load metal bars into the machine,Madigan Tr. 41:8–12, though Ms. Madigan did not have to dothis task every day, id. 42:5–19. At times coworkers wouldhelp each other lift the bars into the machines, but most of thetime Ms. Madigan had to lift them by herself, either by handor by crane. Id. 43:6–20.
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2Ms. Madigan became pregnant and was concerned abouther baby's health. Ms. Madigan learned she was pregnant inJanuary 2023. Id. 52:3–7. She was concerned that her workenvironment would harm her baby's health. One machine (a“parts washer”) “had a big label on it that said it wasn't safe forpregnant or breastfeeding women to interact with.” Id. 38:18–23. Ms. Madigan visited a University of Minnesota Women'sHealthcare Specialists clinic to discuss pregnancy-relatedconcerns about her work environment. Id. 53:25–54:22.She learned from the clinic “that fetal hearing developmenthappens rather early on in the first trimester of pregnancy,”and that she should avoid certain materials and chemicals ifpossible. Id. 55:21–56:1.Ms. Madigan sought pregnancy-related accommodations. Inlate January 2023, Ms. Madigan spoke to Breanna Morriesin Graco's Human Resources department about the pregnancyand “voiced concerns about some of the labels ... aroundthe workplace and about noise.” Id. 56:11–19, 57:2–6. Ms.Morries told Ms. Madigan to speak with Ms. Madigan'simmediate supervisor and to provide medical documentation.Id. 57:11–58:1. That same day, Ms. Madigan informed hersupervisor of the pregnancy, though she does not rememberdiscussing health concerns or requesting accommodations inthat conversation. Id. 58:2–22. On January 27, Ms. Madiganprovided Graco with a doctor's letter from the University ofMinnesota clinic; the letter read:Sophia will be requiring workaccommodations throughout herpregnancy to protect her health andthe health of her baby. Please ensurethat Sophia will not be exposedto chemicals considered harmful topregnancy, noises loud enough torequire ear protection, or lifting objectsover 15lbs. If Sophia is able todo office/desk work in a quieterenvironment, this will be ideal.ECF No. 25-2 at 2. The letter identified the baby's due date asOctober 4, 2023. Id. On February 7, Ms. Madigan providedGraco with another doctor's note detailing the requestedaccommodations:Please ensure Sophia will not be exposed to any heavymetals. This includes absolutely no exposure to lead.Additionally, Sophia should have absolutely no exposureto chemicals considered harmful to pregnancy, no noiseslouder than 75 decibels for any amount of time, andno lifting of objects over 15lbs. These exposures havebeen found to increase risk of preterm labor, spontaneousabortion, small-for-gestational-age newborns, and babiesborn with congenital malformations.It would be idea[l] for Sophia is able to do [sic] office/deskwork in a quieter environment, if possible. Please makethese accommodations to ensure Sophia and her baby aresafe in the workplace.ECF No. 25-2 at 6.Ms. Madigan and Graco believed Graco could not bothaccommodate her requests and allow her to remain in themachinist role. Ms. Morries reviewed the February 7 doctor'snote and emailed Eric Gall, Graco's Human ResourcesManager, saying Graco would not be “able to accommodatefor [sic] these restrictions in [Ms. Madigan's] current roleor here in Riverside.” ECF No. 25-2 at 5. Ms. Morries toldMs. Madigan the same thing. Madigan Tr. 73:13–74:2. Ms.Madigan also believed it would not be possible to perform herjob as a machinist under her requested accommodations. Id.61:12–15. As she testified,I was always exposed to noises thatwere loud enough to require hearingprotection. From my very first day ofworking there as an intern until myvery last day on the production floorI wore hearing protection the entiretime except for [adjusting earbuds]. SoI knew that that would prevent mefrom being able to do my job as amachinist. Also, it wouldn't be veryrealistic to be a machinist and nothave to lift objects over 15 pounds.It would require a lot of supportfrom coworkers ... to accommodatethat. And then the chemicals, I justknew that there were things around inthe environment that just wouldn't beconsidered safe for pregnancy.
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3*3Id. 61:19–62:10; see id. 66:23–67:6 (agreeing thatthe noise restrictions “really kind of knocks out themachinist work as eligible work”). In her view, however,accommodation was possible “[b]ecause Graco is a largecompany with lots of different jobs that people do. And [she]knew that they would be able to find something that [she]could do that would not require lifting over 15 pounds orhearing protection or being exposed to chemicals in any way.”Id. 61:1–11.Graco accommodated injured employees. Ms. Madigan knewof other Graco employees who had weightlifting restrictionsfor injuries like a broken arm, and one machinist had amedical restriction on chemical exposure because he had anallergic reaction to cutting oil. Id. 62:19–64:1. The individualwith an allergic reaction was able to work on other machineswithout exposing himself to the cutting oil. Id. 64:13–22.The lifting restrictions were typically temporary and wentaway once the injury healed. Id. 65:2–8. She identifiedone machinist who, in summer 2020, received a liftingrestriction because of an unspecified injury. Id. 204:5–206:1.Graco accommodated this machinist by assigning him tothe calibration lab, where he continued to work 8-hour daysMonday through Friday, but from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.,rather than his previous shift of 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.Id. 206:2–207:8. Ms. Madigan did not know of any Gracoemployees who had a noise restriction or restrictions toaccommodate a pregnancy. Id. 51:9–16, 65:23–25.Graco provided Ms. Madigan with an alternative, temporaryposition in Anoka. On February 8, Ms. Morries emailed Ms.Madigan explaining that Graco could provide a position forMs. Madigan that accommodated all her medical restrictions.ECF No. 25-2 at 40. The position was in Graco's Anoka office,which is about a 40-minute drive from the Riverside facilityin Minneapolis. Id.; see Madigan Tr. 86:22–87:2. In her newrole, Ms. Madigan was assigned to reprogram meters in anoffice setting. ECF No. 25-2 at 40. Reprogramming the meterswas not physically demanding; a worker had to “hook up acable from [a] programmer to the circuit board and plug itin,” and then press “enter” on the computer keyboard, whichinitiated a four-minute software update. Lorden Tr. [ECFNo. 25-2 at 42–66] 13:19–14:7. The job was temporary; Ms.Madigan “would work until the product was ... all updated.”Id. 18:24–19:5. Ordinarily another employee would do thereprogramming, but he didn't have time for that work inaddition to his other responsibilities. Madigan Tr. 89:6–90:7;Lorden Tr. 13:17–18.The Anoka position accommodated Ms. Madigan's medicalrestrictions. While Ms. Madigan reprogrammed meters, shewas not exposed to any harmful chemicals. Madigan Tr.83:18–24. She was not subjected to loud noises or required tolift objects over 15 pounds, with two exceptions. Id. 83:25–84:16, 84:24–85:22. First, Ms. Madigan was initially requiredto clock in at the Anoka production facility, which, like theRiverside production facility, was loud. Id. 84:1–19. Gracoresponded to this concern by providing a time clock in thequiet Anoka office where Ms. Madigan was reprogrammingmeters, and “[t]hat took care of that.” Id. 84:7–23. Second,at times the meters came in boxes weighing more than 15pounds. Id. 85:2–18. Ms. Madigan solved this problem byremoving enough meters so that the box weighed less than 15pounds, and she “was pretty careful to empty the boxes” sothey would not exceed her lifting restriction. Id.*4Ms. Madigan requested to reprogram the meters inMinneapolis, but Graco required her to do that work inAnoka. Anoka was farther away from Ms. Madigan's homethan the Riverside facility. See id. 96:4–10. It took her 13minutes to commute to Riverside and 40 minutes to commuteto the Anoka facility. Id. 87:1–13, 216:3–8. She typicallycommuted to Riverside by bus, bicycle, or a ride from herhusband, and more rarely she walked to work. Id. 216:9–17. But it was impossible or impractical to commute toAnoka by busing, cycling, or walking, so she had to relyon a ride from her husband, and that cost him significanttime. Id. 216:18–217:20. Ms. Madigan knew that otheremployees had reprogrammed meters from their homes, andshe asked supervisors whether Graco could move the metersto Minneapolis so she could do the work there. Id. 87:14–25, 94:8–23. Graco denied the request and required her tocontinue to work at the Anoka office. Id. 94:14–23, 95:7–22(“They just told me that they weren't going to do it, and itwasn't going to happen.”).Ms. Madigan requested five 8-hour shifts, but Graco gave herthree 8-hour shifts. On February 20, Ms. Madigan's doctorwrote a letter asking her employer to “[p]lease allow Sophiato work 8 hour days to allow for adequate rest and regulareating.” ECF No. 29-3 at 1. Mr. Gall informed Ms. Madiganthat Graco interpreted that language to be a request, not amandate it was obligated to accommodate. ECF No. 29-5 at 1;see Gall Tr. [ECF No. 25-3 at 2–12] 15:20–16:5. On February22, Ms. Madigan submitted another doctor's note with moreimperative language. It read:
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Due to Sophia Madigan's pregnancy related condition it ismedically advisable that she does not work 12 hour shiftsand only works 8 hour shifts.I recommend the following reasonable accommodationsfor the entire duration of her pregnancy to allow foradequate rest and regular eating: She should not work 12hours shifts [sic] and should only work 8 hour shifts.ECF No. 25-3 at 14. The medical note did not mention thenumber of hours she could work in a week or how manyshifts she should work. Id.; Madigan Tr. 100:2–8, 120:10–18 (noting that Ms. Madigan “never had a medical letterrecommending that [she] work five days a week”). Gracoallowed Ms. Madigan to work 8 hours per day. Id. 119:6–11, 121:15–23. Ms. Madigan asked to take five 8-hour shiftseach week; Graco allowed her to work three 8-hour shifts.Id. 119:6–24. Though it is conceivable Graco had reasons todeny Ms. Madigan's request to work five 8-hour shifts—forexample, there may not have been enough of the work shewas doing to fill more than three 8-hour shifts—no recordevidence shows that Graco gave Ms. Madigan a reason whyit did not approve her request.The three-day 8-hour shift arrangement affected Ms.Madigan's benefits, and Graco informed her of that. OnFebruary 21, having received notice of the 8-hour restriction,Graco calculated how Ms. Madigan's benefits would beaffected by her 24-hour work weeks. Under the Familyand Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), she would use up 12hours per week. ECF No. 29-7 at 4. Estimating 32 weeksuntil childbirth, and adding 40 hours already used, Gracoestimated that Ms. Madigan would use 424 of her 480 hoursof available FMLA leave before giving birth. Id. Graco'sshort-term disability benefits were also affected. Chris Winn,Graco's senior disability specialist, wrote in an internal email:Per the Graco policy we deduct partialhours the same as a full work shift.So we would be deducting 36 hoursa week × 32 weeks = 1152 hoursused out of 1040 available. This wouldmean that she would NOT be eligiblefor any paid [short-term disability]benefits for her delivery and recoveryas she would exhaust her 26 weeksof [disability leave] prior to the actualdelivery.Id.; Winn Tr. [ECF No. 25-2 at 11–25] 8:1–3. That dayand the next (February 21–22), Mr. Gall twice emailed Ms.Madigan explaining how her benefits would be affected bythe accommodation to three 8-hour shifts. See ECF No. 29-5at 1–2; ECF No. 25-3 at 17. As to FMLA leave, he wrote:*5 If you were to transition to eight hour shifts, from yournormal twelve hour shifts, you would exhaust FMLA at arate of 12 hours per week. Based on an estimated deliverydate of 32 weeks from now, that would be a total of 384hours of FMLA, which does not include 40 hours whichhas already been used.That would leave you with a total of 56 hours at the timeof delivery.ECF No. 29-5 at 1. Under Graco's policy, employees couldbe entitled to pay from short-term disability benefits for thehours they used FMLA leave. See ECF No. 25-1 at 5–6. Asto those benefits, he wrote:Per Graco policy, partial hours ofdisability are deducted the same as afull shift. To that end, your [short-term disability] would be deducted by36 hours per week (even though youare only missing 12 hours of work),which also means that the 26 weeksof coverage (1040 hours) would beexhausted prior to your expected duedate, leaving you unpaid for a portionof the latter stage of your pregnancy.ECF No. 29-5 at 1. Ms. Madigan could cover or defray wageloss in two ways: short-term disability pay and paid time off.If she took short-term disability, she would receive her fullwage for the 8 hours per day she worked, and 67% of her fullwage for the 4 hours per day she was missing, plus another67% of the 4-hour fill. Id. Paid time off benefits, on the otherhand, were used “in 12 hour increments, which then cover[ed]the entirety of [her] shift.” ECF No. 25-3 at 17. Mr. Gallexplained, “On days in which you use [paid time off], youwould not be paid any Short Term Disability, as the shift isfully covered by [paid time off].” Id. He clarified that she was
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5expected to return to work twelve weeks after delivery, whichcould “be covered by Minnesota Parenting Leave Act,” andwould run concurrent with “two weeks of paid leave underthe Graco Parental Leave Practice.” Id.Starting in March 2023, a new Graco policy provided tenmore weeks of paid pregnancy-related leave. In a documentdated March 2, 2023, Graco's benefits manager wrote that thecompany had adopted “a new Pregnancy-Related MedicalLeave program for all U.S. regular full time and part timeemployees who give birth to a child on or after March 1,2023.” ECF No. 29-8 at 1. The announcement explained,[t]his leave provides an increaseto the length of leave under thedisability program (short-term andsalary continuation) to up to 10 weeksif additional leave is supported bythe employee's physician. In additionto the two-week Parental LeavePractice ... this would give birth-mothers up to 12 weeks of paid leaveat 100% pay.Id. The record does not contain additional information aboutthis leave.2The Anoka work concluded, and Ms. Madigan began officework at Riverside. In April 2023, “[t]he meters had allbeen reprogrammed,” so Ms. Madigan had no more workto do at the Anoka facility. Madigan Tr. 120:22–121:1.Graco assigned her to office work at the Riverside facilityin Minneapolis. Id. 121:24–122:8. Ms. Madigan did “variousthings, ... mostly packing repair kits” in a “cubicle space.” Id.122:11–13. She worked there until October 2023, when shegave birth. Id. 122:14–16, 173:6–7. Ms. Madigan identifiedtwo ways in which the Riverside office work “may have”failed to comply with her restrictions. Id. 123:1–126:9. First,it was possible that the parts she worked with exposed her tochemicals she was supposed to avoid. Id. 123:2–124:3. Whenshe raised this issue with her immediate supervisor, he toldher to wear gloves, which she did “to minimize skin contactwith these things.” Id. 123:24–124:3, 124:16–25. She did notraise the issue to anyone else at Graco. Id. 125:1–4. Second,she was twice asked to lift boxes that were “way over 15pounds,” and she relied other employees to help. Id. 124:3–126:1. She did not appreciate her supervisor's suggestion to“take everything out of the boxes,” because it was difficult tobend down and remove things from the boxes when she waseight months pregnant. Id. It took “a day or two,” but Graco“ended up fixing the issue.” Id. 125:25–126:9. During thisstint at Riverside, Ms. Madigan was never exposed to noiselevels above her restriction, and she was never required towork longer than 8 hours. Id. 127:2–9.*6Graco continued to update Ms. Madigan about theaccommodations’ effects on her benefits. In a July 2023letter, Graco informed Ms. Madigan that she was eligibleand had been approved for FMLA leave from February 24,2023, to September 27, 2023. ECF No. 25-3 at 19. The lettertold her that “[a]s of September 23, 2023, if you have notdelivered your child, you will have exhausted all of yourFMLA benefits and will no longer have federal job protectionunder the FMLA regulations.” Id. The letter also explainedthat Ms. Madigan's short-term disability leave was approvedfrom February 24, 2023, to September 18, 2023. Id. Under theshort-term disability leave policy, Ms. Madigan was eligiblefor 67% of her normal wage. Id. The letter explained that[a]ny time missed after your benefitexhaustion date ... would need to becovered by vacation or personal timeto bridge the gap until your actualdelivery date. If you do not haveenough time available the resultingtime would default to personal timeand could result in a termination ofyour employment.Id. Graco officials met with Ms. Madigan to discuss theletter's contents and asked her to sign the letter; she refused tosign the letter. See id.; Madigan Tr. 129:1–9. Ms. Madigan'ssupervisor told her that she could “face disciplinary action”unless she signed it. Madigan Tr. 133:14–22. Ms. Madigantestified that the July meeting “was the first time it wasexplained to [her] that this FMLA leave was linked to thematernity leave, the policy that Graco has.”Id. 131:1–4.Ms. Madigan filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC.On August 4, 2023, Ms. Madigan filed a charge ofdiscrimination with the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission (“EEOC”). Id. 157:3–23. The charge identifieddiscrimination because of sex, pregnancy, and disability, andit also alleged retaliation. ECF No. 25-3 at 22. Ms. Madigan
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6did not claim the discrimination was a “continuing action,”id., though she testified she should have, see Madigan Tr.165:2–10. The EEOC dismissed Ms. Madigan's charge, seeid. 191:24–192:18, but the right-to-sue letter is not in therecord.Graco again informed Ms. Madigan about the status of herbenefits in September. On September 28, Mr. Gall emailedMs. Madigan about the timelines for her short-term disabilityand FMLA benefits. ECF No. 25-4 at 2. The former would beexhausted on October 1, and the latter exhausted on October8. Id. “Starting 10/9 any time missed is NOT covered time off[under FMLA] and will be subject to Vacation and Personaltime to bridge the gap until the delivery date.” Id. Mr. Gallwrote,[a]fter delivery you will be placedon a personal leave of absence for6-8 weeks (depending on the deliverymethod) and tracked under the MNPregnancy and Parenting Leave law.This time off will be unpaid. Since itis unpaid time off, benefits deductionswill be placed into arrears and willbe deducted when you return towork.... After delivery, you are eligiblefor Graco's Parental Leave, whichprovides two weeks of paid leave.Unless you instruct otherwise, we willcommence the Parental Leave for thefirst two weeks after your delivery.This leave is in addition to the personalleave of absence noted above.Id.Ms. Madigan gave birth and took more leave. Ms. Madigangave birth on October 8. Madigan Tr. 173:7. She took twoweeks’ paid leave after childbirth. Id. 172:20–173:2. Afterthat she took an unpaid leave of absence. Id. 173:22–174:14.This leave was provided pursuant to the Minnesota ParentingLeave Act. See ECF No. 25-4 at 2; Minn. Stat. § 181.941(2023). Ms. Madigan believed she was being deprived ofher “[t]welve weeks paid maternity leave policy at Graco.”Madigan Tr. 177:18–178:8.*7Ms. Madigan was concerned about returning to work,and her leave was extended for medical reasons. Threeissues caused her concern: First, she would be required towork on unfamiliar machines; second, she would have towork a different shift, from 2:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.; andthird, she would be exposed to certain chemicals that couldadversely affect breastfeeding. Id. 175:18–176:24, 178:23–179:7, 181:10–183:23. On November 21, her doctor providedGraco a note recommending that Ms. Madigan return to workon December 18 and asking that she be allowed breaks everytwo to three hours to express milk. ECF No. 29-10 at 1. OnDecember 20, Ms. Madigan's physician sent Graco another,similar note, this time pushing the recommended return dateto January 8, 2024. ECF No. 25-4 at 4. Graco delayed Ms.Madigan's return date to January 19. Madigan Tr. 186:11–25,188:1–5. In total, her leave after childbirth amounted to twoweeks’ paid leave and about thirteen weeks of unpaid leave.Ms. Madigan resigned. On January 19, 2024, Ms. Madigansubmitted “formal notice of [her] resignation” to Graco. ECFNo. 25-4 at 6. The letter stated that she resigned effectiveimmediately “because of medical reasons.” Id. Ms. Madiganlater testified that the medical reasons were “postpartumdistress,” and explained that she resigned because Gracotreated her poorly while she was pregnant and after givingbirth. Madigan Tr. 187:4–20.Ms. Madigan filed suit. She brings five causes of action:violation of the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (“MPLA”),Compl. [ECF No. 1-1] ¶¶ 21–25 (Count I); violation of theMinnesota pregnancy accommodations statute, id. ¶¶ 26–31(Count II); pregnancy discrimination under the MinnesotaHuman Rights Act (“MHRA”), id. ¶¶ 32–37 (Count III);pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil RightsAct, id. ¶¶ 38–42 (Count IV); and retaliation under the FMLA,id. ¶¶ 43–45 (Count V).3IISummary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows thatthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if its resolution mightaffect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantivelaw. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over a fact is“genuine” only if “the evidence is such that a reasonablejury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and alljustifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.ACounts I and V allege violations of the MPLA and FMLA.Compl. ¶¶ 21–25, 43–45; see Hanson v. Mental Health Res.,Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1043 (D. Minn. 2013) (“Courtsapply the same analysis to interference and retaliation claimsunder the MPLA as they do under the FMLA.”). The MPLArequires employers to “grant an unpaid leave of absenceto an employee who is ... a female employee for prenatalcare, or incapacity due to pregnancy, childbirth, or relatedhealth conditions.” Minn. Stat. § 181.941, subdiv. 1(a)(2)(2023). The employee determines the length of leave, up totwelve weeks, unless the employer agrees to extend it. Minn.Stat. § 181.941, subdiv. 1(b) (2023). “An employer shallnot discharge, discipline, penalize, interfere with, threaten,restrain, coerce, or otherwise retaliate or discriminate againstan employee for requesting or obtaining a leave of absenceas provided by this section.” Minn. Stat. § 181.941, subdiv.3 (2023).4*8 The FMLA is similar. It reads:(a) Interference with rights(1) Exercise of rightsIt shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with,restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt toexercise, any right provided under this subchapter.(2) DiscriminationIt shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or inany other manner discriminate against any individual foropposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). “Under the FMLA, eligible employeesare entitled to take leave from work for certain family ormedical reasons, including a serious health condition thatmakes the employee unable to perform the functions of theposition of such employee.” Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 446F.3d 858, 864–65 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). TheFMLA “provides eligible employees up to twelve work-weeks of unpaid leave in any twelve-month period andprohibits employers from discriminating against employeesfor exercising their rights under the Act.” Smith v. AllenHealth Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing 29U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2615(a)(2)).Though MPLA and FMLA claims are analyzed the same way,Ms. Madigan presents them as factually incompatible theoriesof relief. In the MPLA claim, Graco forced her to take leave.Compl. 24. In the FMLA claim, she chose to take leave, andGraco took adverse action against her on that basis. Id. 45.1Start with the MPLA claim. The complaint alleges Gracois liable for “forcing her to take intermittent leave underthe FMLA and then claiming she had exhausted all of herstatutorily allotted leave, rather than give her the full allotted12 weeks of protected leave after the birth of her child.”Compl. 24. In her brief, Ms. Madigan adds that Graco's “July17, 2023 letter warned her that after September 27, any timeoff could result in termination.” ECF No. 30 at 12.There is no genuine dispute that Graco did not violate section181.941 by placing Ms. Madigan on FMLA leave. The EighthCircuit “has not addressed whether placing an employeeinvoluntarily on FMLA leave is a form of interference madeactionable by the [FMLA].” Walker v. Trinity Marine Prods.,Inc., 721 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 2013). Even if this conductwere actionable—and actionable under the MPLA as well asthe FMLA—there are several problems with Ms. Madigan'stheory. Under the federal statute, this kind of claim “ripensonly when and if the employee seeks FMLA leave at a laterdate, and such leave is not available because the employeewas wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in the past.” Id.(quoting Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6thCir. 2007)). Ms. Madigan was never denied FMLA leave (orMPLA leave), so her claim is not ripe. Even if it were, Gracoprovided Ms. Madigan twelve weeks of FMLA leave up tochildbirth, and “the full allotted 12 weeks of protected leaveafter the birth of her child” under the MPLA. Compl. 24;see Madigan Tr. 172:20–173:2; ECF No. 25-4 at 2 (“Afterdelivery you will be placed on a personal leave of absence ...and tracked under the MN Pregnancy and Parenting Leavelaw.”). In fact, she received more than twelve weeks’ leavepost-childbirth; she was off work from October 8, 2023(childbirth) to January 19, 2024 (resignation). See MadiganTr. 173:7, 172:20–173:2,173:22–174:14, 186:11–25, 188:1–5. Similarly, the July 17 letter did not violate the MPLA.It identified when Ms. Madigan's FMLA leave would beexhausted, but the threatened termination was for seeking
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8leave beyond that provided by the FMLA and MPLA. SeeECF No. 25-3 at 19 (“Any time missed after your benefitexhaustion date ... would need to be covered by vacation orpersonal time to bridge the gap until your actual deliverydate. If you do not have enough time available the resultingtime would default to personal time and could result in atermination of your employment.”). The MPLA does notforbid that conduct; it protects employees “for requesting orobtaining a leave of absence as provided by this section,” notfor requesting leave beyond the statutory twelve weeks. Minn.Stat. § 181.941, subdiv. 3 (2023).*9 Though Ms. Madigan raises this allegation as anMPLA claim, it resembles an FMLA entitlement claim.See Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012). FMLA regulations provide thatGraco could “transfer the employee to a part-time job withthe same hourly rate of pay and benefits, provided theemployee is not required to take more leave than is medicallynecessary.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.204(c); see29 C.F.R. § 825.202(b)(allowing intermittent leave when a “medical need can bebest accommodated through an intermittent or reduced leaveschedule”); Johnson v. Norton Cnty. Hosp., 550 F. Supp. 3d937, 965–66 (D. Kan. 2021) (“[A] jury could reasonablyconclude that, by forcing plaintiff to take FMLA leave onTuesdays and Thursdays regardless of any medical necessityand then terminating her employment when she was unwillingto agree to that forced leave, defendant unlawfully interferedwith plaintiff's FMLA rights.” (emphasis added)); Nance v.Buffalo's Café of Griffin, Inc., No. 1:03-CV-2887-WSD, 2005WL 2148548, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2005) (denyingsummary judgment to employer because “there are genuineissues of material fact regarding whether Defendant requiredPlaintiff to take more leave than necessary for her condition”).The parties have not identified a corresponding stateregulation, so even though FLMA and MPLA claims areanalyzed in the same way, Hanson, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1043,it is less clear the same rules apply to the MPLA. If they do,the outcome does not change. Ms. Madigan has not shown afactual dispute that Graco reduced her hours and forced herto take more leave than was medically necessary. Her doctorrequired 8-hour shifts. ECF No. 25-3 at 14. Graco scaled backher shifts to 8 hours and no less. Madigan Tr. 121:15–23.While Ms. Madigan argues she should have been given five8-hour shifts, she “never had a medical letter recommendingthat [she] work five days a week.” Id. 120:10–13. Graco willbe granted summary judgment on the MPLA claim.2Our Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized threetypes of FMLA claims. Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1005. “Thefirst type, arising under § 2615(a)(1), occurs where anemployer refuses to authorize leave under the FMLA or takesother action to avoid responsibilities under the Act.” Id. “Anemployee proceeding on this theory need not show that anemployer acted with discriminatory intent.” Id. Though inseveral older cases the Eighth Circuit has described this claimas one for “interference” with FMLA rights, e.g., Stallingsv. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1050 (8th Cir. 2006), itmore recently declared that “what we formerly described as‘interference’ claims henceforth shall be called ‘entitlement’claims.” Bosley v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 705 F.3d 777, 780(8th Cir. 2013) (citing Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1005) (notingthat, since “all prohibited acts under § 2615(a) appear underthe heading ‘Interference with rights,’ ” the Eighth Circuit hasshied away from that terminology). The second type is for“retaliation.” Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1005. A retaliation claimarises under § 2615(a)(2) and occurs when “an employeeopposes any practice made unlawful under the FMLA—for example, if an employee complains about an employer'srefusal to comply with the statutory mandate to permit FMLAleave.” Id. at 1006. Employers are liable for retaliation if “forthat reason [they] take adverse action against the employeewho is engaged in the opposition.” Id. The third type of claimis for “discrimination,” and itarises when an employer takes adverse action againstan employee because the employee exercises rights towhich he is entitled under the FMLA. In this scenario, theemployer does not prevent the employee from receivingFMLA benefits. Rather, it is alleged that after the employeeexercised his statutory rights, the employer discriminatedagainst him in the terms and conditions of employment.An employee making this type of claim must prove thatthe employer was motivated by the employee's exercise ofrights under the FMLA. The textual basis for such a claimis not well developed in [the Eighth Circuit's] cases, butthe claim likely arises under the rule of § 2615(a)(1) thatan employer may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny theexercise of or the attempt to exercise” rights defined bythe FMLA. To distinguish the “entitlement” claim under §2615(a)(1), and the “retaliation” claim under § 2615(a)(2),we think it helpful to describe this sort of complaint as a“discrimination” claim.
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9*10Id. (citations omitted); see also Massey-Diez v. Univ. ofIowa Cmty. Med. Servs., Inc., 826 F.3d 1149, 1157 n.5 (8thCir. 2016) (noting an “unresolved difference of opinion” inthe Eighth Circuit as to whether a discrimination claim arisesunder § 2615(a)(1) or (a)(2)). Older Eighth Circuit casescalled these “retaliation” claims. See Wierman v. Casey's Gen.Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 999 (8th Cir. 2011); Quinn v. St. LouisCounty, 653 F.3d 745, 754 (8th Cir. 2011).Discrimination claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglasburden-shifting framework, where to make a prima faciecase “an employee must show: (1) that he engaged inan activity protected under the Act, (2) that he suffereda materially adverse employment action, and (3) that acausal connection existed between the employee's actionand the adverse employment action.” Pulczinski, 691 F.3dat 1007; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411U.S. 792, 802 (1973).5 If Ms. Madigan establishes herprima facie case, the burden shifts to Graco “to articulatesome legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverseemployment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. IfGraco succeeds at that step, the burden shifts back to Ms.Madigan to show that Graco's proffered reason is pretextual.See Wierman, 638 F.3d at 993.There is some confusion over how to understand Ms.Madigan's FMLA claim. First, the complaint alleges Gracoretaliated against her, but the brief adds that Graco is alsoliable for interference—an ambiguous term, as Pulczinskirecognized. ECF No. 30 at 14–15; Pulczinski, 691 F.3dat 1005. Second, Ms. Madigan cites a case that uses theold terminology, ECF No. 30 at 14 (citing Estrada v.Cypress Semiconductor (Minn.), Inc., 616 F.3d 866, 871 (8thCir. 2010)), and that case describes “interference” claimsthe same way Pulczinski describes “discrimination” claims.Compare Estrada, 616 F.3d at 871 (“[An interference claim]occurs when an employer's action deters or attaches negativeconsequences to an employee's exercise of FMLA rights.”),with Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1006 (“[A discrimination claim]arises when an employer takes adverse action against anemployee because the employee exercises rights to whichhe is entitled under the FMLA.”). Third, Ms. Madigan doesnot explain whether this cause of action is brought in thealternative. In Counts I and III, she alleges that Graco forcedher to take FMLA leave, Compl. ¶¶ 24, 36, yet she claimsshe told the company “she would exercise her rights under theFMLA,” id. 45. It is difficult to square these allegations.*11 Setting aside those problems, there is no FMLA theoryon which Ms. Madigan's claim survives summary judgment.I do not understand Ms. Madigan to raise an entitlementclaim because her brief's reference to “interference” reads likea discrimination claim, and she does not allege that Gracodeprived her of her rights under the FMLA. ECF No. 30 at14–15. To the extent an FMLA entitlement claim piggybackson the MPLA claim, it would fail for the reasons explainedabove. If Ms. Madigan intended to argue a retaliation theory,she has not shown that she opposed any Graco practice thatthe FMLA forbids. See Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1006. Totake Pulczinski’s example, she has not “complain[ed] about[Graco's] refusal to comply with the statutory mandate topermit FMLA leave,” id., and the undisputed record showsthat Graco complied with FMLA's requirement of providingtwelve weeks of leave. See ECF No. 25-3 at 19 (grantingFMLA leave); ECF No. 25-4 at 2 (noting FMLA leaveexhaustion).On the discrimination theory, she identifies five adverseactions, but none creates a triable issue of fact. Graco “[1]refused [to provide] a modified 40-hour per week schedule,”“[2] misclassified [her] accommodations as FMLA, [3]threatened termination, ... [4] denied her 12 weeks of leaveafter childbirth,” and “[5] artificially accelerated exhaustionof [her] leave entitlement.” Compl. 44; ECF No. 30 at 14–15. As explained with respect to the MPLA claim, Gracowas not required to provide a modified 40-hour workweek,and there is no factual dispute that the company's intermittentleave complied with FMLA regulations. The threatenedtermination was for taking leave beyond that provided bystatute. See ECF No. 25-3 at 19. These are not adverseactions, let alone materially adverse. See Muldrow v. Cityof St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) (defining “materiallyadverse” as causing “significant harm”). Additionally, severalpurported retaliatory actions lack support in the record. Gracodid not deny her twelve weeks of leave after childbirth; itprovided two weeks paid leave and thirteen weeks unpaidleave. The artificial acceleration she refers to is Graco's short-term disability leave. See ECF No. 29-5 at 1 (“Per Gracopolicy, partial hours of disability are deducted the same as afull shift. To that end, your [short-term disability] would bededucted by 36 hours per week (even though you are onlymissing 12 hours of work) ....”). FMLA regulations requireemployers to account for “intermittent or reduced leave ...using an increment no greater than the shortest period of time”used for other forms of leave, 29 C.F.R. § 825.205(a)(1), andthere is no dispute that Graco deducted Ms. Madigan's FMLAleave and short-term disability leave in hour-long increments,
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10so Graco did not run afoul of the regulation. Even if shehad shown an adverse action, Ms. Madigan points to nothingin the record establishing a causal connection between herexercise of FMLA leave and Graco's action. Graco will begranted summary judgment on Count V.BUnder Minnesota's pregnancy accommodations statute,[a]n employer must providereasonable accommodations to anemployee for health conditions relatedto pregnancy or childbirth uponrequest, with the advice of alicensed health care provider ... unlessthe employer demonstrates that theaccommodation would impose anundue hardship on the operation ofthe employer's business.... Reasonableaccommodation may include but isnot limited to temporary transferto a less strenuous or hazardousposition, temporary leave of absence,modification in work schedule or jobassignments, seating, more frequentor longer break periods, and limitsto heavy lifting. Notwithstanding anyother provision of this subdivision,an employer shall not be required tocreate a new or additional position inorder to accommodate an employeepursuant to this subdivision and shallnot be required to discharge anemployee, transfer another employeewith greater seniority, or promote anemployee.*12Minn. Stat. § 181.939, subdiv. 2(a) (2023).6 Further,“[a]n employer shall not require an employee to takea leave or accept an accommodation.” Minn. Stat. §181.93, subdiv. 2(c) (2023). Graco cites extensive caselaw about reasonable accommodations in the Americanswith Disabilities Act context, see ECF No. 24 at 16–20,though it cites no case applying that law to the Minnesotapregnancy accommodations statute, and independent researchhas identified none.No reasonable jury could find that Graco violated Ms.Madigan's rights under the statute's plain text. The partiesagree that Ms. Madigan could not continue work as amachinist with her medical restrictions. The job requiredher to lift heavy objects and be exposed to lead andloud noises. Madigan Tr. 61:19–62:10. Graco and Ms.Madigan “engage[d] in an interactive process” over theaccommodation request, as the statue requires. Minn. Stat.§ 181.939, subdiv. 2(a) (2023). Ms. Madigan envisionedtemporarily working in a new position. See Madigan Tr.61:1–11 (“Graco is a large company with lots of differentjobs that people do. And I knew that they would be ableto find something that I could do that would not requirelifting over 15 pounds or hearing protection or being exposedto chemicals in any way.”). That's in line with the statute'sdescription of reasonable accommodation. Minn. Stat. §181.939, subdiv. 2(a) (2023). Graco did just that—it providedher temporary work that accommodated her restrictions, firstin Anoka and then in Minneapolis.7See Madigan Tr. 83:18–85:22, 125:25–126:9, 127:2–9.Ms. Madigan argues that Graco violated the statute in threeways. First, she proposed a reasonable accommodation of afive-day, 8-hour-per-day, workweek reprogramming meters,but Graco only allowed her to work three 8-hour days perweek. Compl. ¶¶ 27–28. Second, Graco “forc[ed] her to useher FLMA to account for the remaining 16 hours in thework week.” ECF No. 30 at 12. And third, Graco treatedMs. Madigan's medical restrictions as optional requests, notrequirements. Id. at 13.These are not trial-worthy theories. The first two contentionsfail because the statute did not require Graco to createadditional work or grant leave without counting it againstFMLA leave. Ms. Madigan suggests Graco should have givenher full-time work in another role. The statute expresslydenies that an employer must “create a new or additionalposition in order to accommodate” a pregnant employee.Minn. Stat. § 181.939, subdiv. 2(a) (2023). And whilereasonable accommodation “may include ... [a] temporaryleave of absence,” the statute did not require Graco to doso without counting it against FMLA leave. Minn. Stat. §181.939, subdiv. 2(a) (2023). The statute expressly providesthat “[n]othing in this subdivision shall be construed to affectany other provision of law relating to sex discrimination orpregnancy or in any way diminish the coverage of pregnancy,
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11childbirth, or health conditions related to pregnancy orchildbirth under any other provisions of any other law.” Minn.Stat. § 181.939, subdiv. 2(b). Ms. Madigan identifies nocase that might call these conclusions into question. Andher third argument fails because Graco provided reasonableaccommodations; it merely asked Ms. Madigan to submitdoctor's notes mandating rather than requesting a restriction.See ECF No. 29-5 at 1 (“[T]he document provided isinterpreted as a request from your health care provider toreduce your shifts to eight hours per shift, not a mandate. Itreads ‘Please allow ...” This is far different from a documentwhich dictates what an employee can and cannot do.”). Thereis no dispute that Graco allowed Ms. Madigan to work 8-hourshifts. See Madigan Tr. 119:6–11, 121:15–23. Graco will begranted summary judgment as to Count II.C*13 Counts III and IV raise parallel state and federalpregnancy discrimination claims.8See Compl. ¶¶ 32–42.Under the MHRA, an employer may not “discriminateagainst a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation,terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges ofemployment” “because of ... sex.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.08,subdiv. 2(3). “Sex” includes “pregnancy, childbirth, anddisabilities related to pregnancy or childbirth.” Minn. Stat. §363A.03, subdiv. 42. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate againstany individual with respect to his compensation, terms,conditions, or privileges of employment, because of suchindividual's ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “The terms‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include ... becauseof or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medicalconditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,or related medical conditions shall be treated the same forall employment-related purposes.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).To prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim, the plaintiffmust show that the employer treated her “worse” becauseof a protected trait, but she does not have to show that theharm was significant. See Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 354–55;cf. Villaume v. iTradeNetwork, Inc., No. 24-cv-2005 (ECT/DLM), 2025 WL 33697, at *4 n.4 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2025) (“Inthe relatively brief post-Muldrow period, district courts in theEighth Circuit have applied Muldrow to MHRA disability-discrimination claims.”). The state and federal statutes share“substantial similarities,” so courts often treat them together.Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441(Minn. 1983); see Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d715, 719 (Minn. 1986) (“In analyzing cases brought underthe [MHRA], we have often applied principles developed inthe adjudication of claims arising under Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964.”); Hanenburg v. Principal Mut. Life Ins.Co., 118 F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 1997).Ms. Madigan does not claim to have “direct evidence ofdiscrimination,” meaning her claims are evaluated underMcDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework. Elam v.Regions Fin. Corp., 601 F.3d 873, 878 (8th Cir. 2010)(discussing Title VII); Johnson v. Schulte Hosp. Grp., Inc.,66 F.4th 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 2023) (discussing MHRA).Under McDonnell Douglas, Ms. Madigan must first establisha prima facie case by showing that (1) she is a member of aprotected group; (2) she is qualified for her former position;(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) thecircumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. SeeElam, 601 F.3d at 879; Schulte Hosp. Grp., 66 F.4th at 1114.Graco does not dispute the first two elements. For purposes ofsummary judgment. they concede Ms. Madigan is a memberof a protected group and that she was qualified as a machinist.See ECF No. 24 at 21–30. These claims thus hinge on the lasttwo elements of the prima facie case: adverse employmentaction and inference of discrimination.“One way a plaintiff can establish an inference ofdiscrimination is to prove that she was treated less favorablythan similarly-situated employees who were not in herprotected class.” Wierman, 638 F.3d at 993–94. “Similarly-situated” means similar “in all relevant aspects”—theemployees “used for comparison must have dealt with thesame supervisor, have been subject to the same standards,and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigatingor distinguishing circumstances.” Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000). Evidence that comparators weretreated differently must be “specific” and “tangible.” Philip v.Ford Motor Co., 413 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotingRose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 n.4(8th Cir. 1998)).On this record, these MHRA or Title VII claims are not trial-worthy. Ms. Madigan's brief identifies two adverse actions:she “was denied full-time hours and forced into leave,”and she was denied the “twelve weeks of paid time off”as provided by Graco policy.9 ECF No. 30 at 13–14. Her“forced leave” argument is a reworking of her other claims:Graco allowed her to work three 8-hour shifts, did not provideextra hours of work, and docked her 12 hours of FMLA leaveeach week. She requested a daily 8-hour work restriction, and
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12Graco accommodated that. Madigan Tr. 119:6–11, 121:15–23. She was willing to work two more shifts per week, butGraco did not offer her those shifts and instead informed herthis arrangement would use up twelve hours of FMLA leaveper week. Id. 119:6–24. As with the FMLA claim, Graco'sconduct does not amount to adverse employment action. Theargument based on Graco's pregnancy-leave policy fails aswell. Ms. Madigan produced a document showing that Gracohad a policy to provide twelve weeks of paid pregnancy-related medical leave. ECF No. 29-8 at 1. Graco's evidencethat it provided only two weeks of paid leave cannot becredited in this procedural posture. See ECF No. 25-1 at 2;Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Assuming Graco's failure to pay is anadverse action, Ms. Madigan has not shown any comparatorswere treated better. While her brief asserts that she was“treated differently” from other pregnant employees who didnot use FMLA leave, ECF No. 30 at 14, that is not the relevantprotected category for her MHRA and Title VII claims,which tether discrimination to pregnancy. She identifies nocomparators who received full pay during pregnancy-relatedleave, and admitted that she “was not totally sure whathappens with other women at Graco when they take theirmaternity leaves.” Madigan Tr. 135:6–13; see ECF No. 30at 14 (“Graco had a policy allowing up to twelve weeksof paid time off following pregnancy. Madigan was treateddifferently because she was not provided this benefit.”).*14 If she could show an adverse action, she has notshown an inference of discrimination. Lacking comparators,she argues that “she was [Graco's] only pregnant machinistin 17 years,” so a jury could infer that she was subjectto disparate treatment. ECF No. 30 at 13. Accepting thatfact makes no difference for comparator analysis, whichrequires plaintiffs to identify “similarly situated employees,who are not members of the protected group,” who were“treated differently.” Clark, 218 F.3d at 918. The non-pregnant employees she identifies are not similarly situated.The machinist with a lifting restriction continued to workfive 8-hour shifts, just at different times. Madigan Tr. 206:2–207:8. The machinist with the chemical restriction wasassigned to use cutting fluid instead of cutting oil. Id. 63:10–64:18. No comparators had a noise restriction. Id. 65:23–25.There is no evidence that they shared a supervisor with Ms.Madigan, and no one else had an hours restriction or requestedadditional shifts. On this record, she has not met her burden toshow that the machinists are similarly-situated comparators.Because Ms. Madigan has not made her prima facie case ofdiscrimination under the MHRA or Title VII, Graco will begranted summary judgment on Counts III and IV.IIIThere is one more matter to address: Ms. Madigan's briefcites two nonexistent cases. First is the fictitious “Hernandezv. Best Buy Co., 2012 WL 1970771 (D. Minn. May 31,2012).” ECF No. 30 at 12. There is a case at that citation,but it's an insurance contract dispute in the Sixth Circuit,and it has nothing to do with the MPLA, which it was citedto support. See Detroit Pub. Schs. Program Mgmt. Team v.Valley Forge Ins. Co., No. 11-1549, 2012 WL 1970771 (6thCir. 2012). The second is “LaPoint v. Family Orthodontics,P.A., 2020 WL 6118773 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2020).” ECFNo. 30 at 12. There is a case at that citation, filed on thatdate—an action brought by the Securities and ExchangeCommission over allegedly fraudulent liquor license loans.See SEC v. Champion-Cain, No. 3:19-cv-1628-LAB-AHG,2020 WL 6118773, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2020). The SECcase has nothing to do with the relevant subject: Minnesota'spregnancy accommodations statute. It's worth noting there isa Minnesota Supreme Court case with the cited caption, andit discusses pregnancy discrimination under the MHRA. SeeLaPoint v. Fam. Orthodontics, P.A., 892 N.W.2d 506, 513–18 (Minn. 2017). It does not support, however, the contentionin Ms. Madigan's brief that “[m]anagement testimony showsHR treated her doctor's note as optional.” ECF No. 30 at 12(citing the fictitious LaPoint).After Graco pointed out it could not locate Hernandez orLaPoint, ECF No. 32 at 1, Ms. Madigan's counsel emailedchambers and opposing counsel, acknowledging that he usedan artificial-intelligence-based legal-research service to aidhis briefing. He stopped short of admitting that Hernandezand LaPoint were AI hallucinations, acknowledging onlythat they were “incorrect.”10 Subsequently, in a secondletter sent to the Court and Graco's counsel, Ms. Madigan'scounsel expressed his view “that the two citations related tosmall background points and do not relate to the substantiveanalysis of the summary judgment issues.”When an attorney presents the court with a signedbrief, he “certifies that to the best of [his] knowledge,information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonableunder the circumstances ... the claims, defenses, and otherlegal contentions are warranted by existing law or by anonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversingexisting law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.11(b)(2). A reasonable inquiry requires that “the prefiling
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13investigation must uncover a factual basis for the plaintiff'sallegations, as well as a legal basis.” Coonts v. Potts, 316 F.3d745, 753 (8th Cir. 2003). “Every filing in a federal court thatcontains citations to phony case law amounts to a violation ofRule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Turnagev. Associated Bank, N.A., No. 25-cv-3004 (ECT/DTS), 2025WL 3052638, at *3 (D. Minn. Sep. 12, 2025). Courts “mayconsider the wrongdoer's history, experience and ability, theseverity of the violation, the degree to which malice or badfaith contributed to the violation, and other factors.” Pope v.Fed. Express Corp., 49 F.3d 1327, 1328 (8th Cir. 1995) (citingWhite v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 685 (10th Cir.1990)). “On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm,or party to show cause why conduct specifically described inthe order has not violated Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3). Here, I conclude the better approach is to leave the issuewhere it is. The problematic conduct has been raised withcounsel. Though counsel's responses do not reflect clear orcomplete acceptance of responsibility,11 I believe counselunderstands the problem and will take steps to prevent thesame thing from recurring in future cases.ORDER*15 Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files,records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:1. Defendant Graco Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment[ECF No. 22] is GRANTED.2. Plaintiff Sophia Madigan's Complaint [ECF No. 1-1] isDISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 296444Footnotes1Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed or described in a light most favorable to Ms.Madigan. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).2Graco filed a document stating that the company only provided two weeks of paid maternity leave. See ECFNo. 25-1 at 2 (policy effective October 3, 2022). Resolving this factual dispute in Ms. Madigan's favor, asrequired at this procedural stage, Graco's policy was to provide up to twelve weeks of paid maternity leave.See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.3Due to a typographical error, the causes of action are misnumbered—Count II is listed twice. See Compl. ¶¶26–37. They are listed here according to their numerical order, not the numbers in the complaint.4The statute was amended to include this language effective July 1, 2023. See 2023 Minn. Laws, ch. 53, art.11, § 30. Previously, subdivision 3 prohibited only retaliation. See id. Since the alleged interference occurredin July 2023 or later, the full range of prohibited actions are on the table. The statute was amended in 2024without change to the relevant provision. See 2024 Minn. Laws, ch. 110, art. 2, § 10.5The Eighth Circuit has not ruled whether the “materially adverse” standard for FMLA discrimination claimsremains after Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024). Muldrow held that, to establish a primafacie Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show that she suffered an injury, but not that the injurywas “material” or “significant.” 601 U.S. at 352–53. The “materially adverse” standard still applies to Title VIIretaliation claims. Id. at 357–58. Courts have applied Muldrow to other discrimination statutes, but case lawon FMLA claims is scant. See, e.g., Plump v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 161 F.4th 1222, 1229 n.10 (10th Cir. Dec.16, 2025) (declining to reach the proper standard for a FMLA retaliation claim post-Muldrow). Because FMLAdiscrimination claims function like Title VII retaliation claims, the better answer is that Muldrow doesn't change
Sophia Madigan, Plaintiff, v. Graco Inc., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.14the analysis. Compare Parker v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 129 F.4th 1104, 1114 (8th Cir. 2025) (laying out TitleVII retaliation elements at prima facie stage), with Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1007 (laying out same elementsfor prima facie FLMA discrimination claim). However, nothing rides on this distinction; Ms. Madigan's claimwould fail under the more lenient standard as well.6This version of the statute became effective July 1, 2023. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 53, art. 11, § 27. Theprevious version was substantively similar. SeeMinn. Stat. § 181.939, subdiv. 2(a) (2021) (“ ‘Reasonableaccommodation’ may include but is not limited to temporary transfer to a less strenuous or hazardous position,seating, frequent restroom breaks, and limits to heavy lifting.”). The statute was amended again in 2024without change to the relevant provision. See 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 110, art. 2, § 9.7Ms. Madigan testified that she may have been exposed to unsafe chemicals while working in the Minneapolisoffice, see Madigan Tr. 123:2–125:25. The record does not show that she was exposed to lead or otherdangerous substances, however, and Ms. Madigan does not argue in her brief that this potential exposureconstituted failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. The same goes for the brief moments when shewas tasked with lifting heavy boxes. These problems were resolved without requiring her to exceed the liftingrestriction, and she does not argue otherwise.8The complaint cites the MHRA's retaliation provision, but based on the text of the complaint and the argumentin the opposition brief, I understand Ms. Madigan to raise a discrimination claim. See Compl. ¶¶ 37, 42 (citingMinn. Stat. § 363A.15); id. ¶¶ 33–36, 41 (alleging discrimination).9Ms. Madigan waived her right to argue any other Graco action was adverse under these statutes, includinga constructive-discharge claim. See Hassan v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 23-cv-1470 (ECT/DLM), 2025WL 591313, at *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2025) (collecting waiver cases). If she hadn't waived the argument,she could not show that she was constructively terminated. She resigned on January 19, 2024. ECF No.25-4 at 6. She filed her discrimination charge with the EEOC on August 4, 2023. ECF No. 25-3 at 22. Shedid not indicate in her charge that her discrimination was a continuing action. Id. She has not exhaustedher administrative remedies with respect to this claim, as the circumstances of her termination—what sheclaimed were “medical reasons,” ECF No. 25-4 at 6—are not “like or reasonably related” to the allegationsin the EEOC charge. Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442 F.3d 661, 672 (8th Cir. 2006); see ECF No. 25-3at 22 (“[Graco] forced me to work at a different location (over 30 minutes away) and cut my hours to allowme to receive the accommodations I needed.... [Graco] has also been trying to force me to sign documentsthat affect my leave.”).10Ms. Madigan's counsel did not appear for the scheduled summary-judgment hearing. Around the time thehearing was to begin, the Court telephoned counsel. He apologized for his absence, explaining he hadcalendared the hearing incorrectly. The hearing was canceled, and the motion decided on the papers.11For example, counsel's claim that the fake cases were minimally relevant is not reasonable. They arethe only two cases counsel cited to oppose summary judgment on Ms. Madigan's MPLA and pregnancyaccommodations claims. ECF No. 30 at 11–13.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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