Respondent employed Mark Hall (who was a party defendant against which Appellants claim was dismissed before submission of the case to the jury) to clean the garage of all the property that is the subject of this suit. Mark Hall testified that he moved property out of the garage at the request of Respondent. Hall testified that he did not see all of the items Appellants claimed removed, but that he did carry away three pick-up loads of property to the dump while keeping some items for his own use.
Appellants went to the foreclosed home on June 28, 1981, and determined that their property had been taken from the garage. Appellants called the Sheriff’s office first, and then on the 29th of June, were in contact with Respondent’s agent about the removal of their property. Mark Hall returned the items he had retained to Appellants on August 15, 1981.
In their point on appeal appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction:
“Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe either:
First, plaintiffs abandoned the personal property referred to in evidence, or
Second, the conduct of plaintiffs implied their permission for defendant to take the property referred to in evidence.”
Appellants contend that the portion starting with “Second” is erroneous because it did not require a finding that plaintiffs had knowledge that their property was subject to being removed and discarded by respondent. Appellants’ brief cites only Kegan v. Park Bank, 320 Mo. 623, 8 S.W.2d 858 (1927), modified on rehearing 320 Mo. 623 at 654, 15 S.W.2d 333 (1928). They refer us to the court’s discussion in 8 S.W.2d at 871, placed under headnotes 16 and 17.
We do not believe it aids appellants. The removal there would not have been anticipated and consent to it could not reasonably have been implied without knowledge that it might occur. A bank taking over one’s property, earlier improperly taken from the owner’s box in the bank, would not be contemplated without the owner’s knowledge and consent. Here, appellants would know that if they did not remove their personal property from the house, respondent would likely move it or dispose of it in some manner.
Conversion is the unauthorized assumption of the right of ownership over the personal property of another to the exclusion of the owner’s rights. Kegan, supra, 8 S.W.2d at 871; Houston v. Columbia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 569 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Mo.App.1978); Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Mo.App.1977); Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo.App.1974). See also Annot., Duty and liability of one in possession of real property in respect of personal property which he finds thereon belonging to another. 131 A.L.R. 165 (1941).
Obviously, if the owner consents, there is no unauthorized taking. That consent can either be express or implied. Graves v. Stewart, 642 S.W.2d 649, 650-651 (Mo. banc 1982); Kegan, supra, 8 S.W.2d at 871; Wirth, supra, 508 S.W.2d at 267; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Conversion, § 72, p. 202; 89 C.J.S. Trover & Conversion, § 5, p. 535.
“Implied” means necessary deduction from the circumstances, general language or conduct of the parties. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 492 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo.App.1973). “Implied consent” is that manifested by signs, actions or facts, or by inaction or silence which creates an inference that consent has been given. State v. Stanfield, 1 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Mo. 1927).
If appellants’ conduct implied permission for respondent to take their property, it does not matter what appellants’ actual knowledge may have been. This is similar to apparent mutual assent required to have a contract. That assent is not determined by the state of mind, but by the conduct of the parties and the language employed by them, judged by a reasonable standard. Roper v. Clanton, 258 S.W.2d