Nelson v. Derry (Apr. 15, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
In the Marriage of: Sarah Lynn Nelson v. Abel Aaron Nelson
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Minnesota (MN)
Court
Minnesota Supreme Court
Decided
Apr. 15, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
In the Marriage of: Sarah Lynn Nelson, n/k/a Sarah Lynn..., Not Reported in N.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1065922Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTICE: THIS DECISION IS NONPRECEDENTIALEXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY MINN. R. CIV. APP.P. 136.01(1)(C) AND MINN. ST. SEC. 480A.08(3).Court of Appeals of Minnesota.In the Marriage of: Sarah Lynn Nelson, n/k/a Sarah Lynn Derry, petitioner, Respondent,v.Abel Aaron Nelson, Appellant,Ramsey County, Intervenor.A25-0827|Dated: April 15, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-FA-21-428Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson,Judge; and Kirk, Judge.∗ORDER OPINIONJudge Elise L. Larson*1 BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, ANDPROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:1. Self-represented appellant Abel Aaron Nelson (husband)and respondent Sarah Lynn Derry (wife) married in 2015.In March 2021, wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage.In July 2023, a referee presided over the trial and issuedrecommended findings of fact, conclusions of law, andorder for judgment. The district court adopted the referee'srecommendation on November 14, 2023, and entered ajudgment and decree (initial J&D). As relevant here, thedistrict court amended the initial J&D in May 2024 (amendedJ&D), maintaining language regarding husband's Legacy Inc.401(k) retirement plan (the plan) and ordering the parties toprepare a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).12. In March 2025, wife filed a motion to compel husband tosign a QDRO, attaching a proposed QDRO to the motion. Theproposed QDRO included language from the amended J&D,but added administrative directives, a waiver of the right tocounsel, and a statement that husband freely and voluntarilysigned the document. At an April 2025 hearing, the districtcourt ordered husband to sign the proposed QDRO. Thedistrict court suggested that the parties execute the proposedQDRO in an adjacent room. Husband then told the districtcourt that, given his pending appeals, ordering him to sign“anything giving away [his] rights” would be a signature“under duress.” The district court replied, “Well, you're doingit pursuant to a court order.” Outside the district court'spresence, husband signed the QDRO and wrote “signedunder protest remains subject to further appeal” next tohis signatures. Wife suggested the parties discuss husband'sconcerns with the district court, but husband did not return tothe courtroom after he left to “get a drink of water.” The nextday, the district court filed the signed QDRO at wife's request.3. Husband appeals, challenging the district court's decisionto file the signed QDRO, raising four arguments.2 We addresseach in turn.4. First, husband asserts the district court lacked authority tofile the signed QDRO because the referee who presided overthe July 2023 trial lived in Wisconsin. But we resolved thisquestion in husband's two earlier appeals. In re Nelson, No.A24-1582 (Minn. App. Oct. 15, 2024) (order op.) (rejectinghusband's argument that the referee did not satisfy residencyrequirements); Nelson v. Nelson, No. A24-1135, 2025 WL1498063, at *8 n.3 (Minn. App. May 27, 2025) (denyinghusband's motion to take judicial notice that prior districtcourt orders were void, in part, because he raised a similarargument regarding the referee's residency in his petitionfor writ of mandamus and “[p]etitions for rehearing are notallowed in the court of appeals”). Husband appears to, again,seek rehearing on an issue previously decided, and petitionsfor rehearing are not allowed in this court. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 140.01.*2 5. Second, husband argues the district court lackedauthority to file the signed QDRO on the basis that adistrict court “may not modify a final property division.”
In the Marriage of: Sarah Lynn Nelson, n/k/a Sarah Lynn..., Not Reported in N.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2See Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App.2011) (quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 594 N.W.2d 272, 275(Minn. App. 1999)).3 We review this issue for an abuseof discretion. See Johnson v. Johnson, 902 N.W.2d 79, 84(Minn. App. 2017). “A district court abuses its discretion bymaking findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is againstlogic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Whilea district court cannot modify a final property division, adistrict court “may issue orders to implement, enforce, orclarify the provisions of a decree, so long as it does not changethe parties’ substantive rights.” See Nelson, 806 N.W.2d at871 (quoting Redmond, 594 N.W.2d at 275). Here, the newprovisions in the signed QDRO did not alter the division of themarital property at issue—the plan. In fact, husband concedesthat the signed QDRO “track[ed] the division” of the plan.Instead, the new provisions involved enforcement of the finalproperty division. Accordingly, because the QDRO addedenforcement provisions and, therefore, was supplemental tothe amended J&D, we conclude the district court did not abuseits discretion.6. Third, husband argues the district court violated his rightto substantive due process because the district court coercedhim into signing the “waiver of right to counsel” provision inthe signed QDRO. We review this issue de novo. See In reBrown, 28 N.W.3d 486, 500 (Minn. App. 2025). We concludethat husband voluntarily and intelligently waived his right tocounsel. See In re Welfare of G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d 718, 723(Minn. 2000) (holding, in family law context, determinationof whether waiver of counsel is voluntary and intelligentcan be based on surrounding circumstances of the case).The record demonstrates that husband is well acquaintedwith both district court and appellate judicial proceedings.The record also shows that husband acknowledged thathe was waiving his right to counsel on the record, and—after being offered the opportunity to discuss any remainingconcerns with the district court—he fled the courthouse.Under these circumstances, we conclude husband voluntarilyand intelligently waived his right to counsel.7. Fourth, husband argues the district court violated hisright to procedural due process when it filed the QDRO theday after the hearing. We review this issue de novo. SeeSawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn.2012). “We conduct a two-step analysis to determine whetherthe government has violated an individual's procedural dueprocess rights.” Id. “First, we must identify whether thegovernment has deprived the individual of a protectedlife, liberty, or property interest.” Id. The second step“requires us to determine whether the procedures followedby the government were constitutionally sufficient.” Id.(quotation omitted). Constitutionally sufficient proceduresinclude “notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. (quotationomitted). To decide whether a procedure meets this standard,we typically apply the factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424U.S. 319 (1976).4 See id. But husband does not analyze theMathews factors or offer any other authority to support hisclaim that the district court did not provide him an opportunityto be heard.5 Instead, the record demonstrates that wifegave husband two weeks’ notice of the “waiver of counsel”provision in the proposed QDRO, and the district court helda full hearing to determine whether to compel husband tosign the proposed QDRO.6 The record demonstrates thathusband had notice of the terms in the proposed QDRO andhad an opportunity to be heard at the associated hearing. We,therefore, conclude husband was not denied procedural dueprocess.*3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:1. The district court's order is affirmed.2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), thisorder opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case,res judicata, or collateral estoppel.BY THE COURTAll CitationsNot Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2026 WL 1065922Footnotes#Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
In the Marriage of: Sarah Lynn Nelson, n/k/a Sarah Lynn..., Not Reported in N.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.31A QDRO is a domestic relations order that requires a portion of a retirement plan to be assigned or paid to anotherperson, such as a former spouse. See Langston v. Wilson McShane Corp., 828 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Minn. 2013) (citing29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (2006)).2Husband has two other cases pending before our court, Nos. A26-0092 and A26-0264.3Husband also cites “DeMars v. DeMars, 590 N.W.2d 116, 120-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).” We have been unable to locatethis case. Cf. Willis v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as Tr., Igloo Series Tr., 783 F. Supp. 3d 959, 960 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (“Itis no secret that generative [artificial intelligence (AI)] programs are known to ‘hallucinate’ nonexistent cases, and withthe advent of AI, courts have seen a rash of cases in which both counsel and pro se litigants have cited such fake,hallucinated cases in their briefs.” (quoting Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 168-69 (2025))).4The Mathews factors require us to consider:First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of suchinterest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens thatthe additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.424 U.S. at 335.5Citing Ertl v. Ertl, 871 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. App. 2015), husband asserts that the added provisions to the signed QDROviolated his right to procedural due process when he did not have an opportunity to contest the new terms. We are notpersuaded. Unlike Ertl—where the district court sua sponte modified substantive terms—wife filed a motion attachingthe proposed QDRO two weeks prior to the hearing and, as explained above, the proposed QDRO did not amend anysubstantive terms.6Husband makes various arguments that wife's motion did not comply with the Minnesota General Rules of Practice. Butthe district court has discretion regarding whether and to what extent to enforce such rules, see Hopkins by LaFontainev. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn. App. 1991), and we must ignore errors that are harmlessor de minimis, see Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts to ignore harmless error); Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 105(Minn. App. 2009) (noting that appellate courts ignore prejudicial error when prejudice is de minimis). Even if wife hadnot strictly complied with the Minnesota General Rules of Practice, we discern no abuse of discretion and conclude thatany error is harmless.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access