Ramos v. Ramos (Jan. 7, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
In re the Custody of: Clotine Rae RAMOS v. Miracle Rose RAMOS
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Minnesota (MN)
Court
Minnesota Supreme Court
Decided
Jan. 7, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Ramos v. Ramos, Not Reported in N.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 81956Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTICE: THIS DECISION IS NONPRECEDENTIALEXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY MINN. R. CIV. APP.P. 136.01(1)(C) AND MINN. ST. SEC. 480A.08(3).Court of Appeals of Minnesota.In re the Custody of: Clotine RaeRAMOS, petitioner, Respondent,v.Miracle Rose RAMOS, Respondent Below,Mark Jones, Appellant.A25-0150|Filed January 7, 2026Hennepin County District Court, File No. 27-FA-24-2632Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Connolly,Judge; and Larson, Judge.ORDER OPINION*1 BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, ANDPROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:1. Self-represented appellant Mark Jones (father) appeals adistrict court decision to grant sole legal and sole physicalcustody of his child to respondent Clotine Rae Ramos(grandmother) as a third-party de facto custodian.2. Child was born in Minnesota in June 2020 to father andMiracle Rose Ramos (mother). Later in the year, father,mother, and child moved to Georgia. In 2023, mother askedgrandmother to care for child, so grandmother flew to Georgiaand brought child back to Minnesota. Child has resided withgrandmother, in Minnesota, since that time.3. In April 2024, grandmother petitioned for third-partycustody of child as a de facto guardian, pursuant to Minn. Stat.§ 257C.03 (2022). Grandmother also requested an ex parteorder regarding custody and an accelerated hearing.4. A few days later, the district court filed the ex parte ordergranting temporary sole legal and temporary sole physicalcustody of child to grandmother. Additionally, the districtcourt issued an order for service by alternate means, andfather was served with notice in early July. After being served,father filed a document he captioned as “High PrerogativeWrit of Quo Warranto,” requested an in-person hearing, andsubmitted documents he referred to as “trust documents.”5. The district court held a remote hearing in July 2024.There, father and another individual repeatedly interruptedthe proceeding, claiming the district court lacked personaland subject-matter jurisdiction. After numerous warnings,the district court terminated the proceeding. Thereafter, thedistrict court issued an order for temporary custody whereingrandmother retained temporary sole legal and temporarysole physical custody of child (temporary order). The districtcourt found that grandmother had “demonstrated a basis forproceeding ... as a de facto custodian entitled to pursuepermanent custody of the minor child.”6. In November 2024, the district court held a remoteevidentiary hearing. Both grandmother and mother testified.Again, father and another individual repeatedly interruptedthe proceeding. But the district court exercised great patiencein its attempts to direct father to ask substantive questions andallow father to articulate his point of view. Father asked afew substantive questions but elected not to testify. Followingthe evidentiary hearing, in December 2024, the district courtgranted the petition and awarded grandmother sole legal andsole physical custody of child (final order).7. Father appeals and raises several arguments which weaddress in turn below.18. Father first asserts that the district court lacked personaljurisdiction. “We review whether personal jurisdiction existsde novo.” Gopher Mats, LLC v. Kalesnikoff Lumber Co.,Ltd., 16 N.W.3d 807, 818 (Minn. App. 2025), rev. denied(Minn. May 13, 2025). Personal jurisdiction refers to thedistrict court's “ability to exercise control over the parties tolitigation.” Id. The requirement flows from the Due ProcessClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ins. Corp. of Ir.,Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,702 (1982). Here, father's assertion that the district courtlacked jurisdiction is primarily based upon the document hecaptioned “High Prerogative Writ of Quo Warranto.” But thisdocument is based upon “the sovereign-citizen jurisdictionaldefense [that] has ‘no conceivable validity in American
Ramos v. Ramos, Not Reported in N.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2law.’ ” State v. Winbush, 912 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Minn. App.2018) (quoting United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569,1570 (7th Cir. 1990)), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2018).Father further contends that the district court lacked personaljurisdiction due to insufficient service of process under Minn.R. Civ. P. 4.03. But the record demonstrates the districtcourt applied Minn. Stat. § 518.11 (2024), which allows foralternative service of process. And father makes no argumentand cites to no authority to support the contention that section518.11 is unconstitutional. See Scheffler, 890 N.W.2d at 451.Nor does father assert that the procedural requirements insection 518.11 were not followed. Therefore, we concludefather failed to show that the district court lacked personaljurisdiction over him in this case.*2 9. Father argues second that the district court violatedhis right to procedural due process. See U.S. Const. amend.XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. We review this issue denovo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn.2012). “We conduct a two-step analysis to determine whetherthe government has violated an individual's procedural dueprocess rights.” Id. First, we identify whether father wasdeprived of a “protected life, liberty, or property interest.” Id.Because father has a protected liberty interest in “the care,custody, and control of his ... children,” see Rew v. Bergstrom,845 N.W.2d 764, 785 (Minn. 2014), we move to the secondstep. Under the second step, we must determine whetherconstitutionally sufficient procedures were employed. Sawh,823 N.W.2d at 632. Constitutionally sufficient proceduresinclude notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. Todecide whether a procedure meets this standard, we wouldtypically apply the factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424U.S. 319 (1976).2 But father does not analyze the Mathewsfactors. Instead, he perfunctorily argues that he was deniedthe opportunity to be heard because the district court helda remote hearing. But remote hearings satisfy proceduraldue process.3 See, e.g., In re HGB, 306 N.W.2d 821, 822(Minn. 1981) (“Due process of law does not compel thephysical attendance of a parent at a termination of parentalrights proceeding.”) (syllabus); In re Child. of K.H., No.A20-1386, 2021 WL 1605147, *5-6 (Minn. App. Apr. 26,2021) (applying HGB to conclude district court did not violatefather's procedural due-process rights when it conductedremote proceeding).4 Father also asserts, citing no authority,that he was denied procedural due process because the districtcourt muted him during the proceeding. See Scheffler, 890N.W.2d at 451. But it is well established that the district courthas the “authority to enforce the Rules of Civil Procedureand to maintain order and decorum in the operation of thecourt system.” See In re Burns, 542 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn.1996). And, upon our inspection, the district court exercisedpatience and restraint in its use of mute as a tool to controlthe proceedings. Therefore, we do not observe any obviousprejudicial error in the procedure the district court employed.10. Father argues third that the district court's decision to grantthe petition violated his right to substantive due process. Wereview this issue de novo. SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d815, 821 (Minn. 2007). The Fourteenth Amendment affords“heightened protection against government interference withcertain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). “A parent's right tomake decisions concerning the care, custody, and control ofhis or her children is a protected fundamental right.” SooHoo,731 N.W.2d at 820. Here, father challenges the district court'sdecision to grant the petition on the basis that the districtcourt failed to apply the common-law standard from Troxel v.Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). But we recently determined ina persuasive, nonprecedential decision that once the districtcourt determined grandmother was “the de facto custodian ofthe child,” chapter 257C precluded the district court “fromgiving father custody preference based upon his status as abiological parent.” In re Custody of K.K.N., No. A23-1314,2024 WL 3024921, at *8 (Minn. App. June 17, 2024).“Instead, the best-interests-of-the-child analysis ... applied toaward custody between [the] biological parent and [the] thirdparty.” Id. We concluded that this framework appropriatelyincorporated the presumption set forth in Troxel. Id. And wereach the same decision in this case.5*3 11. Father asserts fourth that the district court lackedsubject-matter jurisdiction. We review this issue de novo. In reWelfare of Child. of D.M.T.-R., 802 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Minn.App. 2011). Subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the authorityof a court “to hear and determine a particular class of actions”and “the particular questions” the court can decide. Irwin v.Goodno, 686 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Minn. App. 2004). To supportthis argument, father relies on cases that we are unable tolocate.6 As such, father has failed to support this argumentwith any authority, and we conclude that it is forfeited. SeeScheffler, 890 N.W.2d at 451. Further, upon our inspection, itappears the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction overthis proceeding under chapter 257C.12. Father's fifth argument is that the district court abused itsdiscretion when it granted grandmother's petition for third-party custody. “Appellate review of custody determinations islimited to whether the [district] court abused its discretion.”
Ramos v. Ramos, Not Reported in N.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). Adistrict court abuses its discretion when it makes findings thatare unsupported by the evidence, misapplies the law, or issuesa decision that is against the logic and the facts in the record.Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). Wedo not set aside a district court's factual findings unless theyare clearly erroneous. In re Custody of A.L.R., 830 N.W.2d163, 166 (Minn. App. 2013). When reviewing factual findingsfor clear error, we defer to the district court's credibilitydeterminations and will not “reweigh the evidence,” “engagein fact-finding anew,” or “reconcile conflicting evidence.” Inre Civil Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-23(Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted). Father asserts the districtcourt clearly erred when it granted the petition becausegrandmother obtained possession of child by “kidnapping.”But the district court's finding that grandmother was caringfor the child at mother's request is well supported by therecord and, therefore, not clearly erroneous. See id. at 221-23.Father also contends, citing In re Custody of N.A.K., 649N.W.2d 166, 172 (Minn. 2002), that the district court abusedits discretion when it granted grandmother third-party custodybecause grandmother needed to “prove that parental custodywould be detrimental to the child's best interest.” But, aswe stated in K.K.N., the N.A.K. decision addressed thecommon-law presumption. 2024 WL 3024921, at *8. Andfollowing that decision, the legislature adopted chapter 257Cin a manner that incorporated the common-law presumption.See id. (citing A.L.R., 830 N.W.2d at 167-69). Here, thedistrict court followed the procedure in chapter 257C, andafter determining grandmother was the de facto guardian,the statute precluded the district court “from giving fathercustody preference based on his status as a biological parent.”Id. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse itsdiscretion when it granted grandmother's petition.13. Finally, father asserts he is entitled to a new hearingbecause the district court judge was biased. See Minn. CodeJud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A). We review whether a judge wasdisqualified from presiding over a case de novo. In re Jacobs,802 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 2011). We presume that a judgeproperly discharged their duties. Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Father contends the district courtjudge was biased because the judge asked questions duringthe hearing. But it is well within the district court's discretionto question witnesses. See Sheeran v. Sheeran, 401 N.W.2d111, 115 (Minn. App. 1987). Father also submits that thedistrict court judge was required to recuse because father fileda lawsuit against the judge based on decisions made in thiscase. But “[t]he mere fact that a party declares a judge partialdoes not in itself generate a reasonable question as to thejudge's impartiality.” State v. Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596, 601-02(Minn. 2008).7 And “a judge who feels able to preside fairlyover the proceedings should not be required to step downupon allegations of a party which themselves may be unfairor which simply indicate dissatisfaction with the possibleoutcome of the litigation.” McClelland v. McClelland, 359N.W.2d 7, 11 (Minn. 1984). Under these circumstances andconsidering these authorities, we conclude the district courtjudge did not exhibit bias.*4 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:1. The district court's order is affirmed.2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), thisorder opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case,res judicata, or collateral estoppel.All CitationsNot Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2026 WL 81956Footnotes1Several claims father raised in this appeal are not addressed in this opinion because they were not raised in district courtor were not supported by legal arguments or citations to legal authority. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.1988); Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017).2The Mathews factors require us to consider:[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of suchinterest through the procedures used, and the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens thatthe additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Ramos v. Ramos, Not Reported in N.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4424 U.S. at 335.3The district court also denied father's request for an in-person hearing because he did not comply with the requirementsin Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303. This basis is also well supported by the record.4This opinion is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite nonprecedential opinions only as persuasive authority.See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).5Father raises an alternative substantive-due-process argument regarding the district court's reliance on Ramsey Countyv. X.L., 853 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. App. 2014) in its temporary order. He specifically challenges the district court's statementthat “[t]he birth certificate alone is not enough to establish a legal father.” But during the evidentiary hearing and in the finalorder the district court plainly treated father as child's biological parent. The district court simply determined based uponthe record that the best interests of child outweighed his rights as child's biological parent. See Slaughter v. Black, No.A14-0348, 2014 WL 6863207, *3-4 (Minn. App. Dec. 8, 2014) (affirming determination that it was in best interests of childto award custody to third-party de facto custodian over biological father's objections). Therefore, we are not persuadedthat the district court did not treat father as a biological parent when reaching its final decision to grant grandmother'spetition.6“It is no secret that generative [artificial intelligence (AI)] programs are known to ‘hallucinate’ nonexistent cases, andwith the advent of AI, courts have seen a rash of cases in which both counsel and pro se litigants have cited such fake,hallucinated cases in their briefs.” Willis v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as Tr., Igloo Series Tr., 783 F. Supp. 3d 959, 960 (N.D.Tex. 2025) (quoting Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 168-69 (2025)).7Father also suggests the district court judge's bias was evident because the transcripts were altered and there are recorddiscrepancies. But under Minn. R. Civ. App. P 110.05, issues regarding the accuracy of record must “be submitted to anddetermined by the [district] court.” There is no evidence father did so and, accordingly, we assume the record submittedto our court is accurate. See Doty v. Doty, 533 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating that we do not determine whetherexisting record “truly discloses what occurred in the trial court”).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access